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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines changes in Hispano and Pueblo Indian land tenure in
the Tewa Basin of north central New Mexico across three centuries. Land grants
imposed upon the Pueblo world in the Spanish colonial period limited the shrinking
Pueblo population. They paradoxically protected Pueblo land from further incursions
through the Mexican era. By the American territorial period, Pueblo and Hispano land
grants were exposed to similar legal, political, and economic processes that dispossessed
both communities of their commonly held lands. When New Mexico became a state in
1912, the federal government intervened after decades of reneging on its duty to protect
Pueblo lands. The result was the Pueblo Lands Board, which examined non-Indian
claims to lands within the exterior boundaries of Pueblo land grants. New Deal programs
followed the proceedings of the board, and addressed both Pueblo and Hispano land
tenure by purchasing numerous Hispano community and quasi-community land grants
that had long since passed from communal ownership.
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Through an examination of intercultural relations and government relations, I
analyze how Indian Pueblos and Hispano villages that once shared a sense of common
destiny grew apart by the middle of the 20th century. This dissertation explores ethnic
politics in Hispanos struggle for culturally based land claims in New Mexico. It
examines the repression of Pueblo-Hispano hybridity by Pueblo rights advocates,
government bureaucrats, Indiophiles, Hispanophiles, and Hispano and Pueblo
communities themselves. It compares Hispano communities’ struggle for land and water
rights with comparable Pueblo Indians struggles. Despite similarities in how they
worked and bore claim to their land in the past, the divisive way that Hispano and Pueblo
communities relate to one and other and how they understand and articulate their claims
to land and water rights is indicative of growing fissures between the two communities.
Convoluting already complex relationships are changes in Hispano ethnic politics, where
celebrations of a Spanish colonial heritage have given way to a recognition and assertion
of indigenous origins, articulated notably in claims to land and water rights.
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Introduction
Vinieron los españoles
de la España a esta tierra
donde hallaron sus querencias,
hermosas indias morenas
jeya, jeya, jeya, ja.

The Spaniards came
from Spain to this land, where
they found their hearts desire,
beautiful dark Indian women,
heya, heya, heya, ha.

Aquellas indias hermosas
Virtuosas y llenas de gracia,
escogieron para esposas,
donde nació linda raza,
jeya, jeya, jeya, ja.

Those beautiful Indian women,
virtuous and full of grace,
were chosen as wives
and bore a new handsome race,
heya, heya, heya, ha.

Raza buena a amorosa,
color bronce de mestizo,
mezcla del indio del pueblo,
donde salió un genízaro
jeya, jeya, jeya, ja.

A good loving race,
bronze colored people,
mixture of the Pueblo Indian
from whence came the Genízaro,
heya, heya, heya, ha.

Verses from, Cleofes Jaramillo, Himno del Pueblo de las Montañas de la
Sangre de Cristo, San Cristóbal, New Mexico, 1988.1

Somos Indigena is a story about land and people. Set in the Tewa Basin of north
central New Mexico, this dissertation explores how land tenure united and divided
Pueblo and Hispano people across three centuries. Studying land grants in New Mexico
is, for some, an archaic practice of an archane history analogous to genealogy. This study
argues that within this old story of land grants lies a new or at least less-familiar story of
conflict and compromise, a tensely negotiated coexistence that shaped both Hispano and
Pueblo communities. It questions the hard lines drawn and redrawn between two of New
Mexico’s indigenous populations, the Pueblos who have called the Tewa Basin home for

1

Enrique R. Lamadrid, Hermanitos Comanchitos: Indo-Hispano Rituals of Captivity and
Redemption (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003), 188-189. See also,
Cleofes Jaramillo, "Himno del Pueblo de las Montañas de la Sangre de Cristo," in Music
of New Mexico: Hispanic Traditions, © 1992 by Smithsonian Folkways Recordings,
SFW40409_121, compact disc.
1

nearly a millennia and the nuevomexicanos who have for centuries reinvented it as their
patria chica, their nacioncita de Sangre de Cristo (Little Nation of Sangre de Cristo).2
This dissertation reads Pueblo and Hispano land tenure together. While other
works have compared the histories of Pueblo and Hispano land tenure, they have done so
by emphasizing conflict and subsequently ignored parallels that complicate simple
portrayals of Pueblos and Hispanos as disparate people. By focusing on the land tenure
history of the Tewa Basin (Figure 1, roughly a diamond shaped area bordered by Taos in
the north, Santa Fe in the South, the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in the east and the
Jemez Mountains in the west), this work offers a retelling of Pueblo and Hispano history
that exposes how static ideas about race and ethnicity distort the complexity of PuebloHispano relations.
The Tewa Basin of north-central New Mexico offers an ideal setting to examine
the Pueblo-Hispano changing relationship. The Tewa Basin is culturally defined by the
six remaining Tewa-speaking Pueblos: Ohkay Owingeh (San Juan), Santa Clara, San
Ildefonso, Pojoaque, Nambé and Tesuque. The region also includes the Tiwa-speaking
Pueblo of Picurís, which maintained significant cultural ties with San Juan before and
after the Spanish incursion. Geographically, the Tewa Basin is roughly bounded by
Santa Fe to the south and Taos to its north; it lies between the Sangre de Cristo
Mountains to the east and the Jemez Mountains to the west.3 National forests, the Santa
Fe and the Carson, flank the basin on the east, west, north and south.

2

San Cristóbal folklorist Cleofes Jaramillo coined the term to describe the villages of
Sangre de Cristo. See “Himno a la Nacioncita de la Sangre de Cristo” in Lamadrid,
Hermanitos Comanchitos, 189.
3
A more detailed geographic description comes from the Soil Conservation Service,
which undertook a massive reconnaissance survey, called the Tewa Basin Study in 1935:
2

Pueblo Indians and their ancestors had called the Tewa Basin home for over three
hundred years before Spaniards explored the area under Francisco Vasquez de Coronado
in 1540. Anthropologists have estimated that as many as twenty-thousand pre-Puebloan
people occupied more than seventy-five sites across the basin. Their population
plummeted, largely because of disease and drought, which coupled with abuse and
religious suppression by Spanish civil and ecclesiastic authorities, led to the Pueblo
Revolt of 1680. After the Reconquest, Pueblo-Hispano relations were renegotiated. An
essential part of this renegotiation was a post revolt land tenure system, centered around
mercedes (land grants) that both limited Pueblo Indians’ land base, but also protected it
from colonial encroachment.
Hispano settlers coveted Pueblo lands and regularly trespassed onto pueblo lands
throughout the Spanish and Mexican eras. Vecinos (subjects or citizens under the
Spanish crown), who were mix of Spanish, Mexican and detribalized and Hispanicized
Indians, gradually expanded their Tewa Basin settlements from settlements around Santa
Cruz de la Cañada. Pueblos responded to these encroachments through official protest.
“Lying immediately north of Santa Fe is a wide, somewhat V-shaped, natural basin
which is bounded roughly on the west by the Jemez mountains and on the east by the
Sangre de Cristo Mountains. This area is the Tewa Basin. The confluence of the Rio
Grande and the Rio Chama mark its appropriate center. For the purpose of this study the
eastern boundary was taken as the ridge of the Sangre de Cristo Range from its southern
tip east of Santa Fe north and east to the head waters of the Tres Ritos creek. The divide
north of Tres Ritos creek forms a section of the northern boundary. The remainder of
which coincides with the Rio Grande and Rio Chama above their confluence. On the
west the boundary runs from a point about ten miles west of Abiquiu south along the
ridge to Frijoles Canyon, where it joins the Rio Grande. The southern boundary running
east from Frijoles Canyon to the Sangre de Cristo Mountains is the only portion of the
boundary not following natural features.” U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil
Conservation Service, Region Eight. Inventory of Materials on the Río Grande
Watershed: An Evaluation of Surveys and Reports. By Hugh G. Calkins, Regional
Bulletin No. 34, Conservation Economics Series No. 2 (Albuquerque, New Mexico,
1937), 8.
3

Figure 1: Modern Tewa Basin Map, 2013: by Emanuel Storey, © Jacobo D. Baca
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They also procreated with vecinos, introducing new vulnerabilities when children of
these unions adopted Spanish conceptions of property and alienated Pueblo patrimony in
pre capitalist markets. When the pueblo population continued to drop in the eighteenth
century, some Indians independently sold their pueblo’s lands to Hispanos desperate to
possess their superior lands.
The Hispano population, meanwhile, grew slowly, expanding settlements from
the southern Tewa Basin to its northern and eastern limits. In the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth century, land grants were made to the colonial elite who participated in
the reconquest and requested the lands of abandoned pueblos or those adjacent to existing
ones. Other elite colonists received grants because they possessed the means to create
new settlements in often-dangerous areas that would both relieve densely populated core
settlements and protect them from raids by surrounding tribes. Enlightened Spanish
governors, such as Tomás Vélez de Cachupín, and other colonial officials both protected
Pueblo lands and guided settlements away from existing Spanish and Pueblo grants to
avoid conflict and stabilize the struggling colony.
Despite laws and policies that promised to protect Pueblo lands, Hispano
encroachments were not uncommon. They increased in times of peace, when settlements
expanded as raids decreased and as the Hispano population of the colony boomed. When
sovereignty shifted from Spain to Mexico, a new era of speculation commenced.
Hispanos and Pueblos, united in 1837, much as they had to fight nomadic raids the
century before, to behead Governor Albino Pérez, who they believed threatened their
independence. A decade later, they united again to behead provisional civil Governor
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Charles Bent in Taos and rose in rebellion to fight the American occupying army in
battles at Mora and Embudo.
The sixty-two-year United States territorial era only brought more strife as the
Hispano population continued to infringe on pueblo lands. But the new American era
brought values that transformed the Pueblo world and Hispano homeland into a highly
prized commodity. Land grants, Hispano and Pueblo, attracted speculation, investment,
and development that tore communally held lands from villages. American laws upheld
the validity of speculators’ actions. And Pueblos and Hispanos entered statehood without
lands that long ago sustained their communities. The Pueblo Lands Board attempted to
sort out conflicting claims caused by decades of federal abrogation of its duties toward
the Pueblos. When these reforms failed to repatriate a significant amount of land back to
the Pueblos, progressive-reformer-turned-Indian commissioner John Collier used New
Deal projects to achieve land tenure reform in the Tewa Basin. As federal programs
dwindled in the late 1940s, Hispano and Pueblo villages continued to be overpopulated
yet decline, until the traditional agrarian economy was supplanted by federal laboratories
in Los Alamos, which has wrought untold ecological harm in the Tewa Basin’s native
communities.
Studying Pueblo or Hispano land tenure is by no means a novel exercise. This
dissertation, nonetheless, makes a contribution to the field of land grant studies by telling
together two stories that are generally separated in the work of scholars and the legal
actions of local, state and the federal government. Scholars have focused on the
adversarial Hispano-Pueblo ownership of land, painting a picture of two distinct peoples
whose only interaction was conflictual. The appropriation of Pueblo lands by Hispanos

6

was often forced and unilateral, but the unyielding focus on that narrative has obscured
larger stories that offer a more-nuanced understanding of Pueblo-Hispano land tenure and
interethnic relations. These histories range from considerable evidence of inter-marriage
to commercial relations, through which land was traded on an evolving barter market. In
doing so, scholars have missed the similarities or shared experiences that connected
Pueblo and Hispano land tenure. Examining these tenures together in the Tewa Basin
demonstrates that both communities were subject to similar legal, economic and political
processes that dispossessed communal societies of the land and water resources on which
they historically and mutually depended.
This dissertation has other goals as well. It seeks to demystify and question the
primordialist rhetoric of Collier and other Progressive Era Indian allies and the
celebratory colonial rhetoric of elite Hispanos and Hispanophiles alike. This work also
explores the complexity of race in the Pueblo Lands Board era. Spanish and Mexican
settlers were not the saviors of the Pueblos as Hispanophiles would argue. Nor were they
categorically the Pueblos’ enemies, as the more radical Pueblo advocates posited. A
more accurate and nuanced interpretation lies somewhere between the two extremes. In
fact, intercultural relationships discouraged in the Spanish colonial era were exploited in
the Mexican era and often normalized by the American territorial period.
Like their Spanish-colonial forbears, Hispanos in the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth century took part in the dispossession of Pueblo communities and put formerly
communal land on a market of mixed private and communal ownership. They acted as
they had been acted upon; the displaced communities adjacent to their own former
communal lands, from which they had been displaced. Some of those Hispanos had
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considerable wealth, grazed herds of cattle, and relied on Pueblo lands to expand their
herds. They accumulated dozens, sometimes even hundreds of acres by coercing Pueblo
leaders to grant boundless leases or even to make outright sales of land. More often, the
most destitute Hispanos took advantage of the equally desperate Indian Pueblos and
bought lands from Pueblo leaders who saw their communities shrinking and who
believed that their communities were on a path to extinction.
The ramifications of Spanish land grants to the Pueblos are particularly vexing.
They both limited and protected the land rights of Pueblo Indians, reducing their
traditional lands to a four-square-league tract that was constantly violated in the Spanish
and Mexican periods. Those same grants also ensured that Pueblos would not be
resettled into one large Pueblo reservation during the American territorial era. This
temporary protection was quickly exploited in the American territorial period, when a
U.S. Supreme Court decision, U.S. v. Joseph (1876), removed already inadequate federal
protections by claiming the Pueblos were not by culture, habits, or practices, actually
Indian.
This dissertation reads native New Mexican and New Mexico native (indigenous)
land tenure together. To tell this story, it engages traditional resources in a different way.
Early chapters rely largely on secondary source materials. The historiography of New
Mexico and the Greater Southwest is dominated by the Spanish-colonial era and the vast
sources created by colonial-era scholars provide ample material on which this dissertation
draws. Later chapters examine previously neglected primary sources through new
perspectives, reading documents against the grain to discover connections between the
stories of Pueblo and Hispano land tenure.

8

One of the chief contributions of this dissertation is a new interpretation of the
significance of the Pueblo Lands Board. Both historian Lawrence C. Kelly and attorney
G. Emlen Hall have written on the Pueblo Lands Board. Kelly’s lengthy report for the
Office of the State Engineer4 discusses the institutional history of the board from the
passage of the Pueblo Lands Act through the waning days of the Board. This essential
work provides a chronology and discusses the Board’s impact on land and water rights,
especially among Southern Tewa Pueblos fighting for water rights decades before the
infamous State of New Mexico v. Aamodt case. Kelly privileges the perspectives of board
members and Pueblo advocates, who corresponded heavily about its operations and
decisions. This sole focus on the Board leaves little room for discussion of the actual
impact of its decisions on Pueblo and Hispano communities. In fact, Hispano and Pueblo
perspectives are concealed in a narrative that rarely discusses the native communities’
opinions. Kelly’s 1983 article “John Collier and the Pueblo Lands Board Act”5 and his
Collier biography6 follow a similar vein, discussing Collier’s impact on the legislation
without discussing the communities that were ultimately subjected to its decisions.
Hall’s work situates the Board in the larger story of Pueblo Indian land tenure.7
Hall discusses the impact of Spanish-colonial, Mexican-republican and American-

4

Lawrence C. Kelly, “History of the Pueblo Lands Board, 1924-1933” (Santa Fe: Office
of the State Engineer, 1980). L. G. Moses’ forthcoming book will offer Pueblo
perspectives on the Pueblo Lands Board processes.
5
Lawrence C. Kelly, “John Collier and the Pueblo Lands Board Act,” New Mexico
Historical Review, 58:1 (1983): 5-34.
6
Lawrence C. Kelly, The Assault on Assimilation: John Collier and the Origins of Indian
Policy Reform (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983).
7
G. Emlen Hall, “The Pueblo Land Grant Labyrinth” in Land, Water, and Culture: New
Perspectives on Hispanic Land Grants. ed. Charles L. Briggs and John R. Van Ness
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987), 67-140; G. Emlen Hall, Four
9

territorial governance over Pueblo Affairs. His portrayal of the Pueblo Lands Board
describes it as a noteworthy attempt by the federal government to “untie the knot” of
Pueblo Indian land tenure. Hall interprets the frustrating inconsistencies of land tenure
with wit and style. Like Kelly, his work nonetheless submerges the perspectives of
Pueblo Indians and their Hispano counterparts beneath the opinions and statements of the
lawyers, who often did not have the best interest of their clients in mind. Focusing on
Board hearings and decisions at Tesuque, Nambé, Pojoaque, Picurís, San Juan (Ohkay
Owingeh), Santa Clara, and San Ildefonso, I delve into the unique story of non-Indian
claims at each Pueblo. What emerges is a more complex nuanced portrayal of the Indian
and Hispano relations at each pueblo. In particular, previous scholars’ generalizations
break down under the examination of just how Hispanos appropriated lands at each
Pueblo. The process was not always brazen trespass or outright theft.
Malcolm Ebright, more than any other scholar, has influenced the historical and
legal study of land grants in New Mexico. Since his 1994 publication of Land Grants
and Lawsuits in Northern New Mexico, the attorney-turned-historian cast a powerful
influence on the study of land grants. Ebright is arguably the last active scholar in the
Center for Land Grant Studies collective which once included sociologist Clark
Knowlton and anthropologists John R. Van Ness and Charles Briggs. He participated in
the 1971 Land Title Study, commissioned by the New Mexico State Planning Office,

Leagues of Pecos: A Legal History of the Pecos Grant, 1800-1933 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1984).
10

contracted to the White, Koch, Kelley, McCarthy law firm, but inspired by land grant
leader Reies López Tijerina and the Alianza Federal de Mercedes’s radical activism.8
Ebright avoids portraying Hispanos as casualties of land speculation. Instead, he
examines differences in Anglo and Hispanic legal conceptions of property as the root of
dispossession. Ebright acknowledges that the “perception of injustice held by many land
grant heirs is largely justified,” but he subtlety argues for Hispano land rights by
demonstrating U.S. courts’ willful ignorance of Hispanic common law in their
implementation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo after the U.S.-Mexican War. Ebright
sees the U.S. state not as a malevolent sovereign bent on dispossession, but a nation
bound by legal and economic philosophies that abhorred “unproductive” uses of
resources. According to Ebright, the legal treatment of property in Spanish, Mexican,
and American courts derived from the difference of ways in which Hispanic law and
society favored the building of community and Anglo American law and society exalted
the individual. American land speculators exploited this political and business
environment and attempted to enrich themselves at the expense of communities.
Through meticulous and insightful readings of colonial and territorial documents, Ebright
enriches land grant history and seeks an understanding of the competing ideologies
behind land dispossession.9
Malcolm Ebright’s devotion to understanding the longue durée of land tenure in
New Mexico has cemented his influence and legacy in land grant studies. In his most
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recent works, with Rick Hendricks and Richard Hughes (Four Square Leagues, 2014)
and his own Advocates for the Oppressed: Hispanos, Indians, Genízaros, and Their Land
in New Mexico (2014), Ebright tells the story of Pueblo lands through vignettes about
individual Pueblos and general essays discussing the Pueblo league, the spurious Cruzate
grants, the American territorial period, and the Pueblo Lands Board. His Advocates for
the Oppressed: Hispanos, Indians, Genízaros, and Their Land in New Mexico (2014)
discusses Pueblo, Hispano and genízaro land tenure, largely through the governorship of
Tomás Vélez de Cachupín. Ebright argues that Vélez de Cachupín demonstrated
incredible vision in his administration of land tenure in colonial New Mexico. In this
work, Ebright makes his most explicit connections between Pueblo and Hispano land
tenure, but largely does so discussing the colonial era. Ebright certainly considers both
Pueblo Indians and Hispanos to be New Mexico’s native populations. He writes:
“Having written about Hispano land grants, and more recently about Pueblo Indian land
grants . . . I have attempted in this book to bring both narratives together, to reconnect
them, and in some cases to resurrect lost histories.”10
Over his nearly fifty-year career, lawyer and historian G. Emlen Hall has
unambiguously discusses connections between Pueblo and Hispano land tenure.11 In
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Herbert O. Brayer published Pueblo Indian Land Grants of the "Río Abajo," New Mexico,
in 1939 in the wake of the implementation of Pueblo Lands Act (1924). Benefitting from
the extensive historical and legal files created from decades of litigation, many of which
he organized as the head of the federal-records survey during the New Deal, Brayer’s
work rests firmly in the historical record and rarely ventures toward other sources or his
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writing about the legal history of the Pecos Pueblo land grant, Hall represents scholarship
detached from implicit land grant advocacy. In Four Leagues of Pecos: A Legal History
of the Pecos Grant, 1800-1933, Hall demonstrates how encroachment by Hispanos
beginning in the 1810s commodified Pecos Pueblo land and water resources, and
accelerated the decline of the pueblo, and forced its eventual abandonment.12 Hall’s case
study of Pecos Pueblo is by no means narrow. He looks at broader Pueblo litigation in
the Spanish, Mexican, and American periods, and brings in examples from other Pueblos
to his text. This method, however, is both a weakness and strength. Pecos offers an
interesting and tragic story, but is Pecos representative of the larger Pueblo experience or
an exceptional case of exploitation? Hall, nonetheless, reveals the complexity of the
larger Pueblo relationships to their neighbors and government entities in his
scholarship.13
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Together, Hall and Ebright represent the two legal minds most devoted to the
understanding of Pueblo and Hispano land tenure.14 Both have a commanding presence
in the field of land grant studies. Still, their depiction of Pueblo and Hispano land tenure,
grounded in legal theory, portrays Hispanos and Pueblos land tenure as inimical and
creates impressions that Pueblo and Hispano communities are equally drawn apart. In
this dualistic narrative that emphasizes the enduring effects of Spanish colonialism,
episodes of commerce become acts of thievery. This dualism has left little room for
stories of cooperation that has rendered a complex story simple and made a complex
story two-dimensional. I argue that law functions in a state of conflict. Plaintiffs file
protests. Protests result in injunctions. And injunctions face demurrers. This legal story
creates misconceptions of Pueblos and Hispanos social relationship. My work offers to
utilize extant legal sources to tell a different story about Pueblos, Hispanos and their land
in the Tewa Basin.
Though not trained as a lawyer, Victor P. Westphall authored works that are
principally legal and political histories of land grants during the territorial period. He
oscillates between supporting Hispano land rights and defending Anglo land speculators,
particularly Thomas B. Catron. Relying exclusively on territorial-era records,
Westphall’s histories lack almost any social or cultural component. That contextual
omission not only makes his work fairly one-dimensional, it also leads him to dubious
statements, such as cautioning Hispanos to remember that the Treaty of Guadalupe
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Hidalgo “did not attempt to safeguard social justice, cultural autonomy, or any form of
bilingualism for Mexicans.”15 Westphall’s works are less a history of land grants, land
laws and land tenure in eighteenth and early nineteenth century, as the title Mercedes
Reales (‘royal grants’) suggests, but more an examination of who controlled grants in the
nineteenth century. Perhaps this focus partly derives from his exclusive use of secondary
sources in discussions of the Spanish and Mexican periods.
Anthropologist John R. Van Ness was the first member of the land grant studies
collective to take Hispano’s relationship to land into account. Using what he called a
holistic anthropological approach, he examines the physiography, hydrology, soils,
climate, and flora and fauna of the Cañones microbasin, and uses it as a case study of the
agropasotral system found throughout northern New Mexico land grant communities.
Van Ness argues that previous scholars’ focus on ecological degradation through partible
inheritance has blinded them to the uniqueness of the subsistence agricultural society and
compelled them to blame poverty on cultural characteristics. Through the study of the
long-term settlement of the Abiquiú region, Van Ness shows cultural adaptations to
changing economies and growing populations. Farming, irrigation, stock raising, and
hunting, articulated either through direct cooperation or through trading, reaffirmed and
solidified community relationships. The ecological exploitation of land became severe
and widespread when the equilibrium that had created both the complex communitybased tenure system and localized subsistence economies was disrupted. Traditional
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communities were dislocated through the expropriation of land and natural resources and
through the replacement of barter societies with a monetized system of exchange, both of
which disrupted traditional communities.16
While Anglo land systems encouraged the exploitation of the environment by
individuals to achieve maximum profit without community restraints, the comparably
ecologically appropriate Hispanic land tenure system ensured careful usage for the
maintenance of the subsistence economy. For Cañones, the Forest Service acquisition of
ejidolands (common lands set aside for communal use in a land grant) restricted hunting,
grazing, and fuelwood and timber gathering, it restricted the community to the small
bottomland acreage of the microbasin, and forced their exclusive reliance on farming,
which never was sufficient to sustain the community. Van Ness argues that the land
grant system was not simply a product of a particular cultural and legal tradition
transferred mechanically from Ibero traditions. Instead, the land grant system, a mix of
private and communal property in cooperative grazing and irrigation, had an underlying
ecological rationale that was ideally suited to the limited agro pastoral possibilities of
semi-arid micro-basins of northern New Mexico. This system dictated collaboration,
minimized risks, and assured, at least, basic subsistence.17
William deBuys’s Enchantment and Exploitation: The Life and Hard Times of a
New Mexico Mountain Range also studies the ecology of Hispanos of northern New
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Mexico, but deBuys reaches less charitable conclusions than does Van Ness.
Enchantment and Exploitation is largely a legal and ecological history of Las Trampas
and the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, where lawyers, public officials and government
agencies struggled for land and the dispossession of Hispanos. DeBuys maintains that
fraud, chicanery, and unethical legal practices left a legacy of bitterness and divisiveness
among land grant residents, Pueblo Indians, and Anglos. He blames Congress for the
loss of land, citing its failure to implement the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and claiming
that land grants would have stayed intact under Mexico.18 Aside from an erroneous
reading of Mexican history,19 Enchantment and Exploitation is completely unconcerned
with ethno-historical analysis, offering almost no perspective of dispossessed Hispanos.
DeBuys’s Enchantment and Exploitation offers an optimistic interpretation of the
federal government’s relationship with Hispano communities. He claims that through the
U.S. Forest Service, the federal government gave unprecedented grazing rights to
Hispanos, despite their continual overuse of resources surrounding their communities.20
Many have lauded Enchantment and Exploitation as a definitive ecological history of the
Sangre de Cristo mountain range. Much of the praise goes to deBuys’s ability as a writer,
18
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who skillfully turns phrases, and offers wit and sharp analysis. Rather than following the
familiar victim/proletarian trope, deBuys echoes Hal Rothman’s argument that all
cultures that have inhabited the Sangre de Cristos have abused it to varying degrees. He
reveals that the number of grazing permits in the Carson National Forest surpasses those
of other national forests. Corporate and Anglo ranchers’ accumulation of permits was
possible only through Hispanos’ willingness to sell them. He defends the federal
government, vilified by so many as the perpetuator of injustice, as the inheritor of an
unjust situation. In doing so, however, he ignores federal policies that favored
commercial timber operators and judicial decisions (like U.S. v. Sandoval, 1897) that
directly dispossessed land grant communities of their commons. deBuys’s ability to tell a
story aside, he writes an environmental history in place of an ecological one, placing man
and nature in a dichotomous relationship and telling a story that emphasizes abuse and
ignores stewardship.21
While he endeavors to democratize his telling of ecological abuse and free it from
cultural essentialism and idealization, deBuys still writes in the spirit of Thoreau, Muir,
Gifford and Leopold, and of naturalism, conservation, and land ethics, all traits which he
believes Hispanos lack. He invokes querencia, Hispanos’ deep and abiding respect and
stewardship for place, not to express their sense of place but to describe mockingly
bovine querencia, the places where cows prefer to graze. deBuys has since been taken to
task by sociologist Devon Peña, who criticizes bioregionalists and environmental
historians for false dichotomies between man and nature, philosophical divisions that he
believes derive from the disconnect that Anglos feel from nature. Peña argues that
21
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despite centuries of sequential occupancy and sustenance of community and
environment, Hispanos still are not seen as part of the environment, while Indians are.
Although deBuys admonishes Hispanos for introducing foreign flora and fauna that
disturbed the ecological balance that Indians had achieved, Peña commends Hispanos for
increasing biodiversity of northern New Mexico by extending riparian zones with acequia
agriculture.22
The ideological rift between Peña and deBuys does not end there. Where deBuys
sees wilderness, Peña sees a homeland imbued with a sense of place. When deBuys
draws on Leopold’s ideas of land ethics, Peña cites Hispano philosopher Reyes Garcia’s
idea of homeland ethics, social practices guided by ecological sensibilities and notions of
vergüenza (shame).23 Understanding peoples’ emic notions of ecology will inform etic
ideas created by scholars, building respect and truly valuing their existence on and
creation of cultural landscapes. The late Estevan Arellano has employed the concept of
querencia, which he defines as “raza bioregionalism,” to describe the knowledge of and
obligation to land that Hispanos of the Río Arriba possess. Arellano condemns the effect
that Los Alamos National Laboratories has had on the local economy of northern New
Mexico, estranging people from their land and encouraging the abandonment of
traditional economies.24 When he discusses querencia, which he defines as the intimate
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connection to, knowledge of, and stewardship for land, Arellano does not engage in
abstract spirituality. He finds the roots of querencia codified in the Recopilacion de los
leyes de los reynos de las indias (Laws of the Indies), which demanded that settlers gain
personal knowledge of the land before settlement.25 He believes this deep knowledge and
the philosophy that guides it are the best models for preserving nuestra querencia for
future generations.
The land values that Arellano expresses are deeply cultural. Though this land
ethic is arguably fading with incursions of outside influence, it remains the basis for
Hispano collective activism in many communities. For many communities, land was
more than a commodity or an investment that is traded or sold when its value has reached
its peak or the weak market demands that it be jettisoned from a strained portfolio. While
private land grants were eagerly traded amongst the colonial elite, parts of community
grants were owned collectively, which nurtured more profound connections to land.
Similar cultural land values are found among the Pueblos, whose entire land base
was held communally. Collectivity created stability because land could not be
expropriated from Pueblo ownership by any single member. This permanence bore fruit
in the Pueblo worldview, which emphasized connections to place. Late Pueblo
anthropologist Alfonso Ortiz (San Juan, Ohkay Owingeh) writes: "Pueblos have never
been displaced from their homelands, something almost unique among North American
Indian groups ... after more than four centuries of European exploration and colonization,
most of the Pueblo people still live in places of their own choosing. The importance of

(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2009), 65, regarding the growing role of Los
Alamos in the Tewa Basin economy and its displacing of traditional knowledge and
authority.
25
Arellano, “La Querencia,” 32-35.
20

this for cultural survival cannot be overemphasized, for, indeed, we might say that the
Pueblos only believe in what they see and experience, and in their homeland they can see
what they believe."26
In her work comparing the traditional Pueblo built environment embodied in the
plaza and the BIA day school imposed on her native Santa Clara Pueblo, Rina Swentzell
discusses how place and identity are intertwined for Pueblo peoples. She writes, “Pueblo
people believe that the primary and most important relation to humans is with the land,
the natural environment, and the cosmos, which in the pueblo world are synonymous.
Humans exist within the cosmos and are an integral part of the functioning of the earth
community. The mystical nature of the land, the earth, is recognized and honored. Direct
contact and interaction with the land, the natural environment is sought. . . . These
symbolic places remind the people of the vital, breathing earth and their specific locations are
where the people can feel the strongest connection to the flow of energy, or the creation of
the universe. The plants, rocks, land, and people are part of an entity that is sacred because it
breathes the creative nature of the universe.”27

For Hispanos, these connections grew into something more complex than a land
ethos: they were often political and were crucial to identity formation.28 Anthropologist
Sylvia Rodríguez argues that nuevomexicano identity and ethnicity can be understood
through their ongoing relationship to land and water, which, she claims, crystallized as
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the symbol of Hispano cultural survival and social self-determination.29 Independent
from their utility in maintaining ethnic boundaries, cultural values of land had a religious
and spiritual component as well. Writer, scholar, and Tierra Amarilla native Sabine
Ulibarrí articulated this beautifully in an 1997 interview for the documentary Chicano!:
“The land was sacred because your parents and their parents were buried there, some of
your children were buried there and you would be buried there. So the sweat, blood and
tears have filtered into the land. So it is holy, it is sacred, it is sacrosanct.”30
Where Peña believes that a Hispano land ethos informed by cultural connections
to land articulated by Arellano and Ulibarrí, is possible, others doubt that this is the case.
Geographer Alvar Carlson remains skeptical of the ability of Hispanos to care for the
environment. His The Spanish American Homeland: Four Centuries in New Mexico’s
Río Arriba (1990) is a revisionist history of the region, a rejoinder against what he
considers to be over politicized works rife with moralizing and Anglo bashing and
exaggerated emphasis on Hispano subjugation and social injustice. Carlson believes that
his perspective is considerably “detached from any political or other cause.”31 Echoing
Gary D. Libecap’s and George Alter’s claim that cultural characteristics like partible
inheritance doomed Hispano villages, Carlson claims that Hispanos were victims only
because of their own adherence to the archaic use of land, a holdover from Spanish
colonialism. Further, he portrays Hispanos as the deceitful predators of Pueblo land,
29
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continuing their cruel subjugation of Pueblo Indians through encroachments on their land
well into the American period.32
Nowhere does Carlson adequately address the effect that the loss of common
lands had on land grant communities. He ignores the fact that the ejido offered not only a
community resource base but the potential for community growth.33 His dire appraisal of
northern New Mexico paints it as a waning cultural region in which each generation that
remains is trapped by its own economic and cultural history.34 According to Carlson,
culture and tradition are both the foundation on which Hispanos have built their
connection to land and the shackle that has kept their use of this land stagnant. He
believes Anglo “rejuvenators” are left with the responsibility to bring the dead land back
to life.35 Hispanos are, once again, the “dusty background against which life must
move,” and despite their connection to and self-definition in the land, their ineffectual
stewardship has meant both their cultural doom and regional ecological collapse.36
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Hispanophilic historians, from early borderlands scholar Herbert Eugene Bolton
to New Mexico historian Marc Simmons, have pit Hispanos and Pueblo Indians against
to one another. They have glorified the Spanish conquest of the Southwest while
downplaying Spanish brutality toward Pueblo Indians.37 These historians and others use
of religious, civil, and military correspondence offered a view privileging the two groups
as not only distinctive but oppositional. Reports from official visitations by ecclesiastical
officials and bureaucrats document, with displeasure, the fact that Hispano villages failed
to conform to the strict dictates of the Laws of the Indies. Sprawled across valleys rather
than arranged in compact settlements, Spanish communities closely bordered on Pueblo
Indian villages. While intermarriage was rare, cross-cultural progeny populated
communities that were officially separate but nonetheless mixed. Native and indiophilic
scholars have written an equally dichotomous history, emphasizing Spanish brutality
against Indians and their encroachment on traditional lands. In contrast to these
extremes, historians John Kessell and David Weber have created a vast body of work that
avoids these extreme interpretations, citing the agency of Indians and peaceful relations
between Pueblos and colonists as significant characteristics of the borderlands milieu.38
Historian Oakah L. Jones Jr. avoided the polemical portrayal of Pueblo-Hispano
relations in Pueblo Warriors and Spanish Conquest, published in 1966. Jones argues that
37
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the Spanish commanders relied on Pueblo auxiliaries to fight both hostile tribes and other
Pueblos in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.39 While Jones provides a vivid
account of the Spanish and Pueblo alliance against mutual enemies, his story tells little of
the day-to-day interactions between colonists and natives. Although Spanish colonial
Indian relations were structured to minimize contact between citizens and Indians,
intimate contact inevitably occurred.
Ramón Gutiérrez’s controversial When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went
Away (1991) provides insights to post-Revolt Pueblo-Hispano relations. Gutiérrez’s
objective is to study the social transformation of a caste-based society to the class-based
society that took hold during the Bourbon reforms. Enacted by various Bourbon
monarchs in the eighteenth century, the Bourbon Reforms sought to centralize power and
expand the crown’s powers over an expanding economy. In a population tied together by
mestizaje (Spanish-Indian miscegenation), a strict Spanish hierarchy imposed class
division, enforced inequality and maintained a social order that placed Pueblos and
genizaros, detribalized and Hispanicized natives, at the bottom and the few criollos
(Spaniards born in the New World) and peninsulares (Iberian-born Spaniards) on top in
New Mexico.40 Still, the barriers between Pueblo and Spanish villages were permeable.41
The eighteenth-century defensive necessities and the establishment of Hispano
villages closer to native pueblos increased daily contact between the two groups. At the
same time, Indians became more cognizant of preserving their traditions than they had
been in the seventeenth century while they incorporated Spanish technology and
39
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foodways. Pueblo Indian anthropologist Edward P. Dozier argued that Pueblo society
remained largely unchanged through their selective adoption of Spanish technology,
foods and cultural traits and deliberate compartmentalization of Pueblo culture. Writing
from the Pueblo perspective, Dozier states that “since Spanish contact, Pueblo
socioceremonial compartmentalization, particularly the Spanish-Indian dichotomy,
appears to have great permanence.”42 In other works, Dozier cites the Pueblo practice of
expelling members no longer observing traditional ways as a means to preserve traditions
from Spanish influence. The outmigration of Hispanicized Pueblo expatriates partially
explains comparable figures of Hispano population growth and Pueblo population decline
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.43
Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz’s Roots of Resistance: A History of Land Tenure in New
Mexico echoes Dozier. She argues that the decline of the Pueblo Indian population was
only partly due to disease epidemics and was more likely attributable to outward
migration. Pueblos’ expulsion of dissidents retained the social and cultural integrity of
the community and enhanced the growth of the genizaro and poor Hispano population
that settled community land grants. These grants worked as a buffer to private land
grants of the elite, who were responsible for most of the malicious encroachment on and
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claims to Pueblo lands.44 Though lauded as a groundbreaking study, Dunbar-Ortiz’s
almost exclusive reliance on secondary sources is troubling. Her hard Marxist reading of
a barter society obfuscates colonial relations. Although Roots of Resistance is replete
with examples of peaceful Hispano-Pueblo coexistence, Dunbar-Ortiz is prone to falling
back on the dichotomous portrayal of Hispano and Pueblo relations. The final full
chapter widens the Pueblo-Hispano chasm, telling the story not of “recent conflicts in
New Mexico over land, minerals, timber, and water” as claimed, but of Hispano and
Pueblo conflicts over commemoration. Dunbar-Ortiz discusses the Hispanophilic
celebration of symbols of European brutality and the continued victimization of Pueblo
Indians at the hands of native-born Hispano scholars, such as Ramón Gutíerrez, who still
assault Pueblo historical memory.45
Former New Mexico state historian Myra Ellen Jenkins’s work was influential in
the portrayal of interethnic relations in New Mexico. Jenkins was known for hording
archives and restricting public use of documents and collections. This practice allowed
her to be the first historian to work with historical documents that she often poured into
articles often bereft of analysis. She nonetheless structured her narrative to emphasize
Hispano aggression (especially through trespass onto Pueblo lands), questioned Hispano
claims to lands adjacent to Pueblos, and disputed documents that supported Hispano
claims.46 Her treatment of undocumented Pueblo claims was highly charitable. For
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example, despite the absence of legitimate documents granting land to Laguna Pueblo (in
light of the Cruzate forgeries), Jenkins accepts the “age of tradition” as an indication
“that such a document or map existed prior to 1832.”47 In Taos, Hispanos from
surrounding community grants, including Don Fernando de Taos and Cristobal de la
Serna, lived at Taos Pueblo for safety in 1760 and 1776, suggesting a Pueblo-Hispano
military alliance. Jenkins blithely reports this practice and moves quickly onto further
examples of Hispano exploitation, ignoring customary laws that allowed Pueblos to
control access to their villages and that suggest that Hispanos were at Taos Pueblo at the
Pueblo’s invitation.48
While Pueblos retained some rights under Spanish-colonial law, their economic
status deteriorated with the development of a strong barter economy from the mid
eighteenth to the mid nineteenth centuries. Ross Frank’s From Settler to Citizen: New
Mexican Economic Development and the Creation of Vecino Society, 1750-1820
discusses colonial New Mexico’s participation in the increasingly diverse economy of
northern New Spain. His work challenges the depiction of New Mexico as an
impoverished subsistence society of isolated villages surrounded by violent nomadic
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Indians. Frank argues that Pueblo-Hispano relations soured as trade increased between
New Mexico and northern Mexico in the middle of the eighteenth century. Spaniards
used Pueblos as auxiliaries to defend the settlements central to New Mexico, but
marginalized them in the growing economy. Frank’s analysis of the material culture of
Bourbon northern New Spain reveals that Hispanos increasingly co-opted the traditional
crafts and thus the economic life of the Pueblos. Spanish introduction of the loom
guaranteed superior productivity in weaving and the growing market for Pueblo pottery
affected its quality. Both were sold in a market that Hispanos increasingly controlled.49
The creation of this new economy had untold effects on the once-rigid class
structure and on race relations in New Mexico. Mixed-race classifications used in New
Mexico, such as genizaro (detribalized plains Indians), casta (caste), color quebrado
(mixed race, or mestizo or mulatto), once corresponded with class, but when all nonIndians became incorporated under the vecino label, the mixed-race settlers were now
citizens on the far northern frontier.50 With the complex system of caste divisions gone,
racial divisions hardened. Social and cultural shifts in Hispano villages and in Pueblo
communities sharpened the line between "Spanish" and "Pueblo," as the two groups no
longer relied so heavily on one another for mutual defense. The added stress of declining
Pueblo population and increasing Hispano population throughout the nineteenth century
coincided with reduced intermarriage between Hispanos and Pueblos. The result was that
Hispanos beginning to identify themselves “in contradistinction to the Pueblo Indians.”
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Frank states that "social interaction between Pueblo Indians and vecinos became a
casualty of the structural changes in the New Mexican economy."51
Still, as remarkable as the burgeoning arts and crafts trade was, we may question
whether large segments of the New Mexico population participated in this trade. While
this trade diversified the colony’s economy, most villages were still engaged in local
subsistence and barter economies. Although Frank cites the decline of intermarriage in at
the end of the eighteenth century, the decades of 1820s and 1830s witnessed a boom in
Pueblo-Hispano marriage that, while a lower percentage of the total marriages, dwarfed
eighteenth-century intermarriage in sheer numbers. Lastly, official marriage rolls, which
Frank relies on in his analysis, fail to take into account intimate relations that eluded
church regulation.52
James Vlasich’s Pueblo Indian Agriculture provides perhaps the most complete
assessment of Pueblo-state relations from Spanish contact through the present. Vlasich
demonstrates that sovereigns correctly understood the centrality of agriculture to the
preservation of Pueblo peoples. From Spain’s post-Revolt policies aiming to preserve
native subsistence economies to territorial agents’ fights against encroachments on
Pueblo lands, sovereigns proved willing to protect native traditions, all the while denying
equality through citizenship.53 Amid changing land and water laws and pressures to
expand production, Pueblos adapted to new systems while maintaining traditional
agricultural practices. Although postwar Indian-policy changes signaled the
abandonment of “assimilation through agriculture” programs, Vlasich claims, Pueblos
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negotiated barriers to maintain agricultural traditions of diminishing economic but great
cultural importance.54 Despite centuries of contact and cohabitation, Hispanos and
Pueblos evidently faced very different sovereigns.
Nineteenth-century Pueblo-Hispanos relations undoubtedly strained as the
booming Hispano population began to trespass on Pueblo lands in a large way. Under
Mexican rule, elite Hispanos attempted to gain legal title to Pueblo lands, citing their
legal equality under the Plan de Iguala, the 1821 peace treaty that unified Mexican rebels,
and guaranteed equality for all Mexican peoples. Less fortunate paisanos (countrymen)
simply squatted on Pueblo lands or overstayed lease agreements and eventually claimed
title. During the mid to late nineteenth century, land dispossession drove larger
populations of poor Hispanos onto Pueblos, so that by the 1910s, three thousand nonIndian families lived on Pueblo lands, especially those of the northern Pueblos. Dozier
notes that the “breach between Hispanos and Pueblos widened as succeeding generations
of Pueblo Indians” have been “quick to pick up negative Anglo-American attitudes
toward Hispanos and Mexicans and regard themselves as in a superior status position.”55
Sociologist E. K. Francis remarks that “the sense of common destiny has
disappeared which once united Pueblo Indians and Hispano peasants.”56 Anthropologist
John J. Bodine confirms this division in field work in Taos during the 1950s and 1960s.
Seeking to understand the role of Indophilic tourism in upholding this division, he notes
that in the creation of the “Taos mystique,” Anglos “glorified Taos Indian culture and
relegated the Spanish American to the bottom of the prestige structure.” By doing so,
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argues Bodine, Anglos have controlled the interpretation of ethnicity, Taos’ most
important commodity.57
Anthropologist Sylvia Rodríguez has extended John Bodine’s studies of the Taos
region through ethnographic work on ritual dances, fiestas, and land and water-rights
activism. Rodríguez examines shared cultural practices and reveals remnants of
deteriorating ties that once held Pueblos and Hispanos together. In place of visits, trade,
and gift exchange, Pueblos and Hispano meet in court, where they fight for water rights
and land claims.58 The ubiquitous effects of tourism and the growing Anglo population
have led to the intensification of ethnic boundaries, as Pueblos and Hispanos fight
“displacement, political usurpation or certain forms of cultural suppression or cooptation.”59 While Anglos glorified, advocated, and imitated Pueblo culture, and
controlled the commodities created in the tourist economy, Hispanos faced not only
cultural and social subordination, but land and water loss. Rodríguez argues that along
with water and land, “Indian culture has become a bottom line.” While this process
commodified their culture, it also gave Indians incomparable authority in resource
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contests with neighboring non-Indian villages.60 The net result is both the hardening of
ethnic boundaries and growing animosity as both Pueblos and Hispanos struggle to
maintain tradition and culture in an economy where both are traded largely without their
input.
From their initial contact, Pueblos and Hispanos encountered two very different
sovereigns. The Spanish crown was distant and blissfully unaware in the case of
Hispanos; the Franciscan mission was omnipresent, paternalistic and oppressive in the
case of Pueblos. Pre-Revolt colonial governance acquiesced to repressive practices by
religious officials and abuses of powerful encomenderos (holders of encomiendas, which
were royal grants of forced Indian labor and the right to collect tribute from Indians of a
given area). After the Pueblo Revolt, however, the crown took measures to guard against
further revolts that would threaten Spanish control of the northern frontierin New Spain,
publishing and distributing the Laws of the Indies, granting Indians their traditional lands,
and assigning legal protectors to represent Indian communities in courts and other
measures.
Charles Cutter’s The Protector de los Indios and Malcolm Ebright’s “Advocates
for the Oppressed: Indians, Genizaros and Their Spanish Advocates in New Mexico,
1700-1786” reveal the complexity of Pueblo Indian status in colonial New Mexico. The
protectores (defenders) effectively served as natives’ legal voice in everything from
complaints about abuses at the hands of friars to land disputes with surrounding villages.
And although the office lay vacant from 1717-1810, Cutter argues that the Pueblos’
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previous experience with the protectores had prepared them to effectively utilize
procuradores (colonial paralegals) in their stead.61 Ebright points to the ability of Spanish
advocates to protect not only Pueblo rights, but also genizaro rights, demonstrating the
lengths to which the Spanish government went to settle disputes between Spaniards,
Indians, and genizaros.62
Fear of a second revolt nonetheless led to repressive regulations requiring Indians
to obtain permits to travel, outlawing Indian possession of firearms and addressing abuse
by friars more seriously. Oakah L. Jones Jr. remarks that despite these laws, colonial
governors, including Diego de Vargas, Tomás Vélez de Cachupín, and Juan Bautista de
Anza, allowed Puebloan military travel, armed Pueblo allies with muskets, and feuded
with Franciscan missionaries over their treatment of Indians.63 G. Emlen Hall, on the
other hand, has demonstrated that beneath colonial governors, even those with friendly
policies toward Indians, stood teniente alcaldes and alcaldes (local justices of the peace),
who were more likely to abuse their power to the detriment of the larger community,
Pueblo and Hispano.64 These low-level bureaucrats were often brought up on charges by
Indians complaining of encroachment by new or existing land grants, depredations from
their livestock, or illegal use of water. The Spanish-colonial-era abuse of Indians by
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corrupt or self-interested alcaldes at the local level was continued by their Mexican
successors.
Although Pueblo Indians became citizens under the liberal policies of the
Mexican government, their new-found rights proved to be more a handicap than a
benefit. Formal legal status as citizens, Pueblo historian Joe Sando claims, was injurious
to Pueblo property rights during the Mexican period. He states that Mexican governance
“consisted largely of confusing Indian title, ignoring the illegal taking of Pueblo land, and
responding passively when Indian boundaries were violated.”65 Work by G. Emlen Hall
and David Weber corroborates Sando’s claim, demonstrating the lengths local Mexican
officials went to attempt gaining Pueblo lands. For all of their scheming, a central
government in Mexico bent on retaining control over all affairs, upholding the Plan de
Iguala, and protecting Indian rights blocked their plans.66 These schemes exposed
inconsistencies in Pueblos’ treatment by the Mexican government. Their problematic
legal status as quasi-citizens under Mexican rule was inherited by the United States
government when it annexed New Mexico in 1848.
Historian Deborah Rosen contends that the debate over Pueblo Indian citizenship
spanned the entire territorial period. Early governors James S. Calhoun, W. W. H. Davis,
and David Meriwether fought to repeal statutes that gave Pueblos legal power and voting
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rights, but made them party to judicial proceedings and vulnerable to land speculation.67
Judicial officials, including New Mexico Supreme Court justices John S. Watts and
Warren Bristol, cited lack of both formal treaties with the United States and federally
appointed U.S. Indian agents, along with the fact that Pueblos had full title to their land
under U.S. law as proof they were not Indians.68 Watts, along with Justice Joab Houghton
and Attorney General Stephen B. Elkins, were active land speculators who would benefit
from the privatization of Indian land. Rosen argues that the legal ideologies of these
officials reflected federal policies that promoted individualism, from the Supreme Court
decision in U.S. v. Joseph of 1876, which upheld Pueblo citizenship and denied federal
protection as Indians, to the Dawes Allotment Act of 1887, which broke up reservation
into small parcels and opened the majority of reservation lands for Anglo settlement.69
Suzanne Forrest’s The Preservation of the Village: New Mexico’s Hispanics and
the New Deal presents a less charitable portrayal of the federal government in the
twentieth century. Waves of lawyers and land speculators, urban romantics and post
modernists, and intellectuals and reformers benefitted from an inept state government and
an absent federal government. While liberals saw a utopian refuge from modernity and
traditional communal rural values in New Mexico’s villages, reformers saw a region rife
with illiteracy, unemployment, and poverty. The Great Depression exacerbated poverty
and accelerated the collapse both of small village based economies and of the migratory
labor trail north that villagers had come to depend on. When the federal government
67
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responded to this collapse in the 1930s, it turned to social scientists and romantics to a
design reform programs.70
Forrest argues that while federal relief undeniably saved villages from total
economic collapse, its conservative policies were beset with ethnocentrism, ambivalence
and paternalism.71 As reform-minded liberals sought to preserve Hispano villages in
northern New Mexico, they painted the region’s identity as timeless and immutable,
using crafts and art production and to fight the negative depiction of northerners. As
federal involvement increased during the New Deal, these reformers largely controlled
the ideological direction of reform and fixed Hispanos and thereby Hispano identity in
the utopian pastoral village. Through preserving the village, they sought to control
unbridled modernization and preserve the northern New Mexico of an idealized past, in
effect continuing the century-long U.S. colonization of Hispanos and the Southwest.72
Although Forrest makes an impassioned and convincing argument for the ahistorical
nature of reform, the Hispano voice is muted throughout her book. By using government
documents, she privileges the narrative of the administrators and idealists, who were
sometimes in dialogue with Hispanos but not necessarily active participants in reform
projects. They, in fact, quite actively suppressed the native voice found in Hispano field
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workers’ notes, claiming that no length of time in the villages would allow locals to
interpret data accumulated through their own field work.73
In a time so formative of Hispanidad (Hispanic identity), as new external
pressures undoubtedly redefined self- conceptualization, Hispanos appear as passive
sheep led back into the field in an era when depression and starvation might have killed
Hispano cultural identity altogether.74 While Preservation of the Village offers a
thoughtful discussion of the effect of government policies on people, the voice of the
people was rarely pursued and remains muted, leaving an institutional history in place of
a social or cultural one. Jake Kosek’s Understories: The Political Life of Forests in
Northern New Mexico examines the Hispano perspective of Hispano-federal postwar
relations. Set around the village of Truchas during its fight against environmentalists in
the late 1990s, Understories depicts Hispano villagers as politically astute and vocal
agents in their preservation of tradition. Increased reliance on the federal government
through decreasing grazing rights, increased welfare dependence and employment at Los
Alamos National Labs has shaped Hispano political economy, argues Kosek.75 While
activists call for the return of grant lands, it is debatable whether the majority of norteños
would trade land repatriation for the economic security that Los Alamos National Labs
has provided.76
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David Correia’s Properties of Violence: Law and Land Grant Struggle in
Northern New Mexico examines the land grant struggle in the Tierra Amarilla region of
northern New Mexico, north and west of the Tewa Basin. Correia considers the role that
violence played in the dispossession of the Tierra Amarilla grant, both in resistance
against economic forces by Hispanos in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
and in violence employed by the state to counter radical activism in the mid and late
twentieth century.77 The violent dispossession of Hispano lands, he argues, is important
to remember when considering the violence of the land grant movement, which
characterizes northern New Mexico in the minds of their detractors.
Scholarly debates over the proper identity of nuevomexicanos have been raging
for over a century. Aurelio Espinosa and Arthur Campa disagree over the significance of
Spanish forms in the folklore of New Mexico. Carey McWilliams popularly questions
the existence of veritable Spanish tradition in the United States. He argues that the
“Spanish fantasy heritage” was the white-washing of Mexican history, a cultural scheme
created in the early twentieth century as a way for Anglos to come to terms with land
expropriation and their abuse of the Mexican population.78 Sociologist George I.
Sánchez argues passively for nuevomexicano cultural uniqueness brought on through
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isolation. Rather than celebrating cultural exceptionality, he claimed that Hispano culture
was the reason for the backwardness of the region in the 1940s.79
Post-Chicano movement debates have centered around claims of
nuevomexicanos’ Spanish pedigree. Perhaps most interesting is the Hispanodistinctiveness debate started when geographer Richard Nostrand published a chapter of
his book The Hispano Homeland in 1980. In his article, “The Hispano Homeland in
1900,” Nostrand claimed that isolation created a unique non-Mexican culture evidenced
by the preservation of archaic Spanish words and traditions. Responses from economists,
anthropologists, geographers, and historians questioned Nostrand’s methodology and
conclusions, called his scholarship ideology, and asserted that Hispanos were merely a
subculture of greater mexicanidad. Hispanophilic historians Fray Angelico Chávez and
Marc Simmons support Nostrand’s claims of distinctiveness, thereby defending their own
work. Chávez, the lone New Mexican in the entire debate, also defended his claims to a
unique New Mexican history and identity.80
John Nieto-Phillips’s The Language of Blood and Charles Montgomery’s The
Spanish Redemption seek the origin of the seemingly pervasive “Spanish American”
identity that survived the politics of the Chicano movement. Echoing Ramón Gutiérrez
and Ross Frank, Nieto-Phillips argues that colonial concepts like limpieza de sangre
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(purity of blood) and calidad (quality) broke down in New Mexico and the once-complex
casta system gradually changed into a binary in which español and indio were the only
distinctions.81 He claims that Hispano ethnic identity entered the public sphere in the late
nineteenth century and was transformed by hispanophiles who replaced the “Black
Legend” with the “White Legend,” which downplayed mestizaje, whitened Hispano
identity, and implemented an “imperialist nostalgia.”82 Nieto-Phillips contends that
Hispanos eventually embraced this idea, but rather than conforming to Anglo
expectations, they co-opted and used it to define themselves. By idealizing the romantic
past, they both disregarded the abysmal present and achieved a certain degree of
heightened self-definition.83
Montgomery argues that Spanish heritage was the creation of Anglos and
Hispanos, artists and journalists, boosters and politicians, and educators and even the
paisano that it sought to redeem. Through a more astute reading of ethnic politics than
Nieto-Phillips accomplishes, Montgomery demonstrates the ways that Hispanos took
hold of the Spanish fantasy not for a somatic fix to avoid the abysmal present, but to
claim political and cultural authority in their lives.84 The Spanish Redemption explores
the ways that paternalistic art promoters like Mary Austin and Frank Applegate attempted
to “revive” nuevomexicano art, all the while discouraging innovation, and defining and
enforcing the “authentic” in the artist’s products.85 Simultaneously, a generation of elite
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Hispana patronas like Adelina Otero-Warren, Concha Ortiz y Pino, and Carmen
Espinosa sought to reform Hispano education to modern standards while keeping a
Spanish heritage alive in Hispano consciousness.86
Both The Spanish Redemption and The Language of Blood appropriately avoid
passing candid judgment on the Spanish heritage. Montgomery and Nieto-Phillips are
also careful not to attribute causation to any single aspect of what evidently is a fantasy
heritage. Rather, they study the vast cultural consequences of the Spanish identity. Still,
Montgomery’s study comes across as more plausible. Nieto-Phillips attempts to equate
the reenactment of the Passion of Christ by Los Hermanos de la Fraternidad Piadosa de
Nuestro Padre Jesús Nazareno, popularly known as the penitentes, with the sacrifice of
noble and pure Spanish blood. His adherence to colonial notions of pureza de sangre,
while conforming to his construct of “identity of blood,” or “identity as blood,” is an
intriguing but misguided idea, especially when it is applied to the confraternal
reenactment of the passion play that takes place across the Catholic world.87 He also
states that it is only “ironic” that Hispanophilia did not translate into civic, racial, and
political equality for nuevomexicanos. Perhaps interpreting this time period through the
conceptual lenses of culture and identity has caused him to ignore the changing political
and legal landscape.
In The Spanish Redemption, Montgomery reveals class and cultural dynamics that
fall through the cracks in Nieto-Phillips’s analysis. Montgomery also appreciates the
intangibility of the Spanish identity, pointing out that its definition varied by social
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setting.88 Notwithstanding such praise, both Montgomery and Nieto-Phillips assert that
the Spanish identity failed to resonate past the Coronado Cuatro Centenary of 1940, but
neither one offers ample evidence to confirm that this was the case. Centering their
studies on Santa Fe and treating it as representative rather than exceptional is also
problematic. The Chicano Movement of the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that
mexicanidad lacked the saliency in New Mexico that it had in Texas and California. The
analysis of both Nieto-Phillips and Montgomery would have benefited from extending
their timeline to the post World War II era, a time when a larger swath of
nuevomexicanos actively and vocally participated in the public sphere and Hispano
identity underwent a vast redefinition. Then again, their subject is the career of Hispanic
identity, not Hispanos themselves.
Anthropologist Sylvia Rodríguez’s and sociologist Phillip B. Gonzales’s
comments on Hispano identity reflect views more nuanced than those of Nieto-Philips
and Montgomery, for they explore the academic discourse on Hispanidad and discuss the
need for further research. Gonzales concludes that Hispano identity has a “varied and
complex history” and that further scholarly work should consider the political arena in
studying this regional identity. He also reminds us that claims to Hispano distinctiveness
are distinct from claims to a Spanish American identity.89 Rodríguez intends to clarify the
debate over what she considers to be an ethnopolitcal self-consciousness situationally and
structurally created and sustained through the maintenance of ethnic boundaries. She
points out that Nostrand’s primordialist tendencies conform with not only the Spanish
88

Montgomery, The Spanish Redemption, 87.
Phillip B. Gonzales, “The Hispano Homeland Debate: New Lessons,” Perspectives in
Mexican American Studies: Mexican Americans in the 1990s; Politics, Policies and
Perceptions 6 (1997): 137.
43
89

myth but with tourist fixations on maintaining the tri-cultural myth which, in turn,
affected the “symbolic expression of Indian ethnicity.”90
Academic discussions of the concept of a Hispano homeland have in the past led
to prolonged debates about cultural distinctiveness that flirt with geographic determinism.
I employ the concept of homeland neither to argue that northern New Mexico is a cultural
island free of outside influence nor that it is a final cultural refuge fatalistically awaiting
its demise. Rather, my use of the concept of a Hispano homeland differentiates
nuevomexicanos from other Latinos in the United States, many of whom look outside the
U.S. for placed-based or place-specific connections. In fact, the lack of or suppression of
connections to places outside “la nacioncita de los Sangre de Cristos” [the little nation of
the Sangre de Cristo mountains] has long drawn criticism from other Latinos. Mexicans
in particular perceive New Mexican fidelity to their patria chica (home town or village)
as provincial and boorish, yet arrogant and blind. Connections to rural or semi-rural
agro-pastoral communities root nuevomexicano identities in a sense of place comparable
to American Indian place-based identities. Creating a querencia, the Hispano intimate
knowledge of place discussed above, is comparable to the Western Apache dictum,
“wisdom sits in places,” popularized by the Keith Basso’s book of the same name.91 The
reciprocal relationship between people and their land, whether policed by the “voices of
their ancestors” or “notions of vergüenza,” (shame) has created cultures that share a
comparable connection to place.
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Interestingly, many advocates of Pueblo land rights in the 1910s and 1920s next
turned their attention to the decaying villages of northern New Mexico in the 1920s and
1930s. The descriptor Mexican was rarely used for the romanticized, sleepy, brown
villages of the picturesque north. Put simply, as “Spanish-Americans,” nuevomexicanos
at once had the capacity for salvation and were worth saving. As “Mexicans,” or even as
“mexicanos,” they did not. The reshaping of nuevomexicano racial and ethnic
consciousness amid battles for land and water rights offers a compelling avenue into
study of the politics of inter-ethnicity. If, as Jake Kosek claims, Hispanos are caught
between “what they need to remember and what others will not let them forget,” the
process of remembering and forgetting creates opportunities to examine nuevomexicano
racial and ethnic discourse.92 Taking these opportunities might allow historians to better
understand a people maligned for their self-conception.
My use of the term Hispano in this dissertation begs some discussion. The
colonial forebearers of the Tewa Basin population likely identified themselves as
españoles (Spanish) or españoles-mexicanos (Spanish Mexicans); by the mid and late
seventeenth century, colonial inhabitants of the Basin used the term vecino to describe
themselves and this term carried into the Mexican era, when they aimed to differentiate
themselves from their Pueblo neighbors, who were their fellow citizens under in the
Mexican republic. By the territorial era, Hispano intellectuals publishing newspapers
used the term neo-mexicano or nuevomexicano, a literal translation of New Mexican,
which is used to this day. In Spanish-language conversation, nineteenth century
Hispanos identified themselves as mexicano, a habit that continued until the twenty-first
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century and continues to this day. But trends are by no means stable across time and are
often contextual. If asked his identity in Spanish (“quién eres”), my grandfather would
respond, “mexicano”; if asked in English, he would say “Spanish.”
Politicians and boosters seeking to dispense with the liabilities of the Hispano
population’s mestizo lineage began to fashion a “Spanish American” identity in the
1880s. By the 1920s, politicians displayed a sensitivity to Hispanos and used the term
“Spanish American” interchangeably with the term native, which referred to Hispano, not
Pueblo Indians. The term “Spanish” enjoyed permanence for decades, but was
challenged in the Civil Rights era, when Reies López Tijerina coined the term IndoHispano as a recognition of both Spanish and indigenous roots that would not offend the
sensibilities of land grant heirs who bristled when called “Mexican American,”
“Mexican,” “mexicano,” or “Chicano.” While Hispanos are ridiculed for their rejection
of labels that recognize a Mexican past, experiences discussed in this dissertation offer
clues as to why they have been reluctant to use the ethnic label. For one, the using the
term Mexican during times of racial strife assumed recent immigration, making them
vulnerable to exclusion and expulsion, but also undermined claims rooted in the colonial
era that relied on longevity and permanence. Tijerina’s term Indo-Hispano was not
widely embraced, but it offered an alternative to the term chicano, which was correlated
with crime and poverty, but gained use from the 1970s through the 1980s, when it was
supplanted with Hispanic. Global migrations have diversified the populations rooted in
Spanish colonialism, which brought forth Latino. Spread through commerce, it has
gained usage in New Mexico. I use Hispano as a way to unite various time periods and
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connect colonial ancestors with their modern descendants without the baggage that other
terms carry with them.
I approach the history of land tenure in the Tewa Basin from a very personal
perspective. I was privileged to grow up in a large extended family, among cousins,
uncles and aunts who sat in my grandparents’ kitchen while my grandfather, José
Filadelfio Rodríguez, told the stories of life in the Tewa Basin. He recounted his great
grandfather, the Spanish-born Franciscan priest José de Castro, who fathered nine
children with his housekeeper, María Ygnacia Rodríguez, and was nearly deported when
Mexico gained its independence. My grandfather told of José Ramón Vigil, another
ancestor, who once owned the vast Ramón Vigil grant and whose brothers-in-law,
Antonio Abad and Desiderio Montoya, led the Río Arriba Rebellion of 1837 against the
Mexican government and whose followers eventually beheaded the governor. His stories
reminded us of my grandmother, María Marina García’s grandfather, Juan Luis García,
who was taken captive by Navajos and returned to find the growing town of Española
dominating the changing valley. My abuelo told stories of his youth spent working in
fields and mines in southern Colorado and, finally, of how his father-in-law, Adolfo
García, lost his homestead and lumber mill when the federal government seized the lands
surrounding the Pajarito Plateau to impose and maintain secrecy for the Manhattan
Project, and later built a weapons laboratory that gave him a stable job and a comfortable
retirement. This story, for me, is a very personal one.
This dissertation is organized into twelve chapters that roughly divide into three
major sections. Part I, chapter 1 discusses Spanish-Pueblo colonial relations in the Tewa
Basin from contact through the end of the Pueblo-Spanish War (the many Pueblo Revolts
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plus the reconquest). Chapter 2 examines land tenure and intercultural relations from
eighteenth century New Mexico through the Mexican era, when New Mexico is annexed
during the Mexican American War. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the American territorial
era.
In Part II, Chapters 5 and 6 explore the Pueblo land question in post-statehood
New Mexico and its effect on land tenure in the Tewa Basin. This controversy was
popularized in the Bursum Bill debate, which eventually culminated in the creation of the
Pueblo Lands Board. Chapter 7 disengages with the Pueblo lands debate briefly to
discuss continued parallels in Pueblo and Hispano land tenure after statehood.
Part III centers on the actions of the Pueblo Lands Board. Chapter 8 discusses the
formation of the Board and its hearings at Tesuque; chapter 9, hearings at Nambé;
chapter 10, those at Picurís, San Juan, and San Ildefonso; and chapter 11, hearings at
Santa Clara and Pojoaque, and the end of what I call the Pueblo Lands Board era.
Finally, chapter 12 looks at land reform in the Tewa Basin during the New Deal.
This study seeks to unite histories of Pueblo and Hispano land tenure in one
coherent narrative. Examining parallels in the stories of the Tewa Basin’s Indian Pueblos
and Hispano villages complicates prevailing accounts that espouse a rigid PuebloHispano dichotomy. Recognizing these congruences enriches our understanding of
Pueblo and Hispano relationships created and refashioned across centuries. Recontextualizing the history of land tenure offers a site to examine the politicization of
Hispano ethnic identity and the role governments played in the ceaseless renegotiation of
land tenure and ethnic politics in New Mexico.
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Chapter 1: Spanish Settlement and the Reshaping of the Tewa Basin’s
Pueblo World in Colonial New Mexico, 1598- 1730
This chapter discusses the early Spanish colonial era in New Mexico, arguing that
divisions between Spanish and native peoples were permeable even in the first decades of
contact. After the Pueblo-Spanish War (1680-1700), racial lines hardened between
Pueblos and elite Hispanos, but the impact of Spanish reconquest damaged the Pueblo
world, and native refugees found solace in not only consolidated Pueblos, but also in
peripheral communities that were integral to the colony’s success. These relationships
were informed, though not dictated, by a shared colonial past, during which two distinct
cultures clashed under Spanish exploration and settlement. The Pueblo revolt rejected
this colonial imposition. After the revolt, a tense century and a half of constantly
renegotiated coexistence witnessed the establishment of many Hispano villages that
remain to this day.
This chapter begins by discussing the early-Spanish-colonial era (1598-1680) in
the Tewa Basin, beginning with the exploitation and oppression that brought on the
Pueblo Revolt of 1680. It continues by exploring the Reconquest (1692-1697) and the
renegotiation of Pueblo-Hispano relations, paying particular attention to the Spanish land
grants that again reconfigured colonial space, limited Pueblo access to resources, and
shifted the land-tenure patterns in north-central New Mexico. Pueblos and Hispanos
constantly renegotiated their relations through commerce, kinship, competition, and war.
This chapter demonstrates that even in the early colonial era, distinct racial lines between
Pueblos and Hispanos could not be drawn by colonial authorities who sought to control
both populations by keeping them separate.
~~~~
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From 1200-1500, while Spaniards fought to regain control of the Iberian
Peninsula from the Moors, the Pueblo world was taking shape. After the Anasazi
abandoned Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon, their pre-Puebloan progeny gradually made
their way to the Río Grande Valley. Two distinct languages developed among the Río
Grande Pueblos: eastern Pueblos came to speak variations in the Tanoan language group;
and western Pueblos spoke Keresan language variants. Analysis of pottery chards from
900 A.D. to 1400 A.D. suggest Tiwa occupation of the Tewa Basin either before Tewa
emerged as an identifiable Tanoan linguistic group from the Tiwa,93 or before Tewa
speakers moved from the Río Chama drainage and occupied abandoned Tiwa sites.94
Pueblo society in the Tewa Basin expanded and collapsed between 1250-1600.
Natives created large, multi-room Pueblos, abandoned them and reoccupied previously
deserted sites. These ephemerally occupied sites spread from Chama and Abiquiú in the
north to Santa Fe in the south, from the northern Pajarito Plateau in the west to sites near
Santa Cruz and Truchas in the east. In all, an estimated twenty-thousand proto-Pueblo
peoples occupied seventy-six sites across the Tewa Basin. Bandelier and Puye Cliffs
housed the ancestors of Santa Clara Pueblo (Kha'p'oo Owinge in the native Tewa) and
perhaps San Ildefonso Pueblo (Po-woh-ge-oweenge in the native Tewa). Tewa Basin
Pueblos had contracted in the decades and centuries before Spanish contact. Posi-
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Owinge, the ancestral home of natives of San Juan Pueblo (Ohkay Owingeh in the native
Tewa), was abandoned on the eve of the Spanish incursion in 1540. Archaeologist Kurt
Anschuetz argues that these sites, rather than a sign of permanent abandonment, evidence
cyclical habitation and organizational flexibility that served the Tewa well during
Spanish colonization.95
North of the Tewa Basin, Picurís (Pinguiltha, in their native Tiwa) grew to an
estimated maximum population of about two-thousand by 1630.96 Isolated by mountains
and confined by narrow valleys, Picurís faced agricultural limitations that obliged its
people to engage in varied economies including trade with the Apaches, who even
maintained seasonal shelters near the pueblo to avoid winter travel. Reports by early
Spanish explorers marveled at the sheer size of and defensible nature of Picurís. The
massive nine-story Pueblo was reported to boast six-foot-tall parapets on the roofs, from
which stones were hurled upon their enemies.97 The nearby Pot Creek Pueblo, occupied
between 1100-1320, grew to a maximum of one-hundred and twelve rooms in a massive,
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multistoried Pueblo on the Río Grande del Rancho, which also was the site of an Apache
camp used during trade with Picuris and Taos Pueblos.98
Some archaeologists argue that Pueblo culture at the time of Spanish discovery
was at its peak. Linda Cordell, however, considers the era immediately before Spanish
exploration to be one of social reorganization. She writes that Pueblo peoples dealt with
climatic changes, a wave of refugees from Four Corners sites, and increased interaction
with plains and Great Basin peoples, particularly the Apaches and Navajos.99 More
recently, ethnohistorian William B. Carter has argued that Spanish entry into the
Southwest upset long-established and constantly renegotiated alliances between Pueblos,
Apaches and Navajos, especially by labeling non-sedentary, agricultural peoples indios
bárbaros (wild Indians). This simplistic distinction, according to Carter, drove Spanish
conceptions of native peoples, shaped their policies on treating natives and distinguishing
one group from another, and informed their policies toward native intercultural relations.
Spanish policies gradually drove a wedge between Pueblo and non-Pueblo peoples.100
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When Spaniards entered what today is called New Mexico from Mexico four
hundred and severty-four years ago, they encountered a complex and vibrant Pueblo
world. Rather than observing a cohesive civilization, Spaniards found diverse Pueblo
societies conducting distinct relationships with non-Pueblo Indian peoples, building and
destroying alliances, and moving across a post-Chacoan Pueblo complex that sometimes
experienced abundance and peace, but also famine and war. The pre-Columbian Pueblo
world was far from edenic. Historian John L. Kessell writes that evidence of warfare lies
in petroglyphic and pictographic drawings and depictions of weapons used for purposes
other than hunting.101
Francisco Vásquez de Coronado marched into this world in 1540, eager to find his
own Tenochtitlán to conquer and riches to seize. His search for the mythological Seven
Cities of Cibola was guided by the reports of fray Marcos de Niza, who in 1539 led an illfated expedition that included Estaban the Moor, or Estevanico, the former slave who
wandered across the present-day Southwest with Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca after
being shipwrecked on the coast of Texas. Estevanico met his death at Cibola (Hawikku),
where he reportedly demanded women or bore a rattle from an enemy tribe, and was
killed by the Zuñi, who had probably heard news of Spanish belligerence to the south.
After reports of Estevan’s death, Niza returned south to Nueva Galicia with stories of
wealthy population centers to the north. Coronado, then governor of Nueva Galicia, with
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the support of Viceroy Antonio de Mendoza, garnered investors, mortgaged his land and
profitable encomienda (a grant of native labor and tribute defined by an area), and
organized an expedition that eventually made its way into the middle Río Grande Valley
and the heart of the Pueblo world.102
Coronado’s force of over two thousand Spaniards, African slaves, and Indian
allies, was met with Pueblo suspicion and resistance. After fighting with Zuni warriors,
Coronado received an emissary called Bigotes from Pecos Pueblo, who led Coronado’s
lieutenants, Hernando de Alvarado and García López de Cárdenas, to the Llano Estacado.
Alvarado and Cárdenas set up camp in the middle Río Grande Valley near a cluster of
Tiwa-speaking Pueblos they called Tiguex. Cárdenas forced the abandonment of a
Pueblo, Alcanfor, to provide a winter camp for the massive expedition. Coronado arrived
with his main army for what turned out to be the extraordinarily harsh winter of 15401541. Spanish brutality increased as the winter wore on, and other Tiguex Pueblos were
abandoned to avoid harsh punishments. A siege marked with small skirmishes became
known as the Tiguex War, in which the Spanish annihilated every last defiant pueblo.
After laying waste to what was once one of the most powerful Pueblos of the middle Río
Grande Valley, Coronado rode east in pursuit of Quivira.103
In his nearly two years among Pueblo peoples, Coronado engaged in an obstinate
diplomacy. His apparent manipulation of whole Pueblo villages into war or enthusiastic
cooperation was long interpreted as either a testament to Spanish power and diplomacy
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or, conversely, Spanish brutality and coercion. In reality, Coronado came into a diverse
world of alliances and grievances, and many Pueblos were willing to use the Spanish
intruders and their power to tip the scales their favor. Pecos headman Bigotes notably
offered his people’s assistance to the Spanish against the Tiwas in return for a settlement
in the Río Grande Valley for Pecos Pueblo. Coronado’s expedition ended in 1541 when
the outbreak of the Mixtón War in Nueva Galicia obliged the governor’s return. His twoyear expedition set the tone for the next century and a half of Pueblo-Hispano
relations.104
For the next forty years, New Spain grappled with the failure of colonial
expansion and Indian rebellions, including the nearly forty-year Pan-Indian Chichimeca
Rebellion (1550-1590). As Coronado retreated to Nueva Galicia, his forces divided and
returned home piecemeal. Legends of what happened to his army included that a portion
of his Tlaxcalan auxiliaries remained with Pecos and were either integrated into the tribe
or traded as slaves through its vast regional trade network. In 1581, Fray Agustín
Rodríguez and Francisco Sánchez Chamuscado departed Santa Barbara and travelled
north, up the Conchas River and into the Río Grande Valley. The RodríguezChamuscado expedition visited north as far as Taos and west to Acoma and Zuñi. The
expedition returned one year later after Chamuscado died. In 1583, Antonio de Espejo,
an indebted entrepreneur, reached the Galisteo Basin, where he found silver deposits.
Espejo returned south down the Pecos River into modern-day Texas, where he wrote
glowing accounts of New Mexico and petitioned to establish settlements there, but he
died en route to Spain in 1585. Five years later, Gaspar Castaño de Sosa led an
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unauthorized expedition from modern Coahuila, warring with Pecos and visiting Tesuque
and other Tewa and Tano Pueblos before settling in Ohkay Owingeh to pan for gold.
Castaño de Sosa returned to Mexico in chains, but brought a Tano Pueblo woman from
San Cristóbal Pueblo, who would prove crucial to future attempts at settlement.105
Regardless of what happened to Coronado’s army, the dismal failure of his
expedition inaugurated a new phase of Spanish designs on the Southwest. Mendoza’s
hesitancy to launch a new expedition created a gap that a young Juan de Oñate would fill.
Oñate came from elite stock. His Basque father, Cristobal Oñate, enriched his family and
investors through war, the Chichimeca Rebellion (Mixtón War), and silver mining in
Zacatecas. Juan married Isabel Tolosa Cortés de Moctezuma, the granddaughter of
Hernán Cortés and Tecuichpotzin Ixcaxochitzin, an encomendera (an owner of an
encomienda) and the daughter of the last Aztec emperor Moctezuma Xocoyotzin. By
1593, the wealthy Juan de Oñate served as alcalde mayor (a local, administrative and
judicial official) of San Luís Potosí and shortly thereafter vigorously lobbied Viceroy
Luís de Velasco II for the royal contract to colonize Northern New Spain. Velasco
granted him the royal contract in 1595 and Oñate, as governor and adelantado (a military
title gained by service to the Crown), began assembling an expeditionary force.
In January 1598, Oñate left Santa Bárbara, Chihuahua, with 129 soldiers and
about 450 other men, women and children. Historian John L. Kessell writes that Oñate’s
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group attracted many would-be settlers because of his authority as adelantado to grant
titles such as hidalgo (nobility106), land through mercedes (land grants) and tribute
through the encomienda (grants of Indian labor and produce). By the time he entered
New Mexico, he had one thousand head of livestock. “Although Oñate called it an
army,” Kessell writes, “this was a migration. . . . Settlement had eclipsed exploration.”107
Oñate’s settlers treaded through a “polyglot Pueblo world” of eighty-one Pueblos:
Piros in the south, Tiwas in the north, Pecos to the east, and Zuñis and Hopis to the west.
After encamping briefly at Santo Domingo, the largest Río Grande Pueblo that the soonto-be colonists encountered, Oñate led his settlers up La Bajada and into the Tewa world.
His expedition passed through the lands of Tetsugeh (Tesuque), Po’suwageh (Pojoaque)
and Powohge Owinge.108 Oñate settled at San Juan de los Caballeros, on the site of a
former Tewa Pueblo called Caypa, close to San Juan Pueblo and its exploitable
resources.109
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Oñate attempted to bring all Pueblos in New Mexico, whose population was
estimated at thirty-five thousand, under Spanish control. After narrowly escaping a trap
set at Acoma Pueblo, Oñate set off westward to the Pacific in the fall of 1598. Returning
sooner than planned because of an early winter storm, he learned of the death of his
nephew, Juan de Zaldívar at the hands of the Acomas. With Zaldívar’s brother, Vicente,
Oñate plotted his revenge, and on January 21, 1599, he travelled to the peñol (mesa) of
Acoma to lay siege to the defiant Pueblo. After a three-day siege, eight hundred Acoma
natives, including women and children killed by both Spanish and Pueblo soldiers, lay
dead. Five hundred survivors were tried at Santo Domingo, where Captain Alonso de
Montesinos represented the defendants in a trial for the death of Juan de Zaldívar and his
soldiers.110
Gaspar Pérez de Villagrá, the expedition’s historian, recounted the battle and trial
of Acoma warriors in his epic poem, Historia de Nuevo México.111 Genaro Padilla writes
that Villagrá subtly questions the brutal Spanish colonial enterprise, which the Acoma
warriors resisted. The governor nonetheless issued a harsh sentence, condemning all
women older than twelve and all men between twelve and twenty-five to twenty years of
servitude. Children under twelve were to be placed under the care of Franciscan priests.
All men over the age of twenty-five were condemned to losing one foot and then to
twenty years of servitude. Whether the mutilation was carried out is doubtful, and no
Spanish colonial record refers to un cojo, or a one-footed slave. Oñate’s harsh
110
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punishment of Acomans has nonetheless informed public perceptions of the brutality of
Spanish colonialism in general.112
Oñate’s fanatical punishment of Acoma averted his focus from other problems,
namely, the poor condition of his colony. By 1600, his towns were overpopulated with
new colonists and Acoma refugees. While he persecuted Acoma, some colonists fled his
starving settlements. Miserable, they referred to the annual climate as “nueve meses de
invierno, tres de infierno,” or “nine months of winter, three of hell.” Describing Oñate’s
mistakes, Kessell writes, “Waging war and peace with the Pueblo proved not so critical to
Oñate’s enterprise as the mood of his own colonists.”113 Oñate’s brutality weakened his
colony. His exploitation of Ohkay Owingeh brought overcrowding, disease and
resentment. He founded San Gabriel del Yunque at Yunque-Owinge, another abandoned
Tewa pueblo west of the Río Grande in an attempt to ease the pressure on colonists, but
he still relied on Pueblo stores to feed his fledgling colony.114
In 1601, dozens of unhappy and hungry families abandoned San Gabriel and fled
south while Oñate was on the Plains in search of Quivira. With his colony in crisis,
Oñate responded the only way he knew how: ordering the beheading of the leaders of the
fleeing faction. By 1603, Taos Pueblo led a revolt against Spanish rule, which Oñate
quashed by killing the leader of Taos Pueblo. The colonists deserting New Mexico had
long made their way south to Santa Bárbara, where they found protection from Oñate.
By 1606, Oñate simultaneously resigned his commission and was recalled by the King
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Phillip III of Spain. He spent the rest of his life fighting charges of mismanaging the
colony, brutalizing its settlers, and punishing the native populations .115
Historian Rick Hendricks marks the resignation of Oñate as a major transition in
colonial policy when New Mexico shifted from a proprietary to a royal colony. Pedro de
Peralta recolonized New Mexico in 1610, moving the capital from San Juan to Santa Fe.
Peralta brought brief stability to the colony. For the next seventy years, colonial New
Mexico steadily grew. The elites were given encomiendas, grants of native labor and
tribute. Friars were charged with winning native souls for God and fought to control
native lives and labor. Abuses by both clerics and encomenderos, who sought to extract
the maximum profit from their lands, wore on the Pueblos. They were caught in a
dysfunctional colony between civil and ecclesiastic officials. For decades, Pueblos
would play clerical and civic leaders against one another. But the pressures of drought
and famine, war and nomadic raids, and exploitation and oppression took their toll on
Pueblo people. Disease, more than any other single element or any individual, caused
havoc on their world.116
In Conquest and Catastrophe, geographer Elinore Barrett demonstrates that
seventeenth-century epidemics caused greater shifts in the Pueblo world than did
conquistador cruelty or clerical fanaticism. The culprit in the precipitous decline in Río
Grande Pueblo population was not the violence of Spanish conquistadors, consolidation
under missionaries, coerced labor, or even increased grants of land to colonists. From the
1590s to the 1630s, the Pueblo population remained steady while the number of Pueblos
115
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decreased, from eighty-one in 1598 to perhaps thirty-one by 1680. A population that was
estimated at 60,000 in 1600 dropped to 30,000 by 1640. Pueblos consolidated into larger
communities to defend better against increased Apache raids. Spanish policies
consolidated Pueblos and other native peoples into congregaciones (religious
reservaitions organized around a parish) and reducciones (reservations to settle nonsednetary Indians), making them more vulnerable to disease outbreaks. And tribute taxes
assessed at the household level encouraged larger households of extended family units.117
Epidemic outbreaks in the 1630s triggered Pueblo radicalism. Zuñis killed fray
Francisco Letrado in 1637. A mestizo named Diego Martín led a 1639 uprising at Taos
that killed a friar and two soldiers. Priests and governors worried that mestizos, the
mixed-blood progeny that made up the majority of the colonial non-Pueblo population,
were especially susceptible to Pueblo radicalism.118 Andrew Knaut notes that contact
between Spanish and Pueblo peoples was constant. Just as Pueblo people adopted
Spanish customs, habits and lifeways, there was a reciprocal borrowing of Pueblo ways
among Spaniards. Colonial agriculture, for instance, was most successful when colonists
emulated their Pueblo neighbors and often even more successful when they seized Pueblo
land. Pueblos constantly complained of encroachment, but Spanish leaders also lamented
the “uncivilizing” of the colonial population as Spanish settlers adopted Pueblo ways,
including Pueblo folk healing and witchcraft that the Spanish merged with their own
curanderismo (folk healing) and brujerismo (witchcraft).119
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Colonial New Mexico also suffered crippling disunity. Clerics used the
Inquisition as a political tool to remove governors who resisted their mission and refused
to police Pueblo morality. Many governors were openly corrupt. Governor Luis de
Rosas (1637-1641) operated an obraje (textile factory) in Santa Fe with Pueblo and
captive Indian labor, and taxed nearly anything that came through his office. His
brutalization of both colonists and Pueblos led to his murder while he was under arrest in
Santa Fe to await trial for his misdeeds. In 1640, a smallpox epidemic devastated the
Pueblos, killing as many as a full tenth of their population. After 1650 New Mexico’s
climate became drier and from 1666 to 1672, a severe drought hit the already reeling
Pueblo villages. Drought and famine killed 450 Humanas Pueblo natives. By 1670, all
Tompiro Pueblos were abandoned, and Esteban Clemente, the Spanish-appointed Pueblo
governor of the Salinas and Tano Pueblos, who had previously renounced Pueblo
religion, rebelled against the Spaniards and ordered his pueblos to drive Spanish horse
herds into the mountains. He was executed by authorities for his rebellious turn. In
1672, the Jumano Indians at Abo revolted, burning their church and killing their friar.
The weight of the civil and ecclesiastic turmoil, coupled by disease and drought, proved
too much for the Pueblos to bear.120
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Ramón Gutiérrez notes that a Pueblo population of 40,000 in 1638 had dropped to
17,000 in 1679. Severe conditions radicalized Pueblos Indians, and the Spanish
responded with increased repression. Franciscan priests, in particular, physically abused
caciques (Pueblo religious leaders), confiscated religious relics, and ordered the
destruction of ceremonial kivas. Van Hastings Garner disregards religious repression as
a central reason for the Pueblo Revolt. He argues that material deprivation through
forced labor (encomienda) and the Spanish inability to prevent Indian raids galvanized
Pueblos more than religious destruction, and that the divide between clerical and civil
officials was overstated.121
In 1675, Governor Juan Francisco Treviño submitted to pressure from Franciscan
priests to crack down on native ceremonial and religious practices. Treviño arrested and
hung four religious leaders, including one from Nambé (Nambe Oweenge in the native
Tewa), and ordered the whipping of seventy-five other Pueblo religious leaders. As the
governor prepared to execute other men, dozens of Pueblo warriors, many of them
Tewas, arrived at the outskirts of the colonial capital and demanded the return of their
priests, medicine men and governors. Among those released was Po’Pay (spelled by the
Spanish Popé), a San Juan medicine man who immediately began planning a revolt
against Spanish rule.
Popé left San Juan and relocated to Taos, where he organized the uprising.
Scholars have inferred that his decision to leave his native San Juan Pueblo reflected his
distrust of his own Pueblo’s relationship to and increasing dependence on the Spanish,
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particularly for defense from the increasing Apache and Navajo attacks. His increasing
radicalism seems to have worn on San Juan, especially after he ordered the death of his
own son-in-law, the Spanish appointed governor Nicolás Bua, for his pro-Spanish
attitude. Popé and other revolt leaders conferred with other Pueblos and Apache allies,
ingeniously obscuring their meetings by convening during feast days, when Pueblos
would visit other Pueblos without arousing the suspicion of Spanish clerical and secular
leaders. They avoided Spanish allies like Pecos Pueblo leader Juan de Ye, as well as
caciques from the Tano Pueblos of San Marcos and La Cienega, who opposed the revolt.
Whole Pueblos like Isleta and Pojoaque were excluded, either because of assumed
allegiance to the Spanish or because of actual Spanish civil and clerical observation and
regulation of Pueblo activities.122
This abuse and repression made revolt leaders appear prophetic. Popé was a
millennialist and spoke of Pueblo gods abandoning Pueblo peoples until the Spanish and
their religion were expelled from the Pueblo world. He promised liberation from
oppression and abundance in place of famine in the restored Pueblo world. Domingo
Naranjo, a coyote (mixed blood) from Santa Clara, raised in Pueblo traditions, suggested
using a knotted cord of tallow that would be untied each day until the day of the revolt.
Along with Alonso Caiti of Santo Domingo (whose half-brother, Pedro Marquez, was a
Spanish leader fighting against the revolt), Naranjo was one of many mixed bloods who
led the Pueblos in rebellion. That group also included Francisco El Ollita, a coyote from
San Ildefonso.123
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The leaders of the revolt planned to unleash the uprising on August 11, 1680, the
feast day of San Lorenzo. The fiesta de San Lorenzo came before the supply caravan
arrived from Chihuahua with more ammunition and horses. The Spanish would be weak
and vulnerable. Tesuque natives Nicolás Catua and Pedro Omtua were chosen as runners
who would distribute the knotted cords timing the revolution, but were captured and
tortured by maestre de campo (chief of staff to the governor) Francisco Gómez Robledo,
necessitating the early start of the uprising. In the early morning hours of August 10,
1680, Tesuque Pueblo’s resident priest, Padre Pío, awoke to find the Indian village
abandoned. Pío was killed in a volley of arrows, but his guard, Pedro Hidalgo, escaped
and sent word to Santa Fe. Pojoaque Pueblo natives killed don Joseph de Goitia, Captain
Francisco Ximenes and his family, and Petronila de Salas and her eight children.124
Pueblos first scared off horses and mules, impeding Spanish defense, mobility and
communication. The Spanish had no real military to counter the revolt. Their
settlements were spread thinly along the Río Grande and its tributaries and authorities
could barely muster a dozen well-armed troops in one area. When colonists finally
organized, their arm-bearing soldiers numbered only 150: Pueblos forces, which included
Navajo and Apache allies, numbered about 8,000. Pueblos isolated the Río Arriba from
the Río Abajo and blocked all roads to the capital. Within a few hours, 401 settlers and
21 Franciscan priests, many of whom welcomed martyrdom, were killed. The survivors
gathered at the Governor’s Palace in Santa Fe in the north and at Isleta Pueblo in the
south.
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The siege of Santa Fe thus began. Revolt leader Juan el Tano, likely of Galisteo
Pueblo, demanded the release of all Pueblo prisoners, including his own wife and child.
He also ordered all Apache, Navajo and Mexican Indians be turned over to Pueblos.
When Governor Antonio de Otermín refused, Tano led the despoliation of the barrio of
Analco, which housed many Mexican Indian allies, killing many of its residents.125
By August 21, Indian forces had cut off the water supplies of the barricaded
Spanish. In the early morning hours of August 22, Otermín led the Spanish in a final
assault on Pueblo forces, killing 350 warriors and dislodging the remainder long enough
to flee toward Isleta. Otermín had planned to rally with southern forces, charge back
north, and retake the Spanish colonial capital, but he found Isleta abandoned. Lieutenant
Governor Alonso García had already led the surviving abajeños (those living in south of
La Bajada) and Isleta Pueblo allies to El Paso. On the retreat south, the Spanish
encountered mutilated bodies, Catholic sacramental objects smeared with feces, and
fields and whole villages burned to the ground. Tewa Pueblos’ participation in the 1680
Revolt suggests that the costs of the Spanish presence, including the encomienda and
religious repression, outweighed the benefits of Spanish defense. Though Popé (Ohkay
Owingeh) is popularly accepted as the leader of the revolt, the structure of Pueblo
leadership suggests that the revolt had multiple leaders. 126 Revolt leaders from the Tewa
Basin pueblos included Popé and Tagu of San Juan; Diego Xenome of Nambé; Francisco
El Ollita and Nicolás de la Cruz of San Ildefonso; Domingo Naranjo and Cajete of Santa
Clara; Antonio Malacate and Domingo Romero of Tesuque; and Luís Tupatú of Picurís
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Pueblo, a Tiwa (non-Tewa) Pueblo. Tupatú was one of Popé’s lieutenants who after the
revolt helped enforce Popé’s orders for Pueblos to expunge Spanish influence from their
lives. Tupatú, along with Alonso Caiti of Santo Domingo, travelled across the restored
Pueblo world, imploring Puebloans to return to traditional religion, abandon Christian
names, and destroy churches, crosses and Christian images. By Popé’s orders, Tupatú
and Caiti demanded that Pueblo men abandon wives married through Catholic ceremony
or face expulsion and ordered that all Pueblos destroy Spanish livestock and fruit trees
and refrain from planting wheat and barley.127
Despite the absence of the Spanish, the Pueblo world was difficult to restore.
Spanish flora and fauna had changed the riparian landscape of New Mexico. Diseases
had also decimated the Pueblo populations, and the Pueblo world, which had been
contracting by 1630, continued to shrink after 1680. Piro, Tompiro, Jumano and Tehua
peoples east of today’s Manzano Mountains abandoned sites at Abo and Quarai in the
1670s. When Otermín attempted a reconquest in 1681, he sacked Sandia Pueblo, burning
it to the ground. Sandia refugees left the middle Río Grande valley, some fleeing to
Hopi, where they established Payupki on Second Mesa and others to Sima, a Tewa Basin
site occupied by other Tiwa and Tano refugees who settled over the deserted La Cañada
land grant.128
After 1683, Otermín was replaced as titular governor by Domingo Jironza Petríz
de Cruzate, whose attempts at reconquest were foiled by Indian uprisings in the El Paso
area, expeditions against Apaches, and an interregnum, during which he was removed as
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governor and replaced by Pedro Reneros de Posada. Jironza returned as governor of New
Mexico and mounted a bloody battle against Zia Pueblo in 1689, capturing Keresan
leader Bartolomé de Ojeda, who detailed events in western Pueblos during the revolt. He
described the death of his own grandmother, a “Christian mestiza” named Juana Maroh,
who was stripped naked, whipped, and paraded through Acoma. Tied to two Franciscan
priests, Maroh was stoned and stabbed to death. Ojeda recognized the utility of allying
with Spaniards against his Keresan and Tanoan enemies, and would become an
invaluable collaborator that aided the Spanish reconquest.129
Notwithstanding his participation in restoring the Pre-Columbian Pueblo world,
Tupatú is believed to have taken part in deposing Popé, perhaps as early as 1682 or as
late as 1689. Tupatú may have allowed some useful Spanish practices to remain,
including the planting of wheat. Winter wheat in particular would have been beneficial
to his home pueblo of Picurís, which sits at a high altitude (7,500 feet) with a cold
climate and remarkably short growing seasons. Most Pueblos continued using horses,
and many kept livestock. More pragmatic than the fanatical Popé, Tupatú was too busy
fighting to keep his influence over Tewa Pueblos to purge the Pueblo world of Spanish
influence. His own personal relationships revealed the complications of decades of
Pueblo-Hispano contact. Tupatú was married to a niece of Spanish soldier Miguel Luján,
one of Vargas’s Reconquest lieutenants who had fled during the Pueblo Revolt. From his
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initial involvement in the 1680 Revolt, Tupatú offered both fierce resistance and close
collaboration with Spanish leaders for the next three decades. His experience suggests
that no hard lines could be drawn between Pueblo and Spanish society in colonial New
Mexico.130
After the revolt the Spanish were surprised and disconsolate. They believed a
faction, possibly led by mixed bloods, coyotes and mestizos, had disturbed the peaceful
Spanish and Pueblo relations and imposed their radical views on Pueblo Indians.
Governor Antonio de Otermín and Fray Francisco de Ayeta blamed Satan for inspiring
such ungodly acts against elite Spaniards like themselves, whom they saw as agents of
the Holy Spanish Crown and instruments of Christ. Gutiérrez writes that Franciscans
accepted and celebrated the martyrdom of Franciscan friars killed in the revolt, but
denied the culpability of the twenty-one martyrs in causing the Pueblo upheaval. Writing
in 1967, Franciscan historian Angelico Chávez claims that mestizos, not pure Pueblos,
led the revolt. Focusing on Domingo Naranjo, a Santa Clara Pueblo native who
descended from a mulato, Chávez observes strict interpretive divisions between Pueblo
and non-Pueblo Indians and even deeper divisions between Pueblo Indians and their
Hispano counterparts. He considers Naranjo the embodiment of Poseyemo, a deity who
appeared as the devil incarnated as a black giant during the Revolt.131
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For all of his speculation, Chávez’s research has at least partially revealed why
the restored Pueblo world quickly fractured. According to Chávez, who cites a 1681
account taken by Otermín from a captured Alameda (Tiwa) Indian, Pope’s leadership fell
apart after the Revolt because he was feared, not loved. His radicalism, mimicked by El
Saca of Taos (1690-91), aggravated many Pueblos, and the Tewa Pueblos allied with
Picurís against Taos Pueblo to the north of the Tewa Basin and Keresan Pueblos to the
south. The restored Pueblo world looked little like the one Popé envisioned and
promised.
The brief unity that stretched across linguistic and geographic boundaries broke
down as Pueblos from north to south rejected Popé’s despotism. Popé was deposed
perhaps as early as 1681. By 1683, Luis Tupatú emerged as the leader of the northern
Pueblos, who warred with Keres tribes to the south. The horses and mules that were
chased out of Spanish and Pueblo settlements during the Revolt were quickly acquired by
nomadic Athabaskan tribes, which also faced drought and starvation, and which used
these animals to increase the effectiveness of their raids. Tupatú’s home pueblo of
Picurís and many Tewa Pueblos suffered from increased Navajo and Apache attacks in
the wake of the revolt.132
Tupatú is a fascinating and confounding colonial character who beautifully
illustrates complexity of both inter-Pueblo and Pueblo-Hispano relations during the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. He led his Pueblo, Tiwa speaking Picurís and
Tewa Pueblos against two other factions, led by Taos and Pecos to the north and east, and
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the Keresan Pueblos to the south and west, in a decade of warfare that succeeded the
Pueblo Revolt.133
When don Diego de Vargas returned to the colony of New Mexico in the fall of
1693, Tupatú negotiated peace with him. José Antonio Esquibel writes that the TupatúVargas peace accords reunited at least seven families of Spanish soldiers and Pueblo
allies, extended families separated by the Revolt. Tupatú’s own wife was the niece of
Spanish captain Miguel Luján, who spoke fluent Tewa and returned with Tupatú’s sisterin-law, who had fled the Revolt with Spanish colonists in 1680. Lucía Márquez, the
widow of Spanish soldier Pedro Márquez and sister-in-law of revolt leader Alonso Caiti
returned to her family in Nambé Pueblo. Though Tupatú wisely distrusted Spanish
intentions, Vargas’s accounts demonstrate a mutual respect between himself and Tupatú,
referring to the Pueblo leader as “Don Luis.”134
By 1693, Tupatú broke with Vargas. Three years later, Luís and his brothers,
Lorenzo Tupatú (the governor) and Antonio Tupatú (the cacique), led Picurís in an
unsuccessful revolt against the Spanish. Afterward, the Tupatú brothers abandoned their
pueblo rather than ally with the Spanish in continued inter-Pueblo warfare. They fled to
El Cuartelejo to live with a distinct Apache band on the eastern edge of Apachería, taking
Tewas, Tanos and Santa Clara natives with them. Vargas captured Antonio, killing him
for aiding the exit from Picurís to El Cuartelejo, and took his wife as a captive. The
Picurís remained at Cuartelejo until 1706. Recent work on Pueblo lands contends that the
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majority of the more than three hundred Pueblos gradually resettled Picurís in the ten
years between the revolt and a 1706 effort to bring them all back.135
Two divergent stories of their exit and repatriation to the Jicarita valley emerge.
One story states that Tupatú’s brother, Lorenzo, sent an emissary to Spanish governor
Francisco Cuervo y Valdés and asked to be repatriated. He claimed that they were
abused by the Apache and were treated as slaves.136 Another story claims that the Picurís
were compelled to return from their sojourn under Spanish guard and that they were
forcefully taken from their Apache brethren and longtime trade partners.137 Regardless of
the impetus, Governor Cuervo sent sargento mayor Juan de Ulibarri, the son of a mulatto
slave and a veteran of Vargas’s reconquest, to Cuartelejo where he negotiated with the
Apache for the return of the Picurís. For reasons unknown, the Apache, bearing Christian
crosses and relics, let them return; sixty-two Picuris, including Juan Tupatú, son of
Pueblo revolutionary Lorenzo Tupatú, reunited with their people. Picuris would never
revolt again. The Tupatús became trusted Spanish allies, who, along with Felipe and
Juan de Ye of Pecos and Bartolomé Ojeda (Keres), commanded Pueblo troops in the
defense of Spanish and Pueblo settlements from Navajo, Apache, and Ute raids in the
early eighteenth century.138
Ulibarri’s force included twenty-eight Spanish soldiers, twelve militiamen and
one hundred Pueblo auxiliaries, the latter led by José López Naranjo, son of Revolt leader
135
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Domingo Naranjo. Joseph López Naranjo, who was called Josephillo by the Spanish and
“el Español” by the Pueblos because of his proficiency in Spanish, won praise from
Vargas after his valiant leadership of Pueblo auxiliaries during the Reconquista and
during the failed Revolt of 1696. Naranjo’s brother, Lucas, was among the leaders of the
1696 Revolt. Joseph proved his loyalty by beheading Lucas and presenting his head to
Vargas.139 Joseph’s leadership of Pueblo auxiliaries during the 1696 Revolt earned him
the title capitán de gente de Guerra (literally, “captain of the men of war”; troop
commander) an honor that annoyed Spanish soldiers who believed a mestizo
commanding Indian troops was unworthy of such a title.140
How the Spanish colonial government organized land tenure before the Revolt
remains unclear. Records of land exchanges and court decisions were destroyed by
Pueblos during the revolt. Encomiendas, which were one of the only profitable
enterprises in New Mexico and one of the most cited causes of the Pueblo Revolt, were
granted widely by Spanish governors. Though they were empowered to grant lands to
settlers and contemporary Spanish governors in other provinces did grant lands, no
archive with precise information regarding land grants in pre-Revolt New Mexico has
survived. This lack of records also leaves unanswered questions regarding the
recognition of Pueblo lands by Spanish authorities.141
We do know that Pueblo rights were limited under Spanish rule, especially before
the Pueblo Revolt. Under the Spanish system, much like in the American system, Indians
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were wards of the state. A 1571 decree required that they sell all real property before a
judge. Decrees in 1573 and 1618 regulated their movement from town to town and
further defined their rights as wards under the Spanish crown. The success of the Pueblo
Revolt made the Spanish reassess their colonial plan. They had to shift their system from
the repression of Pueblos under the greed of encomenderos and zeal of Franciscan
missionaries to regulating the Spanish relationships with Pueblo peoples. The first step in
this transformation was the reconquest of New Mexico, led by don Diego José de Vargas
Zapata y Luján Ponce de León Contreras, a well-connected peninsulare (Spaniard born in
the Iberian peninsula) who bought the governor’s post.142
The traditional narrative of Vargas’ peaceful reconquest describes his triumphant
entry into Santa Fe and his warm reception by Picurís leader Luis Tupatú. But that story
ignores the three years of war (1694-96) after the recapture of Santa Fe, and Vargas’s
skillful and often brutal manipulation inter-Pueblo rivalries.143 In the Río Abajo, Vargas
used Pecos leaders Juan and Felipe de Ye as allies in his war against southern Tiwas.
Bartolome Ojeda, the Keresan ally who aided Vargas and carried on an internecine war
against western Keres tribes, reportedly witnessed the brutal execution of his mestiza
grandmother during the Revolt. This act alone unlikely compelled Ojeda to join Vargas
and aid the Spanish in regaining control of New Mexico. Instead, Vargas offered the
power that tipped the scales in Ojeda’s favor in his war against other Keresan tribes and
the ongoing war between Keres, Jemez, Taos and Pecos against Tewa Basin Pueblos and
Picurís.144
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Picurís warriors served as scouts in Vargas’ grinding war with Taos Pueblo, until
the Picurís fled to the plains to live with the Cuartelejo Apaches. Sandía Pueblo had been
abandoned since 1681, its refugees moving west to live with the Hopi, where they would
remain until 1742, when more than four hundred returned to the Río Grande Valley. By
1762, Governor Tomás Velez de Cachupín confirmed Sandía Pueblo’s lands, which they
now shared with displaced Hopi.145
Before the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, a village known as La Cañada stood on the
south side of the Santa Cruz River. The destruction of documents during the revolt
leaves uncertain the size or importance of the settlement. Nevertheless, the proximity of
the Santa Cruz Valley to Nambé Pueblo to the southeast, and Santa Clara and San
Ildefonso Pueblos to the southwest suggests that it may have been an invaluable
settlement for both the missionary efforts of Franciscan friars and encomendero
exploitation before the revolt.
As one of the northernmost Hispano settlements, La Cañada likely felt the wrath
of the Indian rebellion early. At the time of its resettlement in 1695, San Cristóbal and
San Lázaro Pueblo exiles took over the abandoned Spanish town of La Cañada.146 All
other southern Tewa (Tano) Pueblos, including San Marcos and Galisteo, were
abandoned.147 In spite of their appeals to be allowed to remain until harvest, Vargas
demanded that the San Lázaro and San Cristóbal peoples relocate up the Santa Cruz
145
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River to Chimayó and Pueblo Quemado. After they complied with Vargas’s order, the
San Lázaro and San Cristóbal natives joined the ill-fated Revolt of 1696. Escaping the
punishment that would likely follow, the Indians fled north to San Juan Pueblo and west
to Hopi-Tewa Pueblo of Hano in present Arizona.148
On April 22, 1695, Vargas arrived at La Cañada with a group sixty-six settlers
and their families. He named the new settlement La Villa Nueva de Santa Cruz de Los
Españoles Mexicanos del Rey Nuestro Señor Don Carlos Segundo. Ramón Gutiérrez
notes that the invocation of the term españoles was a statement of differentiation from the
Indians and an attempt to connect to the conquest more than a statement of pedigree or
purity of blood.149 Santa Cruz was soon struck with scarcity and starvation, caused by
the settlers’ lack of knowledge of the environment that led to massive crop failure. By
September 1695, residents petitioned Governor Vargas for aid and permission to relocate
to the other side of the Santa Cruz River.150 De Vargas responded by installing a
“missionary preacher as their guardian and minister” and, by October, bolstered the
population with an additional twenty families recently arrived from Zacatecas. In
February 1696, he responded to settler petitions and sent much needed aid in seeds and
livestock.151
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San Ildefonso gave one of the strongest defenses against the re-imposition of
Spanish power. From the highly defensible Black Mesa, Tewa Puebloans tenaciously
fought Vargas’s re-imposition of Spanish colonial rule. Rumors of an impending largescale revolt, on par with the 1680 revolt, had swirled around New Mexico since 1694,
when Vargas held the loyalty of only a handful of Pueblos, including eastern Keres and
Pecos, but relied heavily on key Pueblo auxiliaries to consolidate control over the
colony.152 By 1696, a widespread revolt broke out, with only Tesuque in the Tewa Basin
not participating. Unlike the 1680 revolt, no leader emerged and planning the revolt was
left to competitive factions, which engaged in war with each other as much as with the
Spanish. From the Black Mesa of San Ildefonso Pueblo, Lucas Naranjo briefly emerged
as the leader of the most powerful faction until he was captured, killed, and beheaded by
his brother, Joseph Naranjo, who was loyal to Vargas. Picurís was abandoned in light of
the revolt, going the way of Sandia, Jacona and Cuyamungue, which were all vacated in
the years following the 1680 Revolt and before the Vargas’ Reconquista.153
By 1700, after twenty-years of intermittent war, Spanish-Pueblo relations
changed. Now, they began cooperating against mutual enemies, the Apaches, Navajos,
Utes, Comaches and other surrounding tribes that threatened to despoil both Spanish and
Pueblo towns. Spanish colonial policies and the growing colonial population transformed
relations between Pueblos and non-Pueblo Indians. The growing captive slave trade, in
particular, embittered non-Pueblo Indians against both Hispano and Pueblo populations.
Genizaro populations of detribalized Indians, which were largely former captives, but
also included significant numbers of exiled Pueblo Indians, emerged from this tension
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and occupied both the physical and social periphery of northern New Spain, reshaping the
borderlands milieu.154
From 1692 through the 1730s, the Spanish rebuilt their New Mexico colony.
Scholars have reasoned that the Spanish needed to restore national pride after their
humiliation in the Pueblo Revolt, when sedentary and seemingly passive agricultural
peoples dislodged Spanish power on the edges of its empire. Appearing weak, the
Spanish had to protect their vast unsettled claims in North America from other European
powers, especially France, which traded with Pawnees west of France’s principle
settlements in French Louisiana and Illinois. The success of the restored colony of New
Mexico also rested on the Spanish ability to re-establish the needed buffer between the
populous settlements and the raiding tribes that wrought havoc on settlements in northern
Mexico. Lastly, returning Pueblo Indians to the Catholic faith re-engaged the Spanish
with evangelization of native peoples, still an essential part of the colonial process in the
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.155
While the rumored threat of other European powers motivated the protection of
the colony, real challenges to the early colony came from the increasingly powerful
nomadic tribes that surrounded it. When the Spanish and Pueblo were at war from the
1680s through the 1690s, Apaches and Navajos used horses for quicker and more precise
raids. Governor Francisco Cuervo y Valdes attempted to strengthen the Spanish
communities and defend Pueblo settlements with the use of Pueblo auxiliaries. His plan
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was to go on the offensive against the emboldened Navajos, who lived to the west of the
principle Río Grande settlements. Captain Roque Madrid made a successful raid on the
Navajos in 1705. Accompanied by three hundred Pueblo auxiliaries, Madrid burned
Navajo maize fields and took women and children captive. Early eighteenth century
Navajo raids slowed, but did not stop. The ever-more-powerful Comanche displaced the
Jicarilla Apache from their homeland north of the Llano Estacado and controlled the vast
territory that separated colonial New Mexico from colonial Texas.156
The end of the Spanish-Pueblo War tenuously united the Spanish and Pueblo
world, but divided Pueblo villages into traditional and pro-Spanish factions. Inter-Pueblo
relations changed as well. Many Pueblo communities did not trust each other after
internecine wars that raged during the Spanish absence and continued after the Spanish
reconquest. This enmity lasted until the 1720s, when relationships between Pueblos and
Hispanos united to fight against increasing Apache and Navajo raids. Independent
Pueblo relationships with Apache and Navajos tribes and bands defied Spanish control.
The increasing use of Pueblo warriors as Spanish auxiliaries, however, deepened the
growing enmity between Pueblos and their non-Pueblo trading partners.157
After the reconquest, the Spanish quickly reconfigured land tenure in the Tewa
Basin, asserting their dominance and again replacing the native land systems with a
Spanish land grant system. The Spanish crown seemed to learn the lesson of the Pueblo
Revolt. Spanish colonial officials were ordered to avoid unnecessary impositions on
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Pueblo land when granting mercedes, and the Crown reissued colonial laws and
distributed them throughout the empire. Among these codes were the Siete Partidas, the
medieval statutory code compiled under Castilian King Alonso X (“El Sabio” or “the
Wise”) and the Leyes de las Indias, or the Laws of the Indies, 148 crown ordinances
issued in 1573, a full century before the Pueblo Revolt, which were either unknown to or
ignored by many Spanish colonial officials.158
The Leyes de las Indias were a compilation of nearly a century of Spanish legal
work. Abuses of colonial power had been quickly acknowledged by King Ferdinand II,
who issued Ley Burgos in 1512, after Christopher Columbus’s decimation of Hispañola
and the destruction of whole native societies. After Bartolomé de las Casas issued his
Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies in hearings in 1542, King Charles revised
and strengthened these laws as the Leyes Nuevas,159 which aimed to preserve the native
populations and revise the destructive encomienda system to achieve these ends. Three
decades later, in 1573 King Phillip II issued Ordenanzas de Descubrimiento, Nueva
Población y Pacificación de las Indias, which imposed new regulations on Spanish
discovery, on new Spanish settlement, and on the Spanish “pacification” of Indian
populations.160
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While the Crown issued new regulations regarding the pacification of the Indies,
New World administrators continued to press native populations for tribute and even
forced captured natives to work as slaves in obrajes (textile mills typically operated with
coerced labor), many of them privately run by civil and even ecclesiastical officials. In
New Mexico, the decade leading up to the Pueblo Revolt was marked by droughts,
famines, disease epidemics, and despotic governors and fanatical priests, who abused
Pueblo Indian labor and punished their holy men as apostates. It remains uncertain
whether Spanish legal codes, particularly those regulating the treatment of native peoples,
made their way to the northern frontier. If they did reach outposts like New Mexico,
most early colonial governors ignored them.161
Early land grants (allegedly) made to Pueblos on the eve of the Reconquest
marked a new era in Pueblo-Spanish relations. The Spanish appeared to recognize native
land rights and curbed colonial abuses of Pueblo Indians.162 As early as 1689, expelled
Spanish governors working from El Paso del Norte recognized the property rights of
Pueblo Indians. This act had no real effect on the actual situation or on Pueblo ownership
of land. Spain’s recognition of Pueblo rights to their lands was done more to facilitate
later civil administration and signal to Spanish settlers that Pueblo lands would be
unavailable, in the hope to head off friction between colonists, missionaries,
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administrators and Pueblo Indians. By recognizing Pueblo lands, governors also
demonstrated to the Spanish crown that they were abiding by the Laws of the Indies.163
The story of the Pueblo land grants dates from the Reconquest, when Governor
Domingo Jironza Petriz de Cruzate captured Keresan native Bartolomé Ojeda during his
raid on Zia Pueblo in 1689. Jironza interrogated Ojeda, asking whether the Pueblos
would again revolt. Ojeda answered generally that the Pueblos would not rise up against
Spanish rule. He also described the exact boundaries of the Pueblos in metes and bounds,
and Jironza tacitly recognized Pueblo ownership of their land.164 Whether any actual
grants were ever issued by Jironza remains in question. In 1891, handwriting expert
William M. Tipton threw out the Cruzate grants as forgeries when examining Laguna
Pueblo claims under the Court of Private Land Claims.165 What remained were claims by
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Pueblo Indians that their papers were either held in Santa Fe or taken by surrounding
Catholic priests, local alcaldes, or Hispano settlers.

Figure 2: San Juan (Ohkay Owingeh) Pueblo Map, c. 1860
San Juan Pueblo (Ohkay Owingeh) proper was at the center of its four square league, east
of the Río Grande. The pueblo was once located above the confluence of the Río Grande,
at the center of the grant, and the Río Chama, running from the northwest corner to the
center. Map by John W. Garretson, deputy surveyor. Sandra K. Mathews-Lamb,
"'Designing and Mischievous Individuals': The Cruzate Grants and the Office of the
Surveyor General" New Mexico Historical Review 71:4 (October 1996), 346.
Even without the spurious 1693 Cruzate grants, Pueblo lands were protected
under the Recopilación de las Leyes de las Indias, the codified Spanish “Laws of the
Indies,” which instructed the proper settlement of the New World. The Laws of the
Indies specified that civilized Indians should have sufficient “water, lands, woodlands,
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access routes, and farmlands and an ejido one league long where the Indians can have
their livestock without having theirs intermingle with others belonging to Spaniards.”166
The premium placed on limiting contact between Pueblos and Spaniards was thereby
codified into Spanish colonization law. This practice had ramifications for legal
interpretations centuries later.167
Practice defied codification. With Santa Cruz as a hub, the Spanish quickly
expanded their settlements. They limited Pueblo lands and often invaded these reduced
lands, which had imprecise boundaries that did not correspond to actual Pueblo usufruct
rights. Despite the success of the Pueblo Revolt, the Spanish did not recognize Pueblo
peoples as equals after the Reconquest. Myra Ellen Jenkins writes that Pueblo peoples
were “(l)egally in a dual position, both vassals and wards” of the Spanish crown.
Attorney G. Emlen Hall agrees, and points out that the recognition of Pueblo lands and
the Pueblo league (discussed below) was “based on societal welfare” and the “beneficent
protection of a vulnerable indigenous population rather than the recognition of previously
acquired property.”168 The supposed issuing of Pueblo grants was not, then, recognition
of Pueblo sovereignty. It was an attempt at anticipating and preventing conflict.
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New Mexico historians have also debated the origin of the notion that Pueblo
grants should be restricted to four square leagues, about seventeen thousand acres,
measured from the center of the Pueblo village. Jenkins opines that the only reference to
the four square league in Spanish law came from a 1573 cédula (writ) issued by King
Phillip II, but that this law referred to grazing lands only.169 More recently, Malcolm
Ebright, Rick Hendricks and Richard Hughes have written that the four-square-league
rule was generally accepted as standard law by 1704 and was referred to as the “laws of
our sovereigns.”170 During the eighteenth century, the four square Pueblo league caused
exploitation and offered protection. Spanish authorities both ignored and upheld the rule,
and Pueblo Indians proved able to defend their rights to their patrimony, even using
Spanish law to acquire nearby grants that impinged their lands.
At their most basic level, land grants can be divided into two categories. First,
grants, such as the Francisco Montes Vigil and Sebastián Martín grants were dispensed to
an individual or to a group of individuals. Second, community grants such as the Santo
Tomás Ápostol del Río de Las Trampas and Nuestra Señora del Rosario San Fernando y
Santiago (Truchas) grants were given to a group of individuals and typically carried the
name of a community or locale.171 In their 2008 response to the 2004 GAO report on land
grants, lawyers Ryan Golten and David Benavides provide an operational definition of
community land grants, both contrasting them with private grants and emphasizing their
unique impact on land tenure:
A community land grant was a very distinct type of land ownership pattern in
New Mexico from an individual grant. Under Spanish and Mexican law,
169

Jenkins, “Spanish Land Grants,” 114-115.
Ebright, Hendricks and Hughes, Four Square Leagues, 7.
171
Ebright, Land Grants and Lawsuits , 23-24.
85
170

community land grants were designed to directly provide the necessary resources
to sustain an entire community. The key land ownership feature for community
grants was true common lands, meaning lands that were not privately owned but
were community-owned and freely used by all grant residents. A small portion of
the lands within community grants were private, e.g, house lots and privately
owned irrigated lands, but those private lands were surrounded by much larger
expanses of common lands, to which all land grant residents had free access and
which were critical to successful small-scale farming and stockraising activities
upon which the local economy was based. Land grant boundaries were
deliberately designated so as to encompass the various ecological zones that
would contain the whole array of critical resources. The common lands could not
be sold but were to be held in perpetuity by the land grant in its corporate capacity
as a quasi-public entity.

In contrast, an individual land grant was regarded as private land in its entirety.
Private grants were the private property of the grantee in their entirety, and their
use, ownership, and marketability were purely private decisions. All decisions
regarding the grant, e.g., who could enter and use the grant, or the sale of any
portion of the grant, were the grantee’s decision alone.172
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Complications arise from this simplistic classification. Community leaders who
organized the petition and wrote on behalf of the community grant were often listed as
the primeros pobladores (first settlers) when the grant was made, and the petition and
title papers were completed. Private grantees, on the other hand, often listed the names of
settlers who pledged to settle on the grant if it was approved. These common-law
practices gave rise to confusion over whether the grant was a community grant with the
primeros pobladores listed first on granting paperwork, or whether the grant was a
private one listing all settlers. This imprecision also allowed for mendacious
interpretations by land speculators during the American territorial period, with
adjudication going awry (see chapters 3 and 4). It also allowed the American judicial
system to reject communal land ownership and reduce community land grants to a
corporate land-holding system under the term “tenancies in common,” a legal
interpretation effectively privatizing common lands and making them vulnerable to
speculation.173
Common p-ractices connected land use on both private and community grants.
The basis of a communal land-use ethic was the ejido, the shared communal lands that
were a part of community grants and that came to be a part of many private grants.
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ownership that nonetheless retained usufruct rights. Though similar to Pueblo communal
ownership, in which the Pueblo as a corporate body owned the land as private property,
ejidos derived from post-feudal Castilian ideas of common property. Influenced by
Islamic land-use philosophies, particularly the law of thirst, Spanish common land-use
practices expressed the idea that no man shall have exclusive right to the resources of
nature. The user could only call his or her own those things that he or she produced from
the land in the form of crops, animals, or other goods. Thus, possession of the land was
dependent on the act of using it. Though these lands were private in the sense that they
were owned, anyone associated with a grant theoretically had rights to use the communal
resources of grant and no individual rights preempted greater communal rights. Many
private grants made in the Spanish-colonial period came to incorporate an ejido, albeit
informally, over the course of the century.174
Private grants were the most-common early Tewa Basin land grants, and most
early grants went to veterans of the Pueblo-Spanish War. In 1700, veteran José Trujillo,
requested and received near San Ildefonso Pueblo lands that evolved into the villages of
La Mesilla and Polvadera.175 In 1707, Bartolomé Sánchez petitioned for and received a
grant that skirted the entire western and southern boundaries of the San Juan Pueblo
Grant, enveloping the entire tract that divided Santa Clara and San Juan Pueblo lands and
creating a peculiar L-shaped grant that touched the Río Chama in the north and the Río
Grande in the South.176 This was possible because the disruption of Tewa pueblos in the
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nearly-twenty-five-year Pueblo-Spanish War weakened Pueblo communities and made
their lands vulnerable and available to new Spanish settlements.177
The lands of the Pueblos of Cuyamungue, Jacona, and Pojoaque immediately
drew the interest of colonial elites. In 1699, Governor Pedro Rodríguez Cubero granted
two parcels near Pojoaque Pueblo. The San Isidro tract went to Francisco de Anaya and
later to Juan Trujillo, whose son-in-law, Juan de Mestas, received a disputed grant that
ran along the southern boundary of the Pueblo of Pojoaque near the abandoned Pueblos
of Cuyamungué and Jacona.178 Mestas later sold his portion to Ignacio Roybal, who was
granted the former lands of Jacona Pueblo by Governor Cubero in 1702.179
Myra Ellen Jenkins writes that when the Pojoaque Pueblo Grant was restored in
1707, two additional grantees of lands near Pojoaque sold their tracts to the pueblo. One
sale was complicated when Miguel Tenorio de Alva resold his lands to Baltasar Trujillo
and Pojoaque Pueblo appealed to Juan de Ateinza, the protector de los Indios. Though
Atienza petitioned Governor Juan Ignacio Flores Mogollón to revoke Trujillo’s
purchased grant, the case ended without resolution. Other portions of Pojoaque Pueblo
lands, many falling outside the unsurveyed four-square-league Pueblo grant, were granted
to non-Indians. Even Juan Paez Hurtado, the capitán general under Vargas, who served
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as acting governor following Vargas’s second term, received a grant for lands between
Pojoaque and Nambé from Governor Vargas in 1704.180
No colonial Tewa Basin grants were more controversial than the Town of Jacona
Grant, Town of Chamita Grant and Matías Madrid Grant. The Town of Jacona was
originally a private grant bestowed to Captain Jacinto Peláez in 1699 and purchased by
Ignacio de Roybal, another conquest veteran, in 1702. Two years later, Roybal asked that
the grant be enlarged to accommodate his livestock and to enable him raise sufficient
food for his family, and Governor Vargas obliged. Nearly at the same time, Matías
Madrid supposedly received his 1702 grant from Governor Vargas’s successor, Pedro
Rodríguez Cubero, who awarded the lands on the condition that they not infringe on
previous vested rights. By 1704, Governor Juan Páez Hurtado pressured San Ildefonso to
accept Ignacio Roybal’s claim to lands well within the four square leagues promised to
the pueblo. In 1715, Hurtado also revalidated Madrid’s 1702 grant to Juana Luján,
ignoring its dubious legality and obvious conflict with San Ildefonso Pueblo lands.181
Madrid had previously attempted to sell the land to San Ildefonso, which refused to buy
back its own land from the Spanish interloper. Luján ignored the shaky title and
purchased the claim.
For the next fifty years, San Ildefonso fought for intervention by Spanish
authorities against the extended families of Ignacio Roybal and Juana Luján, whose cattle
herds routinely trespassed on its lands and destroyed the pueblo’s gardens. The Roybal
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and Luján clans claimed that San Ildefonso Pueblo population possessed more lands than
its shrinking population could use. The enlarged Roybal and Luján grants stretched far
into the limited boundaries of the abandoned Jacona Pueblo. Both grants overlapped
each other and infringed on the leagues of the both San Ildefonso and Pojoaque Pueblo
grants. A survey in 1763 revealed that Roybal’s claim penetrated deeply into San
Ildefonso Pueblo’s league, resulting in a lengthy lawsuit that was litigated into the
American territorial era.182 This 1763 decision limited Roybal’s claim to the lands west of
Juana
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Luján’s lands, which were stopped at to the eastern boundary of San Ildefonso Pueblo.
Ignacio Roybal’s house, nearly a mile east of the western boundary of Pojoaque Pueblo,
was now far from his granted and recognized lands. After his heirs partitioned Roybal’s
lands in 1756, his son Mateo Roybal secured a confirmation of his lands by Governor
Juan Bautista de Anza in 1782. The community of Jacona gradually came into being,
along with Hispano communities at Nambé, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso and Cuyamungue in
the early 1800s.183
In 1742, San Ildefonso faced yet another challenge when Governor Juan Domingo
de Mendoza granted Santa Cruz resident Pedro Sánchez’s request for lands near Pajarito
Canyon, south and west of the pueblo. Longtime Santa Cruz alcalde Juan José Lobato
put Sánchez in possession of the lands with San Ildefonso natives standing as witnesses.
The next year, Sánchez devoted his energies to the Black Mesa Grant north of San Juan
Pueblo, which he and his father-in-law, Miguel Quintana, won in 1731, but failed to
occupy. Juan García de la Mora and Diego de Medina petitioned Governor Mendoza for
the Black Mesa Grant, which they claimed that Sánchez abandoned. Mendoza agreed
with their request and rescinded the grant from Sánchez and Quintana and granted the
Black Mesa to García de la Mora and Medina.184 When Sánchez died in 1749, his heirs
claimed the grant as their property, even though Sánchez had abandoned the grant before
perfecting title. Despite protests from San Ildefonso Pueblo, which led to its official
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revocation in 1763 (see below), the grant remained undisturbed and his heirs claimed the
lands and sold them to José Ramón Vigil (my ancestor) in 1851.185
Other Tewa Basin Pueblos also faced outright intrusion by Hispano grants. The
Town of Chamita Grant was given to Antonio Trujillo in 1713 by Governor Juan Flores
Magollón (1712-1715). Trujillo was put in possession by Sebastián Martín, the Santa
Cruz alcalde who owned the vast nearby grant (see below). Trujillo’s requested tract sat
at the center of the San Juan (Ohkay Owingeh) Pueblo Grant. Despite the obvious
conflict, succeeding Governor Juan Domingo de Bustamante (1723-1731) complied with
Trujillo’s request to revalidate his grant. In 1740, a Spanish court heard the protest of
San Juan Pueblo against the Chamita, but no administrative action was taken. Over the
next century, Chamita served as a trading center and by the 1850s, it had grown into a
town of thirteen hundred people, one of the largest settlements in the Tewa Basin.186
Santa Clara Pueblo also faced adversity in the reconfigured Spanish land system
of the eighteenth century. Bounded by the Pojoaque Pueblo, Nambé Pueblo and Jacona
Grants to the south, the Santa Cruz Grant to the east, and the Bartolome Sánchez Grant to
the north, Santa Clara undertook litigation during the Spanish and Mexican periods to
protect its lands from the devices of surrounding Hispanic settlers. When the heirs of
Juan and Antonio Tafoya began to plant crops illegally on their Cañada de Santa Clara
Grant in the mid-1700s, Santa Clara Pueblo successfully fought to keep it designated a
grazing grant. This would prohibit the Tafoyas from irrigating with the Santa Clara
Creek and negatively impact Pueblo irrigation. In 1763, Governor Tomás Vélez
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Cachupín voided the Tafoyas’ property and granted Cañada de Santa Clara lands to the
pueblo.187
Tewa Basin Pueblos faced increased land seizures by Spanish settlers for the next
century. The next chapter continues to discuss how new land tenure patterns developed
within New Mexico colonial society, drawing cooperation and protest from Pueblo
Indians, who faced a growing Hispano population, which would eventually surround
every Tewa Basin Pueblo. By the end of the eighteenth century, the carrying capacity of
New Mexico’s arid landscape limited settlement and forced Hispano and Pueblo
populations, already confined by Indian raids, closer together. Changes in notions of race
and purity wrought by economic progress in the late-Spanish-colonial period eased
liberal transition to Mexican Republican notions of igualdad (equality) that were at the
heart of Mexican Independence. But difficulties in the Mexican Era, as we will see,
paved the way for American conquest and a new political order and land tenure regime.
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Chapter 2: Shifting Land Tenure and Pueblo-Hispano Relations in the Tewa
Basin in Colonial Spain and Republican Mexico, 1710-1848
Early-eighteenth-century grants established an exploitative land tenure pattern in
the Tewa Basin. The colonial elite, many of them former members of Vargas’s
reconquest army, were awarded lands of the ailing Native pueblos, particularly those that
had risen up against the Spanish in 1680 and 1696. But even the elite often treated their
land claims with a communal consciousness. They invited both indios and vecinos to use
or settle their lands and attempted to stabilize their corner of the colony and feel even a
little less isolated. By the end of the eighteenth century, economic reforms and the
emergence of new colonial economies signaled changes in both Spanish-Pueblo relations
and the recognition of the ecological limits of the Tewa Basin. The declining Pueblo
population faced challenges from vecinos outside the pueblos and from members inside
their native communities. Some Pueblos had adopted Spanish culture and set aside
Pueblo obligations or sold Pueblo lands for individual profit. These challenges of the
late-Spanish-colonial period spilled into the Mexican Era, from 1821-1846. The advent
of Mexican Independence complicated Pueblo relations with another foreign sovereign,
now a republican government. Insufficient as they had been, Spanish protections for
Pueblos were removed, and Hispanos who had yearned to possess Pueblo lands targeted
these tracts with even more fervor.
Episodes of Pueblo-Hispano collaboration did emerge from the Mexican period,
most famously in the Río Arriba Rebellion of 1837, and transferred to the early American
period with the Taos Revolt of 1847. But U.S. expansion quickly brought New Mexico,
along with half of Mexico’s northern territory, under American control. This chapter
ends by discussing the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848, a document created to
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protect both Hispano and Pueblo land and water rights decades after the Treaty ended the
Mexican-American War and brought the Southwest under the control of an expanding
American empire.
~~~
Despite land-tenure friction, the story of Hispano land grants in the Tewa Basin
was, nonetheless, not one of outright exploitation or expropriation. Early grants to the
colonial elite challenged concepts of what defined private and community lands, even
divisions between Pueblo and Hispano communities. Sebastián Martín was a resident of
Santa Cruz and a captain in the New Mexico militia when he received a land grant from
Governor José Chacón in 1711. Born in New Mexico in 1672, Martín fought in the
second Pueblo revolt and was rewarded with the enormous 54,387-acre grant at the site
of an abandoned 1703 grant to other Spanish-Pueblo War veterans who failed to perfect
their title. Positioned north of San Juan Pueblo, the grant embraced little irrigable land
but offered vast grazing lands. Martín and his four brothers constructed acequias,
cultivated fields, and rebuilt a large four-room house called “Nuestra Señora de la
Soledad de Río Arriba,” which had occupied by Juan de Dios Lucero de Godoy before
the Pueblo Revolt. Martín’s hacienda was complete with torreones (watch towers) to
protect his grant’s inhabitants from Indian attack. He eventually acquired his brothers’
interests in the grant, and although he lost the deeds that evidenced his sole ownership,
Martín had his grant reconfirmed to him 1712.188
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Figure 4: Sebastian Martín Grant, c.1870. The massive Martin (1712) grant contained
little arable land, but vast pasture lands. It stretched from San Juan Pueblo in the west to
Picurís Pueblo in the east, and bordered the Town of Las Trampas Grant (1751), to which
Martín donated a strip of land upon its founding. Oversize Folder 105, Series 301,
Thomas B. Catron Papers, MSS 29, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries,
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. Accessed online at
http://econtent.unm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/NMWaters/id/3708/rec/34
July 15, 2014.
After 1712, the Sebastián Martín Grant’s history diverged from typical private
grant history. When Martín became alcalde (justice of the peace) of Santa Cruz, nearly
eight miles south of his hacienda, in 1714, he faced the possibility of losing his grant for
failure to maintain residence on it. He increased the population by constructing new
ditches and opening new lands to cultivation while he offered the uplands as a de facto
ejido, a tract of communal land, which settlers could use to graze their cattle, sheep and
goats. San Juan Pueblo, which adopted yet compartmentalized many Spanish customs,
also utilized the vast Sebastián Martín Grant, eventually grazing its own cattle on the
ejido alongside their Hispano counterparts. Martín even granted a portion of his acreage

[Upper River, or Upper Río Grande]”, perhaps a reflection of the isolated and barren
landscape that the Sebastian Martín Grant occupied.
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to San Juan Pueblo natives in exchange for their labor to construct the “first great
irrigation ditch on the east side of the Río Grande.”189
The mutual use of the Martín grant did not, in and of itself, create amity and
community between Pueblos and Hispanos. They more often engaged in disputes over
grazing rights in the San Juan Pueblo area. In 1718, Hispanos were cited for and banned
from using San Juan Pueblo lands. Spanish violations of Pueblo lands possibly a
byproduct of the increased use of the Sebastián Martín Grant, which likely drew interest
to the area. Quarrels like this had taken place since the seventeenth century and were for
decades handled by alcaldes through customary law, which purposefully eschewed
systematization and allowed local authorities to interpret the law in the context of each
situation. When alcaldes, teniente alcaldes (subprefects), lieutenant governors and
governors ruled against Pueblo title or interests, natives often took their complaints to the
protector de los indios, or to procuradores who served in the protector’s absence, or even
travelled to New Spain to advocate their rights. This common-law system contained the
flexibility to allow local authorities to ensure that in legitimate disputes, decisions would
be equitable. Although no parties won decisions completely in their favor, neither did
they typically lose every legal point in a case. But this legal tradition also allowed
patterns of abuse to flourish across decades, especially as the Hispano population grew
and the Pueblo population contracted.190
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The Sebastián Martín Grant continually evolved. Sometimes it appeared as a
community grant; other times, a private grant. On some occasions, Martín took actions
typical of an elite Spanish soldier in early colonial New Mexico. In 1706, he ignobly
bought the lands of his deceased brother, Felipé, from his grieving widow. Felipé’s
children sued Sebastián in 1727 for a portion of the grant lands, winning tracts near San
Juan Pueblo. In 1723, Martín had purchased lands near Taos Pueblo to expand his
property along the Río Grande between the Santa Cruz de la Cañada and Taos, two of the
largest Spanish towns north of villa de Santa Fe. Seven years later, Governor Juan
Domingo de Bustamante ordered Martín to vacate the lands because of cattle
encroachments on Taos Pueblo lands. Martín sued Bustamante, but he lost.191
Martín later proved willing to aid other colonial settlements. In 1751, he granted
a strip of land to the Santo Tomás Apóstol del Río de Las Trampas Land Grant. This act
enabled the community control of additional headwaters and aided the successful
settlement of grant property vulnerable to Indian raids. By his death in 1763, Sebastián
Martín had expanded his Nuestra Señora hacienda to create a twenty-four-room
compound with a courtyard to protect further his lands and settlers on his lands from
Indian attack.192 In subsequent decades, the Sebastián Martín Grant remained an
important resource to the larger regional population. Martín’s heirs and other local elites
used the vast tract to graze their livestock, as did the surrounding Hispanos and Pueblos,
who treated its lands like the ejido of a community grant. His lands physically linked San
191
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Juan Pueblo with Picurís, and the two pueblos maintained their preconquest relationship
by travelling across lands claimed by Martín.
Sebastián Martín was a confounding and contradictory character. At times he
acted as the venal elite Spaniard; at others he was community-minded patrón. Martín’s
operation of his private grant represented a change that many early private Spanish grants
gradually underwent. Land grant historian Malcolm Ebright considers private grants that
eventually operated wholly or partly as community grants, “quasi-community grants.”193
In 1725, Martín’s brother Francisco Martín, along with Juan Márquez and Lasaro
de Córdova, petitioned for and received a piece of land lying north of the Sebastián
Martín Grant and along the Río Picurís. Referring to the funnel like shape of the narrow
river valley, they called the property el Embudo de Picurís. According to Francisco
Martín, Márquez and Córdova, the land was more than three leagues from Picurís and
would not impair the rights of the pueblo. Picurís nonetheless disputed the grant during
its inspection period and claimed usufruct rights over the valley, where the natives
cultivated corn fields and grazed horses. Annoyed by Picurís’s resolve to keep Spanish
settlements far from its land, Governor Juan Domingo de Bustamante and Santa Fe

193

Malcolm Ebright, “Explanation of Types of Land Grants in New Mexico”
http://www.southwestbooks.org/grantstypes.htm. “Grants made to Hispano individuals
who owned the entire grant and could sell it after the four year possession requirement
was met. Unlike Hispano/private grants however, Hispano/quasi-community grants
included an explicit or implied promise by the grantee to bring other settlers on the grant,
and when those settlers arrived the grant would be operated like a community grant. The
new settlers would receive tracts of private land with the implied right to use the
unallotted land for grazing, wood-gathering, and other traditional uses. In US courts,
these rights have been not enforceable by the users of the "common lands" unless they
were expressed in writing. See Lobato v. Taylor opinion re the Taylor Ranch in the San
Luis Valley.”
101

alcalde Miguel José de la Vega y Coca ignored the pueblos protest and awarded the grant
to Martín, Márquez, and Córdova.194
Like other recipients of private grants, these three grantees lured settlers to their
property to aid in perfecting title. Eight families settled San Antonio de Embudo,
building a defensive plaza and torreones to protect themselves from Comanche and Ute
raids, which plagued the northern stretches of the colony. Acequia historian and
community scholar Estéban Arellano, an heir of Francisco Martín, hypothesizes that
Francisco’s defensible villages emulated Sebastián’s compound at Nuestra Señora de la
Soledad de Río Arriba.195 Comanche raids had forced the abandonment of Embudo by
1750, but was later resettled. In 1776, Fray Francisco Atanasio Domínguez reported
fourteen families totaling nearly seventy people were living on the grant, which gradually
operated as a community rather than private grant.196
Many early-eighteenth-century private grants repeated patterns of appropriation
and oppression that had emerged in the first decades after Reconquest. Through the
1730s, private grants often infringed directly on Pueblo grants. In 1731, colonial elites
won confirmation of the Cuyamungue Grant, which included the lands of the abandoned
Cuyamungue (K'uuyemugeh) Pueblo and abutted Tesuque Pueblo and lands of other
wealthy landowners.197 In 1739, reconquista veteran Vicente Durán y Armijo petitioned
Governor Domingo de Mendoza for lands that, he claimed, bordered Nambé Pueblo.
When Nambé protested the grant, Mendoza ordered Santa Cruz alcalde Juan García de
194

Ebright, Land Grants and Lawsuits, 127-129.
Juan Estevan Arellano, Enduring Acequias: Wisdom of the Land, Knowledge of the
Water (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014), 8, 20-21.
196
Ebright, Land Grants and Lawsuits, 130-131.
197
J. J. Bowden, “Cuyamungue Grant” in “Private Land Claims in the Southwest,” 1969,
www.newmexicohistory.org, (accessed 6 June 2012).
102
195

Mora to find comparable lands where Durán y Armijo could settle. Rather than locating
tracts away from Nambé Pueblo, García de Mora approached the Nambé cacique and
secured for Durán y Armijo two tracts amounting to about fifty-seven acres in the middle
of the Nambé Pueblo Grant. Armijo sold these tracts to Gaspar Ortiz in 1798, and Ortiz’s
heirs retained the lands through the American territorial period, gaining infamy as the
smallest grant (fifty-seven acres) approved by American courts.198

Figure 5: Cuyamungue Grant, c. 1875. Settled atop the ruins of the abandoned Pueblo
de Cuyamungue, the Cuyamungue grant infringed on Nambé and Pojoaque Pueblo lands
before it was confirmed for a mere 600 acres, the balance of a 5,000 acre claim that did
not conflict with Pueblo lands. Oversize folder 74, series 301, Thomas B. Catron Papers,
MSS 29, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, UNM, Albuquerque.
Accessed online at
http://econtent.unm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/NMWaters/id/3654/rec/3
Private Spanish era-grants changed hands almost incessantly. Fervent
speculators, many Hispano elites attempted to acquire massive tracts of land under the
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guise of settlement, and then sold the land, parcel by parcel, to actual settlers who would
irrigate and farm crops, and graze livestock. For more than seventy-five years after the
Reconquest, elites in the Río Arriba jockeyed for land grants with no intention to make a
home but to gain personal profit. In 1735, Sebastián Martín’s brothers Geronimo and
Ignacio petitioned Lieutenant Governor Juan Paez Hurtado for lands north of the Pueblo
de Abiquiú and east of the Piedra Lumbre Grant. Conceding to their request, Hurtado
granted a large, vaguely defined tract of grazing lands that he called the Barranca
Grant.199 Governor Gervasio Cruzat y Gongora immediately revoked the grant upon his
return from México, but Geronimo Martín retained his claim to a tract that he
cultivated.200 The Plaza Blanca and Plaza Colorada Grants were granted north of
Abiquiú in 1739, both lying east of Martín’s land.201 The massive Juan José Lobato
Grant was given to the longtime Santa Cruz alcalde by Governor Joaquín Codallos y
Rabal in 1744. Supplanting the 1724 Cristóbal Torres Grant, Lobato’s tract conflicted
with at least a half-dozen grants, overlapping at least four that were delivered into
possession by none other than Diego Torres, Cristóbal’s son.202
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Like the Sebastián Martín Grant, the massive Lobato Grant was gradually
transformed into a community grant. Estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000 acres, it
also spawned speculation. Elite landowners Estevan García de Noriega and Antonio
Ulibarrí petitioned Governor Cruzat y Góngora for portions of the Lobato Grant that they
had cultivated before 1744, when Torres petitioned for the Lobato Grant. Others
followed suit, asking for recognition of their sitios and suertes (the small privately owned
tracts) inside the private Juan José Lobato Grant. Lieutenant Governor Hurtado again
acted unilaterally and assented to their request, only to have Governor Cruzat y Góngora
rescind Hurtado’s actions and reject the smaller claims. Still, the communities persisted
and the Juan José Lobato Grant stood as an unstable leviathan, accounting for nearly 10
percent of all land in the Tewa Basin, housing small communities vulnerable to later
speculation.203
Private grants dominated the early Tewa Basin colonial landscape. After the
Santa Cruz de la Cañada Grant was established as a community grant by Vargas in 1695,
elite residents used the villa as the base from which they expanded Spanish possession of
the Tewa Basin. But community grants did emerge in the 1730s with the Ojo Caliente
Grant. Bestowed on Antonio Martín, the grant was abandoned by 1747, when brutal Ute
and Comanche raids on Abiquiú and Ojo Caliente forced the contraction of Spanish
settlements in the Tewa Basin. In 1751, Governor Tomás Vélez Cachupín and
Lieutenant Governor Bernardo Antonio Bustamante y Tagle ordered the reoccupation of
Ojo Caliente. Many settlers resisted the governor’s orders. Santa Cruz alcalde Juan José
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Lobato, whose own grant also suffered Indian raids, implored the settlers to resettle the
grant or lose their lands. Many Ojo Caliente mercedarios resettled, the grant, which
retained a population from 1752 through 1765.204
By 1766, Ojo Caliente was again abandoned. Vélez Cachupín was completing his
second term when the grant’s erstwhile settlers cited the lack of a committed community
population to fight or discourage Indian raids as the principal reason for their recurrent
abandonment of their grant. They complained that many settlers simply used their sitios
and suertes, which were designated for home plots, as grazing lands and left their
untended animals to forage, a practice that drew more Indian raids. Vélez Cachupín’s
successor, Pedro Fermín Mendinueta (1767-1777), took a different approach to resettle
the grant. When Mendinueta found genízaros (detribalized and Hispanicized Indians,
many being former slaves) living on the grant alongside vecinos, he ordered that all Ojo
Caliente settlers, regardless of race or class, be issued deeds recognizing their property
rights.205
Ignoring Mendinueta’s incentives, vecinos still refused to reoccupy the grant,
even after Mendinueta threatened fines, jail time, and militia service as punishment.
Genízaros, on the other hand, were willing to take the significant risk of living on the
edges of the Spanish empire, where little to no protection from Indian raids was available.
Malcolm Ebright notes that the genízaro population of Ojo Caliente included detribalized
Utes, such as Andrés Muñiz, who seemed to serve as intermediaries between the
mercedarios and the Ute and Comanche. But even the hardy genízaro settlers of Ojo
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Caliente eventually succumbed to raids, and the grant remained abandoned after
Governor Juan Bautista de Anza’s (1778-1788) peace with the Comanche and Ute.
When Governor Fernando de la Concha re-granted Ojo Caliente in 1793, the grant was
still largely a mixed-blood village with a few Spanish vecinos living among the largely
genízaro population.206
Genízaros occupied an ambiguous place in colonial New Mexico. Maligned in
the Spanish-colonial period and misunderstood under the regimes of both Mexico and the
United States, genízaros are now a celebrated part of nuevomexicanos’ complicated
history. Historian James Brooks writes of genízaros as cultural intermediaries who
bridged the important relationships between central Hispano communities and the socalled indios bárbaros who surrounded the weak northern reaches of the Spanish empire.
The complex captivity and slavery system from which genízaros emerged early in the
colonial period arguably held off outright warfare in favor of livestock and slave raids
and reprisals, and redistributed human capital in a resource-poor and comparatively
depopulated area.207 Their introduction into colonial society was, nonetheless, through
punitive raiding and slavery. Although illegal by Spanish law, slavery was
simultaneously concealed, condoned and reinforced by Spanish and Mexican
administrations desperate for frontier settlement and labor. 208
Torn from their communities and traded through a vast slave network, genízaros
occupied a middle ground, neither part of their former tribes nor of the society in which
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they lived. The lack of a sizeable and malleable Pueblo population justified the
kidnapping of young Indian women and children, especially Navajos, in the minds of
many elite Hispano settlers.209 Brooks claims that captives served as “agents of conflict,
reconciliation, and cultural redefinition,” creating alliances in active ways beyond their
status as a tradable commodity, and redefined and expanded the “cultural and geographic
meaning of human exchange.”210 Indian slavery and captivity connected empires and
Indian nations in ways that other forms of exchange could not. Genízaros origin,
nonetheless, came from violent raids, kidnapping of desirable women and young children
servants and the murder of men and older boys.211
Estevan Rael-Gálvez’s portrays Indian captivity and genízaros’ relationship to
Spanish-colonial towns as less benign and mines the lasting effect of slavery on Hispano
villages and Pueblo communities. He focuses on American Indian captivity in northcentral New Mexico and southern Colorado centered in Taos, Abiquiú, Santa Cruz de La
Cañada and San Juan de Los Caballeros. Living on the periphery of Hispano settlements,
genizaros lived between the Spanish and nomadic Indians on ground painted to justify
the dichotomy of civility and barbarity in the Spanish-colonial narrative.212 Imposing the
system of debt peonage and trumpeting the rhetoric of “Christian rescue,” colonial elites
and sub-elites successfully negotiated changes from monarchy to republicanism and
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democracy, while they ignored liberal demands to end Indian slavery and maintained
dominance over natives and poor populations for several centuries.213
Colonial administrators such as Governor Juan Bautista de Anza thought of and
treated Indian groups differently. Anza’s perceptions were guided largely by the
parameters of the long-negotiated Spanish-Indian relationships that varied from tribe to
tribe and from Pueblo to Pueblo. Nuevomejicanos, excoriated by colonial administrators
for their stubborn self-interest, appear differently in the borderlands milieu described by
Brooks. As their interests paralleled, Hispanos and genízaros allied in common-usage,
often created a unified voice, and aired their shared concerns to Spanish-colonial
authorities Santa Fe. These short-term alliances were subject to the negotiation of both
sides, and when their mutually created terms were breached, they quickly fell apart. 214
Genízaros gradually became the core population of many communities. Colonial
Santa Fe’s barrio of Analco was a genízaro community occupied by Tlascalan Indians
before the Pueblo Revolt. Genízaros resettled the community after the Reconquest. In
1733, a diverse group of eastern detribalized Indians, who identified themselves as
genízaros, petitioned Governor Gervasio Cruzat y Góngora for the lands of the
abandoned Sandía Pueblo. Cruzat refused, and these genízaros, of Pawnee, Apache,
Kiowa, Tano Jumano and Aa origin, remained in Indian Pueblos and Hispano land grant
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communities, including the Plaza de los Genízaros in Belén. When the 1744 settlement
of Abiquiú was abandoned in 1747 and again in 1748, Governor Vélez Cachupín turned
to genízaros to resettle the town, which had routinely succumbed to Indian raids.215
Despite his misgivings about the genizaro character, Vélez Cachupín recognized
their abilities in both fighting and making peace with the very nomadic Indians who
threatened the survival of communities in colonial New Mexico. In The Witches of
Abiquiu, Rick Hendricks and Malcolm Ebright credit Vélez Cachupín for recognizing the
serial abuse that genízaros suffered as servants in Spanish households and for extending
privileges held by vecinos to the growing genízaro population. His 1754 grant to the
genízaro Pueblo de Abiquiú was truly revolutionary, elevating the social status of
detribalized Indians, even if he did so by offering them a settlement that would be
extraordinarily difficult to maintain. Vélez Cachupín, nonetheless, treated the genízaros
as Indian subjects and organized their settlements like an Indian Pueblo, even assigning a
patron saint, Santo Tomás, in naming the community, Santo Tomás del Pueblo de
Abiquiú.216
According to Ebright and Hendricks, the 1754 Pueblo de Abiquiú Grant was
settled primarily by a mix of detribalized Hopi, Plains Indians and Tewa exiles. Some
were former servants and others were refugees who found home in a mixed community
on the edges of Spanish civilization. Anthropologist Frances Leon Swadesh writes that
Pueblo presence in genízaro communities such as Abiquiú was widespread: “In practice
many genízaros were [also] Pueblo Indians who had been expelled from their home
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village for being overly adaptive to Hispanic culture. They asked for and received rights
on Genízaro grants.”217

Figure 6: Pueblo de Abiquiú Map, 1880. The Abiquiú grant was restricted on its
eastern, western and southern boundaries by the Juan José Lobato grant. The genízaro
community faced speculation and converted into a livestock cooperative and opted to be
treated as a Hispano community grant rather than a pueblo grant. Oversize folder 28,
series 301, Thomas B. Catron Papers, MSS 29, Center for Southwest Research,
University Libraries, UNM, Albuquerque. Accessed online at
http://econtent.unm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/NMWaters/id/3654/rec/3

217

Frances Leon Swadesh, Los Primeros Pobladores: Hispanic Americans of the Ute
Frontier (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), xviii. Swadesh
identified Hopi, Zuñi and Santa Clara Pueblo Indians in the population of Abiquiú.
111

Treated at times as an Indian Pueblo and at other times as a community land
grant, el pueblo de Abiquiú would confound government officials, petty bureaucrats and
scholars. For decades they sought convenient, even dualistic definitions to understand
and explain a complex community whose history defied easy classification. With their
poor and less-powerful populations that lacked prestige, Abiquiú and Ojo Caliente served
as important buffer communities, protecting central plazas and communities from Indian
raids. But genízaros were far from the only colonial peoples placed in dangerous,
contested zones. The Cañón de Carnué Grant in Tijeras Canyon was settled in 1763, as
protection for the Villa de Alburquerque and other Río Grande Valley settlements.218 As
the Hispano colonial population grew, community grants on the periphery of core private
grants, offered protection.
Although illegal, Hispano-Pueblo contact remained common throughout the
Spanish and Mexican periods. Only by emulating Puebloan horticultural methods
developed over centuries in cold high-desert climates were Hispano colonists able to
adapt their foodways and agricultural techniques to unfamiliar soils and climates.
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Spanish colonists also imitated their native neighbors by gathering and hunting in the
surrounding mountains and lowlands to supplement small yields from farm crops.
Settlers extended the riparian areas of small river basins and valleys by aggressively
engineering acequia irrigation systems, often supplanting existing and abandoned Indian
ditches.219
On newly created cropland, Spanish colonists altered the ecology of the Pueblo
homeland, introducing cattle, sheep, apricots, peaches, plows, shovels, and hoes as well
as indigenous agricultural methods indicative of their Mesoamerican roots. Though
Pueblo natives successfully maintained their society apart from Spanish influence
through selective borrowing of their animals, foods, and technology natives borrowed
nonetheless. Those natives who ventured too far from tradition were cast out of native
communities, joining the growing mixed-blood population on the periphery of the
northern province.220 With the unsolicited presence of Spanish colonists on or nearby
Pueblo lands, the contact between “the natives and the newcomers,” although frowned
upon by Franciscan missionaries, became frequent and routine.
With close and daily contact between Hispanos and Pueblos, convivencia
(coexistence) grew.221 The adoption of horses into plains and basin Indian societies
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triggered defensive cooperation and encouraged the establishment of Hispano villages
near Pueblos. At the same time, the Spanish missionary assault on native religion and
tradition compelled Pueblo Indians to become more-guarded and cognizant of preserving
their traditions while they incorporated Spanish technology, crops, and livestock, a
process called compartmentalization by anthropologist Edward Spicer and applied to
Pueblos by Santa Clara Pueblo anthropologist Edward P. Dozier.222
Dozier argues that Pueblo society remained largely unchanged through its
selective adoption and deliberate compartmentalization of Spanish technology, diet and
cultural traits. Writing from the Pueblo perspective, Dozier states, “Since Spanish
contact, Pueblo socioceremonial compartmentalization, particularly the Spanish-Indian
dichotomy, appears to have great permanence.”223 In other works, Dozier cites the Pueblo
practice of expelling members no longer living traditional lives as a means to preserve
native traditions from Spanish influence. The movement of Hispanicized Pueblo
expatriates partially explains complementary figures of Hispano population growth and
Pueblo population decline in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.224
Thus, the barrier between Pueblo and Spanish villages was porous at best.
Scholars note that Hispano-Pueblo marriages numbered about three hundred unions

Spanish colonists mixed ungrudgingly with their Pueblo neighbors . . . with notable
exception of the 1680 Pueblo Revolt . . . Pueblos and Spaniards engaged in violence
against each other only in exceptional cases . . . much of life . . . moved more quietly
toward convivencia, coexistence, setting precedents for well-known accommodations of
later centuries.”
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between 1694 and 1846. Historian Ramón Gutiérrez, using the diligencias matrimoniales
(pre-nuptial investigations) required by the Catholic church and the Mexican diocese of
Durango, suggests Pueblo-Hispano intermarriage was the exception. His work on
exogamy in Spanish and Pueblo villages, however, demonstrate significant and sustained
connections between Pueblo and Hispano communities spanning the entire colonial era.
From 1700-1846, fifty marriages connected Santa Cruz de La Cañada, the villa and oldest
land grant in northern New Mexico and mother grant for most grants in the Tewa Basin,
with Truchas and Chimayo. Over roughly the same period (1694-1846), two dozen
marriages connected Santa Cruz with the Pueblos of Nambé (8), Pojoaque (5) and Picurís
(11).225 Though the rate was half that of inter-village Hispano marriages, Pueblo-Hispano
intermarriage was nonetheless a significant practice, uniting Pueblo and Hispano peoples,
communities and families.
A century and a half of adjacency surely wrought intimate relationships that even
the diligencias matrimoniales could not record. In fact, Spanish population growth in
times of little in-migration from Mexico suggests that rapid increases before 1790 can at
least partially be attributed to Pueblo migration into Hispano villages. Pueblo expulsion
of dissidents or nonconformists had retained the social and cultural integrity of their
communities for centuries before Spanish contact. By the colonial era, Pueblo outcasts
found receptive communities in New Mexico and enhanced the growth of the genízaro
and poor Hispano population that settled community land grants.226 These genízaro
grants, such as Abiquiú and Ojo Caliente, often buffered the private land grants of the
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elite colonial Hispanos, who were largely responsible for the most destructive
encroachment on Pueblo lands.227 The Santa Gertrudis Lo de Mora Grant was petitioned
by natives of Peñasco and Picurís, as well as by villagers from the Cristobal de la Serna
Grant, whose ancestors were Puebloans from the abandoned Pueblo Quemado near
Chimayó.228
The role that Pueblos played in colonial captivity and kinship is unfortunately lost
in narratives fashioned from colonial correspondence. Both fluctuations and stagnancy in
the Pueblo population were brought about by violent raiding and disease.229 Pueblos
appear almost as hapless victims reliant on Spanish diplomacy to compromise with
Plains, Basin, and western natives, who raided Hispano and Pueblo villages.230 Their
relationship with genizaros, which included significant numbers of exiled or expelled
Puebloans, is even more ambivalent, but very real through bonds of kinship and through
trade and military relations.231
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Pueblo warriors played an important role in the defense of the often feeble colony
during the eighteenth century. Vargas relied on leaders such as Bartolomé Ojeda, Juan de
Yé and Joseph Naranjo to fight other Pueblos in sporadic internecine warfare. Historian
Oakah Jones writes that Pueblo auxiliaries evolved into a significant part of the colonial
military force countering nomadic raids and often dwarfed the small citizen militia
recruited or drafted from Hispano villages.232 Along with genízaros, Pueblos were
preferred to these often unwilling Hispano soldiers. Spanish captains attributed Pueblo
intensity in battle to long-held animosities between the Pueblos and nomadic enemies.
But their knowledge of multiple languages and cultural habits of nomadic enemies made
them critical assets in making both war and peace. Campaigns against Apaches, Navajos,
Comanches and Utes were typically organized at and launched from Indian Pueblos.
Toward the end of the Spanish colonial campaigns against the surrounding native tribes,
Pueblos and Hispanos integrated into the same military regiments in their campaigns
against the raiding nomadic Indians.233
The Pueblos’ legal and economic status under the Spanish crown further
complicated their relationship with the growing non-Pueblo population. As wards of the
Spanish crown, Pueblo Indians needed the representation of colonial bureaucrats, both
protectores de indios and procuradores in legal matters. As colonial vassals, they owed
their allegiance to a foreign sovereign, who attempted to regulate their relationships with
non-Pueblo peoples, both Hispanos who surrounded and coveted their lands, and seminomadic tribes whose relationships with Pueblos worsened during the long eighteenth
century. Despite the lack of direct representation in the courts, scholars have argued that
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Pueblos understood their legal rights and protected their lands from Spanish
encroachment and themselves from missionaries’ abuses.234
After the Pueblo Revolt, however, the crown took measures to guard against
further revolts that threatened Spanish control of the northern frontier. It published and
distributed the Laws of the Indies, granting Indians their traditional lands, and assigning
legal protectors to represent Indian communities in courts and other measures. Charles
Cutter’s and Malcolm Ebright’s examinations of the office of the protector de los Indios
have revealed the complexity of Pueblo Indian status in colonial New Mexico. The
protectores effectively served as the natives’ legal voice in everything from complaints
about abuses at the hands of friars to land disputes with surrounding villages. Though the
office lay vacant from 1717-1810, argues Cutter, the Pueblos’ previous experience with
the protectores had prepared them to utilize procuradores effectively in their stead.235
Ebright writes that Pueblos faced decades without protection between 1717 and 1749,
when Governor Tomás Vélez Cachupín arrived in New Mexico and proved the most
energetic and evenhanded governor of the early colonial era.
According to Ebright, what set Vélez Cachupín apart from other governors was
his equitable treatment of all native groups within his jurisdiction, including both Pueblo
and non-Pueblo Indians. Governor Gervasio Cruzat y Góngora (1731-1736) had denied a
1731 petition of genízaros living in Belén for the site of the abandoned Sandia Pueblo.
The governor wanted to assign the genizaros to standing pueblos rather than assign them
their own lands. The genízaros replied that they were unwanted by the Pueblos, but
234

See Charles R. Cutter, The Protector de Los Indios in Colonial New Mexico
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), and Ebright, “Advocates for the
Oppressed,” 305-339.
235
Cutter, The Protector de Los Indios, 107.
118

Cruzat stood his ground.236 Governor Joaquín Codallos y Rabal grew incensed when
Antonio Casados, the genízaro captain of Belén, attempted to press his case for the
protection and rights of genízaros on the Belén Land Grant with the viceroy in México
City. But Vélez Cachupín’s governorship in the mid-eighteenth century (1749-1754;
1762-1767) and Juan Bautista de Anza’s in the late eighteenth century (1778-1788)
empowered protectores de los indios like Felipe Tafoya and Carlos Fernández to achieve
an impressive level of legal equity.237
Vélez Cachupín’s predecessors, however, continued to award largely private
grants to Spanish settlers. In 1742, Governor Gaspar Domingo de Mendoza, who
approved the Durán y Armijo Grant on Nambé lands in 1739, dispensed the Caja del Río
Grant to Captain Nicolás Ortiz for his military service to the colony.238

236

Ebright, “Advocates for the Oppressed,” 305-339; 316-318.
Ibid, 333.
238
Benavides and Golten, Response to the 2004 GAO Report, appendices, 44-45. See
also J. J. Bowden “Gaspar Ortiz Grant,” from “Private Land Claims in the Southwest.”
119
237

Figure 7: Caja del Rio Grant, c. 1880. (from collection) “Sketch of Caja del Rio Land
Grant No. 39. 72,000 Acres. Blue line represents areas surveyed, red line denotes land
granted. Canada Ancha arroyo connecting to Rio Grande at Mesa Gigante.” Oversize
Folder 22, Series 301, Thomas B. Catron Papers, MSS 29, Center for Southwest
Research, University Libraries, UNM, Albuquerque. Accessed online at
http://econtent.unm.edu/cdm/ref/collection/NMWaters/id/1964

Mendoza also awarded the Black Mesa Grant, west of the Sebastián Martín Grant and
north of San Juan Pueblo, to Santa Cruz alcalde Juan García de la Mora and Diego de
Medina. He then approved the 1743 petition of four Chimayó residents for the Santo
Domingo de Cundiyó grant, which stretched from the headwaters of the Río Santa Cruz
above Chimayó in the west to the Sierra Mosca in the east. The grantees soon dug
acequias and brought the narrow riverine valley along the Río Cundiyó under cultivation.
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Indian raids in the 1750s compelled settlers to maintain permanent residences in Chimayó
and commute to their fields in Cundiyó. The grant was resettled by 1776, when Fray
Domínguez visited the settlement during his inspection of New Mexico villages.
Domínguez seemed skeptical of the Cundiyó population’s origins when he remarked that
the “citizens of this Cundiyó pass for Spanish. They speak a simple Spanish, as do their
servants, who are of various classes.”239

Figure 8: Santo Domingo de Cundiyó Map, 1896-1900. Cundiyó was granted in 1743.
It lay east of Santa Cruz and Chimayó and south of the Truchas Grant. It claimed the
illusive Pueblo Quemado Grant as its northern boundary. Oversize Folder 120, Series
301, Thomas B. Catron Papers, MSS 29, Center for Southwest Research, University
Libraries, UNM, Albuquerque. Accessed online at
http://econtent.unm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/NMWaters/id/3712/rec/11
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The Santo Domingo de Cundiyó Grant was settled over the abandoned Diego de
Velasco Grant. Governor Juan Domingo de Bustamante had granted the lands to the
Reconquest veteran in 1725, but complaints by Nambé Pueblo about Velasco’s abuses
and absentee ownership led Governor Henrique de Olavide y Michelena to rescind the
grant in 1738.240 In 1743, Governor Mendoza apparently granted the San Francisco
Javier del Pueblo Quemado Grant on another unoccupied portion of the former Velasco
Grant. Citing anthropologist Charles Briggs, Ebright notes that the site was once a Tano
Pueblo abandoned because of incessant Navajo and Apache raids. The name “Pueblo
Quemado,” which translates to “burned town,” references the charred ruins of the
abandoned Tano Pueblo.241
The original papers of the Pueblo Quemado Grant were lost, leading to confusion
over the grant’s boundaries. It was referenced as the northern boundary of the Santo
Domingo de Cundiyó Grant in 1743. After abandonment in 1748, the Quemado Grant
was resettled, and by Fray Dominguez’s visit in 1776, Pueblo Quemado had grown to 52
families of 220 people.242 In 1744, Governor Joaquín Codallos y Rabal approved Juan
Benavides’s request for a grant in the headwaters of the Río Tesuque, south and west of
Tesuque Pueblo. Benavides had purchased the lands from Pedro Vigil, who had received
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the grant only a year earlier.243 In 1752, Vélez Cachupín awarded the Cañón de Río
Tesuque Grant to Juan de Gabaldón, his extended family and other settlers.244 The grant
abutted the Río de Tesuque Grant, and the nebulousness of the two grants’ boundaries led
to controversies during adjudication in the American territorial period. They also sat at
the headwaters of the Río Tesuque, undoubtedly affecting the flow of waters to Tesuque
and other Pueblos downstream. But during the defensive crisis of the 1750s, the Santo
Domingo de Cundiyó, Pueblo Quemado, Río de Tesuque and Cañón de Río Tesuque
grants expanded the settlement of the southeastern Tewa Basin, protecting both Santa
Cruz and Santa Fe, to the south.
When Vélez Cachupín became governor in 1749, he inherited a colony
weathering a defensive crisis and teetering on the verge of collapse. Santa Cruz, the
oldest community at the heart of the Tewa Basin, was badly overpopulated and lacked
sufficient grazing lands to sustain its population. To relieve this situation, Vélez
Cachupín shifted the land tenure patterns in the Tewa Basin. He generally preferred
community land grants and limited private grants during his first term. Vélez Cachupín’s
policies reflected his belief that communal grants created more-stable communities and
the heirs were more invested in the success of the grant and less likely to abandon their
private tracts when raids made life difficult or dangerous. In 1750, Vélez Cachupín
contended with the abandonment of the Ojo Caliente (1751), Abiquiú (1747) and
Embudo (1750) community land grants. Over the course of his two terms as governor
from 1749-1754 and 1762-1767, he re-established Ojo Caliente, Abiquiú and Embudo
243
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and created the Las Trampas and Las Truchas Grants, both of which survive to this
day.245

Figure 9: Testimonio, Town of Las Trampas Grant, 1751. Signed by longtime Santa
Cruz alcalde Juan José Lobato, the tattered original testimonio outlined private tracts
assigned to the original settlers. New Mexico Office of the State Historian,
newmexicohistory.org
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Figure 10: Nuestra Señora del Rosario, San Fernando y Santiago del Río de las
Truchas Grant, 1892-1896. The 1754 Truchas claim absorbed the lands of Pueblo
Quemado, much to the chagrin of heirs of the village of Quemado, known for more than a
century as Córdova. Oversize Folder 122, Series 301, Thomas B. Catron Papers, MSS
29, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, UNM, Albuquerque. Accessed
online at http://econtent.unm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/NMWaters/id/3714/rec/1
Both the Las Trampas246 and Truchas247 grants have received considerable
scholarly attention. Las Trampas was granted in 1751 with a considerable donation of
land from Sebastián Martín, whose own private grant contained at least one community
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that was vulnerable to raids. Ebright presumes that Martín hoped to obtain the good will
of Vélez Cachupín and the labor of Las Trampas’s settlers by donating land on the
eastern portion of his grant to aid this new settlement.248 Whatever his motivation,
Martín donated some 1,640 varas249 of land to the new settlement. While this constituted
a very small portion of the Las Trampas Grant, it extended the tract to cultivable
lowlands needed to make the grant tenable.
Vélez Cachupín quickly approved the petition of twelve families from Santa Fe’s
Barrio de Analco, a community inhabited by genízaros, mulattos and remnant
populations of Mexican Indians who settled New Mexico after serving in Vargas’s
Reconquest. He instructed Santa Cruz alcalde Juan José Lovato to put the settlers into
possession of the Santo Tomás Apostol del Río de Las Trampas Grant. Lovato assigned
individual tracts and identified tierras de pan llevar, aguas, pastos y abrevaderos (wheat
growing land, waters, pastures and watering places) and the massive ejido, which
grantees would need for defense, for cazas (hunting grounds) and leñas (fuelwood). The
Sebastián Martín Grant formed nearly the total western boundary of the grant. The
southern boundary of the four-square-league Picuris Pueblo Grant abutted the northern
portion of nearly half of the grant.250
Three years later in 1754, Vélez Cachupín approved the petition of eleven
residents of Chimayó and Pueblo Quemado for the Nuestra Señora del Rosario, San
Fernando y Santiago del Río de las Truchas Grant, a tract he had promised the residents
when he granted the Las Trampas Grant in 1751. The grantees’ intimate knowledge of
248
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the tract suggests their use of it before they were officially allowed to settle the grant.
Residents of both grants were pressured by Vélez Cachupín and Lovato to complete the
construction of acequias and bring lands under cultivation as quickly as possible. The
governor and alcalde understood that massive private grazing grants like Martín’s were
unlikely to develop communities needed to sustain a population in the rugged Sangre de
Cristo Mountains, where long winters limited growing seasons, and intermittent raids by
Utes, Comaches and Jicarilla Apaches terrorized residents.251
The two communities were complemented by a private grant Vélez Cachupín
dispensed to Francisco Montes Vigil, II, an elite Hispano from Santa Cruz. Montes Vigil,
who is one of my ancestors, was the son of Francisco Montes Vigil, I, a veteran of the
Pueblo-Spanish War, who was granted the expansive Alameda Grant in the Río Abajo in
1710. He eventually sold the grant and moved to Santa Cruz de la Cañada, where he
raised his family, including his son, the younger Francisco Montes Vigil.252 The 1754
Francisco Montes Vigil Grant enveloped the entire mountain tract that divided Truchas
and Las Trampas. When Vélez Cachupín approved the grant, he instructed Alcalde Juan
José Lobato to ensure that the grant’s boundaries did not infringe on the lands of the Las
Trampas and Truchas grants. Melchor Rodríguez and Juan Arguello of Las Trampas and
Salvador de Espinosa and Juan de Díos Romero from Truchas were present during the act
of possession and lodged no protest. Ebright writes that the Montes Vigil grant was
similar to the Sebastián Martín Grant, a large private grant that demonstrated aspects of a
community grant. The Montes Vigil tract was a private grazing grant, with portions
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operating as common lands for residents from Truchas, Trampas and Santa Cruz de la
Cañada.253
Though the Francisco Montes Vigil Grant was not given until 1754, the heirs of
Montes Vigil and Martín had speculated in Pueblo land since the 1730s. In 1732, Pedro
Montes Vigil, son of the elder Francisco Montes Vigil (I) and brother of the younger
Francisco Montes Vigil (II), purchased a tract of Picurís Pueblo land from native
governor Luis Romero.254 Hendricks, Ebright and Hughes write that the community of
Santa Bárbara was settled on Pueblo land along the Río Chiquito south and east of Picurís
Pueblo in the early 1740s, possibly at the present site of Peñasco. Relatives of Sebastián
Martín, including Jacinto, Antonio and Juan Francisco Martín, petitioned Governor
Joaquín Codallos y Rabal for the grant in 1739, claiming that they wanted to offer
protection to Picurís Pueblo. The pueblo, for its part, seemed to offer no protest, though
Jacinto, who served as the lieutenant alcalde of Picurís, may have coerced the pueblo to
remain silent. Codallos apparently allowed the community to remain, but did not
recognize its lands with a formal grant.255
Settled on the western slopes of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, the Las Trampas
and Truchas grants faced the ecological limitations of their high altitude. Vélez
Cachupín’s designation of pan de llevar (wheat lands) suggests that other crops were
difficult to produce in growing seasons cut short by late-spring frosts and early-autumn
253
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snowfalls. Las Trampas and Truchas almost immediately engaged in disputes over the
area’s resources. In 1755, friction sparked when Trampas herederos (heris) attempted to
appropriate for their exclusive use the Rito de San Leonardo del Ojo Sarco. Truchas won
the support of Vélez Cachupín and exclusive use of the waters, only to have Trampas
revive the dispute in 1836 and win use of this important water source.256

Figure 11: Map of Ramón Vigil Grant, 1912. The massive grant, which Malcolm
Ebright labels as fraudulent, passed through the hands of a Spanish priest and the founder
of the Los Alamos Boys school before its fell into the hands of Tewa Basin entrepreneur
and sheepman Frank Bond, who later sold it to the federal government. Judith Machen,
Ellen McGehee and Dorothy Hoard, Homesteading on the Pajarito Plateau, 1887-1942
(Los Alamos, N.M.: Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2012), 23.

Vélez Cachupín achieved impressive transformations during both his two terms as
governor. He rescinded the Tafoya Grant of the Cañada de Santa Clara and transferred
its title to the Santa Clara Pueblo. In 1763, he revoked the massive Pedro Sánchez Grant
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/ Ramón Vigil Grant that threatened resources critical to San Ildefonso Pueblo. The grant
was a private grazing grant encompassing much of the land below the Pajarito Plateau.
The Sánchez / Vigil Grant also maintained the nearly constant interest of speculators.
Originally granted to Pedro Sánchez in 1742, the grant was only lightly cultivated before
Sánchez abandoned his claim and requested the vacant Bartolome Trujillo claim near
Abiquiú. San Ildefonso Pueblo complained that the Sánchez / Vigil Grant invaded its
Pueblo league, leading to its official revocation by Vélez Cachupín in 1763. Ramón
Vigil, a descendent of the Montes Vigil clan and my matrilineal ancestor, nonetheless
purchased the grant from Pedro Sánchez’s heir Antonio Sánchez in 1851. Antonio sold
his own and his seven siblings’ interest. Vigil, who served as alcalde of Santa Cruz in the
1840s, was perhaps one of the richest men in the Tewa Basin. In 1856, represented by
Supreme Court of New Mexico Territory Justice John S. Watts, he submitted his petition
for confirmation of his grant, which was approved by it on June 21, 1860, the same day
Congress confirmed the Sebastián Martín Grant.257
During his second term from 1762-1767, Vélez Cachupín deviated from his
preference for community grants in the Tewa Basin. Responding to increased raiding by
Utes and Jicarilla Apaches north and west of the Basin, Vélez Cachupín awarded the
Piedra Lumbre and Polvadera grants to Pedro and Juan Pablo Martín Serrano, who had
requested lands lost by settlers killed in Indian attacks. Descendants of Sebastián Martín,
the Martín Serranos were granted the lands on the condition that they not impair the
rights of other neighboring grants, particularly the Pueblo de Abiquiú, which Vélez
257
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Cachupín took great care to protect. When the Polvadera Grant was disputed by its
previous owners, Vélez Cachupín proved hesitant to disturb Juan Pablo Martín Serrano’s
claim and awarded the plaintiffs land in the Río Abajo. In 1807, the heirs of Pedro
Martín Serrano were awarded the Juan Bautista Valdez Grant by Governor Joaquín del
Real Alencaster, who also awarded the vast Cañón de Chama Grant (or San Joaquín del
Río de Chama Grant) north of the Tewa Basin. The Martín Serranos thus controlled
hundreds of thousands of varas of largely grazing lands west of Abiquiú, on the NavajoApache-Ute frontier. Ebright claims that while the Martín Serranos operated the Piedra
Lumbre as a private grant, the Polvadera and Juan Bautista Valdez grants came to be
operated as quasi-community land grants.258
Vélez Cachupín’s land grant strategy, which included both privileging community
land grants and encouraging private grants to operate as communal lands, was only part
of a broader policy to counter the Indian raids that threatened eighteenth-century colonial
New Mexico. He mixed trade and warfare to achieve and maintain peace with the
Comanche and Navajo. When his successor, Pedro Fermín Mendinueta, dismantled his
diplomacy and re-engaged in war, the Tewa Basin’s Pueblo and Hispano communities
united in a defensive war against the Comanche to the east and Navajo to the west. This
258

Malcolm Ebright, “Piedra Lumbre Grant,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories, vol. 11, 3-5;
“Polvadera Grant,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories vol. 12, 1-2; “Juan Bautista Valdez,”
Land Grant / Pueblo Histories vol. 7, 1-2. The community of Cañones, which operated as
a community grant with ejidos and other communal land-management aspects, emerged
from the Valdez grant. See Paul Kutsche and John R. Van Ness, Cañones: Values,
Crisis, and Survival in a Northern New Mexico Village (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1981); John R. Van Ness, “Hispanic Land Grants: Ecology and
Subsistence in the Uplands of Northern New Mexico and Southern Colorado,” in Land,
Water, and Culture: New Perspectives on Hispanic Land Grants, ed. Charles L. Briggs
and John R. Van Ness (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987), 141-214;
and John R. Van Ness, Hispanos in Northern New Mexico: The Development of
Corporate Community and Multicommunity (New York: AMS Press, 1991), 258-262.
131

policy evolved into so-called punitive expeditions, offensive raids that accelerated and
expanded the captive slave trade and brought more Comanche and Navajo children and
their mixed captives into Tewa Basin households. 259
Between 1777-1787, Governor Juan Bautista de Anza restored peace to the
colony, but in much more violent ways than Vélez Cachupín had. Anza inherited a
colony in crisis after Mendinueta proved incapable of agile diplomacy and only provoked
more brutal warfare, especially with the Comanches. After killing Cuerno Verde in 1779,
Anza made peace with eastern Comanche leader Ecueracapa and allied with the
Comanche against their mutual enemy, the Apache, who had expanded their territory and
power north and west of the Tewa Basin.260 Anza oversaw a colony in transition, bringing
a peace that allowed the colonial population to grow, its economy to prosper and a
regional culture to flower.261
Relationships faltered with diminished Indian raids. Though Pueblos and
genízaros were conscripted to defend the province’s central settlements, the two
communities disassociated as defensive necessities decreased. Spaniards used Pueblos as
defenders of New Mexico’s central settlements, but marginalized them in the economy
that was growing under the Bourbon Reforms. The complex, racially divided caste
system that placed Pueblos and genízaros at the bottom of colonial society gave way to
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an economically driven, class-based society. Variations in pedigree dissolved, and the
administrative and ecclesiastic structures that once offered a textured depiction of
colonial society were rendered two dimensional: citizens, called vecinos, and Pueblo
Indians. Hispanos quickly took control of the barter economy that extended from
northern Mexico to northern New Mexico and, that boomed following the decline of the
nomadic raids, which had stifled colonial development for the better part of the
eighteenth century. Hispanos increasingly co-opted traditional Pueblo crafts and sold
them in a market they controlled. Hispanos also introduced the weaving loom,
guaranteeing their superior productivity and disenfranchised vecinos began producing
“Pueblo” pottery. As trade increased and the New Mexico economy expanded, HispanoPueblo relations soured.262
Demographic and economic growth only increased the competition for resources
in the Tewa Basin. In 1795, Governor Fernando Chacón granted the Town of Cieneguilla
Grant to a group of Hispanos led by José Sánchez, who had requested lands north and
east of the Embudo Grant.263 He conferred the Rancho del Río Grande Grant to Nicolás
Leal and the heirs of Diego Romero,264 who were heirs of the Cristóbal de la Serna Grant.
The massive grazing grant lay east of the Cristóbal de la Serna and was granted to protect
the small streams and springs that the residents of the Cristóbal de la Serna Grant
depended on.265 The approximately 100,000 acre Rancho del Río Grande Grant
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approached the eastern boundary of Picurís.266 Chacón also approved the Santa Bárbara
Grant, a community grant, in 1796. The Santa Bárbara Grant was a subgrant that broke
off the the eastern half of the Las Trampas Grant. Chacón awarded the grant to sixtyseven Las Trampas settlers, including distant relatives of Sebastián Martín. The grant
recognized settlements, including Santa Bárbara, that had been growing in the eastern Las
Trampas Grant for nearly fifty years at the turn of the eigtheenth and nineteenth century.
By the 1830s, Picurís both complained of Hispano encroachment from the Santa Bárbara
grant and freely sold land along its southern boundary to local Hispanos.267
Sales of Tewa Basin Pueblo land by Pueblo Indians had taken place since the
eighteenth century. The story of San Juan Pueblo native Juan Chiniagua’s private claim,
while rare, illustrates how changing colonial identities affected Pueblo land tenure. His
claim would survive the Spanish, Mexican and American eras. In 1744, Chiniagua,
petitioned San Juan leaders for a parcel of land so that he might live apart from the
pueblo as a vecino, a Spanish-colonial citizen. The Pueblo Council reportedly granted his
request as a way to limit Chiniagua’s influence on other Pueblo men, especially given
that he practiced Penitente rites.268
Chiniagua received from the Pueblo a three-hundred-yard wide tract (an estimated
thirty to fifty acres) that stretched from the Río Grande at the Pueblo’s heart to the
foothills above the Pueblo to the east. But by 1747, only three years after the Pueblo
266
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granted his request, Chiniagua abandoned his newfound religious identity and elected to
return to the Pueblo, resuming the practice of Pueblo ways. In 1762, however, he once
again petitioned the San Juan Council to allow him to take up the same tract of land, live
apart from the Pueblo, and resume his practices as a hermano, or Penitent brother.
Again, the Pueblo granted his request. Upon Chinagua’s death, however, his three
children, all full-blooded San Juan Pueblo Indians, divided the tract and sold it to the
surrounding Hispano population. Their Hispano progeny allegedly expanded this claim
to sixteen hundred acres of the best irrigable lands at San Juan Pueblo.269
A case similar to Conjuebes took place in 1744 at Santa Clara Pueblo, but Santa
Clara successfully defeated it. Roque Conjuebes, a Santa Clara Pueblo native, petitioned
Governor Codallos y Rabal to emancipate him from Santa Clara Pueblo, grant him title to
the assigned Pueblo lands that he cultivated, and make him a private citizen. Em Hall
notes that by granting Conjuebes request, the governor violated both the corporate nature
of Pueblo grants, wherein no Indian has individual title to Pueblo lands and Spanish legal
principles codified in the Laws of the Indies which forbade the sale of Pueblo lands. 270
While adopting a Spanish identity, Conjuebes and his heirs gradually increased his
allotment. In an 1815 decision, Governor Alberto Maynez confirmed the tribal
disposition of all Pueblo lands, leading Antonio Conjuebes (Roque’s grandson) to travel
to Durango have his lands confirmed by comandante general Nemesio Salcedo.
Salcedo’s successor, Bernardo Bonavia, ordered Conjuebes to rejoin his Pueblo, return
his lands to Santa Clara and retain rights under the authority of its leaders.271
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San Ildefonso Pueblo experienced a period of crisis and disunity in the early
Mexican period, and its people expropriated dozens of acres of Pueblo lands across a
decade. In 1820, San Ildefonso governor Juan José and his principales allegedly sold
1,416 varas of land to Francisco Ortiz, who owned an estancia at Caja del Río, or the
modern White Rock Canyon. Historians Myra Ellen Jenkins and John Baxter doubt the
legitimacy of this sale, and opine that only three legitimate pre-American era sales were
executed at San Ildefonso. Relying on Spanish archives, Baxter and Jenkins document
only three sales in 1834, 1837 and 1841 that they could not cast doubt on. Deed abstracts
completed during the Pueblo Lands Board hearings at San Ildefonso in 1929 tell a very
different story.272
Abstracts for at least one dozen claims show a spate of sales from 1832 to 1837,
executed by everyone from Augustín Roybal, a San Ildefonso governor, to a principal
named Juan Miguel Guagu, and even Pueblo women María Luisa, Maria Ignacia Peña,
and Juana and Dominga. Purchasers were typically Hispano men who already had claims
on or near San Ildefonso Pueblo land. Juan Ponciano Sánchez aggressively purchased
Indian lands to create a large contiguous tract within San Ildefonso’s boundaries.
Subsequently, he and his heirs parceled out and sold the lands. Juan Ignacio Gonzales
replicated Sánchez’s methods twenty years later, purchasing lands from Pueblo natives
Ascension Peña in 1858 and Antonio Roybal in 1865. Felipe Ortiz, a San Juan Pueblo
Indian who claimed San Ildefonso land, sold a tract to Francisco Antonio Maestas in
April of 1842. Payment for these lands ranged from cows and bulls to five or seven
272
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pesos, inexpensive costs for lands sold by a shrinking Pueblo seemingly desperate
enough to sell off its lands. 273
The wide participation of both natives and Hispanos in the San Ildefonso market
suggests that the 1830s and 1840s may have been a time of crisis at San Ildefonso
Pueblo. Internal factors are difficult to ascertain, but external factors are easier to
document. They include the change from Spanish-colonial laws, which treated natives as
a protected class of subjects, to Mexican republican laws, which considered all natives
citizens bearing the rights and burdens of their free status. In the late-Spanish-colonial
period, the Cortes de Cádiz’s Constitution of 1812 began to apply liberal and progressive
laws that the young Mexican republic took up with Independence in 1821 and through the
liberal Mexican Constitution of 1824. Their combined effect was the privatization of
public lands that specifically excluded ejido lands yet took direct aim at “surplus” Indian
lands.274
While New Mexico was recreating connections to New Spain, the Spanish
Crown’s most important province was in the midst of revolution. After successfully
defeating rebels in 1810 and again in 1813, Spain signed the Treaty of Cordoba in 1821,
recognizing Mexican Independence. Under the newly independent Mexican government,
indigenous communities, now made up of theoretically free citizens, lost the protection of
a paternalistic state. The Mexican Constitutions of 1824 and 1835 stated an explicit
aversion to communal property, which it viewed as a vestige of colonialism and a shackle
273
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to economic development. Many indigenous groups in Mexico lost communal lands
under liberal reforms, but Pueblos had derived their lands from royal land grants that had
been protected from free-market exploitation. Mexican-period speculation was
surprisingly unsuccessful in New Mexico, despite the changing conception of property in
a free-market economy. Still, despite the break from Spain, the legal status of native
property rights continued from Spanish-colonial to Mexican-republican rule. Under
Spanish law, Pueblo lands were inalienable both by speculation by an outsider and by the
willing sale by the Pueblos themselves. Outside Pecos Pueblo, whose residents decided
to sell some of their land because of Mexican encroachments and internal population
decline, no New Mexico Pueblos unwillingly lost lands by official action by the Mexican
government in the Mexican period, despite the aggressive petitions of the surrounding
elite Hispanos for their lands.
This does not mean that Mexican officials were sympathetic to Pueblo land
tenure. In March of 1825, legislators of the diputación (legislative assembly) in Santa Fe
met Pecos Pueblos claims to their rights to their Spanish league evocatively, stating that
“just as old obligations have ceased, so have their privileges ended.” Even so, they
proved unwilling to break up Pueblo lands without referring matters to the central
government in Mexico City.275 While Governor Antonio de Narbona was inclined to
convert all Pueblo property into private land, the Mexican central government took a
surprisingly conservative stand on Pueblo land rights. Decades later, Mexico would
dismantle corporate and communal lands under the reforms of treasury secretary Miguel
Lerdo de Tejada, whose “Ley Lerdo” privatized and commoditized common lands. In
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the 1820s, however, the liberal Mexican government proved hesitant to dismantle
communal lands, be they Pueblo or Hispano.276
During the Mexican era, Pueblo Indians were unwilling to become the casualties
of land reform by hostile governments. Pecos Indians, for instance, demonstrated deep
knowledge of their changing status when they protested Hispano encroachments.
Addressing Governor Manuel Armijo in 1829, they invoked their rights as citizens and
asked whether the “right of ownership and security that every citizen enjoys in his
possession has been abolished.”277 Pecos Indians appealed successfully to regain their
land. The change in sovereigns from Mexico to Spain created little change for Pueblo
rights. The diputación of New Mexico refused to divide Pueblo lands as early as 1825
and rejected all attempts thereafter.278
One of the few Mexican Era Tewa Basin grants took aim at lands near Picurís
Pueblo. By the beginning of the Mexican era, the Pueblo was surrounded by Hispano
land grants, including Embudo in the west, Trampas and Santa Bárbara to the south and
Rancho del Río Grande to the north. In 1816, a trans-mountain acequia was built by San
Antonio de lo de Mora, a community founded by settlers from the Picurís area.279 These
settlers painstakingly constructed the acequia near the headwaters of the Río Pueblo,
nearly seventeen miles upriver from the pueblo, which gradually could impact the flow of
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the Río Pueblo’s waters. The 1829 request for the Río de Picurís Grant threatened to
fully enclose the Picurís with non-Indian settlements.280
Rafael Fernández and twenty-three Hispano residents of the Pueblo de Picurís
requested the Río de Picurís Grant, but were turned down when Picurís native Mariano
Rodríguez protested to the territorial deputation, claiming they were “speculators . . . not
bona fide colonists.”281 Fernández and the would-be settlers were allowed to harvest
their crops, but ordered to vacate the lands after their crops were harvested. They ignored
the order, establishing the communities La Placita del Río Pueblo on the edges of the
Pueblo grant and Vadito, which wholly encroached on the Pueblo league, drawing
additional protests in 1831 and 1833. The diputación reversed its earlier decision in 1833
and granted the Hispano settlers rights to their suertes, but held that the other lands
requested were to remain as an ejido shared by Picurís Pueblo and the vecinos of
Vadito.282
Throughout the brief Mexican period, a political struggle between centralists and
federalists colored political affairs throughout the republic. Liberal reforms in the lateSpanish-colonial period, including the 1812 Constitution, had begun to empower the
national legislature in Madrid, Spain. Under Mexico, these reforms were carried out on
the local level. The first half-century of Mexican independence was unstable, as
centralist and federalist factions alternated control of the national government, and
imposed political constitutions that reflected their conservative or liberal ideologies.
New Mexico was made a Mexican territory in 1824, the same year as the passage of the

280

Ebright, Hendricks and Hughes, Four Square Leagues, 114-117.
J. J. Bowden “Río de Picurís,” in “Private Land Claims in the Southwest,” 997-1002.
282
Ibid.; Ebright, Hendricks and Hughes, Four Square Leagues, 114-117.
140
281

first liberal constitution, which called for a division of federal powers and popular
representation. Unlike Mexican states, New Mexico and other territories had little
control over their most important political offices, such as governor, who was still
appointed by the central Mexican government in Mexico City.283
Hispanos in New Mexico gradually adapted to Mexican land policies as well.
The land Colonization Laws of 1824 encouraged the economic development of Mexican
hinterlands, creating so-called empresario grants and generating fear among New
Mexicans that their land grants would soon be threatened. Instead, nuevomexicanos
found characterizations of New Mexico as economically peripheral advantageous, and
simply began recording with local officials title transfers within land grants. More
transitions occurred in 1836, when centralists passed the conservative Constitution of
1836, which centralized government, strengthened executive power, and dissolved the
national congress.284
The 1836 Constitution created the departmental plan, which reorganized New
Mexico from a territory into a department with a high council in the departmental junta,
seated in Santa Fe. Divided into prefectos (prefects) and partidos (subdistricts), the plan
extended central Mexican power over departmental affairs. The nuevomexicano village
of San Ildefonso which had grown with the lands sales of the 1820s and 1830s, housed a
partido. Joseph Sánchez, Robert Spude, and Art Gómez write that asambleas (political
assemblies, empowered by the central government to levy taxes) and alcaldes
constitucionales (local mayors, elected under constitutional reforms) weakened the
authority of the governor, who was still appointed by the central government. Battles
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between the diputación (a three-member legislative body, empowered to make land
grants) and the governor colored New Mexican affairs.285 As Mexico sought to centralize
power and modernize its economy, it levied new taxes that many New Mexicans of
varying classes and regions simply refused to pay.
The tensions created by the reforms of a distant and disinterested government
came to a head in 1836. Centralist president José Justo Corro appointed General Albino
Pérez as governor, defying a tradition of selecting locally born nuevomexicanos for that
post. Described as bold and brash, but also naïve and idealistic, Pérez quickly heightened
tensions when he became embroiled in old political feuds with former governors
Francisco Sarracino and Manuel Armijo, as well as Juan Estevan Pino, a local político
and land speculator, and Juan Bautista Vigil. Pérez sought to crack down on illegal trade
with Americans, impose new taxes and bring the department into solvency and selfsufficiency. Janet Lecompte writes that his taste for high-priced luxury items imported
along the Camino Real offended local nuevomexicanos, who resented his crack down on
commodities coming from St. Louis.286 Pérez’s plans to impose new taxes were also
unrealistic in an undeveloped economy, a fiercely independent post-colonial population,
and a colony suffering from increased Indian raids with weak defense provided by central
authorities.
In 1837, nuevomexicanos from Santa Cruz de la Cañada and Chimayó rose in
revolt against Pérez’s reforms. Led by Antonio Abad Montoya and Juan José Esquibel,
both of whom are my distant relatives, and Antonio Vigil of Truchas (known as El
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Coyote), arribeños (residents of the Río Arriba) formed a twelve-member council they
called the Cantón, and drafted a proclamation decrying the excesses of the Departmental
Plan and taxation, and affirming their love of God, their faith in Jesus Christ, and their
love of the Mexican nation. The Cantón attracted disfranchised Hispanos and Pueblo
Indians, particularly from San Ildefonso and Santa Clara. It attacked elite privileges,
among them the excessive fees collected by priests for burials and baptisms. Padre José
Antonio Martínez, who owned a vast hacienda and many Indian slaves outside Taos,
complained about the reluctance of nuevomexicanos to pay the fees for basic Catholic
sacraments. He informed Bishop Antonio de Zubiria in 1837, that the growing rebellion
had forced him to give up his sacramental fees. He identified the rebels as the “turbulent
inhabitants of Santa Cruz de la Cañada, who have always been the sewage of New
Mexico.”287
Governor Pérez quickly traveled to Santa Cruz with a small force of regulars and
a two-hundred-man militia of Santo Domingo, Cochití and Sandía Pueblo natives, who
continued the military tradition of their Pueblo auxiliary ancestors. He was met by
fifteen hundred to two thousand rebels at La Mesilla, south and west of Santa Cruz, who
refused to negotiate and immediately engaged Perez’s militia. The Pueblo natives turned
on Pérez, who fled to Santa Fe after the rebels took his militia’s cannon. Santo Domingo
natives captured the governor and cut off his head, parading it through the streets of Santa
Fe. Still condemning his luxurious tastes, they yelled, “You no longer will drink
chocolate or coffee!”288
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The rebellion spread, and José Gonzales, a vecino living at Taos Pueblo, emerged
as its new leader. Natives of Taos Pueblo and Tewa Basin Pueblos joined Hispanos in
the rebellion, which failed, however, to transition into a functional government.
Gonzales proved incapable of controlling rebel factions and was rebuffed by the central
Mexican government, which sought only to suppress the rebellion and kill its leaders.
The Río Abajo, dominated by wealthier Hispanos who benefitted from Mexican
economic reforms and the Camino Real trade, also felt threatened by the seeming anarchy
in the Río Arriba. They drew up the Plan de Tomé, which identified Manuel Armijo as
their leader, denounced the involvement of Pueblo Indians in the civil affairs including
the rebellion, and disavowed the authority of the Cantón. With federal troops from
Chihuahua, Armijo quickly crushed the rebellion, beheading its leaders in Truchas in
October 1837, before he captured the original Cantón leaders Juan José Esquibel, Juan
Vigil, Antonio Abad Montoya and his brother, Desiderio. On January 24, 1838, the four
leaders were likewise beheaded. Afterward, rebels from Taos met Armijo at Pojoaque,
where mixed Pueblo and Hispano forces eventually succumbed to Armijo’s superior
army. Gonzales, the rebel governor from Taos, who was cast by Padre Martínez as a
genízaro, was taken to Santa Cruz and shot.289
Manuel Armijo thus began his second gubernatorial term by crushing a rebellion
that seemed, for a moment, to dislodge another colony from the young Mexican republic.
Barely two years after executing the leaders of the Río Arriba rebellion, he faced another
challenge to Mexican governance in 1840. Mirabeau Lamar, the president of the
Republic of Texas, attempted to engineer another rebellion against centralist Mexican
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authority to annex New Mexico as a part of Texas, which claimed the Río Grande as its
western boundary. An expedition of over three hundred me n set out from Austin, Texas,
in June, 1841. Attacked by Kiowas suspicious of Anglo designs in the area, the
expedition fragmented into small groups that arrived intermittently in New Mexico. The
men appeared motley, half-starved tramps rather than soldiers of a conquering army.
Arresting them near present-day Tucumcari, in San Miguel del Bado and in Santa Fe,
Armijo treated the prisoners brutally before sending them to Mexico for central
authorities to deal with.290
At the same time that he protected New Mexico from Texan encroachment,
Armijo increased the influence of French and American traders, perhaps unintentionally
reorienting New Mexico’s economy from Mexico to St. Louis. Still, New Mexicans’s
distrust of a distant and foreign sovereign remained strong following the 1837 Río Arriba
Rebellion. Governor Armijo had restored peace to the Mexican province, but hardly
ameliorated the dissatisfaction of the rebels. Instead, Armijo spent the next nine years
clinging to his control of provincial politics. While governor, he granted enormous land
grants to friends and collaborators, speculators like Bartolomé Baca, Stephen Luis Lee
and Narcisco Beaubien, the young son of French Canadian trader Charles Beaubein and
María de la Luz. Guadalupe Miranda and Carlos Hipolote Trotier Beaubien received
from Armijo a 1.7 million-acre grant. The entrepreneurs promised to develop the vast
property which stretched from Mora in the south to present southern Colorado in the
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north, the foothills of the Sangre de Cristos in the west to the stretches of the Llano
Estacado in the east.291 One-quarter interest was quickly transferred to Armijo and trader
Charles Bent.292Some scholars and Armijo apologists have argued that he granted lands
to empower Mexican citizens against the impending American invasion.293 Others see the
designs of a governor with an impressive ability to maintain authority and personal
success across decades of change.
The invasion came in August of 1846, three months after the United States
formally declared war on México. General Stephen Watts Kearny marched the Army of
the West into Santa Fe. Armijo assembled a badly armed citizen militia of threethousand and deployed them in Apache Canyon in the mountains west of Santa Fe, to
await Kearny’s coming. Diego Archuleta, who was supposedly bribed by American
trader James Magoffin, led the small professional Mexican army to abandon its posts and
travelled south. Armijo ordered his citizen militia to stand down and turn to Santa Fe,
while Armijo retreated to Chihuahua. With few military matters to be settled in New
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Mexico, Kearny split his forces and marched west to California in September 1846,
leaving Colonel Alexander Doniphan and eight hundred men to keep order. The lack of
resistance to General Kearny’s quick entrance to and exit from New Mexico made some
believe that Pueblo and Mexican citizens welcomed American rule. When Kearny left
Santa Fe for California, he chose none other than Charles Bent, the longtime Taos
resident and trader, as New Mexico’s first American civil governor.294
As Doniphan departed to campaign in Chihuahua, Colonel Sterling Price of
Missouri was left in charge of the military occupation of New Mexico. Charles Bent kept
the helm of the civil government, which was governed under the Kearney Code, a mix of
Spanish and Mexican law, Missouri state laws of the state of Missouri and Louisiana’s
Civil Code of 1825. A well-known civic leader and successful trader, who had expanded
his influence in the Mexican and territorial eras though Bent’s Fort on the Arkansas
River, Bent seemed a logical choice to govern civil matters of the military occupation.
But his arrogant and pejorative views of the Hispanos and Pueblos grated on the
province’s native populations. According to historian William Wroth, Bent considered
the Hispano’s the “most servile people that can be imagined.” He believed that the
“Mexican character is made up of stupidity, obstinacy, ignorance, duplicity and
vanity.”295 Bent’s clashes with Padre José Antonio Martínez bred animosity throughout
Taos’s Hispano community. Martínez was equally critical of Anglo and Hispano
políticos and land speculators, and especially disdained the presence and influence of
Americans in Mexican provincial affairs. Like Ceran St. Vrain and Carlos Beaubien,
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Bent had married into the Jaramillo clan, one of the elite Hispano families in the Taos
Valley, and he used his new familial connections to expand his economic influence and
wealth.
Bilingual and well known over much of the territory, Bent had helped keep the
New Mexican economy dependent on the Santa Fe Trail and under the economic sphere
of Missouri and the Midwest. Kearny underestimated the resentment that American
occupation generated. Charles Bent was well known, but also reviled over much of the
territory. On January 19, 1847, angry over the American occupation, Hispanos and
Pueblo of the Taos area rose in revolt. The leaders of the rebellion that would take Bent’s
life in early 1847 were characterized as uneducated and barbarous. In fact, many of New
Mexico’s leading citizens from Taos, Santa Cruz, Santa Fe, and Albuquerque had plotted
to overthrow American rule. Diego Archuleta, the son of Mexican military commander
of New Mexico Juan Andrés Archuleta and Tomás Ortiz, whose brother, Juan Felipe
Ortiz, served as the vicar of Santa Fe, were among the conspirators. Bent clearly felt that
the American military presence had both uncovered any legitimate plans for a revolt and
intimidated all others from attempting one. His unguarded return to his residence in Taos
spelled his doom.296
Led by Pablo Montoya and Taos Indian Tomasito Romero, the rebels of Don
Fernando de Taos attacked Bent’s house, killing him as he attempted to fend off the
rebels and protect his family. He was shot in the face and chest with arrows several times
before he was scalped in front of his family. Rebels destroyed all the papers they found
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in Bent’s home in the belief that they were protecting title to their land claims. Carlos
Beaubien’s son, Narciso, was killed, along with Cornelio Vigil, the recipient of the vast
Vigil and St. Vrain Grant in Southern Colorado. The next day, a mob of five hundred
attacked the Turley’s mill in Arroyo Hondo, north of Taos. In Mora, seven American
traders were killed. Colonel Price left Santa Fe for Taos with more than three hundred
troops and sixty-five volunteers, the latter organized by Bent’s close friend and business
partner, Ceran St. Vrain. They met 1,500 nuevomexicanos and Tewa Pueblo Indians in
battles at Santa Cruz de la Cañada and again at Embudo Pass. Many were likely part of
the 1837 Río Arriba rebellion. Defeated a both battles, remaining rebels retreated to Taos
Pueblo and took refuge in the thick-walled adobe church, which was leveled by cannon
fire, killing one-hundred and fifty rebels.297
Like the rebels in New Mexico, Mexican forces were outmatched by American
armies and the U.S.-Mexican War ended almost as quickly as it began. American forces
took control of the port of Veracruz by March 1847, depriving Mexico City of needed
supplies, including arms. By the fall, the American military took Chapultepec castle in
Mexico City, the home of the Mexican military academy. Mexican leaders divided on
whether to pursue peace or to continue fighting the superior U.S. army. American
president James K. Polk, the ardent expansionist who provoked the war when he
deployed troops to south Texas in 1846, sent Nicholas P. Trist to negotiate a peace with
Mexico. Polk instructed Trist to negotiate for Mexico’s northern territories, lands that
would extend the United States across the continent, achieving what many considered to
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be America’s “manifest destiny.” Unsure of Trist’s intentions, Polk rescinded his
authority, but not before Trist negotiated a treaty with Mexican president Manuel de la
Peña y Peña, who assumed office after General Antonio López de Santa Anna resigned
and Pedro María de Anaya refused to cede any land to the United States.298
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed by Nicholas Trist on behalf of the
United States and by Luis G. Cuevas, Bernardo Couto and Miguel Atristain as
plenipotentiary representatives of Mexico on February 2, 1848, at the main altar of the
old Cathedral of Guadalupe at Villa Hidalgo (today Gustavo A. Madero, D.F.), slightly
north of Mexico City as U.S troops under the command of General Winfield Scott
occupied Mexico City. Among its provisions was Article X, which stated that U.S.
government would honor and guarantee all land grants awarded in territories ceded to the
United States to citizens of Spain and Mexico by those respective governments. Article
VIII guaranteed that Mexicans who remained more than one year in the ceded lands
would automatically become full-fledged American citizens, and Article IX guaranteed
that their property would enjoy all the rights and protections of all property rights.
Recognizing the difficulty of developing the lands of “inferior” people, the U.S. Senate
modified Article IX to state that Mexican citizens would "be admitted at the proper time”
(as judged by Congress), instead of "admitted as soon as possible." It deleted Article X
outright, which recognized the legitimacy of land grants, Hispano and Pueblo, private and
community.299
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Mexico protested the unilateral actions of the United States, and in May 1848,
Mexico and the United States negotiated the three-article Protocol of Quetétaro, which
elaborated on the American amendments. Most important for land grants was the second
article, which confirmed the legitimacy of all land grants pursuant to Mexican Law. The
United States ignored the protocol, stating that its representatives, like Trist, had
overreached their authority in negotiating with Mexico.300
This violent transition of New Mexico into American rule colored the relationship
between New Mexico’s native populations and its appointed representatives. Many of
these representatives carried with them pejorative views of both Mexicans and Pueblo
Indians. They doubted the ability of either population, both of whom were technically
citizens under Mexico, to understand, let alone to practice, the basic tenets of American
democracy. While it was difficult for most outsiders to differentiate between many of the
mixed Tewa Basin communities like San Ildefonso and Nambé, lines between Hispanos
and Pueblos continued to harden. As the Pueblo population plummeted, the Hispano
population boomed, exasperating already tense relations across the Tewa Basin.
This colonial interaction, a relationship between Hispanos and Pueblos created
over two and a half centuries, would change. A part of this evolving relationship was a
land tenure system that transformed across the colonial era in the Tewa Basin. It began
with elites consuming lands as the spoils of the Reconquista. Relations changed with a
tensely negotiated coexistence, including alliances against mutual enemies. But in times
of peace, Spanish colonial expansion was colored by quarrels over water and land.
Governor Tomás Vélez de Cachupín’s administration of New Mexico demonstrated an
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aggressive attempt at equity, which created new community grants, protected Pueblo
lands from invasion, and forced the genízaro resettlement of abandoned communities.
Governor Juan Bautista de Anza took up Vélez Cachupín’s task and brought a new era of
peace and prosperity through crisis and war. By the late colonial era, the booming
Hispano population pressed even harder upon Pueblo resources and slowly grew its
economy.
The Mexican era brought a new period of speculation, as elites and officials
fought to gain Pueblo lands through so-called progressive Mexican land laws that marked
the gradual rejection of communal land ownership. But Pueblos and Hispanos united
when the young Mexican nation fought to tax the struggling territory while providing
little defense and even less assistance. Their rebellion beheaded Governor Albino Pérez
in 1837, a fundamentalist who believed he could create efficiency in the ancient colony.
Charles Bent met the same fate ten years later, when Pueblos and Hispanos united, once
again, to fight the imposition of a distant, foreign sovereign.
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Chapter 3: “Not a Feeling in Common”: Changes in Pueblo and Hispano
Land Tenure in Territorial New Mexico, 1850-1876
New Mexico’s long territorial period from 1850-1912 spelled doom for both
Pueblo and Hispano land grants. Heretofore, scholars have examined how the Pueblo
Indians’ uncertain legal status withheld federal guardianship and left them vulnerable to
land speculation, and how Hispanos were dispossessed of their land grants by both
speculators and the federal government. These two histories have largely been narrated
separately. Over the decades federal agents, politicians, lands speculators, and the nativeborn Hispano population debated the obligations of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Anglo and Hispano land speculators held that Pueblo Indians’ citizenship under the
Mexican Republic continued under the United States. Nonetheless, Pueblo Indians
received neither their full rights as U. S. citizens nor legal obligations due to them as a
protected native population. Their numbers continued to decline and Hispanos took full
advantage, buying, renting and seizing Pueblo lands, almost at will.
Hispano land grants faced similar challenges. The federal government created
two mechanisms to examine the titles of land grants, and confirm or deny hundreds of
claims to their native lands. When the first, the Office of the Surveyor General, which
operated from 1854 to 1891, proved susceptible to corruption and ill-equipped to defend
against the designs of land speculators, the federal government created a second, the
Court of Private Land Claims (1891-1904), which aggressively defended against the
corruption of the early territorial era. Legitimate claims were denied by the court and
Hispano communities were denied access to lands that they depended upon, often for
mere survival. Federal lands, meanwhile, increased as common lands were absorbed into
the public domain, which grew even further with the creation of forest reserves in the
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early 1900s. Caught in the fray were land grant communities, both Hispano and Pueblo,
which lost their lands to the very lawyers who represented their petitions for
confirmation. As the territory’s economy modernized, speculators feigned development
and invited investment that pushed Hispanos and Pueblos from their lands.
This chapter retells the story of land loss in early territorial New Mexico. This
story is by no means new, but past histories have failed to draw explicit parallels between
Pueblo and Hispano land loss, instead focusing on the role that Hispanos played in
Pueblo dispossession while they were simultaneously deprived of their patrimony. The
double colonial model, in which Hispanos, once the conquerors, join the Pueblos as the
conquered, has understandably influenced how we conceive of the native land rights in
the territorial era. But it also has drawn rigid lines between Pueblo and Hispano
communities and renders a complex relationship, evolving over decades and centuries,
into a simple two-dimensional portrait. This racial or ethnic binary has cast a long
shadow over Pueblo and Hispano land rights and intercultural relations, and shaped how
scholars and the general public perceive Pueblos and Hispanos as the opposite of each
other.
In this chapter, I argue that Pueblo and Hispano lands were exposed to similar
economic pressures and political processes, bent on removing communal control of
properties and placing them on regional markets. During the territorial period, attorneys
and land speculators served in various posts, ranging from Indian agents to special
attorneys, from congressional delegates to surveyors general, further linking the
dispossession of Hispano grants and the exploitation of Pueblo lands in an insidious
capitalist project. Reframing the territorial experience of Pueblos and Hispanos offers us
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the opportunity to re-examine land tenure in a new context, and helps make sense of the
turmoil over land rights that continued to plague New Mexico in the early twentieth
century.
~~~
New Mexico’s violent entry into the Union caused many observers and pundits to
doubt that the foreign land would ever be worthy of statehood. Numerous social issues
plagued the American territory, from public violence and political immaturity to
illiteracy, Indian raiding, and slave trading. Racial biases against the Hispano and Indian
populations shaded the Americans thoughts about New Mexico. The distrust of the
Hispanos was arguably rooted in the Mexican-American War. Ongoing wars against
nomadic tribes played into popular contemporary conceptions of the untamed West. In
public and cultural discourse, Pueblo Indians were considered by many an anomaly, but
another vanishing Indian race.
Early on, under American rule, the Pueblo and Hispano populations confounded
the federal government's assumptions of race and citizenship. Ignoring the Plán de
Iguala, which clearly made Pueblo Indians citizens under the Mexican republic, federal
authorities debated whether the population that they inherited was fit for citizenship. The
Mexicans who had participated ambiguously in their own governance under the Mexican
flag from 1821-1846, were considered at best a burden to good government, but also a
potential internal enemy under the control of foreign interests.
Senator William H. Seward of New York considered the Hispano population to be
more Indian than European. Speaking before the Senate, Seward told his colleagues, "It
is Indians, sir, that we have conquered." Seward, who overestimated the population of
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the New Mexico territory, claimed that "European races" numbered only two thousand
souls. In what was possibly a vague reference to the genízaro population, he numbered
"10,000 creoles" as the "descendants of Spanish colonists." Finally, Seward counted
"ninety thousand Indians, more or less mixed in blood, but all civilized and
Christianized."301 Governing New Mexico seemed an impossible task to the New York
senator.
After the Charles Bent murder, Donaciano Vigil and Henry Connolly both briefly
served as New Mexico’s civil governor, an ineffectual post that was under the authority
of the military governor. Vigil was an active land speculator who had collaborated with
Armijo’s army that suppressed the 1837 Río Arriba rebellion and who had served as
secretary to the Cantón’s government. He owned a portion of Pecos Pueblo which he had
swindled from the heirs of Juan Estevan Pino,302 who had originally purchased the land
from the vanishing Pueblo in 1830.303 Vigil became an indispensable resource to land
speculators, who would tap the respected orator to testify to the veracity of a land grant’s
documents, title and boundaries, often in exchange for land or the relief of debt.304 He
served as acting civil governor after Charles Bent’s murder in January 1847 through
December 1847.
Henry Connolly, who married the widow of Mexican-Era governor Mariano
Chaves (January –April 1844), was elected governor of New Mexico under a state

301

Richard Frost, “Aspects of Southern Tewa Land and Water Rights in the American
Period,” unpublished manuscript, August 24, 1979, Box 8, Folder 14, Ward Alan Minge
Papers, UNM-CSWR, 10.
302
Hall, “Giant Before the Surveyor-General: The Land Career of Donaciano Vigil,” 71.
303
G. Emlen Hall, “Juan Estevan Pino, “Se los coma”: New Mexico Land Speculation in
the 1820s” New Mexico Historical Review 57:1 (January 1982), 27-42; 33-34.
304
Hall, “Giant Before the Surveyor-General,”68.
156

constitution that was annulled by the Compromise of 1850, passed by the United States
Congress. He never assumed the office, but would later served as territorial governor
under President Abraham Lincoln from 1861-1866. After General Stephen Watts
Kearny’s occupation of New Mexico in August 1846, New Mexico was controlled by
military governors until 1851. Colonel Sterling Price commanded the occupying after
Kearny’s exit in September 1846 through October 1848, during which he led American
forces to that crushed the 1847 Taos Revolt, killing four hundred Hispano and Pueblo
rebels. Price’s volunteer army was unpaid and lacked necessary supplies and turned to
raiding the fields and stores of Hispanos and Pueblo Indians. By July 1847, Price was
promoted to brigadier general. In Chihuahua he won the Battle of Santa Cruz Rosales in
March 1848, more than a month after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed.305
General Price remained in New Mexico as its defacto military governor until he
was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel John M. Washington, a regular army officer who
continued his predecessors’ fight against Navajo raids on New Mexico villages.
Washington was relieved by Colonel John Munroe, who served as New Mexico’s
military governor from October 1849 through March 1851. Munroe dealt with many
loose ends, including Texas’s claim that its western boundary extended to the Rio
Grande, which would have made eastern New Mexico, including Santa Fe, a part of the
Lone Star State. He convened the May 1850 assembly that ratified an anti-slavery
constitution that aspired for statehood and elected Henry Connelly governor and Manuel
Alvarez, who acted as Mexican consul during the occupation, as lieutenant governor.
Munroe prevented Connelly and Alvarez from taking office, an action that led Kentucky
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Senator Henry Clay to characterize Munroe as an autocrat.306 The resulting standoff
lasted several months, but was relieved with passage of the Compromise of 1850.307
The Compromise of 1850 ended the controversy, as well as Texas’s claim to half
of New Mexico’s territory. Introduced by Senator Clay in January 1850, the
Compromise was a series of five bills that centered chiefly on the diuvisive issue of
slavery, amending portions of the Fugitive Slave Act and abolishing the slave trade in
Washington, D.C.. The Texas New Mexico boundary dispute was settled and California
entered the Union as a free state. The Compromise created territorial governments in
Utah and New Mexico.308 James S. Calhoun was tapped by President Millard Fillmore to
serve as the Governor of the Territory of New Mexico in December of 1850.
Calhoun, a Georgia born Whig politician, had been appointed by President
Zachary Taylor to be superintendent of Indian Affairs in a recess appointment. Arriving
in Santa Fe in 1849, he received little background or instructions on his mission as Indian
agent, leading some to speculate that he was sent by Taylor as to foment a grassroots
statehood movement. If this was the case, then Calhoun’s covert task became irrelevant
when Taylor died in office in July 1850. By December 1850, Calhoun had spent nearly
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eighteen months in New Mexico.309 On his arrival, Calhoun immediately came under the
influence of Joab Houghton, who was appointed a judge under the Kearny code and later
served as territorial supreme court justice, and speculated in land grants during early
adjudications. Houghton informed Calhoun’s early understanding of New Mexico. On
July 29, 1849, Calhoun wrote Indian Commissioner William Medill: “Pueblo Indians . . .
[were] entitled to special consideration of the government of the United States. They are
the only tribe in perfect amity with the government, and are an industrious, agricultural,
and pastoral people [who by] Mexican statute . . . [were granted] the privilege of
voting.”310 By November, Calhoun wrote Medill’s successor, Orlando Brown, that an
“eternal state of war, and reciprocal robbery” between Navajos and Pueblo and Hispano
villagers existed, and that “Spaniards or Mexicans” were particularly incensed when
American officials disallowed reprisals against Indian raids.311
Adrift at the edges of the new American empire, Calhoun furiously and frequently
wrote to his superiors in Washington, D.C. His letters mostly alerted his superiors to the
status of the inhabitants and conditions in the territory. His portrayal of the Mexican
population was typical of an officer who who spent the last two years fighting in the
unpopular Mexican-American war. While he privately disavowed the manner in which
the United States took the Southwest from Mexico, Calhoun accepted conquest as
bringing progress to an uncivilized land. In Calhoun’s eyes, the remnant Mexican
population was backward, superstitious, and idolatrous. In contrast, Calhoun saw the
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Pueblos as the model Indians. God fearing, sedentary and practicing an agricultural
tradition hundreds, perhaps even thousands of years old, these peace loving tillers of the
soil, living in palace-like adobe complexes, sharply contrasted to the raiding tribes that
surrounded Hispano and Pueblo settlements clustered along the Rio Grande.312 He wrote
Commissioner Medill that the Pueblos were suspicious of all federal agents in the
territory: “We have associated with the Mexicans, for whom they have no respect.”
Further, Calhoun claimed, “The Mexicans and the Pueblo Indians have not a feeling in
common.”313
From his earliest letters, Calhoun reported Pueblo protests against Hispano
encroachment. “Scarcely a day passes,” Calhoun wrote Commissioner Brown, “that
complaints are not brought before me of Mexican aggressions.” These incessant
complaints came from various Pueblos, including Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, San Juan,
Tesuque, and Pojoaque in the Tewa Basin. At San Ildefonso, native leaders complained
that “Mexicans, and others, were thrusting themselves into their Pueblos selling
spirituous liquors, and creating great mischief and trouble.”314 They also complained that
Mexicans bore undue influence over their young men and appropriated native lands,
daring the pueblo to take action. We can only guess whether these incursions were
related to the sales by San Ildefonso tribal members to the surrounding population in the
1830s. The fact remained, however, that the Hispano population surrounding San
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Ildefonso took advantage of its declining population, which was estimated at 154 souls in
1860.315
Calhoun immediately appreciated the dismal state of Pueblos, whose populations
and agriculture continued to decline. He observed that Pueblos sat on some of the richest
agricultural lands in the territory and their lands would be as coveted by newcomers as
they had been by the surrounding Mexican population. During inspections, Calhoun
found whole Mexican villages on Pueblo reservations, as was the case at Peñasco, which
sat on the lands of Picurís Pueblo and at Chamita, which lay wholly on the lands of San
Juan Pueblo. This trespass of Pueblo lands was a constant complaint in Calhoun’s visits
with tribal leaders, many of who had grown accustomed to visiting Santa Fe to protest
during the Mexican period. His interest in protecting their lands reflected his admiration
for the Pueblos, perhaps originating from his observations of the tragic Cherokee removal
in his native Georgia. Calhoun seemed to fear that Pueblo Indians would devolve to the
practices of the surrounding nomadic tribes if the government did not protect them from
the “uncivilized” Mexicans appropriating their resources.316
Calhoun cautioned Commissioner Brown against reducing the Pueblos onto one
reservation, an action that would free up rich agricultural lands to development by
American settlers:
The removal and concentration of the Pueblo Indians, is advocated by others. The
bare suggestion of this measure to men, at this time, would produce a phrensy, a
desperation of the most terrible character. But this result, that is, the removal and
concentration of these Indians, may be peaceably accomplished in a few years. I
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am not prepared to recommend the adoption of any measure looking to this
result.317
The idea that all Pueblos would be aggregated on one reservation was not an empty
threat. While Pueblos’ status as subjects or citizens, government wards or members of the
body politick was debated throughout the territorial era, American Indian policy
decisions from the end of the Mexican American War consistently pushed Indians onto
federal reservations. These reservations shrunk as non-Indians constituents pressed their
representatives for supposedly unused reservation lands. 318
Since approval of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, the United States aggressively
had removed Indian populations from the proximity of Anglo settlements, and relocate
them to the west and confined them into reservations. 319 Calhoun later warned the
commissioner of Indian affairs that Pueblo removal could spark violence, and it could be
“dangerous to the public tranquility to compel them [Pueblos] to a repugnant association
with the people of New Mexico, as Citizens of the State or territory. Either would
produce a bloody contest at this time.”320 Instead, Calhoun believed that Pueblo lands
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should be surveyed, conflicting Hispano claims “ascertained,” and Pueblo lands enlarged
where they were insufficient to support the village’s population.321
Both as Indian superintendent and as the first civil governor of the New Mexico
territory, Calhoun struggled to balance two very different Indian policies. One focused
on diplomacy and war with nomadic tribes that raided Pueblo and Spanish settlements.
The other sought the protection of Pueblo lands, a policy that put him in direct conflict
with Hispanos exploiting the end of Mexican-era protections. Calhoun could draw on
decades of Indian policy created for nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes, but he struggled to
make his superiors understand these agricultural Indians. Calhoun fought to repeal an
1847 statute by the provisional legislature that made Pueblos quasi-corporations
vulnerable to lawsuits relating to land but unable to purchase land.322 He remained an
opponent of Pueblo suffrage, believing that Hispano and Anglo elites would manipulate
their vote. Calhoun pushed for Washington to extend the protections of the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1834 to Pueblos:
Extend to them the protection of your laws regulating trade and intercourse with
the various tribes of the United States, establish trading houses, liberally, give to
them agricultural implements, for a few years, allow them blacksmiths, and
carpenters, and locate among them such agents as will Americanize their labor,
and morality, and you will, at an early day, discover the gratifying fact, that a
more upright and useful people are no where to be found; fit to be associated with,
and to have all the rights and privileges, of the body politic, at least, so far as the
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right of suffrage is concerned; or, if it should be preferable, you may then
colonize them, without risking a convulsion.323
Calhoun thus advocated a policy that would also Americanize Pueblo agriculture,
something that he considered the only viable defense against the designs of non-Indians
who coveted Pueblo lands. His call for the examination of non-Indian claims to Pueblo
lands would not be met for more than half a century, when the Pueblo Lands Board
would investigate non-Indian claims on Pueblo grants.
Calhoun’s desperation to protect Pueblo lands seemed to resolve in a formal treaty
between the United States and the Pueblos. Tesuque, Santa Clara, and Nambe signed the
treaty on July 7, 1850 and San Ildefonso signed a few days later. Thirteen Pueblos in all
signed Calhoun’s treaty, which Commissioner Brown authorized, despite misgivings by
many observers who believed a Pueblo treaty was unnecessary for the Pueblos were
never in a state of war with the U.S. government.324 His efforts were negated when
Congress refused to ratify the treaty. In December 1850, Calhoun reported that
encroachment on Pueblo lands persisted.325
Calhoun’s tenure as territorial governor was beset by the ongoing crisis between
Hispano and Pueblo villages and by continued raiding by Apache and Comanche tribes.
He also quarreled with military leaders, including Lieutenant Colonel Edwin V. Sumner,
the military commander in New Mexico, and failed to extend both free schools and
slavery into the territory. In May 1852, Calhoun escorted a delegation of Tesuque Pueblo
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leaders en route to Washington, D. C. Ailing since January, Calhoun travelled with his
secretary, David Whiting, son-in-law and his daughters, but also with a coffin. He died
near Independence, Missouri, on July 2, 1852.326 The Tesuque delegation, headed by
Carlos and José María Vigil, journied onward to Washington, where the natives pushed
for recognition of their rights, as U.S. citizens, under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
rather than for their protection by the federal government as wards.
Whiting travelled to Washington with the Tesuque delegation and escorted them
to meetings with President Fillmore and members of Congress. He seemed to share
Calhoun’s growing distrust of the Hispano population. In August, Whiting wrote:
“Governor Calhoun deemed it of the utmost importance that a delegation of Pueblo
Indians should visit the States at this time, not only for the purpose of carrying out the
policy of the Government towards them, but also to secure more firmly their confidence
and esteem towards our people. Evil disposed Mexicans and others have been tampering
with them and endeavoring to induce them to join in a scheme for the purpose of
overthrowing the present government.” Whiting’s letter was already drawing a hard line
between Mexicans and Pueblos in New Mexico, and ignored their cooperation in the
Taos Rebellion five years earlier.327
Protecting Pueblo lands from serial incursions was an ongoing and impossible
task for Calhoun’s successors. Missourian Dr. Willian Carr Lane’s brief tenure as
governor and ex-officio Indian superintendent was marked by repeated visits from
various Pueblo representatives, a habit perhaps created under Spain and Mexico and
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magnified when Calhoun occupied the office.328 Historian David Frost writes that
Territorial Governor David Meriwhether feared that Mexicans and lawyers would
bankrupt pueblos through frivolous lawsuits.329
Politically, Pueblos were as disempowered as they were legally. The 1848
constitutional convention had limited voting to "free white male inhabitants residing
within the limits of New Mexico." The Territorial Act of 1850 continued the exclusion
of Pueblo Indians from political participation. By 1854, just as the surveyor general of
New Mexico began sorting out centuries of grants and claims, the territorial government
withheld the pueblos’s right to participate in territorial elections, while upholding their
right to internal governance, electing their own officials and ditch bosses. In 1847, the
territorial legislature under the occupation had attempted what the Lane v. Santa Rosa
(1919) and U.S. v. Candelaria (1926) cases would assert seventy years later: that Pueblos
were properly considered a “corporate body” or a “juristic person,” with rights to sue or
to be sued or bring court action on their own behalf.
Amid this crisis in Pueblo affairs, the United States created the Office of the
Surveyor General to adjudicate land grant claims protected under the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo. William Pelham’s onerous task was beset by numerous
complications, but these impediments did not prevent him from quickly grasping the
desperate state of Pueblos and the need to provide some legal defense of their lands. By
1856, Pelham had submitted the land claims of eleven native pueblos, including San Juan
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and Picurís, to Congress for confirmation. These claims were based on specious
documents bearing the forged signature of Spanish governor Domingo Jironza Petríz de
Cruzate, who allegedly granted the pueblos four-square-league grants in 1689.330 Where
Pueblos lacked title or grant papers, Pelham interviewed leaders about the existence of
title papers. Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, Nambé, Pojoaque, Tesuque and other pueblos
were all submitted for congressional confirmation.331 Two years later, in 1858 Congress
approved most Pueblo grants, including Picurís and all the Tewa Pueblo grants. All
Pueblo grants received their patents in 1864, and the Pueblos became an anomaly as
natives who held fee-simple title to their lands. Although lacking treaties with the United
States, they were clearly Indian and considered so by both officials and citizens of the
territory.
In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln issued silver-crowned canes to each Pueblo.
According to Pueblo historian Joe Sando, Lincoln decided to award issue the canes as a
belated recognition of Pueblo peoples. A recent documentary suggests that Michael
Steck, superintendent of Indian affairs for the New Mexico Territory at the time,
proposed to Lincoln the idea of issuing canes to Pueblo leaders, emulating a practice
started by Spanish and Mexican governors.332 According to Sando the canes’ message
was mixed: At once, they were symbols of Pueblo authority over their affairs and a
reminder that they “owe allegiance to the United States of America. On the other hand,
the canes are also symbols of the United States government’s responsibilities and
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trusteeship of the Pueblos.”333 Exactly what these responsibilities were for the Pueblos
remained uncertain.
Historian Deborah Rosen contends that the debate over Pueblo Indian status as
wards or as citizens spanned the entire territorial period. The 1876 U.S. v. Joseph
decision was the outcome of this nearly thirty-year debate. Governors Calhoun and
Meriwether, and Territorial Secretary W. W. H. Davis fought to repeal statutes that gave
Pueblos legal power and voting rights, but that made them party to judicial proceedings
and vulnerable to land speculation.334 Judicial officials, including Justices John S. Watts
and Warren Bristol of the New Mexico Territorial Supreme Court, cited lack of both
formal treaties with the United States and the paucity of federally appointed Indian
agents, along with the fact that Pueblos had full title to their land under U.S. law as proof
they were not Indians.335 Watts, along with Chief Justice Joab Houghton and Attorney
General Stephen B. Elkins, were active land speculators who would benefit from the
privatization of Indian land. Rosen argues that the legal ideologies of these officials
reflected federal policies that promoted American individualism in the marketplace and
civil society. This framework was sanctioned by the Supreme Court decision in US v.
Joseph (1876), which upheld Pueblo citizenship and denied federal protection as Indians,
and the Dawes Allotment Act of 1887, which broke up Indian reservations into familysized parcels.336
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Even James S. Calhoun, who fought so passionately to preserve Pueblo Land and
water rights, who considered the Mexican and Pueblo populations as absolutely separate,
who more than any other individual can be credited with the confirmation and patenting
of Pueblo grants, was confused over whether Article 9 of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo applied to Pueblo Indians, and whether Pueblo Indians were citizens or wards of
the federal government.337 In light of the confusion, and to guard the Pueblos against
plundering by the surrounding non-Indian population, Congress passed a series of
measures that effectively treated pueblos as wards. In 1870, it voted appropriations for
Indian schools in Pueblo country. Two years later Congress formally began funding a
Pueblo Indian agent, ending the era during which the territorial governor and Santa Fe
Indian School superintendent served in that post. By 1875 the government also allowed
salaries for interpreters at the Pueblo Agency.338
In 1874, Indian agent Edwin C. Lewis reported to Commissioner Edward
Parmelee Smith, “In the event of the removal of the protection of the Government, many
of these Indians would be deprived, by fraud, of their lands and, reduced to pauperism,
[and] would soon follow the life and habits of savage tribes."339 The fear that Pueblo
Indians would move to a life of nomadic savagery and away from sedentary civility was
held by many federal authorities and Indian reformers. That the Mexicans were
barbarous marauders was left unspoken. The contrast of Pueblo civilization with
termination of tribal holdings and their conversion into individual private ownership, as
marketable as any other private land would be.” Hall, Four Leagues of Pecos, 137. For
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Mexican barbarity played well in popular ideas of the “Wild West.” That discussion
between two peoples was still a powerful notion among Progressive Reformers in the
twentieth century.
Though Pueblo’s status remained a point of high political debate for decades,
Hispano’s role in the territory seemed clearer to U.S. authorities and the American public.
In her examination of race and law in nineteenth-century New Mexico, Laura E. Gómez
found a federal government unwilling to accept the territory’s mixed-race Mexican
population fully into the Union. She explains: “More than anything, it was New
Mexico’s racial make-up that accounted for its lengthy status as a federal territory.
Though substantial Indians lived in the territory, they were disfranchised. It was the
majority-Mexican federal citizens whom Congress objected to including as state
citizens.”340
According to Laura Gómez, part of the elite Hispanos’ claim to citizenship was
their claims to whiteness and equality with Anglos. However, they rejected the
citizenship of Pueblos, who were not white; and thereby denied all racial or ethnic
connections between Pueblo and Hispano people.341 But while Hispano elites may have
distanced themselves socially and legally from Pueblo Indians, poorer Hispanos
physically drew closer to them, utilizing their land and water to sustain a growing
population that was ever-more dispossessed of their won natural resources. The
adjudication of land grants by Congressional action bolstered and accelerated a process of
dispossession that was decades, even centuries, in the making.
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The adjudication process began formally when the U.S. Surveyor General Act for
New Mexico was passed on July 22, 1854. Like those in other states and territories, the
New Mexico surveyor general was housed under the General Land Office in the Interior
Department and was assigned the responsibility of surveying all public lands in the
territory. But Congress also assigned the New Mexico surveyor, unlike other surveyors
general, the responsibility of investigating all Spanish and Mexican land grant claims, as
well as the land grants of the Pueblo Indians. Beyond validating land claims and
identifying available lands for settlement, determining the status of land claims aided the
United States in fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.342
In the act, Congress instructed the surveyor general to base his decisions
regarding land grant claims on the “laws, usages, and customs” of Spain and México.343
The surveyor general was to become “acquainted with the land system of Spain, by
examining the laws of Spain; its ordinances, decrees, and regulations; and congressional
acts and U.S. Supreme Court decisions that had addressed Spanish land grants in other
parts of the United States.” To complete this formidable task, lawmakers instructed the
surveyor to create his own archive of documents dealing with Spanish and Mexican land
grants, land laws and a registry of all past Spanish and Mexican officials authorized to
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issue grants. This was difficult given the relatively small budget granted to the office.344
Surveyors general, in actuality, relied on the documents that claimants used to evidence
their claims, and only after decades did they accumulate a considerable archive with
which to compare incoming documents and determine their validity.
The Office of the Surveyor General for New Mexico was also instructed to “treat
the existence of a city, town, or village at the time the United States took possession as
prima facie evidence of a grant.”345 This language was taken directly from the surveyor
general act for California. Unlike the hastened California confirmation process, which
aimed at dispensing with land claims to achieve statehood as quickly as possible, the
surveyor general operated in New Mexico for thirty-six years. Though Congress
instructed the office to guard against fraudulent claims, multiple surveyors general,
particularly T. Rush Spencer (1869-1872) and Henry Atkinson (1876-1884),
duplicitously shepherded their friends’ and associates’ land claims through the
confirmation process. They not only recommended the claims to Congress for
recommendation, but also assured that surveyors hired to survey land claims would allow
the most charitable interpretations and extend boundaries, giving many grants the “India
rubber” quality that eventually attracted suspicion.346
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Historian Victor Westphall calls the surveyors general charge an “impossible
task.” Indeed, when William Pelham arrived in New Mexico in 1854, he was ill-suited to
review dozens of land claims. His inability to read or write Spanish made it nearly
impossible to utilize the unorganized archive of Spanish and Mexican documents in Santa
Fe. Surveyors general also lacked both the funds and the authority to investigate claims
until they were petitioned in his office. The surveyor general was thus powerless and was
disallowed from even investigating competing or contiguous claims on his own. Rather
than a federal official empowered to do field surveys and interview claimants and other
interested parties, the surveyor general became a static bureaucrat, ignoring conflicting
claims and adjudicating on a first-come-first-serve basis. Despite its iniquitousness, the
“first-come-first-serve” policy was embraced by the Court of Private Land Claims
decades later.347 In tying the surveyor general’s hands, U. S. Congress proved
uninterested in adjudicating or confirming land grants justly or equitably.
Numerous Tewa Basin claims were submitted to the Office of the Surveyor
General during Pelham’s term. He recommended the Sebastián Martín, Ramón Vigil,
Baca Location 1, Gaspar Ortiz grants for Congressional confirmation, as well as the
Town of Chamita and Town of Las Trampas claims. Though Las Trampas was correctly
confirmed as a communal grant, Chamita was confirmed as an individual grant to Manuel
Trujillo, the sole heir of Antonio Trujillo in 1859. Pelham’s inability to survey the grant,
even superficially, inhibited his ability to understand the nature of the claim. Congress
confirmed the grant in 1860, but not until an 1877 survey by deputy surveyors Sawyer
347

GAO, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: Findings and Possible Options, 57-58;
Benavides and Golten, Response to the 2004 GAO Report, 58; Ebright, Land Grants and
Lawsuits, 136-137. Victor Westphall, Mercedes Reales: Hispanic Land Grants of the
Upper Rio Grande Region (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983), 85-88.
173

and McElroy did the federal government realize that the grant lay fully within the
boundaries of San Juan Pueblo. It took no action on the situation until 1920, when
Chamita heirs requested a patent for the grant amid the threat of ejectment lawsuits.348
In 1855, Tomás Cabeza de Baca petitioned Surveyor General Pelham for
confirmation of his great-grandfather Luis María Cabeza de Baca’s 1821 grant, which
was overlapped by the 1835 Town of Las Vegas Grant. Luís María and his son, Juan
Antonio, had both died from Navajo raids on the family’s sheep range, leaving Francisco
Tomás Baca to manage the massive grant. Francisco Tomás protested the Las Vegas
Grant to Governor Manuel Armijo in 1838, alleging that Las Vegas and the Cabeza de
Baca claim were for precisely the same lands. Armijo ignored the protest, and Pelham,
after examining both claims, held hearings and recommended both grants to Congress for
confirmation, leaving an impending legal battle. Represented by Territorial Supreme
Court Justice John S. Watts, Baca’s heirs offered to abandon their claim for equivalent
lands elsewhere in New Mexico. In June 1860, Congress both confirmed the Town of
Las Vegas Grant and authorized five tracts as compensation to the Baca family, creating
the so-called Baca Float grants. The Baca Location Number 1 contained some 99,239
acres, including the Valle Grande, atop the Jemez Mountains west of the Tewa Basin.349
In June of 1859, Mariano Sánchez, as the sole owner of the Sebastián Martín
grant, submitted his claim to Surveyor General Pelham, who recommended confirmation,
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save the portion Martín donated to the Las Trampas Grant in 1751. Congress approved
the grant on June 21, 1860. Later, in 1876, it was surveyed at 51,387.20 acres.350 In
1856, Ramón Vigil was represented by Justice Watts when he submitted his petition for
confirmation of his grant. Pelham recommended the grant to Congress, which approved
it on June 21, 1860, the same day Congress confirmed the Sebastián Martín Grant. The
Martín grant would gradually draw timber and grazing interests, but the Vigil grant
would change hands, from Vigil to Father Thomas Aquinas Hayes in 1879 for $4,000.
Hayes inflated the price through a false sale in 1881 and eventually sold the grant for
$100,000 in 1884.351
Unwieldy claims to vast grants flooded Pelham’s office, and he was unprepared to
scrutinize such large claims. Grants were traditionally described by metes and bounds
and it was difficult for Pelham to ascertain their true boundaries. The landmarks
described in the petitions were unlikely to be found on maps available to him, and
witnesses supplied by the claimants were almost certain to corroborate the names
assigned to hills, rivers, and even-smaller landmarks like old trees and unique
outcroppings of rocks. Most claims that were recommended by Pelham were approved
by Congress by 1860, the same year that he left the office, but most were not surveyed
until 1877, when the actions of his successors began drawing scrutiny. By the time he
reported his last claims, Pelham was disillusioned with the elasticity of the process and
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recommended both that a commission be appointed to examine claims and that the
interest of the government be represented in future adjudication proceedings.352
During the next three decades, over two-dozen other Tewa Basin grants were
submitted to the Surveyor General’s office. Surveyors General T. Rush Spencer, James
K. Proudfit, and Henry M. Atkinson all recommended these grants to Congress for
confirmation, but the pace of confirmation slowed after the end of the Civil War.
Changes in land speculation complicated the process. Early lawyers turned speculators
were paid in cash or, more often, by a portion of the confirmed lands. The confirmation
process became more lengthy and now involved much more than submitting the claim to
a surveyor general. lawyers could easily exercise influence over the Santa Fe-based
surveyor general, convincing but Congress to act on the claims of their clients was much
more difficult. This often fell to New Mexico’s territorial delegates, men compelled to
use their office for their own private business interests. Stephen B. Elkins was one of
these men.
In 1873, Elkins was elected congressional delegate for the Territory of New
Mexico. The affable Elkins had moved to New Mexico less than a decade earlier and
was quickly elected to the territorial legislature, amassing a political following and
gaining the post of territorial district attorney in 1866-1867. With Thomas B. Catron, his
roommate back at the University of Missouri, Elkins speculated in land grants. Together,
he and Catron gained interest in the Santa Gertrudis lo de Mora grant. Elkins
energetically pursued congressional confirmation on land grants, especially those in

352

Westphall, Mercedes Reales, 92.
176

which he and his business partners had interest. Of the seven grants confirmed and
patented during Elkin’s tenure as territorial delegate, Catron had an interest in five.353
The speculative habits of attorneys and politicians drew the suspicion of federal
officials in Washington. This was especially true after the confirmation of the Maxwell
(Beaubien-Miranda) and Sangre de Cristo Land Grants for 1.7 million and 1 million
acres, respectively. Lawyers active in the early era of land adjudication successfully
enlarged land grants in the Tewa Basin as well. The enormous Juan José Lobato Grant
was expanded from 100,000 to 205,615 acres, overlapping fourteen other grants,
including the Abiquiú, Barranca, Plaza Blanca, Plaza Colorada, Polvadera, Vallecito, Ojo
Caliente and the Town of El Rito Grants. When heirs or claimants of these grants
protested, most were rejected outright. The Abiquiú, Plaza Colorada and Plaza Blanca
Grants were the only ones confirmed within the Lobato Grant. Their combined 33,000
acres reduced the Lobato Grant to 172,615 acres. Some smaller claims were approved
for at least their houses and ranches in small claims court, but the Lobato Grant
nonetheless impacted multiple superior claims, including the Manuel Garcia de las Rivas
and Juan Estevan García de Noriega (another of my maternal ancestor) claims.354
Overlapping claims were commonplace in the early proceedings of the surveyor
general. The first-come-first-serve policy allowed inferior claims to win out and
encouraged land speculators to pursue larger tracts and push for their confirmation. The
Court of Private Lands Claims that succeeded the Surveyor General’s office accepted the
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first-come-first-serve policy despite the inequity and dispossession it caused.355 The
ineffectiveness of the surveyor general in scrutinizing fraudulent claims and
implementing the provisions of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo has led to ample
criticism. Ebright claims that the federal government deprived land grants of due process
of law: “The surveyor was merely a passive agent of the government, and the procedure
before his office was not really an adjudication at all.”356
Land speculators and former business partners Catron and Elkins would meet
again, this time on opposite sides of a lawsuit that would decide the fate of Pueblo Indian
lands. Appointed the U.S. attorney of the Territory of New Mexico in 1872, Catron used
this political post for his own economic and political advancement. Em Hall writes that
Catron’s quarrels with the Taos County Democratic Party political machine led to his
prosecution of two cases, U. S. v. Santistevan and U. S. v. Joseph. Juan Santistevan and
Antonio Joseph were Taos natives, owners of portions of the Antonio Martínez Grant and
active in Taos County politics. Both men led a Democratic walkout of the 1872
Territorial Legislature, protesting the election of Republicans in a Democrat-controlled
house.357
Catron’s predecessor as U.S. attorney was none other than his former legal partner
and close friend Stephen B. Elkins. Whereas Elkins had pursued only fines, not eviction,
in his 1867 case against Beniño Ortiz, who trespassed on Cochiti Pueblos lands, Catron
sought legal resolution to the larger Pueblo lands question in U. S. courts and the
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opportunity for political revenge against his enemies in Taos County. Elkins had claimed
that the 1834 Non-Intercourse Act, which prohibited all unregulated trade with Indian
tribes, did not apply to New Mexico, even though the act was explicitly extended to the
territory in 1851. In preparing his cases against Joseph and Santistevan, Catron built his
prosecution from recent case law, both the 1867 US v. Ortiz decision and the 1869 US v.
Lucero decision, another case prosecuted by Elkins while U.S. attorney.
Like the Ortiz suit, Lucero dealt with fines levied against trespass on Cochiti
Pueblo lands, this time by José Juan Lucero of Peña Blanca. In Lucero, Territorial
Supreme Court justice John S. Watts borrowed heavily from late justice John Slough’s
opinion in the Ortiz case, which drew wildly on Mexican history and cited the Plán de
Iguala, the Treaty of Córdova and Mexican president Benito Juarez’s misconstrued
Pueblo blood as proof that the Pueblos were bona fide citizens of the United States. For
his part, Watts did differentiate between federal Indian policy and Pueblo’s status as
citizens under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo:
This court, under this section of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, does not
consider it proper to assent to the withdrawal of eight thousand citizens of New
Mexico from the operation of the laws, made to secure and maintain them in their
liberty and property, and consign their liberty and property to a system of laws
and trade made for wandering savages and administered by the agents of the
Indian department . . . For the Indian department to insist, as they have done for
the last fifteen years, upon the reduction of these citizens to a state of vassalage,
under the Indian intercourse act, is passing strange. A law made for wild,
wandering savages, to be extended over a people living for three centuries in
fenced abodes and cultivating the soil for the maintenance of themselves and
families, and giving an example of virtue, honesty, and industry to their more
civilized neighbors, in this enlightened age of progress and proper understanding
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of the civil rights of man, is considered by this court as wholly inapplicable to the
pueblo [sic] Indians of New Mexico.358
Although driven by Catron’s will to punish his political enemies, the US v. Joseph
case would seemingly force the United States to face the question of the Pueblos’ status
as either Indians or citizens. Instead, the Joseph case, as argued by Catron to the New
Mexico Territorial Supreme Court, only discussed the nature of the Pueblos’ titles to their
land grants. Rosen writes that the U.S. Supreme Court followed suit, upholding New
Mexico’s rejection of federal oversight and “declining to take broader issues of Pueblo
Indians’ legal status.” Further, she contends that in the Joseph decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court narrowly interpreted its own laws and held that because Pueblos were not
recognized by a legal or ratified treaty, they were not wards of the government and were
not due federal protection. It also held that the Pueblos held title to their lands,because
they were recognized by a federal patent. Their claim was thus superior to any claims of
the United States, meaning that the federal government could not protect the title of lands
to which it had only an inferior claim. This obscure legal distinction justified the federal
government abdication of all oversight of Pueblo rights, including those to their lands.359
The impetus for the US v. Joseph case came from none other than Antonio
Joseph. His Portuguese father had come to Taos after being shipwrecked off the Gulf
coast of Texas. Antonio was born in Taos in August of 1846, merely a week after
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Colonel Stephen Watts Kearny entered New Mexico. When he was a child, Joseph and
his mother were taken captive by marauding Apaches, who burned his father’s store. He
was rescued by Colonel Sterling Price, baptized by Padre Antonio José Martínez, after
whom he was named, and later attended Bishop Jean Baptiste Lamy’s school in Santa Fe
and business college in St. Louis. After his father’s death in 1862, Joseph took over the
mercantile and busily set about speculating in lands in the Taos area. He gradually
expanded his holdings, claiming lands on the Antonio Martinez, Antoine Leroux and
Arroyo Hondo grants.
Joseph’s claim to ten acres of Taos Pueblo land drew the pueblo’s protest, and
U.S. Attorney Catron pushed the case all the way to the United States Supreme Court in
1876. In that court, Joseph was represented by none other than Stephen B. Elkins, the
very attorney who had lost the Ortiz and Lucero cases defending Pueblo lands. Now, he
defended Joseph’s non-Indian claim to Pueblo land.360 On May 7, 1877, Associate Justice
Samuel Miller delivered the court’s opinion: because the United States had no
jurisdiction over Pueblo lands, it was not a party to private claims against Pueblo title.
Disputes over non-Indian claims could be meted out in court where illegitimate claims
would surely fall.361 Rosen writes that while the Ortiz, Lucero and Santistevan decisions
on Pueblo land tenure were decided in the context of local interests, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Joseph decision “reflected and expressed a strong national sentiment in favor of
advancing American individualism and expanding economic markets.”362
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Antonio Joseph’s speculation in Pueblo and Hispano lands demonstrates both his
locally informed habits and his interest in inviting broader investment in northern New
Mexico. Legally, Pueblo grants were now completely vulnerable to outside speculation.
In light of the Joseph decision Congress, advised by the Board of Indian Commissioners,
redoubled its efforts to protect the Pueblos in ancillary ways. In 1883, Congress began
formally designating Pueblo appropriations for agricultural implements, seeds and ditch
construction. The Santa Fe Indian School was created in 1890363 and Congress began
funding the Presbyterian founded Albuquerque Indian School in 1891364. In 1899
Congress legislated the position of special attorney for the Pueblo Indians. By 1905, the
Appropriations Act held that the lands and livestock of Pueblo Indians were free
territorial taxation.365
In 1880 Joseph relocated to Ojo Caliente where he built a hotel and health resort
and sanitarium. He claimed proprietary use of the springs, which had been used by
Hispanos, Pueblo and other Indians for centuries. Why Joseph relocated from Taos is
unknown. An ardent Democrat, Joseph fought the Republican territorial establishment in
vain until 1884, when a split in the territorial Republican Party helped Joseph win
election as delegate to Congress for the New Mexico Territory. The presidency of
Grover Cleveland assured that Joseph would not only retain his post, but would control
the small but invaluable federal patronage, which endeared elected officials to voters.
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Joseph served as New Mexico’s delegate to Congress for the next ten years, longer than
any other territorial delegate.366
A political opportunist, Joseph held his own political fortunes above New
Mexico’s. For instance, he refused to support outright L. Bradford Prince’s unending
pursuit of New Mexico statehood. In his early years as a delegate, Joseph supported bills
for New Mexico statehood until it appeared Republicans would control the territory,
whereupon he withdrew his support. Joseph favored political expediency above New
Mexico’s political maturation, and for this he was widely criticized in the local press
which publically doubted the rare times that he promised to support bills requesting a
statehood enabling act. When questioned on the floor of Congress about his tepid and
tardy support for New Mexico statehood, Delegate Joseph cited both unresolved Indian
depredation claims and unresolved land claims, complicated by clouded Spanish and
Mexican title as cause for his sudden about-face. The people of New Mexico, claimed
Joseph, believed only statehood offered resolution to these problems.367
Joseph likely would not have supported statehood if he had known it would
eventually alter the land market and curb land speculation. Before he moved to Ojo
Caliente in 1880, he had expanded his land holdings by speculating and eventually
gaining title to the Ojo Caliente Land Grant. Exactly how he gained title remains
unclear. Malcolm Ebright’s research has uncovered Joseph’s practice of distributing
$1.00 bills to the heirs of the Cieneguilla Grant east of the Embudo Grant and adjacent to
Ojo Caliente, in order to obtain title to the entire grant. The Cieneguilla heirs believed
366
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that they were only granting right of way or paying to have their title revalidated.
Instead, Joseph proved successful in using the same methods of duplicity, bribery and
coercion that Thomas Catron and Alois Renehan famously used in Mora and Trampas,
distributing dollar bills for thousands of acres of land.368

Figure 12: Plat of the Ojo Caliente Grant, 1873. This plat represents Griffen and
McMullen’s 1873 survey of Antonio Joseph’s 92,160-acre claim. The survey reduced the
grant to 38,490 acres. The reduced claim was rejected by an 1894 CPLC decision, which
further shrank it to 2,244 acres (see Figure 12 below). “Land Grant Deed Filed for Ojo
Caliente,” August 17, 2012, The Taos News, online at
http://www.taosnews.com/news/article_ed21e766-e7e6-11e1-810d-0019bb2963f4.html
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Figure 13: Survey of the Ojo Caliente Grant, 1877. The 2,244 acres represented in
this survey illustrate the effect of the CPLC’s 1894 decision, which rejected all of the
uplands east of the Río Ojo Caliente in the western reaches of the grant. folder 57, series
301, Thomas B. Catron Papers, MSS 29, Center for Southwest Research, University
Libraries, UNM, Albuquerque. Accessed online at
http://econtent.unm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/catron/id/876/rec/1
We can only infer how Joseph came to own most of the Ojo Caliente Grant, but
his actions at the adjacent Cieneguilla Grant provides clues. After distributing dollar bills
to gain interest in the Cieneguilla Grant, Joseph filed his claim to undivided title, which
he also did at Ojo Caliente. In 1878, Joseph objected to an 1877 survey conducted by the
deputies of the U.S. Surveyor Generals office granting him only 38,000 acres. He
claimed he owned the entire land grant commons of 44,000 acres. When the Surveyor
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General’s Office failed to take final action on his claim, he filed his case in 1892 in the
Court of Private Land Claims, whose founding legislation he helped pass.369
Represented by fellow land grant speculator Napoleon B. Laughlin, Joseph
submitted his claim to what he called the “Antonio Joseph Grant.” His petition included
a chart crudely abstracting title to all the deeds that represented his claim to undivided
interest in the grant, including fifty-three shares representing the fifty-three original
settlers. Ebright comments that at least thirty-five of these fifty-three shares of interest
carry a convoluted story of previous sales to land speculators Antonio Maes and Salvador
Lucero. Despite these uncertainties and the objection of Jesús María Olguin and other
heirs of Antonio Olguin, an original Ojo Caliente settler, the CPLC awarded Antonio
Joseph title to the entire Ojo Caliente Grant. But Chief Justice Joseph R. Reed’s decision
in April 1894 held that Ojo Caliente’s eastern and western boundaries rested at the
foothills adjacent to the Ojo Caliente River. Reeds conclusion reduced the acreage to just
2,244 acres.370
Antonio Joseph, who infringed on both Taos Pueblo’s lands and robbed Ojo
Caliente of its patrimony, was an enterprising speculator in both Hispano and Pueblo
lands. And he was far from alone. Again, Pueblo and Hispano lands were subject to the
same political, legal and economic pressures. In fact, many of the same attorneys and
jurists served the dispossession of both communities. Stephen B. Elkins both defended
Pueblo land tenure and the claims of non-Indians as New Mexico’s district attorney
(1866-1867), attorney general (1867), and as U.S. attorney (1867-1870). As territorial
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delegate in 1876, he infamously pursued Congressional approval of the partition suit, and
when Congress refused, he engineered a territorial statute that allowed for partition of all
property, but was aimed at partitioning large land tracts on Hispano grants. When
Thomas B. Catron served as the U.S. attorney (1872-1878), his defense of Pueblo lands
was motivated more by the spirit of vengeance on Taos Democrats Juan Santistevan and
Antonio Joseph than his obligation or desire to protect Pueblo lands. Ebright, Hendricks
and Hughes comment that soon after he lost the Joseph case, Catron used the Supreme
Court’s decision to substantiate his own claims to Pueblo lands.371
Just as Pueblo land tenure was still under assault, Hispano land grants likewise
faced a new era of speculation. When the Surveyor General’s Office proved itself more
able to guard against fabricated or inflated claims, speculators began working to
influence the office. They were successful with Surveyor T. Rush Spencer (1869-1872),
who approved the survey of the Maxwell Land Grant while he worked for the Maxwell
Land Grant and Railway Company and gained interest in the Mora Land Grant with
Elkins and Catron.372 His successor, James K. Proudfit, was also involved in speculation,
investing in the cattle companies and land grants that he adjudicated. Proudfit later
pressed Congress to scrutinize claims and suggested a claims commission that would
address complaints of collusion and unethical legal practices.373 Henry Atkinson (18761884) took up Spencer’s mantle and partnered with Thomas B. Catron, William
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McBroom and booster Max Frost, approving an additional survey of the Maxwell Grant
while speculating in the massive Anton Chico Grant.374
Ryan Golten and David Benavides explain the influence of Samuel Ellison on
Proudfit and Atkinson.
Samuel Ellison was a prodigious land grant attorney in the 1870s and brought
more land grants into the adjudication process that any other attorney. For some
reason he has escaped careful scrutiny. He represented 23 of the 49 claims that
came before Proudfit (and 13 of the 35 that came before Proudfit’s successor
Atkinson). These claims followed a similar pattern in which Ellison made
anonymous claims for land grants that eventually were recommended as private
land grants. The initial petitions for the Town of Vallecito de Lovato and the
Petaca land grants, for example, included witness depositions for claims that
Ellison himself provided. In both cases Samuel Ellison delivered to James
Proudfit a petition and a series of witnesses. This pattern was suspicious (Julian
noted the unusual patterns of Ellison’s petitions in a series of reports to the
General Land Office) and was replicated in other claims. Samuel Ellison had a
unique knowledge of the system of Mexican land grants and understood evidence
necessary to make claims for adjudication. Proudfit and Atkinson, meanwhile,
actively invested in land grants and incorporated cattle companies in land grants
petitioned by Ellison.375
Even as surveyors general partnered with attorneys and created development
corporations to invite investment, the environment of speculation was in a period of
transformation. The massive tracts on which lawyers gained an undivided interest were
still protected by communal ownership. To break this corporate hold on the grant,
Stephen B. Elkins attempted to get Congress to pass legislation that allowed the
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partitioning of property, a legal device common in American property law. When
legislation died in committee, Elkins enacted a partition statute in the New Mexico
Territorial Legislature in 1876, the same year that the Joseph case created similar
vulnerabilities on Pueblo lands.
The partition statute now allowed lawyers to sue for partition at any district court
in the territory. When an equitable partition was impossible to achieve, a result that was
likely as heirs held varying interest in their grant, the grant went up for a public sale.
Lawyers typically worked with business partners, who would buy the grant for pennies
on the dollar. Partition was particularly destructive of community and quasi-community
land grants, which were now dispossessed of the ejido that made their communities
sustainable.376
New Mexico’s early territorial era inaugurated a period of speculation on both
Pueblo and Hispano lands. Despite Calhoun’s attempts to protect Pueblo lands, his
successors were unable to stop the Hispano invasion of Pueblo lands and the designs of
land speculators. The early adjudication of land grants under an ill-equipped and
unprepared Surveyor General’s Office allowed attorneys to speculate in grant lands and
dispossess their Hispano communities. Antonio Joseph, Stephen B. Elkins and Thomas
B. Catron were among the most well known and active lands speculators. They ventured
to gain title to Hispano land grants and, though they were charged with protecting Pueblo
Indian lands, they also unencumbered these lands of federal protection.
The year 1876 proved to be an important and transitional one for Hispano and
Pueblo communities and their lands. In the next chapter, we will see how the invasion of
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Pueblo lands increased after the US v. Joseph decision. We will also see how the
partition statute offered a new legal device to dispossess community grants of their lands,
and initiated a new era of speculation, during which the ominous influence of the Santa
Fe Ring led to the closing of the Surveyor General’s Office and the creation of the Court
of Private Land Claims (CPLC). Despite the Supreme Court’s disavowal of its fiduciary
duties toward Pueblo Indians, Congress provided a special attorney for Pueblo Indians.
The first Pueblo attorney, George Hill Howard, used this position as an inroad to land
grant speculation and used the partition suit to dispossess grants in the Tewa Basin of
their common lands. Later special attorneys served as federal attorneys in CPLC
hearings, as counsel to Hispanos fighting Pueblos over precious water resources, and as
agents for investors purchasing former Pueblo and Hispano lands. By the end of the
territorial era, connections between Hispano and Pueblo land tenure undeniable.
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Chapter 4: Speculation and Appropriation in Late Territorial New Mexico,
1876-1912
Non-Indian encroachment on Pueblo lands grew in the decades after the Joseph
case. Emboldened by the federal government’s formal disavowal of its guardianship of
Pueblo lands and people, renters overstayed their leases on and squatters moved onto
Pueblo lands, refusing to leave. Indian agents implored Pueblos to discontinue leasing
tracts to Hispanos, especially to cattlemen, whose herds routinely overgrazed already
barren Indian lands. By the 1890s, Pueblo governors and tribal members unilaterally sold
their lands to non-Indians. In these same decades, Hispano land grants faced a more
stringent adjudication process when the Court of Private Land Claims replaced a
Surveyor General’s Office too prone to corruption. Both Pueblos and Hispanos suffered
irretrieveable land loss during the Gilded Age, although the forces of attrition were
sometimes dissimilar.
Despite the rigidity of the the CPLC, speculation in Hispano grants continued.
Scholars have argued that the assault on Hispano land grants was motivated by American
legal notions of communal property as unproductive and contrary to free-market
capitalism.377 The same rationale, exalting individualism as the path toward native
assimilation, underlay the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, and was at play in the Joseph
case, which undermined the tribal control of communal lands. The similarities in Pueblo
and Hispano land loss in the Tewa Basin went beyond fin de siècle federal philosophies.
Personal fortune also drove the plundering and dispossession of Pueblos and Hispanos.
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George Hill Howard, the first special attorney for Pueblo Indians, left his office in
scandal when he solicited loans from Laguna Pueblo, which he was unable to repay.378
He quickly turned to land speculation on the Petaca and Juan José Lobato land grants.
William H. Pope served as a federal attorney in the Court of Private Land Claims before
serving as the special attorney for the Pueblos. Despite this experience, he later upheld
the U.S. v. Joseph decision, only to be overturned by the U. S. Supreme Court. Lawyers
A. J. Abbott, Francis C. Wilson, Jacob H. Crist, Richard H. Hanna and Ralph E.
Twitchell all speculated in land grants before or after leaving their post as special Pueblo
attorney.
Infamous land speculators Thomas B. Catron and Alois B. Renehan predictably
held land claims to Pueblo lands. Less known among historians are attorneys like
Edward Hobart, who serve as the U.S. surveyor general from 1889-1893 and left his
office to embezzle half of Santa Clara Pueblo’s land; he was represented by none other
than Judge A. J. Abbott, the immediate past Pueblo attorney, charged with protecting the
Pueblo from this very type of action. Speculation by attorneys united Pueblo and
Hispano land tenure, both of which faced not only similar philosophies bent on their
dispossession, but also a cadre of attorneys seeking to profit off tribal and communal
lands. The season for speculation was wide open in land grant country. This chapter
discusses this new era of land speculation, marked by the U.S. v. Joseph decision and the
partition suit that created new vulnerabilities for Pueblo and Hispano communities.
~~~
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After the 1876 Joseph decision made Pueblos and their lands more vulnerable to
outside speculation, Congress funded agents, schools, farmers and a special attorney for
Pueblo Indians. The rampant speculation in Hispano land grants also drew federal
intervention. Clarence Pullen briefly served as surveyor general (1884-1885) and was
followed by George Washington Julian (1885-1889). Chosen by President Grover
Cleveland to clean up New Mexico politics, Julian invited national attention and
unprecedented scrutiny to the territorial dominance by the Santa Fe Ring.379 Other
surveyors general had been influenced by land speculators, but he adopted an adversarial
stance toward all land claims. Julian reexamined over thirty claims approved by his
predecessors that awaited Congressional action: he rejected over twenty, returning to the
federal government over four million acres of land. These included the Cieneguilla,
Francisco Montes Vigil, Juan Bautista Valdez, Petaca, Polvadera, and Antonio de Salazar
Grants in the Tewa Basin.380
Though Julian certainly thwarted the claims of unscrupulous speculators, he
unfortunately also blocked legitimate claims. His call for reform was, in part, responsible
for the closing of the Office of the Surveyor General and the creation of the Court of
Private Land Claims. Julian posited that common lands were never the actual property of
the heirs and that neither the Spanish crown nor the Mexican government had intended to
relinquish title to their subjects and citizens when a grant was made. His theory would be
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adopted and embellished by Matthew G. Reynolds, the United States attorney for the
Court of Private Land Claims.381
In his history of the Court of Private Land claims, historian Richard Bradfute
lauds Reynolds guarding against fraudulent claims. Lands that were a part of rejected
claims were returned to the public domain and kept out of the hands of speculators.
Bradfute writes: “Reynolds seemed dedicated to the defeat of as many grants as possible.
If he could not defeat them, he strove to reduce acreage as much as possible.”382 While
his suspicion guarded against fraudulent claims, it created a hostile legal environment
that unjustly reduced the lands of community and quasi-community land grants.
To fight against fraudulent claims, Reynolds hired William M. Tipton, who had
served in the surveyor general’s office since 1876 and was familiar with the territory’s
archives, witnesses, and speculators. Henry Ossian Flipper, first black graduate of
Westpoint and a former buffalo soldier, collected and translated Spanish and Mexican
laws under Reynolds, and later served as an assistant to Secretary of the Interior Albert B.
Fall. William H. Pope served as the assistant U.S. attorney under Reynolds. Pope would
later serve as special attorney for Pueblo Indians, federal district judge for New Mexico’s
Fifth Judicial District, chief justice of the territorial New Mexico Supreme Court and
finally as federal judge for the new state of New Mexico in 1912, where he upheld the
Joseph decision in the U.S. v. Sandoval case (see Chapter 5).
Scholars and land grant heirs studying the Court of Private Lands Claims (CPLC)
have pointed to Reynolds’s clear advantage in CPLC adjudication proceedings. Through
381
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his assistant, Henry Ossian Flipper, he compiled a translation of Spanish and Mexican
land laws. His Spanish and Mexican Land Laws: New Spain and Mexico became the
authoritative text on all questions regarding the Spanish and Mexican policies. This text
was used not only by his office, which scrutinized all land claims, but also by the CPLC
itself, whose justices adjudicated them.383
Guided by Reynolds’s interpretations of Spanish and Mexican laws, the CPLC
took a hostile stance toward land claims. This attitude intensified over its thirteen-year
tenure and it was manifested in decisions that destroyed communal land grants by
removing the ejido, the communal lands that made villages sustainable. That known land
speculators were either forwarding their own claims or representing the claims of others
only invited more scrutiny by the CPLC. At the same time that legal devices operated to
dispossess land grants, developing markets transformed lands that barely sustained their
small communities. These ejidos were already stretched to their ecological limits, but
drew investment to develop its resources and produce material goods that were sold on
erratic regional markets.
The CPLC’s rejection of the Embudo land grant provides a case in point. Granted
in 1725, heirs petitioned Surveyor General John Clark for confirmation in 1863, and
when no action was taken, they filed their claim with the CPLC. Land-speculator
Napoleon Laughlin, who represented Antonio Joseph at the neighboring Ojo Caliente
Grant, represented the Embudo heirs, who were led by Antonio Griego. When Griego
presented a certified copy of the title papers drafted by alcalde José Campo Redondo in
1786, Assistant U. S. Attorney William Pope protested that there was no way to test their
383
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veracity and that alcaldes did not have the authority to make copies of the grant’s title
papers.384
Malcolm Ebright comments that Pope’s position ignored the lack of escribanos
(scribes or notaries) in New Mexico. In fact, alcaldes were often the only official
available to make official copies of land grant paperwork. In the Embudo case, the
CPLC departed from the surveyor general’s practice of recognizing the presence of a
community as prima facie evidence that the community held legal title to its lands. The
Supreme Court decision in Hayes v. United States in 1898 held that claims not “lawfully
and regularly derived from the Government of Spain or Mexico” would not be
recognized, meaning that the presence of a community was no longer accepted as
evidence of the grant. With two of the five justices dissenting, the CPLC, nonetheless,
rejected the Embudo Grant, creating legal vulnerabilities that affected the grant through
the 1970s, when the Bureau of Land Management attempted to make heirs pay the
federal government for their own home lots.385
Lawyers Ryan Golten and David Benavides write that the federal government
played a key role in dispossessing land grants both during and after the confirmation
process. Through its decisions, the federal government created weak spots in the legal
armor for land grants. Its positions almost guaranteed that attorneys representing land
grants on contingency fee agreements would turn to communities’ only asset, its land,
when recouping their losses. Lawyers also used the partition suit to pry apart land grants,
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which would sell at auction, netting for lawyers their fee and removing communal lands
that were integral to a community’s survival. Golten and Benavides write that partition
suits, empowered when community grants were misidentified as tenancies-in-common,386
extended the speculation and exploitation of community land grants. They consider
tenancies-in-common a fabrication, a “federal invention for community land grants,” and
impeach the federal government for its role in making communities susceptible to the
designs of speculators.387
Confusion over the nature of grants seeded fertile ground for fraudulent and
enlarged claims. The Spanish system of metes and bounds was responsive to the limits
of the natural environment, shaping petitions that attempted to include the resources
necessary to sustain a community. It was also imprecise, leaving uncertainty that allowed
for wild speculation on the former lands of many Spanish and Mexican grants. The
Pueblo Quemado Grant, on the eastern edge of the Tewa Basin, was one of these cases.
Likely settled at the end of the seventeenth century, Quemado was restricted by its high
altitude and the narrow canyon in which it lay. While the canyon provided protection
from Apache and Comanche raids, it also ensured that the population would never grow
too large.
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By the 1850s, the Quemado Grant held a small population of less than twohundred souls, which lived along the narrow river canyon, but used the surrounding lands
to provide pastureland, hunting grounds and range for gathering herbs and wild fruits.
The age of the grant created an opportunity for speculation in the lands west of Quemado
and north of Santa Cruz de la Cañada. Three equally shoddy and competing claims
emerged on March 3, 1893, the last day to file claims before the court. Thomas Catron,
in one of his earlier ventures into lands speculation in the Tewa Basin, would claim that
the Quemado Grant embraced perhaps 280,000 acres, an acreage that would have made
the grant overlap the Santa Cruz de la Cañada and San Juan Pueblo grants. Pueblo
attorney George Howard Hill filed a protest on behalf of San Juan Pueblo. Other protests
were filed on behalf of the Sierra Mosca, Diego de Velasco and Pueblo of Nambé by U.S.
Attorney Matthew G. Reynolds, and Assistant U. S. Attorney Willian H. Pope filed
claims on behalf of the Santa Cruz de la Cañada Grant, Nuestra Señora del Rosario San
Fernando y Santiago del Río de las Truchas Grant, the Santo Domingo de Cundiyó Grant,
the latter two of which mention the existence of the Quemado grant in the boundary
descriptions of their grants.388
A 1900 hearing revealed that the 1895 survey of the Nuestra Señora del Rosario
San Fernando y Santiago del Río de las Truchas Grant had already encompassed most of
the Pueblo Quemado claim, leaving the village of Quemado (later renamed Córdova)
with no title. The neighboring village of Truchas held it. With no title papers to support
their claim or contest Truchas’s awarded boundaries, Catron and the other attorneys
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abandoned the case.389 The nearby Santo Domingo de Cundiyó Grant faced similar
issues.
Cundiyó was represented by Ralph Emerson Twitchell, who had arrived in New
Mexico in 1882 and quickly became an avid researcher in the Spanish and Mexican
archives in Santa Fe. Twitchell filed one of many conflicting claims to the Cundiyó
Grant on March 3, 1893, the last day that claims could be filed in the Court of Private
Land Claims. He eventually struck a deal, however, with attorneys Thomas B. Catron,
Charles Coons and Robert Gortner to merge their claims into one and split the
contingency lawyers’ fees. Twitchell then knowingly filed claims representing Antonio
Vigil for the Diego de Velasco Grant on the same day as the Cundiyó claim, which
declared for precisely the same land as the Cundiyó Grant. The Velasco claim was
unsuccessful; the Cundiyó claim, estimated at over twenty-thousand acres and stretching
west beyond the Sierra Mosca, was rejected by the CPLC and reduced to just over
twenty-one hundred acres. Cundiyó heirs were issued a patent for these lands in 1903.
Golten and Benavides comment that Twitchell seemed uninterested in the case and did
not protest the vast reduction of the grant, but rather accepted it without consulting his
clients.390
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U.S. Attorney Reynolds’s hostility toward communal land ownership met its
highpoint in the 1894, when the CPLC ruled that the common lands of the San Miguel
del Bado Grant belonged to the federal government, not the grant itself. Reynolds
reasoned that the Spanish crown only granted the sitios and suertes, the small allotted
tracts of private lands, when it issued community land grants. The CPLC, nonetheless,
confirmed the 315,000 acre grant, but Reynolds appealed the decision to the U. S.
Supreme Court. Overruling the CPLC, the Supreme Court, reduced the San Miguel del
Bado Grant to 5,000 acres immediately adjacent to the Pecos River, depriving heirs of the
vast common lands on which they grazed their herds.391
While the CPLC decided against applying the decision retroactively, it withdrew
its approval of communal lands on other grants that had yet to be patented. The Santa
Cruz de la Cañada Grant was reduced from 48,000 acres to 4,567.6 (see Figures 13 and
14); the Cañon de Chama, north and west of the Tewa Basin, from 472,737 acres to a
paltry 1,422.62 acres. In all, nearly 1.137 million acres were rejected, leaving barely
16,485 acres in the hands of seven community grants.392
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Figure 14: Santa Cruz Survey, 1898-1899. This Clayton Coleman survey estimated the
reduced Santa Cruz de la Cañada Grant at 4,433.08 acres, a far cry from the 40,000 plus
acre tract granted by Governor Vargas in 1693. Oversize Folder 114, Thomas B. Catron
Papers, MSS 29, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, UNM,
Albuquerque. Accessed online at
http://econtent.unm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/NMWaters/id/3670/rec/55

de Carnue, Cañón de Chama, Don Fernando de Taos, Town of Galisteo, Petaca, San
Miguel del Bado, and Santa Cruz. The seven grants claimed 1,136,903 acres, but the
decision, which reduced grants to their private tracts, restricted the grants to a total of
16,485.24 acres. See GAO, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 113. The UNM Land Grant
Studies Program’s mapping project estimated in 2012 that current federal lands on these
rejected former common lands totaled at least 659,732.186 acres, meaning that the
federal government was the biggest beneficiary of its conservative interpretation of the
true ownership of community land grants’ common lands.
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Figure 15: Santa Cruz de la Cañada, 2011. The area outlined in red conforms to the
1899 Coleman survey. The larger area, outlined in green, portrays the historic boundaries
of the grant, which ran against the eastern boundary of San Juan and Santa Clara Pueblo
and the southern boundary of the Sebastián Martín Grant. Land Grant Studies Program,
University of New Mexico, 9-30-2011, map by E. Storey and J. Jaramillo.

The Juan Bautista Valdez Grant had a similar fate. Surveyor General Julian had
rejected two competing claims to the grant, the Encinias Tract and the Cañon de
Pedernales claim, arguing that the first lacked proper documentation and the second was
“patently fraudulent.” The CPLC followed Julian’s lead in 1898 and confirmed only the
agricultural and residential tract to the heirs of Juan Bautista Valdez, the poblador
principal (first settler) of a community grant. The grant was thus reduced from a 60,000
to 256,000 acre claim to a mere 1,468.57 acres (see Figures 15 and 16 below).393
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Figure 16: Juan Bautista Valdez Grant survey, 1899. The survey of the greatly
reduced Valdez Grant, showing 1,468.57 acres. Folder 106, Thomas B. Catron Papers,
MSS 29, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, UNM, Albuquerque.
Accessed at http://econtent.unm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/NMWaters/id/3663/rec/3
See Paul Kutsche and John R. Van Ness, Canones: Values, Crisis, and Survival in a
northern New Mexico Village (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981),
115.
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Figure 17: Juan Bautista Valdez Map, 2011. A historical representation of the original
claim, with the approved tract highlighted in green in the northeast corner of the grant.
UNM Land Grant Studies program, 9-30-2011, map by E. Storey and J. Jaramillo

The pressures of a changing economy and their traditional modes of life ill-suited
to adapt to these changes made Hispanos vulnerable to speculation and development.
They dealt with these changes by appropriating lands of the even-more vulnerable Pueblo
Indians, the single group more susceptible to the economic disruptions than they were.
George Hill Howard again served as the first special attorney for Pueblo Indians from
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1897-1899. Howard arguably served the Tewa Basin Pueblos well. He filed an adverse
claim against the Pueblo Quemado claim in 1897 on behalf of San Juan Pueblo, even
though it sat more than twenty miles from San Juan. In 1898, he filed a request to docket
a Santa Cruz Land Grant claim, asserting that it infringed on the lands of Santa Clara
Pueblo. He represented Nambé in its case against surrounding Hispano parciantes
(someone who shared water rights from an acequia) in 1899.394
Before he served as the first special attorney for the pueblo Indians, Howard was
a successful land speculator in the northwest corner of the Tewa Basin, and he had
speculated in Arizona land grants in the 1870s before coming to New Mexico.395 He
relocated to New Mexico with his son, George Volney Howard, in the 1880s. In 1892,
the father and son incorporated the Northern New Mexico and Gulf Railroad
headquartered in El Rito, New Mexico.396
The elder Howard represented both the Piedra Lumbre and Juan José Lobato
Grants in the northwest corner of the Tewa Basin in 1894. Historian David Correia
writes that Howard teamed up with Amado Chávez and won una tercera parte (one-third
part interest) as compensation for his representation of a group of Piedra Lumbre
claimants in the CPLC. He faced none other than Thomas B. Catron, who was apparently
hired by Piedra Lumbre heirs to advance their claim, despite the fact that Howard was
already retained. Catron was buttressing his claims in the area, particularly the Tierra
394
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Amarilla Land Grant, which he had mortgaged for $250,000.397 When the court approved
the Piedra Lumbre on August 30, 1893, Howard held one-third interest and Catron and
his clients held the remaining two-thirds interest. The grant was surveyed for almost
fifty-thousand acres in 1897, patented in 1902 and partitioned by 1903.398 Howard
controlled the northern third of the grant and Catron the southern two-thirds. Ebright
writes that Catron became the agent for the entire grant and all heirs lost all interest to
Catron and Howard.399 Howard proved even-more successful on the Juan José Lobato
Grant east of the Piedra Lumbre. He worked with Catron and Alois B. Renehan to
partition the Lobato soon after gaining interest in the grant in September 1901. While
lawyers were often successful in receiving a full third of the grant for their representation,
Howard won half the grant, which he partitioned with other land speculators.400
Once more, while Howard speculated on Hispano land grants, he did protect the
interests of Tewa Basin Pueblos. When the CPLC rejected the majority of Santa Clara
Pueblo’s claim to the Cañada de Santa Clara Grant, the grazing grant that Vélez
Cachupín confiscated from the Tafoyas 130 years earlier, Howard pursued approached
Edgar Lee Hewett to aid him, not knowing that Hewett had other designs for the sacred
pueblo lands. The Santa Clara claim to the canyon grant was restricted to the riparian
lands along the Santa Clara Creek and the watershed that supported the land was now
vulnerable to abuse and appropriation (see maps below).
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Figure 18: Cañada de Santa Clara, 1899. The Santa Clara Pueblo was robbed of the
majority of the Cañada de Santa Clara Grant by a 1894 CPLC decision that claimed the
grant only embraced those lands immediately adjacent to the Río Santa Clara, also called
the Santa Clara Creek. See Malcolm Ebright, Rick Hendricks and Richard W. Hughes,
Four Square Leagues: Pueblo Indian Land in New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 2014), 160-161. Folder 1, Series 301, Thomas B. Catron Papers,
MSS 29, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, UNM, Albuquerque.
Accessed online at
http://econtent.unm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/NMWaters/id/3679/rec/2

Figure 19: Cañada de Santa Clara Grant, within Santa Clara Reservation, 1940.
UPA Land Use Division, Land Status Report, 1940, Box 9, Folder 11, Ward Allen Minge
Collection, MSS 815, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, UNM,
Albuquerque.
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Santa Clara’s desperate state led President Theodore Roosevelt to grant the
pueblo a thirty-three thousand acre Executive Order reservation in 1905, restoring much
of the Cañada de Santa Clara lands rejected by Julian almost two decades earlier. But the
rangelands were hardly a replacement for richer lands east of the Río Grande lost more
than a decade earlier. Most of Santa Clara’s nine hundred and two claims were in this
vast tract, and nearly all derived from the unscrupulous actions of a Santa Fe lawyer
named Derwent H. Smith, who had represented the Pueblo in its attempt to gain full title
to the Cañada de Santa Clara Grant in 1891. The agreed-upon attorney’s fee was sixty
acres of land within the original Santa Clara Grant. Smith apparently tricked the pueblo
into deeding away eight thousand acres of land and allegedly visited the pueblo in
October 1891, distributing one hundred silver-dollar coins to Indians in exchange for
their mark on quit-claim deeds, a practice evidently commonly used by lawyers tricking
native communities out of their lands. Smith conveyed the land to his wife, Helen, then,
in 1893, he sold Santa Clara’s eastern lands to Edward F. Hobart, the former surveyor
general, who also busily speculated in San Ildefonso Pueblo lands. Hobart understood
the legal and ethical implications of purchasing Pueblo lands: in 1894, he was appointed
the interim head of the Ramona Indian School in Santa Fe, charged with supervising
federal Pueblo agents.401
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Hobart’s absurd claim went unchallenged for more than a decade. He cordoned
off a two- hundred-acre tract that he irrigated from acequias fed directly from the Río
Grande and created the Santa Cruz Land and Irrigation Company to attract both
purchasers and investors. Historian Myra Ellen Jenkins posits that Santa Clara’s distrust
of lawyers and lack of funds delayed any legal action to reclaim its lands.402 When the
Pueblo did file a suit of ejectment against Hobart in 1901, it sat unanswered for almost a
decade. In the interim, Special Attorney for the Pueblos William H. Pope, who filed the
case, left for a judgeship in the Philippines and was replaced by none other than A. J.
Abbott, an attorney with little Indian-law experience, who had represented Hobart against
Pope’s original 1901 complaint.403
In 1909, Santa Fe District Court judge John R. McFie dismissed the case, again
for want of prosecution and declared Hobart’s deed valid. He cited the territorial statute
of limitations, stating that ten years had passed since the filing of the case, and ordered
Santa Clara to pay Hobart’s court costs. Meanwhile, Hobart began dividing the land,
granting some to his son, Horace Hobart, and selling tracts to dozens of Hispanos,
including Felipe Sandoval, whose sale of liquor on Santa Clara lands in 1911 would bring
on federal guardianship of Pueblo peoples and their lands. Other purchasers included
Fredric Seward Blackmar, an Española dentist, who also served as an agent for the
Delaware-based Copper Canyon Mining Company. By 1911, Francis C. Wilson assumed
the post of special attorney for the Pueblos and filed another ejectment suit, this time,
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against all claims deriving from Hobart’s phony purchase in 1891. Hobart and Blackmar
secured a dismissal on the grounds of McFie’s 1909 decision. All other claimants
remained in legal limbo.404 At the same time, the Santa Claras fought opposition to the
expansion of their 1905 executive order reservation and battled the creation of the “Cliff
Dwellers” and “Cliff Cities” National Parks, which were to complement Bandelier
National Monument, but would be carved from Santa Clara’s executive order lands.405
Indian pueblos in the Tewa Basin continued their gradual agricultural decline.
Still, the population of many pueblos increased slowly during the territorial period. San
Juan and Santa Clara maintained stable population growth, despite the ongoing incursions
onto their lands by outsiders. Extra-tribal marriage in both the case of Santa Clara and
San Juan can account for modest population growth.406 Others, like San Ildefonso and
Tesuque maintained a small population in the early territorial period only to drop sharply
by the 1870s,407 and still others, such as Pojoaque and Nambé, 408 continued a gradual
population slide that had begun in the Spanish-Colonial era, continued through the
Mexican Republic period and hastened until near extinction during the American
territorial and early statehood periods. Indian agents reported that the Pojoaque natives
were literally pushed off their lands and gradually moved in with the Nambé. They did
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not report, however, the extent to which Hispanos and these southern Tewa Basin
Pueblos intermarried, cohabitated or had children together.409
From the beginning of the American territorial era, Picurís Pueblo faced
incursions by surrounding Hispanos. Its 1850 population was estimated at 222, a new
low. The Picurís protests against the Embudo Grant were ignored in 1725, and Picurís
lost agricultural plots that it planted in the box canyon west of the pueblo village. Over a
century later, the Río de Picurís Grant legitimated Vadito, a Hispano settlement along the
Río Pueblo that encroached on the pueblo’s eastern lands. The community of Río Lucío
grew on the Río Santa Barbara, but was tolerated, perhaps even encouraged, for mutual
defense against Apache and Comanche raids. Communities growing on the Las Trampas
Grant also impacted Pueblo resources. Llano de San Juan Nepomuceno, for instance,
was built along the Río Santa Barbara and Río Chiquito, two tributaries that eventually
fed into the Río Pueblo de Picurís on the pueblo grant. Their growth threatened to
deplete waters for Picurís, but had a direct impact on Embudo, which held superior rights
to waters that eventually flowed to its community through the Río Embudo.
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Figure 20: Picurís Survey Map, c. 1870. At the center of its four league grant, Picurís
was surrounded by Hispano community grants, whose populations encroached on pueblo
lands since the colonial era. The Embudo Grant lay to the west, the (rejected) Río de
Picurís Grant and the Santa Barbara grant to the east. The Pueblo was boxed in on the
north by Picurís Peak and the Las Trampas Grant to the south. Folder 102, Series 301,
Thomas B. Catron Papers, MSS 29, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries,
UNM, Albuquerque. Accessed online at
http://econtent.unm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/NMWaters/id/3695/rec/5/rec/5
When these communities remained small and outside the Picurís grant, the pueblo
endured. By the 1780s, communities proliferated out of the Sebastián Martín, Embudo
and Las Trampas grants. The granting of the 1796 Santa Barbara Grant brought
increased settlement along the Río Pueblo and its principle tributaries. Communities,
such as La Placita del Río Pueblo, initially sat on the edge of the pueblo grant. In the
1820s, Hispanos began settling on the Picurís grant so that by the 1850s, Peñasco, Vadito
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and Chamisal grew on the Pueblo league. By the end of the territorial era, they were the
Jicarita valley’s largest non-Indian settlements.410
The adjudication of the grants that surrounded Picurís affected the pueblo in
different ways. The Sebastian Martín was among the first Tewa Basin land claims
adjudicated by the Surveyor General’s Office. In June of 1859, Mariano Sánchez, as the
sole owner of the grant, submitted his claim to Surveyor General Pelham, who
recommended confirmation, save the portion Martín donated to the Las Trampas Grant in
1751. Congress approved the Martín Grant on June 21, 1860. It was surveyed at
51,387.20 acres in 1876. Speculation on the Martín Grant gradually closed the traditional
use of its lands as an informal commons by Hispano communities, and Picurís and San
Juan Pueblos, all of which had come to rely on access to its resources.411
The Santa Barbara Grant was held in large part by Napoleon B. Laughlin, the
lawyer who took one-third of the grant as his fee. Laughlin eventually lost most of the
grant to tax seizures when Taos County instituted an aggressive policy of suing property
owners for failure to pay taxes in the early twentieth century. In 1907, A. B. McGaffey
formed the Santa Barbara Tie and Pole Company to provide timber to the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad. The name came from the Santa Barbara grant on which
McGaffey initially concentrated his lumbering. In a few years, he sold the operation to
the railroad, which subsequently expanded onto the adjacent Rancho del Río Grande
Grant north of the Rio Pueblo. Until the 1920s, some 400,000 rail ties were taken
annually from the mountains north and south of the Rio Pueblo. In 1928, the last year of
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operation, the Santa Barbara Tie and Pole Company moved only 106,000 trees down to
the Rio Grande.412
The commons of the Sangre de Cristo grant north of Taos was lost in the same
way. The New Mexico economy that had boomed from the 1880s through the early
1900s brought higher land values. This, in turn, generated higher taxes which created
another pressure on land grant communities whose traditional economies did not generate
the cash to pay them. In 1902, the heirs of the Sangre de Cristo Grant formed the
Defensive Association of the Land Settlers of the Rio Costilla to fight incursions and
lawsuits deriving from unpaid back taxes. The association would disband in 1921, after
losing most of its cases, only to reunite in 1941 when tax sales, again, threatened grant
land.413
Contention between Hispanos and Pueblos across the Tewa Basin grew as the
booming Hispano population increasingly encroached on Pueblo lands. In 1903, Santa
Clara Pueblo governor Diego Naranjo complained Northern Pueblo Superintendent C. J.
Crandall of a “Mexican goat herder” who not only grazed his herds on lands belonging to
the pueblo but also forbade Santa Clara natives from digging clay used for their
pottery.414 Three years later, Santa Clara governor Leandro Tafoya asked Crandall that he
remove from their reserve Jemez Forest guards who allowed the cutting and sale of
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timber in Española.415 Santa Clara day-school teacher Clara True confirmed “Mexican”
stock grazing and timber cutting on Santa Clara’s lands. True implored Crandall to
obtain a letter from the New Mexico Territorial Supreme Court explicitly stating the
Pueblo’s rights. This would discourage further trespass by Mexican cattle and annul the
decisions of “the Mexican justice of San Pedro,” who prohibited the Pueblo governor
from holding cattle until restitution was paid. Besides failing to maintain their cattle,
True remarked, the Mexicans were remiss in providing timber for the Santa Clara Pueblo
Ditch, whose damaged headgate needed repair to maintain flow for the mutual use of
Mexicans and Indians.416
Over the hills at Nambé, relations between Hispanos and Indians of the Pueblo of
Nambé were no better. In 1899, José A. Ribera, involved in land disputes for decades in
Nambé, Cochiti, and Santo Domingo Pueblos, led parciantes in a dispute over the status
of water rights on private claims on Pueblo lands. Purchases and seizures of Nambe’s
lands altered the control of Nambé waters, and Hispanos insisted that Pueblo Indians
submit to the authority Hispano mayordomos (ditch bosses) rather than their governor on
shared acequias. Nambé Pueblo governor Francisco Tafoya conversely maintained that
that all waters running though the Pueblo were subject to the disposition of the governor
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and were never community or public acequias subject to territorial water law but private
ditches owned by the pueblo and managed according to its needs, rules and customs.417

Figure 21: Sketch map of Nambé acequias, undated. The Pueblo, pictured at center,
protested the Acequia Nueva, the northernmost acequia on this sketch map, which took
waters from the Río Nambé above acequias it controlled. Box 1, Folder 12, Indian
Affairs Collection, MSS 16, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, UNM,
Albuquerque.
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While in the midst of their battle for water rights, the walls of the Nambé Pueblo Catholic
Church collapsed, and native Catholics exchanged parcels of Pueblo land for Hispano
laborers to make repairs. Land and water, the essential elements of Nambé Pueblo’s life,
were increasingly commodified in the market place and traded to surrounding Hispano
population that had settled near or squatted on Pueblo lands for centuries.418
The coming of American entrepreneurs reshaped the economy of northern New
Mexico. Alienated from traditional land bases, where farmers and pastoralists once
benefitted from vast common lands to pasture their cattle and sheep, Hispanos could no
longer maintain the meager subsistence they had for centuries. For instance, Arthur
Rochford Manby expanded his holdings in and around the Taos area, utilizing
dispossessed Hispanos to watch his flocks and water his fields.419 Manby’s Taos-area
enterprise, popularized by Frank Waters, was small nothing compared to that of Frank
Bond, the Scottish transplant whose legacy still lives on in the Española Valley.
The federal government was in a quandary. With little arable land available in the
Española Valley and its vicinity, expanding the agricultural land base for the Pueblos in a
meaningful way was a difficult challenge. Land was available for purchase, but these
tracts were largely the dry uplands used for grazing by homesteaders and valley farmers,
public domain that they were reluctant to relinquish to Indians. The executive order
reservations created for Nambé and Santa Clara were carved out of these uplands.
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Nambé’s problems with Hispano encroachment languished in the early twentieth
century. Indian agents and superintendent Clinton J. Crandall petitioned their superiors
for aid in acquiring additional lands. On September 4, 1902, President Theodore
Roosevelt created the Nambé Pueblo reservation, which adjoined the pueblo’s lands on
the southeast corner of its grant. The 6,776 acre executive order reservation retained
squatters who refused to leave. Agapito Herrera was threatened with legal action and
hired the Gortner-Catron law firm to press his case, but he was eventually removed.
Alois B. Renehan, however, was developing a power plant on the lands at the time of
purchase and was allowed to remain on reservation lands, at least temporarily.420
Santa Clara had long faced encroachment as well. Pueblo Attorney George Hill
Howard had initiated investigations to gain land near the pueblo, preferably a contiguous
tract to serve as a buffer. He soon found that Edgar Lee Hewett planned to establish there
the Pajarito National Park, which threatened sacred sites and lands that the Santa Clara
valued deeply. By 1903, Crandall was pursuing another executive order reservation.
Roosevelt created the 33,000-acre Santa Clara Indian Reservation on July 29, 1905,
which stretched from the western edge of the Santa Clara Pueblo Grant to the eastern
edge of the Baca Location No. 1, atop the Pajarito Plateau. Santa Clara regained their
full claim to the Cañada de Santa Clara Grant, which had been reduced by the Court of
Private Land Claims a decade earlier.421
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Fear of the expansion of reservation lands and creation of additional national
parks provoked non-Indians in the Tewa Basin. Pajarito Mesa homesteader H. H. Brook
implored New Mexico delegate William H. Andrews to block the transfer of Forest
Service lands to the jurisdiction of the Indian service. Citing lost school revenues from
timber sales and grazing fees, Brook exposed deep, racist bias against the Pueblo Indians,
whom he believed were wasting productive lands. Brook wrote, “The Indians are now
quarrelsome, unreasonable and arbitrary and this addition would swell them up,
encourage a belligerent spirit, and promote dissatisfaction, broils and probably serious
fights.” He claimed that “scores of homesteads, through the loss of grazing privileges,
would be rendered valueless and practically confiscated,” and that “an outrageuous
hardship would be worked on the poor people dependent on this area for fuel, timber for
grazing their few work horses and milch (sic) cows.” Closing his letter to Andrews,
Brook declared, “The Indians now stand steadfastly in the path of prosperity. To put
more land under their wasteful and blighting control would make prosperity and
development impossible and unknown . . . [it would be a] ridiculous outrage” 422
Brook eventually abandoned his homestead, which had grown to over 800 acres
thorugh purchases. He sold his lands to Ashley Pond in 1917 and relocated to Las
Cruces, where he became the state’s first extension farmer at the New Mexico College of
Agriculture and Mechanic Arts.423 Political and economic forces that drove speculation
and development in the territorial era remained influential in early statehood. Though the
CPLC may have dislodged the overt manipulation of the adjudication process by the
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speculators (notably those associated with the Santa Fe Ring), the achievement of
statehood brought the opportunity for these very speculators to cash in on overburdened
portfolios and, they hoped, realize schemes decades in the making. Many Ring members
struggled to develop massive tracts more often gained by deceptive means.424 George
Hill Howard’s irrigation scheme on the Juan José Lobato Land Grant, for instance, never
realized the profits that he promised investors. Alois Renehan, who never sought
political office, remained in the courtroom, gaining a reputation as the young state’s best
trial lawyer. Thomas Catron, who so brilliantly epitomized the legal manipulation,
political corruption and financial scheming of the Santa Fe Ring and perhaps of the entire
territorial era, was much more successful in realizing his plans.
Catron’s long tenure and arguable dominance of territorial politics still flourished
when the forty-seventh state’s first legislature elected him to one of two senatorial seats.
In 1912, Catron had been in the state for forty-six years. Over the years, he partnered
with a half dozen other lawyers, developers and land speculators, including Wilson
Waddingham, Charles Spiess, Alois Renehan and Frank Clancy, the state’s first Attorney
General. After having served in various political posts throughout the territorial era,
Catron was more than ever in a strong position to develop his considerable land holdings,
which, many people believed, would skyrocket with statehood.425
By 1912, Catron owned properties in dozens of land grants and held interests in
the Juan José Lobato and Caja del Rio Grants, as well as tracts of land at San Juan Pueblo
in the Tewa Basin. Despite his well-known duplicity, simultaneously representing and
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dispossessing grants, Catron was still hired as an attorney by grant after grant. When the
CPLC closed and new claims could no longer be made, Catron turned again to the
partition suit to pursue confirmed land claims. And after a sabbatical from political
appointments, Thomas B. Catron, a man who controlled politics and land speculation
across the territorial era, served as one of New Mexico’s first Senators. Albert Fall,
another noted land speculator, served as the other.426
Fall’s tenure in New Mexico was short compared to Catron’s, but he was far from
a neophyte when it came to land speculation. The Kentucky-born Fall was only in his
mid-twenties when he moved to Mexico, drawn by an arid climate that would relieve his
respiratory problems. He established his law practice in Las Cruces in 1891 after
working in mining interests in El Paso and northern Mexico, and focused on Mexican
law. Described as a “master of sulphurous phrases and political vitriol,” Fall spent the
1890s butting heads with the Republican establishment and dabbling in southern New
Mexico politics, using his newspaper, the Independent Democrat, to gain the political
loyalty of the Las Cruces Hispano population. He served in both the upper and lower
house of the New Mexico Territorial Legislature and gained Democratic presidential
appointments as associate justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court (1893-1895) and
twice as territorial attorney general (1897 and 1907).
Amidst the flowering of his political fortunes, Fall changed party allegiance, and a
state Republican Party that had spent well over a decade fighting his political influence
now welcomed it. As a delegate to the 1910 Constitutional Convention for New Mexico
Statehood, Fall cemented his status as a Republican political leader in New Mexico. He
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made his mark, and his money, however, in defending irrigation, development and
mining companies, and railroad and industrial interests, in which he invested heavily in
southern New Mexico through the 1910s.427 Fall believed it was his responsibility to
ensure that all western resources remained available for speculation and development.
As senator, Fall continued his interests in developing the tribal lands of the Mescalero
Apache and expanding resource extraction in the region’s newly created national parks
and forest reserves. Fall challenged the executive orders and legislation that kept large
swaths of federal lands out of the hands of developers. Through inventive interpretations
of the law, he proved averse to “unproductive” uses of land, and when President Warren
Harding appointed Fall secretary of the interior in 1921, he sought to use his post to
expand private interests hold on public lands.428
Catron and Fall are both the most-notable and most-blatant examples of land
speculation and political manipulation thriving well after the CPLC closed. When Fall’s
action had alienated many members of the state republican party, they used the
opportunity to dispose themselves of Catron, asking Catron not to run for Senator in
1916. Fall failed to acquiesce to party demands and defiantly ran again in 1918, winning
re-election and proving his surprising popularity with the New Mexico electorate.
Catron’s political career was over, but Fall’s was in full bloom. Though hated by both
Democrats and Republicans at home in New Mexico, Fall was well connected in the
Senate and enjoyed relationships with key figures in the Republican Party, including
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Warren G. Harding, Harry Daugherty and Edwin C. Denby. Daugherty and Denby
would gain infamy alongside Fall for their involvement in the Teapot Dome Scandal, yet
another example of Fall’s belief that public lands and resources were there for those with
the ambition and knowledge to exploit them.429
In New Mexico, Fall’s career in speculation differed from that of his fellow New
Mexico senator. Where Catron’s career in lands speculation was the perpetual
investment and outright ownership in broad swaths of land across the entire state, Fall
lacked the monies to take such an aggressive approach. The younger Fall had come to
New Mexico in the late 1880s, when the Surveyor General Julian and CPLC had made
speculating in land grant lands more difficult. Fall’s experience in mining served him
better in southern New Mexico, a more-industry-friendly environment free of the
progressive criticism of Taos and Santa Fe residents. He considered Catron’s incautious
approach to speculation unappealing, since owning land included the liability of
maintaining them before and beyond its peak profitability. Fall quickly passed on land
investments in El Paso and southern New Mexico in the 1880s, realizing he lacked the
capital to develop these investments. His relentless speculation in the water rights of
Mescalero Apache Indian Reservation lands that abutted his Three Rivers Ranch proved
his willingness to develop his own profits at the expense of public and tribal lands, which
he saw as one in the same.430
In his second senatorial term, his zealous pursuit of federal public lands
manifested in a bill that would sell ten percent of the public domain at auction and use the

429

Ibid. See also, Gordon R. Owen, The Two Alberts: Fountain and Fall (Las Cruces,
N.M.: Yucca Tree Press, 1996).
430
Kelly, The Assault on Assimilation, 173-174.
223

proceeds to build access roads to these lands. Timber and mineral rights would remain
with the government, which would have little reason not to develop lands augmented by
private investment. Fall positioned his lands to be included in an All Year National Park,
which would blend private and public lands and placed his ranch at the center of a
federally funded development and increase its value exponentially. It also would have
opened the Mescalero Indian Reservation to oil, natural gas, and mineral leases that Fall
had previously engineered on the Navajo Reservation, extending the General Leasing Act
into Indian Country.431
Fall speculated in the investment and development of New Mexico’s resources,
leveraging his political connections and knowledge of local situations for the financial
support of would-be industrialists. He never controlled the natural resources his
counterparts did. Unlike Elkins and Catron, whose names are ascribed to land
speculation in New Mexico, Fall came to New Mexico comparatively late, after the
heyday of land grant speculation. But when speculators failed to develop markets they
often hurried and struggled to rid themselves of what they growingly considered
liabilities. Catron famously balanced a portfolio of hundreds of thousands of acres of
land interests but was comparably poor in liquid assets. His son, Charles, proved much
more willing to part with lands gained by his father, disposing of lands before they
reached their maximum value, but reducing his risk in the process.432
The division between Pueblos and other Indians, however, had deeper roots than
the US v. Joseph decision, which was unlikely to be a point of significant discussion in
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the churches and pastures of Hispano villages dotting the Rio Grande and its tributaries.
Throughout the Spanish period, colonial institutions, both ecclesiastic and civil,
differentiated between Pueblos and the indios bárbaros who surrounded colonial
settlements in the northern frontier of New Spain. Augmented by the complex caste
system evidenced and maintained in official records, the racial division between Pueblos
and other Indians would not fade in the comparably brief Mexican period when castas
were done away with under the Plán de Iguala. Rather, Mexican governance explicitly
granted citizenship to civilized and progressive Indian groups, New Mexico’s Pueblos
included, while Mexican Indian policy toward non sedentary or semi-sedentary groups
differed little from previous Spanish policy. Through the American territorial period,
how nuevomexicanos comparatively interacted with Pueblo and non Pueblo Indians
upheld colonial ideas that distinguished between the two groups. They continued to
baptize their Pueblo neighbors and fight with their communities for resources, but also
continued to trade with and enslave the marauding Indians who posed less and less a
threat to their communities.433
Commenting on Pueblo-Hispano relations, historian Richard Frost writes:
The pueblos had their own historic reasons for resenting the Hispanos, and the
American agents invariably shared the social prejudice against lower-class
Spanish-Americans of their fellow Anglos, invariably calling them “Mexicans.” It
is also undoubtedly true that the Pueblo agents could rail with impunity against
Mexicans, and for a federal agency that was as vulnerable politically as the Office
of Indian Affairs – whose natural constituency, the Indians, was disfranchised and
without effective voice in Congress – it must have provided some relief. Pueblo
agents rarely name the BIA’s enemies in New Mexico politics, but
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Commissioners in Washington could be expected to raise no objection to criticism
of an ethnic group that had extremely little political power in the national capital.
That “Mexicans” did harass the Pueblos, of that there is no question; but the
Indians’ problems lay deeper, in the deterioration of their geographic
environment, and that went untouched by federal policy.434
The same desperation, communal fissures or corruption that led individual
Pueblo Indians to sell their land out from under their community had long allowed for the
speculation in Hispano-owned grants. As fragile, agrarian and typically subsistence
communities fractured under the stress of a land-adjudication system that privileged the
“progressive,” or capitalistic, use of land over traditional land use, both the poor and
desperate, and the wealthy and opportunistic turned to Pueblo lands for relief. Hispanos
relied on adverse possession to uphold their rights to the lands they took and more and
more turned to politicians to intercede and crush any efforts by Indian agents and
advocates to stop or slow the rapid loss of land.
The common thread that united the dispossession of Hispano and Pueblo
community lands is a free-market assumption, the idea that so-called progressive
conceptions and extractive use of land was desired by and would benefit all communities,
regardless of their race or ethnicity, of their cultural values and religious traditions, and of
their complex histories. The partition statute, the U.S. v. Joseph decision and U.S. v.
Sandoval (1896) decision all assumed that the communal nature of property ownership
imposed an unnecessary burden on the individual or private interests from within and
outside of the grant. These measures held that the law should not protect or help these
impediments. They all assumed that given the opportunity, members of Hispano and
Pueblo communities wanted their membership in a community reduced to an interest or a
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share in an economic enterprise. Further, it presumed that members of these native
communities yearned to place these shares on the market, alienating land for individual or
private profit.
Desperation heightened tensions between Indian pueblos and Hispano villages,
tensions that had long simmered and occasionally boiled over since the colonial era. By
1904, Pueblos and their Hispanos neighbors had already spent the last decade of the
territorial era engaged in lawsuits. Indians complained bitterly to Indian agents,
superintendents, and school teachers of flagrant invasions of Pueblo lands and
appropriation or Pueblo resources. Still, there remained the practice by individual
members of Pueblos and sometimes their governors of selling off Indian lands as an
individual marketable asset rather than a Pueblo’s patrimony. This informal practice, rare
in the Spanish colonial era and somewhat more common in the Mexican era, became
routine in the American territorial era. After the US v. Joseph case confirmed the legality
of these sales in 1877, the practice increased and accelerated.435
The challenges that plagued land grants throughout the territorial era flowed into
the statehood period. In his recent extensive study of the Santa Fe Ring, historian David
L. Caffey writes that land claims offered attorneys the opportunity “to obtain wealth and
property.” He explains:
“The process for consideration of land claims provided such an opportunity, as
cash-poor claimants had little choice but to pay for legal services in land. From
the early years of territorial administration, attorneys, some of whom were also
public officials, represented the claimants. Among them, judges Joab Houghton,
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John S. Watts, attorney generals Hugh Smith and Merrill Ashurst, and supreme
court clerk Samuel Ellison represented at least thirty-eight claimants in
confirmation proceedings. Stephen Elkins, Thomas Catron and Henry Waldo
were part of a second wave of attorneys who acquired property in this manner.
Charles Catron, A.B. Renehan, and other lawyers carried the practice into a new
century.”436
Land grants and legal cases were a western bonanza for lawyers in New Mexico.
In the waning days of the territorial era, after the closing of the CPLC on June 30,
1904, land tenure issues deeply influenced racial, ethnic, political and economic
interactions in the Tewa Basin. The resolution of the land-title question was one of the
conditions for statehood. These controversies plagued the territorial era and hampered
investment and development. At face value, these conditions had been met; millions of
acres were stripped from communities and placed either in the public domain or in the
capitalist land market, which commodified homelands and assured buyers of
opportunities to acquire and improve former land grant lands. While land left Hispano
ownership en masse compared to piecemeal loss by Pueblos, the result was no less
devastating. Put simply, for both Hispano and Pueblo communities, the land problem
was far from solved.
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Chapter 5: The Pueblo Land Question in the Tewa Basin in Early New
Mexico Statehood, 1912-1922
On January 6, 1912, President William Howard Taft signed into law the
congressional bill that granted New Mexico statehood. Six decades as a federal territory
had shifted New Mexico’s political and economic orientation from a neglectful and
distant Mexico to an exploitative yet equally distant United States. Statehood was touted
as the great equalizer in the Union and as a grand opportunity for the common man to
improve his fortunes. The state’s native peoples, Indians and Hispanos, benefitted very
little from the change in New Mexico’s political status.
Indian pueblos and Hispano land grant communities staggered into the statehood
period, weary from decades of land speculation by Anglo outsiders and some wealthy
nuevomexicanos. The Pueblo population continued to drop under U.S. sovereignty.
Pojoaque Pueblo was on the verge of extinction, with the majority of its remnant
population scattered among surrounding Tewa Pueblos. Hispano grant communities
remained vulnerable to the land speculation that had ravaged communal lands throughout
the territorial era. The Santa Fe Ring still operated in New Mexico, its leaders retaining
political power. Thomas B. Catron, considered by many the Ring’s leader, became the
state’s first U.S. senator. Most importantly, the Ring’s legal tools, particularly the
partition suit, still threatened every Spanish and Mexican grant with dissolution and
division. The speculation in grant lands and the disintegration of land grant communities
continued and even accelerated during early statehood.
Just as these communities were made vulnerable by property laws and legal
decisions averse to communal land ownership, so too had Indian pueblos suffered
speculation of their lands. This chapter will confront the Pueblo lands question, which
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hung menacingly over the young state. Hardening the struggle over Pueblo lands was the
growing division between Hispano and Pueblo communities. For many reformers, the
boundaries between Pueblo Indians and New Mexico Hispanos were unambiguous and
permanent. The fight against the Bursum Bill and the passage of the Pueblo Lands Act of
1924, exposed the ambiguities that divided Indian Pueblos and Hispano villages, and both
reformers and bureaucrats applied an increasingly black and white and conflictive
understanding of the two communities at both micro and macro levels. As we shall see
below, understandings of race, ethnicity, and culture were bound up in Anglo ideas that
identity was permanent, biological and even primordial, especially in the case of
identifying who was and was not “native” or “Indian.”
This dualism obscured the centuries-old complex relationship between Pueblos
and Hispanos. Undoubtedly, the booming nuevomexicano population took advantage of
the shrinking Indian population’s seemingly vacant lands and oral agreements, not
recorded on paper, supposedly justified apparent invasions. Hispanos undeniably
occupied sacred Pueblo lands and violated sacrosanct Indian rights. But within this story
of Hispano aggression lies antother, where Pueblo Indians voluntarily alienated their
lands. For instance they sold their property as payment for services rendered. In one
case, Nambé paid Hispano artisans to repair its crumbing Catholic Church with tracts of
Pueblo land. Across the basin, Pueblos sold land as individuals. They had seemingly
adopted European conceptions of property and alienated tribal land from the community
for their own personal profit. Both friends of the Pueblos and attorneys for the “Mexican
settlers” conceived of and imposed an absolute division between the two communities.
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John Collier and the more-radical Pueblo advocates viewed Pueblo and Hispano relations
as wholly exploitative, with Indians always losing in the bargain.
This chapter seeks to demystify and question the native primordialist rhetoric
embodied in the writings of Collier and other Progressive Era Indian allies and the
celebratory Spanish-colonial rhetoric of elite Hispanos and Hispanophiles alike. This
chapter also explores the complexity of race in the Pueblo Lands Board era. Spanish and
Mexican settlers were not the saviors of the Pueblos as Hispanophiles would argue. Nor
were they categorically the Pueblos’s enemies, as the more radical Pueblo advocates
posited. A more accurate and nuanced interpretation lies somewhere between the two
extremes.
Chapter 5 re-iterates one of this dissertation’s central contentions: that histories of
Pueblo Indian and Hispano land tenure habitually emphasize conflict and ignore parallels
in their shared land tenure history. Examining both tenures together in the Tewa Basin
demonstrates that both communities were subject to similar legal, economic and political
processes that dispossessed communal societies of the land and water resources they
depended on. Like their Spanish-colonial forbears, Hispanos in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century took part in the dispossession of Pueblo communities and put
formerly communal land on a market of mixed private and communal ownership. They
acted as they had been acted upon, displacing communities adjacent to their own former
communal lands from which they were displaced. Some of these Hispanos imposing on
Pueblo lands had considerable wealth, grazed herds of cattle, and relied on Pueblo lands
to expand their herds. They accumulated dozens, sometimes even hundreds of acres, by
coercing Pueblo leaders to grant boundless leases or even make outright sales of land.
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More often, however, the most destitute Hispanos took advantage of the equally
desperate Indian Pueblos and bought lands from Pueblo leaders who saw their
communities shrinking and who believed that their communities were on a path to
extinction.
~~~
The status of Pueblo lands was vigorously debated during the statehood
movement and the early twentieth century. No less vexing was the contest between
federal and territorial and later state governments for New Mexico’s lands. Although the
federal government declared its control over New Mexico Indian affairs, including those
of the Pueblos, in the 1910 statehood Enabling Act, the state of New Mexico deemed
Pueblos subject to state courts and capitalist markets. In New Mexico’s state courts, the
Pueblos were not part of Indian Country and their land was unprotected by federal statute
or legislation. The presence of Indian agents, who ineffectively protested land invasions,
had deterred neither territorial courts nor officials from considering Pueblo lands as New
Mexico’s in their decisions and policies. Federal agents who staffed Indian schools in
Santa Fe and Albuquerque were no more a restraint. Both the Board of Indian
Commissioners and the Indian Rights Association sent agents, emissaries, and academics
to study and report back on the status of Pueblo tribes suffering under federal inattention.
New Mexico state officials ignored the evident cultural and racial traits that confirmed
Pueblos as Indians. Their aim was to establish state hegemony over Indian affairs in
defiance of the federal government.
By confirming and reasserting its jurisdiction over Pueblo affairs through the
Enabling Act of 1910, the federal government now had to reverse its neglect of its
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fiduciary duty to Pueblo Indians. Over fifty years of benign neglect had left Pueblo lands
susceptible to sale and invasion. Much Pueblo land expropriation happened years before
passage of the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, which legislated the reduction of federal
oversight of native communal property and forced native heads of household to accept
land parcels from their tribal patrimony. Pueblos had fought the expropriation of their
lands in territorial courts until 1876. That year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in U.S. v.
Joseph that because Pueblo Indians had been citizens under Mexico, they were likewise
citizens under the United States and were due no special federal protection of their
communal lands. The mounting loss of Pueblo lands from 1848 on forced to the surface
legal questions that the federal government wanted to avoid: what was the federal
government’s responsibility in protecting Pueblo lands? When and where did its
obligation start? Were Pueblo Indians state wards like other tribes, even though no
Pueblo treaties explicitly recognized the role of the federal government in acting as a
“Great Father?”
Questions of official policy toward the Pueblos were avoided by federal officials.
Rather, the U.S. Congress enacted a hodgepodge of laws and funding that treated Pueblos
as Indians and wards of the government. A special 1876 congressional act granted them
Pueblos Indian agents, a deliberate measure responding to the U.S. v. Joseph decision that
had withdrawn federal protection. The Pueblo’s children were sent to industrial schools
in Santa Fe and Albuquerque built respectively in 1889 and in 1891. In the late 1890s,
legislators appointed a special attorney for Pueblo affairs to aid Indian agents in
navigating territorial and federal laws, and to aid Pueblos in retaining their land and water
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rights. Still, the federal government generally ignored the issue its authority over the
Pueblos.437
Even with statehood, the federal government still allowed state courts, state
officials, and Hispanos to continue preying on Pueblo lands. Pueblo Indians, through
their agents and through their own intercession, begged the federal government to
exercise its legal jurisdiction over Pueblo lands, something the Enabling Act seemed to
infer. As early as 1852, Tesuque Pueblo had sent a delegation to Washington to ask that
the federal government fulfill an 1850 treaty never ratified by Congress, and as late as
1912, a mixed Pueblo delegation attempted to deed their lands to the federal government
for twenty-five years.438 Their complaints fell on deaf ears. In 1911, however, Felipe
Sandoval, a bootlegger selling alcohol to Santa Clara natives, opened the door for
Pueblos to press their case for federal protection by the federal government.
Who Felipe Sandoval was remains a mystery. A Felipe Sandoval was listed as an
owner of a private claim on San Ildefonso Pueblo in 1926. He may have been the “Felipe
Sandoval” that bought Santa Clara Pueblo land from Edward Hobart in 1910. The
commonness of his name makes it pure speculation whether the two Sandovals were, in
fact, the same man. Selling alcohol to Pueblo and Hispano villagers had been a lucrative
trade in northern New Mexico for decades. Correspondence of the era refers to “Taos
lighting” and “la mula blanca” or “white mule,” a potent moonshine that varied greatly
437
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but was always distilled from common local ingredients. Its consumption in these
communities of destitute populations became an epidemic. Catholic priests and
Protestant missionaries denounced the bootlegging, and Indian agents demanded federal
aid to stop the trade.439
Sandoval was cited by Agent William “Pussyfoot” Johnson in 1911, on the eve of
statehood and arrested in early 1912. The ensuing trial over a seemingly minor act
offered the state and the federal government and opportunity to plead their case for
holding legal jurisdiction over Pueblo lands. Alois B. Renehan, already a prominent trial
attorney deeply involved in land and estate litigation, represented Sandoval. He argued
that Pueblos were Indians in neither their habits nor their history; thus Sandoval was
innocent of the charge of distributing liquor to a restricted population. He further argued
that Pussyfoot Johnson, a federal Indian agent without the legal power to make arrests,
had no authority to detain Sandoval. Deciding otherwise, argued Renehan, would uphold
a federal prohibition of liquor sales to Pueblo Indians but one that had been refuted by the
New Mexico territorial counts in numerous decisions and would ultimately cause New
Mexico to enter the Union on a footing unequal with other states.440
As special attorney for the Pueblos, Francis C. Wilson argued that Sandoval’s sale
of liquor to Pueblo Indians was, indeed, a violation of federal statute, specifically the
1834 and 1851 Trade and Intercourse Acts and a special 1897 act that explicitly forbade
the sale of intoxicating substances to all Indians, who were wards of the state. Wilson’s
legal task was a difficult one. He argued his case for federal jurisdiction over the Pueblos
against decades of territorial case law that had denied it. And he litigated before Justice
439
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William H. Pope, who, in 1907, had ruled that the special federal act of 1897 did not
apply to the Pueblos. Judge Pope was no novice to land grant law, Pueblo affairs, and the
scope of federal jurisdiction. As an assistant to U.S. Attorney Matthew G. Reynolds
during the tenure of the Court of Private Land Claims, Pope had assisted Reynolds’s
efforts to reserve as much land as possible for the federal government by rejecting oftenlegitimate land claims on dubious grounds. He then served the second special attorney
for Pueblo Indians, following the tenure of George Hill Howard, who speculated in the
Hispano lands grants and was even implicated in the sale of Pueblo lands. While
assistant U.S. Attorney, Pope fought in the courts to maintain federal power over New
Mexico’s lands, but he enforced the decision in the 1876 U.S. v. Joseph case, specifically
that the Pueblos were not, by legal definitions, “Indians.” Convincing Pope to change a
mindset built over decades would surely be challenging.441
Few were surprised by Judge Pope’s decision. In July 1913, he ruled in favor of
the defendant: Felipe Sandoval’s sale of alcohol to Santa Clara Pueblo natives violated no
law. Pope used the Sandoval case to argue that federal control over Pueblo lands under
the 1910 Enabling Act was null and void because that legal provision would remove state
control over New Mexico’s public and private lands. He largely agreed with Renehan’s
defense, especially his argument that the State of New Mexico could not be asked by the
federal government to cede its authority over such a large portion of its lands, and thus
put itself on lesser footing than that of other states. Renehan claimed victory, and
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although Wilson doubted than an appeal would be successful, he nonetheless filed an
appeal and the case went to the U.S. Supreme Court. 442
Wilson, the Pueblo’s special attorney whose duty it was to protect Pueblo lands,
had to hide his involvement in divesting the declining Pojoaque Pueblo of its lands.
Pojoaque Pueblo had remained small throughout the Spanish and Mexican periods,
numbering seventy-nine people in 1712 and dropping to fifty-three by the end of the
eighteenth century. In 1870, its population numbered thirty-two and by 1890 it increased
slightly to forty. By the end of the nineteenth century, Hispano encroachment on
Pojoaque’s fertile lands accelerated the depopulation, making it impossible for the pueblo
to administer religious ceremonies or secular affairs.443 First pulished in 1907, Fredrick
W. Hodge’s Handbook on North American Indians described Pojoaque Pueblo as
abandoned and John P. Harrington’s Ethnobotany of the Tewa Indians, published nine
years later, confirmed that during fieldwork in 1909, no Pojoaques lived at the pueblo,
though two Pojoaque families resided in Santa Fe and one in Nambe.444 Through the
1920s, Pojoaque could claim no population until José Antonio Tapia led an effort in the
early 1930s to create a “new Pojoaque,” fenced the Pojoaque Grant, evicted “SpanishAmericans,” and resettled fourteen Pojoaque natives.445
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Wilson worked closely with Pojoaque Pueblo leaders willing to sell the pueblo’s
lands. In 1913, the abovementioned José Antonio Tapia and Wilson claimed Tapia was
the last surviving Pojoaque Pueblo Indian. With Wilson’s help, Tapia attempted to sell
all of Pojoaque’s remaining lands that had not been bought or claimed by surrounding
Hispanos to California investor D. C. Collier for three-thousand dollars. In 1914, during
the process of clearing title to Pojoaque’s lands, Wilson left his position nas pueblo
attorney for his complicity in arranging the sale to D. C. Collier. Wilson had also
recently represented D. C. Collier in his attempt to purchase Pecos lands. Wilson’s legal
partner, Melvin Dunlavy, represented Tapia, answering opposing claims by Pojoaque
Indians descendants. Dunlavy considered the claims null and void because the plaintiffs
had left the grant and “on account of the Pojoaque Indian custom had severed their right
therein.”446
When a survey of prospective lands revealed roughly one-third of the Pojoaque
grant was occupied by Hispano settlers, Wilson filed a quiet title suit on behalf of buyer
D. C. Collier and Company in January of 1914 to clear title to the enitre grant. The suit
doubted the title of anyone other than Tapia, the self-proclaimed last-remaining
legitimate heir of Pojoaque Pueblo, who proved willing to part with what remained of the
Pojoaque’s lands. Switching sides after the sale, Wilson filed complaints on behalf of
Pojoaque Pueblo descendants and expatriates living at Nambé Pueblo. As their private
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counsel, he protected their land grant in a way he did not as the government-appointed
and salaried attorney.447
While former U.S. Pueblo attorney Wilson was deeply involved in the sale of the
Pojoaque Pueblo Grant, he remained suspiciously silent on the U.S. v. Sandoval case
pending decision in the U.S. Supreme Court. He had written the plaintiffs’ motion on
behalf of the United States. Pueblo attorneys had long fought the expropriation and
exploitation of Pueblo lands by non-Indians. Both New Mexico territorial and state
governments were adverse to communal land ownership and were determined to privatize
all village lands, whether they were Pueblo or Hispano community land grants.
Likewise, the federal government, uninterested in Pueblo welfare and bound by the U.S.
v. Joseph decision, considered Pueblos as U.S. citizens and their lands private property
held in corporate ownership. The Enabling Act of 1910, however, confirmed federal
jurisdiction and responsibility for Pueblo Indians and their lands.
As Indian Pueblos and Hispano villages engaged in battles over land and water
rights and simultaneously traded and sold land, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion
in the U.S. v. Sandoval case. Writing the majority opinion, Justice Willis Van Devanter,
the court’s Indian law expert, declared that Pueblos were Indians in “race, custom and
domestic government.” Despite their “sedentary rather than nomadic” habits and
“inclinations … to peace and industry,” they lived in “separate and isolated
communities,” adhered to “primitive modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and
fetishism,” and governed themselves according to “crude customs inherited from their
ancestors.” In short, they were a “simple, uninformed and inferior people.” Commenting
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on the U.S. v. Sandoval opinion, lawyer and historian G. Emlen Hall points out that those
uncivilized characteristics that qualified Pueblos as Indians in Devanter’s mind could
have applied equally to nuevomexicanos surrounding the Pueblos and often occupying
their lands.448
Sandoval (1913) reversed the Joseph decision (1876), which effectively privatized
Pueblo lands and unburdened the federal government of Pueblo guardianship. From
1876 through 1913, Pueblo lands had been opened to the market, and buyers actively
sought individual Indians willing to disregard tribal claims or authority and sell parcels to
non-Pueblos. As the Pueblo population continued its steady decline, Pueblo governors
themselves began to expropriate land, often for their own personal benefit. Hispanos
took advantage of lands lying fallow or vacant, often renting them for several seasons
before declaring the lands their own. This process took place while tribes across the
region were subject to severalty under the 1887 Dawes General Allotment Act. For a
quarter century, the Dawes Act alienated tribal lands by individualizing communal
ownership, and subjected the balance to homesteads and resource extraction.
Consequently, the Joseph case informally achieved the same ends as the infamous Dawes
Act, causing or justifying the expropriation of hundreds of acres of tribal lands. Although
the federal government was the guiding hand of severalty, its neglect allowed Pueblo
lands to leave Pueblo hands.
Joseph cited the granting of royal land grants and the Pueblos’ constitutional
status as Mexican citizens as further proof that they were Indians in neither race nor
custom. Hall points out that the centuries of Pueblo Indian land tenure issued from
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succeeding sovereigns’ notions of their civilization. “At Valladolid,” writes Hall,
“Indians had proved their humanity and had won crown protection for their lands. In the
Joseph decision the court had rewarded their civilization by removing that protection. In
the Sandoval appeal, the Pueblos won back protection only by proving their
inferiority.”449 Sandoval affirmed federal guardianship over Pueblo peoples and
property, reversed decades of territorial jurisprudence, and ruled invalid decades of
political decisions prejudicial to Pueblo land tenure.450 No less significant is that
Sandoval threw into legal limbo hundreds of Hispano land claims amounting to
thousands of acres and the entire northern New Mexican towns of Española, Peñasco, and
Taos.451
The Sandoval decision initially did little to affect the land tenure practices on
Pueblo lands.452 The decades-long practices of squatting, leasing, selling, and reselling
Pueblo lands did not to halt. Months after statehood, while the Sandoval decision was in
appeal, Special Attorney Wilson had travelled to Washington, D.C., with representatives
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of ten pueblos seeking to deed their land to the federal government for twenty-five
years.453 While the Interior Department considered the proposal, New Mexico’s
congressional delegation, including Senators Albert B. Fall and Thomas B. Catron, and
Representative George Curry, blocked any action on the Pueblos’ proposal. However,
Sandoval affirmed the U.S. government’s jurisdiction over Pueblo lands and annulled
New Mexico’s jurisdictional claims. In 1914, the federal government finally set out to
understand what its guardianship of Pueblo lands entailed.
The federal government could no longer ignore the encroachment on and
exploitation of Pueblo lands. Decades of sales and Hispano impositions had created huge
islands of Hispano ownership or occupation of the Pueblos of San Juan, Santa Clara, and
Nambé. Pojoaque Pueblo was seemingly abandoned by Indians, who had been absorbed
into Nambé. In 1914, U.S. Surveyor Francis C. Joy resurrected a 1911 Department of
Interior proposal to investigate northern New Mexico’s lands thoroughly and began
surveying private claims within Pueblo lands. Joy’s methods, which were intensely
debated for the next fifteen years, were more sociological than legal. When surveying a
Pueblo, he asked the claimant of private tracts to show him the land they claimed. Joy
did not ask to see deeds, titles, or any other proof of ownership. Joy’s survey revealed
over three thousand non-Indian claims, totaling between twelve thousand and seventeen
thousand acres of the most fertile Pueblo land. The federal government’s stated objective
was to give Pueblo attorneys precise information about non-Indian claims, but many nonIndian owners immediately interpreted the Joy survey as federal recognition of their
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claims. With the Joy survey in hand, owners of private tracts sought legal patents to their
lands, fenced their claims, and even filed suits to confirm their validity.454
The erection of fences on native lands infuriated Pueblos. They responded by
tearing down the fences of non-Indians, only to suffer further trespass of Hispanic or
Anglo livestock onto their land and even more property destruction. The resulting cattle
losses brought complaints from Indians and non-Indians as well, leading Pueblo agent P.
T. Lonergan to bring a lawsuit against the non-Indian trespassers in San Juan Pueblo in
1916. Assistant Interior Secretary and future New Mexico senator A. A. Jones
successfully stopped the eviction of non-Indians at San Juan and forced Lonergan to
withdraw his suit, which certainly would have confirmed federal jurisdiction over Pueblo
lands, before it went to trial. Controversies over the Joy survey roiled though the tenure
of Pueblo Attorney Jacob H. Crist, Wilson’s successor. Crist pursued congressional aid
against trespass at San Juan Pueblo in 1916. 455
Two years later in 1918, Agent Lonergan, in trouble equally for his agitations on
behalf of Pueblo Indians and for his irritation of Pueblo Indians, was transferred from
New Mexico, and the Pueblo Agency was split in two. Horace J. Johnson and Leo Crane
served as agents of the Pueblo Agency now divided into northern and southern
jurisdictions. Working in a climate more favorable to the Pueblo cause, Crane and
Johnson nonetheless believed that they were the Pueblos’ last and best hope and
aggressively defended native lands. They even confiscated trespassing Hispano cattle.456
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From the 1913 through 1918, New Mexico state courts routinely dismissed lawsuits
regarding Pueblo lands. Justices cited federal jurisdiction, or simply let them sit on the
docket unanswered. Then, in 1918 former New Mexico Supreme Court justice Richard
H. Hanna accepted appointment as Special Attorney for the Pueblos.
In 1919, Hanna began filing in U.S. District Court ejectment suits to remove
settlers from San Ildefonso, Santa Clara, San Juan, Taos, Tesuque, and Sandia Pueblos.
In the past, suits initiated by Pueblo Indian agents, superintendents, or attorneys had
taken a piecemeal approach to evict non-Indian owners. Hanna’s suits advocated an
uncompromising interpretation of the Sandoval decision, which New Mexico attorneys
embroiled in land litigation and speculation had dismissively written off as the “liquor
case.” Hanna’s legal position denied the validity of all non-Indian claims to patented
Pueblo land, regardless of the tenure of the claimants or the legitimacy of their title,
whether proven by deed or tax payment.457
Pueblo Indian agents Johnson and Crane, emboldened by Hanna’s legal actions,
more aggressively protected Pueblo lands. But both were involved in disputes with
Pueblo leaders, and after Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall transferred L. A.
Dorrington, a special inspector of Indian affairs, Crane and Johnson were likewise
removed by the middle of 1922.458 In light of the Hanna suits, banks were hesitant to
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give loans or mortgages to owners or buyers of private lands situated on Pueblo grants.
The largely Hispano settlers were unable to borrow on their land claims or gain
mortgages to make improvements and were left in a state of tenancy. Drier conditions in
the Southwest and Rocky Mountain West, along with the decreased need for American
agricultural and pastoral production with the end of World War I, led to a decline in
access to migratory wage labor upon which villages had become dependent.459
The Sandoval and Lonergan decisions and Hanna ejectment suits, combined with
the steady stream of complaints by Pueblo agents and Office of Indian Affairs employees,
alerted Congress to a growing problem in New Mexico. When the House Subcommittee
on Indian Affairs held hearings in Tesuque on May 16, 1920, its members found that
Pueblo land issues involved more than Mexican bootleggers and their unruly cattle. José
Ramos Archuleta of San Juan, with Congressman Benigno C. Hernández translating for
him, addressed the committee: “This is the situation in regard to our lands: There have
been some lands that have been sold by members of our tribe. There is other land that we
do not know how people came into possession of. There is other land that was probably
squatted upon.”460 Committee chairman Homer P. Snyder retorted, “As I understand it
the Government originally set aside sufficient land for these Indians to make a living
upon and they have let the land get away from them.” Archuleta replied:
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No, we have not let the lands get away from us. I understand and we contend that
these sales that they have been made since the government surveyed these grants
for us and set apart this land are not legal. We claim that these fellow members of
our tribe who have sold this land had no legal right to sell it because this was
tribal property. . . we are continually exhorting our people not to sell our lands,
and so members of our tribe have secretly made sales[,] claiming that they are
only leasing the land.461
Archuleta’s testimony alone muddied the legal picture of land ownership among Pueblos
and Hispanos.
The testimony of Porfirio Mirabal and Lorenzo Martínez of Taos Pueblo and of
Northern Pueblo superintendent Horace J. Johnson demonstrated that the problems facing
San Juan were more widespread among the Pueblos than was thought. When Mirabal
and Martínez testified that the bulk of Taos Pueblo’s tillable lands were under cultivation
by neighboring Hispanos, Representative Hernandez, a native of Taos, responded, “As a
matter of fact, you lease a considerable amount of the tillable land to the people who live
around you there, don’t you?” Martínez confirmed the observation, but explained that
the “leasing has been referred to many of the inspectors” and that he had “always been
opposed to leasing the cultivated land of my people.” Pressed by Hernández, Martínez
stated, “Yes, there is a class of Indian that when they cannot find feed for their family
they do it.”462
In his testimony, Johnson addressed the questionable Pueblo practice of leasing
lands to non-Indians, suggesting that the Pueblos’ internal traditions of granting usufruct
rights rather than fee-simple deeds to individual Pueblo members had led to the alienation
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of lands that were unrequested and unused. San Ildefonso was a case in point. Johnson
testified that at San Ildefonso, non-Indian land claims derived from three major parcels
that had been divided over decades. The first two were purchased from the Pueblo
Council by local Hispanos in the 1700s, but the third was illegitimate. It had been
enlarged and segregated from contiguous Pueblo lands by the moving of the highway in
the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. Johnson reiterated the opinions of Mirabal
and Archuleta. He stated that he was not in favor of Pueblos being made U.S. citizens,
for “they are surrounded by a population that is not friendly to them.” If a “white man as
a representative of the Government cannot get justice in one of our courts here . . . I do
not know how an Indian can get it.”463 Rather than appealing to federal fiduciary
obligations to Pueblo Indian wards, Pablo Abeyta, the renowned orator of Isleta, bluntly
remarked, “An Indian is not a part of you and you are not a part of us.”464
The Committee ended its survey of Pueblo affairs with the testimony of Alois B.
Renehan, defense counsel in the Sandoval case and the legal representative of non-Indian
claimants in the San Juan, San Ildefonso, Santa Clara and Picuris ejectment suits, and of
Río Arriba merchant Frank Bond, a longtime client and the largest claimant of Santa
Clara Pueblo land. In his lengthy testimony before the committee, Renehan admonished
the Supreme Court’s 1913 Sandoval ruling and the defense of Pueblos by their advocates
and attorneys. “The Pueblo Indian,” claimed Renehan, “is quick to pick up on notions
beneficial to him,” and they “have lain outdoors absolutely in waste. . .The Indians [have]
paid no attention to it whatsoever.” After chastising Pueblos for their inefficient use of
their land, Renehan painted a rosy picture of Pueblo-Hispano relations. Though strife
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marked relations until the Taos Rebellion in 1847, afterward “matters quieted down and
the utmost harmony has prevailed between the Mexican people and the Indians.”465
Referring back to the 1919 Hanna suits, Renehan stated, “It seems now, in light of
two suits recently filed in the US District Court here, that there is a project to upset all of
the titles which the Mexicans and Americans living upon the Indian grants have believed
that they possessed for years.” Always prone to exaggeration, Renehan portrayed the
Hanna suits as a conspiracy against the New Mexican citizenry. Perhaps more telling is
that he separated the citizenry into two groups, “Mexicans and Americans,” though
Hispanos were citizens protected by the same legal rights as their Anglo counterparts. As
for Bond, when the committee asked him to substantiate his claim with title, he offered
only a deed, revealing that New Mexico had no practice of abstracting titles before 1856,
and most towns kept no records until obligated to do so in 1883. Renehan then cited
Pueblo Indians’ oral traditions as another reason that no records of lands being sold to
Mexicans existed in any archives.466
Pueblo leaders would later accuse Hernandez of misrepresenting their statements
at the 1920 hearings, but the essential points of contetion were now clear in the record
and the land-tenure situation was more complex than initially believed. Rather than a
simple legal scenario wherein Congress would evict recent squatters from Pueblo Indian
reservation lands, the testimony of Pueblo leaders, government bureaucrats and attorneys
for Hispano and Anglo settlers revealed that individual Pueblo Indians had sold or were
selling their lands, acting as fee-simple owners of the greater Pueblo patrimony. This
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legal problem might not have arisen had the federal government made Pueblos wards of
the state decades earlier.
While the congressional hearings at Tesuque revealed how extensive and
complicated disputes over Pueblo land tenure had become, they offered neither a legal
alternative nor a legislative solution to the Hanna suits. Hanna’s invocation of the
Sandoval decision jeopardized not only those people directly threatened with eviction.
State politicians who had shaped territorial jurisprudence and law and held the federal
government at bay during the territorial years, were no less affected. They were not
going to forsake New Mexico’s control over it lands, and fought desperately to retain that
authority.
Just as New Mexico’s political leaders were reluctant to abandon to Washington
their power over land decisions, New Mexico farmers, both Hispano and Pueblo, held on
to age-old traditions that blurred the line between private and public lands. Since the
Spanish-colonial era, Hispano communities had released their cattle on the stubblefields
after harvest, an act that brought them closer to their settlements. Called derrota de
mieses, literally meaning “tearing the cornfields,” the practice had temporarily converted
all lands from private to public and brought cattle into agriculture fields to help the soil
recover by depositing nutrient-rich manure. In time, Pueblos had adopted the practice,
eventually generating intra-Pueblo disputes between so called “progressive” and
“traditionalist” factions, the latter disallowing Spanish practices on Pueblo lands.467

467

Joseph Melchor of Cochiti Pueblo wrote Pueblo Superintendent C. J. Crandall,
protesting the prior actions (fall 1922) of Cochití Pueblo governor Marcial Quintata, who
corralled his father Juan Pablo Melchor’s cattle when the elder Melchor released them “a
derrotar los mieses,” or to “graze the stubblefields.” See Joseph Melchor to C. J.
Crandall, September 8, 1923, Folder 3, Box 2, Records Concerning Claims Before the
249

Hispanos had gradually expanded this grazing practice in the twentieth century
with little regard to the wishes of Pueblo Indians or their need of the stubblefields for
their own cattle. On the eve of statehood in 1912, state and federal officials had
attempted to work out a compact by which neighboring “white and Mexican settlers”
were given notice if their cattle trespassed on Pueblo Indians’s conspicuously marked
lands. Thereafter, their cattle would be seized, and they would have to pay a penalty of
one dollar per head of cattle and less for sheep. But Office of Indian Affairs
representatives and New Mexico state officials were at an impasse. While the Sandoval
case was still in litigation, Indian agents clashed with local authorities. The former were
anxious to exercise federal plenary power over Indian lands defined in the 1910 Enabling
Act for New Mexico statehood, while the latter sought to preserve the primacy of New
Mexico territorial law and local control. On April 20, 1912, Indian Agent and Santa Fe
Indian Industrial School Superintendent H. F. Coggeshall had reported to Commissioner
of Indian Affairs Cato Sells that he had taken up 101 cows trespassing on Santa Clara
Pueblo lands.468 Two days later, he wrote U.S. Attorney Stephen B. Davis to request legal
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action against the trespass of stock on San Juan Pueblo lands. Davis replied that Pueblo
lands were private property and that the natives could impose whatever fine they saw
fit.469 Coggeshall reiterated the problems to Commissioner Sells, this time informing him
that cattle easily trespassed on Santa Clara grant and executive-order reservation lands by
public roads leading to grazing land in the Jemez Forest Reserve. Coggeshall believed all
Mexicans transporting cattle to the forest reserve should pay a nominal fee of one cent
per head of sheep and two cents per head of cattle, for their animals were sure to stray
from the public road into Santa Clara lands.470
Coggeshall’s actions caught the attention of local officials. Over a year and a
half, he continued impounding cattle that trespassed on Pueblo lands. But what had
changed was the legal climate in which Coggeshall protected Pueblo lands. When he
started the process in 1912, Judge Pope upheld the authority of territorial law over Pueblo
lands; by 1914, Pope’s decision had been reversed by Justice Van DeVanter’s Sandoval
decision, and federal agents more willingly tested this affirmation of federal authority
over native lands. Commissioner Sells informed Coggeshall, that Senator Thomas B.
Catron had requested a report regarding the cattle seizures and that New Mexico attorney
general Frank W. Clancy questioned the legality of his impounding cattle, regardless of
trespass. Clancy opined that the laws Coggeshall was attempting to enforce were
intended to discourage intentional pasturage of stock on native lands, not incidental
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1793-1989, Record Group 75, National
Archives - Rocky Mountain Region, Denver, CO. One of the offending cattlegrowers
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damage caused when Indian lands were used as a passage to private or other federal
lands. Clancy wrote Catron, his former law partner, that Coggeshall had no authority to
take up trespassing cattle, and he could be prosecuted under territorial law. Clancy asked
Catron to take up the matter with the Indian office and “prevent Mr. Coggeshall from
annoying people.”471
Clancy had also been in correspondence with José A. Ribera of Peña Blanca, who
had been cited for his cattles’ trespass onto the lands of Cochiti. “This action of Mr
Coggeshall is absolutely without any authority under the law,” wrote Clancy. “Mr.
Coggshall’s action, in effect, makes him a court to adjudicate the penalty and an office to
collect it.”472 Coggeshall meanwhile wrote the commissioner of Indian affairs to
complain of the grazing practices of Mexicans on the lands of Santo Domingo and
Cochiti Pueblos. He reported that Mexicans at Sile and Peña Blanca “consider Indian
lands to be for their common benefit and have turned their stock out to graze on Indian
lands.”473 When Ribera was questioned by Coggeshall about the trespass of his stock onto
the Cochiti Pueblo Reservation, he explained that “they [nuevomexicanos] always used
Indian lands for their own benefit and could not see buy (sic) that they would not
continue to do so.” Attorney General Clancy was so outraged by Coggeshall’s tactics
that he engineered a Joint Memorial in the New Mexico State Legislature condemning
the practices.474
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Despite Coggeshall’s impoundments, New Mexico state leaders still believed that
their laws superseded federal statutes enforced by U.S. agents on Pueblo reservations.
Laws and the legal code created over the sixty-two year territorial period were
incorporated into the new state’s legal codes, and territorial jurisprudence, which had
shaped the legal knowledge of jurists and lawyers alike, lived on in early New Mexico
statehood. Their defense of the precedence of New Mexico territorial law over federal
law united all New Mexico politicians, Republican and Democrat, Hispano and Anglo
alike. Although the 1910 Enabling Act explicitly ended New Mexico’s jurisdiction over
Pueblo Indian lands, political leaders in early statehood fought to maintain control over
Pueblo lands and undertook an elaborate, even convoluted interpretation of recent
Supreme Court decisions and federal mandates to uphold their authority. They did so by
narrowly interpreting judicial decisions regarding Indian land. Their reading reduced
Sandoval to the “liquor case,” which did not affect other types of commerce, especially
land sales. In their interpretation Sandoval especially did not wholly transform the
Pueblo’s non-Indian status, which had been affirmed earlier in the Joseph case. New
Mexican authorities also questioned the applicability to Pueblos of land laws created for
Indians in other part of the United States. Finally, they simply ignored federal authority
over Indian lands, claiming, with some truth, that it rendered New Mexico unequal to
other states and forced unnecessary legal and economic hardship on the new state.
Pueblo Attorney Richard Hanna’s ejectment suits meanwhile posed a real threat
to non-Indian’s private claims on Pueblo lands. Jurisdiction over Pueblo affairs and lands
proved more complicated than a simple judicial statement. What were, for instance, the
Pueblos’s water rights in relation to those of surrounding villages and other users? Were
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rights to waters flowing through Indian pueblos not subject to state courts and
jurisdiction? Would the federal government seize control of water resources, a power
typically held by states? Hanna’s suits offered no answers to these larger questions and
the Congressional Hearings at Tesuque in 1920 did little to calm growing concerns over
the potential of the litigation to displace thousands of Hispano and Anglo settlers across
New Mexico. These claimants hardly took the threat of litigation lying down. Many
turned to Alois Renehan, the lawyer and noted land speculator, who had won the first
round of the Sandoval fight, to defend the validity of their claims.
In March of 1921, the U.S. District Court filed an injunction against Hispanos’s
exploiting grazing lands within the exterior boundaries of the Santa Clara and San
Ildefonso Pueblo grants, bringing the direct judicial action that Pueblo governors had
requested form Clinton J. Crandall and Clara D. True decades earlier.475 Renehan
defended Hispano grazers against the injunction. Clara True, meanwhile, had aboutfaced
from aiding Pueblos’s defense of their lands to making her own claims against them.
Living on a tract of land that was well within the San Ildefonso Pueblo Grant, True led an
effort to defend land claims against the 1919 Hanna ejectment suits. The meddlesome
Indian Rights Association representative, who fell in and out of the employment of the
Indian Service as a Santa Clara Pueblo day school teacher and who eventually became
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superintendent of the Española valley’s public schools, was among the first to organize
non-Indians and recruit Renehan to the settler cause.476
True organized the San Ildefonso Committee, an organization of non-Indians
defending their claims, and served on the Executive Committee with Martín Luján and
Perfecto Gallegos.477 From 1920-1921, the Committee had collected $1,100 to pay
Renehan either to defend the claimants’ case in court or to lobby Congressional
intervention to block the Hanna ejectment suits. True wrote the general counsel of the
Denver and Rio Grande Railroad to solicit funds for a case that made “victim of all of
us,” pleading for the company to send something on behalf of “widows with children in
the orphan asylum.”478 Renehan, meanwhile, worked with Congressman Nestor Montoya
to introduce legislation to “adjust controversies affecting small holding claims.”479 While
Renehan busily organized settler committees and Congressmen to fight the ejectment
suits, the New Mexico Republican Party’s “Old Guard” approached the ejectment suits as
an opportunity to fix the woes of an ailing party.
Amid Congressional hearings and the turmoil of the 1919 Hana ejectment suits,
the New Mexico Republican Party had readied itself for the 1920 campaign. Having
divided into Old Guard and progressive camps, Republicans made blocking or throwing
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out eviction suits a central part of their party’s platform for the next four years, especially
appealing to a northern Hispano constituency in a state of panic. With the notable
exception of the progressive politician and newspaper publisher Bronson Cutting, the
Republican Party was estranged equally from the common northern New Mexican voter
and the Hispano patrones on whose support they relied. Killing eviction suits and
clearing title to non-Indian claims on Indian lands would confirm the Republican’s
commitment to nuevomexicanos. It would also ensure that thousands of acres of valuable
land remained on the private market.480
In his waning days as New Mexico’s lone Representative to U.S. Congress,
Benigno C. Hernández submitted a bill that both confirmed absolute federal jurisdiction
in internal Pueblo matters and recognized non-Indian title to Pueblo lands through patents
issued by a three-man commission. His successor, Nestor Montoya, sought to clear all
small-holding claims in sweeping legislation that gained no traction. Despite attempts to
unify its base, Republican Party leadership remained divided. Bad blood between former
territorial governor Herbert J. Hagerman and Holm Bursum had boiled since 1906, when
Hagerman removed Bursum as head of the Territorial Penitentiary for embezzlement.
Senator Albert Fall had supported Bursum’s gubernatorial bid in 1916, but they fell out in
1919-1920, when Bursum failed to back Fall’s support of Warren Harding in the
Republican presidential primary. With Harding’s election, Fall won a seat in the new
cabinet as secretary of the interior. Bursum was widely considered the most appropriate
Republican to fill Fall’s vacant senate seat. But Fall threatened to stay if incoming
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governor Merritt Mechem intended to appoint Bursum, which he did as soon as Fall took
the helm of the Interior Department.481
Secretary of the Interior Fall immediately conferred with Commissioner of Indian
Affairs Charles H. Burke and Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty about the Pueblo
land situation. Fall implored Daugherty to appoint longtime New Mexico attorney and
historian Ralph Emerson Twitchell as special government attorney for the Pueblo
Indians. In March, 1921, Daugherty acquiesced, commissioned Twitchell special
assistant to the attorney general for Pueblo Indians, and instructed him to prepare a
historical and legal report on Pueblo land tenure and pursue suits of ejectment.482
Twitchell was well versed in the history of the speculation in Pueblo lands. In
1895, Twitchell with his first wife, Margaret Olivia Twitchell, purchased a tract of land
from San Ildefonso Pueblo governor Domingo Peña, then quickly sold it to Cosme
Herrera at a profit.483 Twitchell remarried after the death of Margaret, and continued an
unremarkable career as a land speculator, unsuccessfully filing claims on the Diego de
Velasco and Santo Domingo de Cundiyó claims in the Tewa Basin.484

481

Kelly, Assault on Assimilation, 198-200; Forrest, Preservation of the Village, 56-58.
Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs, Survey of Conditions of the
Indians in the United States: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Indian Affairs, 71st congress, 2nd session, pt. 20, Pueblo Lands Board, May 2, 8 and 9
1931; January 26-30, 1932, 10764-10767. In his new position, Twitchell answered to the
attorney general in the Department of Justice, where the special attorney for the pueblos
was a Bureau of Indian Affairs position within the Department of the Interior.
483
Twitchell was quite familiar with speculation in Pueblo land. His first wife, Margaret
Olivia Twitchell, purchased a tract from San Ildefonso Pueblo (Domingo Pena was
governor) in June of 1895, a parcel of land she quickly sold to Cosme Herrera on July 5,
1895 for $75.00. Notes Regarding San Ildefonso Land Sales, Folder 3, Box 2. Indian
Affairs Collection, MSS 16, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, UNM,
Albuquerque.
484
See Ebright, “Cundiyó Grant,” 4-6. Ebright writes that Twitchell filed one of many
conflicting claims to the grant on March 3, 1893, the last day that claims could be filed in
257
482

While Twitchell was compiling his report, the verdicts for ejectment suits filed by
Pueblo attorney Richard H. Hanna were rumored to be issued soon. Fall interceded, once
again requesting that Daugherty await Twitchell’s report and delay New Mexico District
Court judge Colin Neblett’s pending decision on four ejectment cases naming sixhundred non-Indians as defendants.485 Hanna and Francis C. Wilson, former law partners
who succeeded one another as attorney for Pueblo Indians, were confident that Neblett’s
decision would favor the Pueblos and would call for the ejectment of all non-Indians
from Pueblo lands. They believed Neblett’s hands were tied by the Sandoval decision,
which defined Pueblo lands as Indian Country, with explicit embargos against non-Indian
land ownership. Wilson’s confidence came with some hesitation, for he feared the social
and political consequences of removing hundreds of Hispanos from lands they had
farmed for decades and may have bought in good faith from Hispanos or even from
Pueblo Indians themselves. Neblett yielded to Daugherty’s request, allowing the
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prospect that a legislative solution could offer the equity that a judicial decision could
not.486
Twitchell’s report pointed out the speculative habits of Spanish-colonial and
Mexican officials, all the while turning a blind eye to their American successors. Many
of these territorial land speculators were Twitchell’s personal acquaintances, colleagues
and adversaries, with whom had partnered or whom he had fought during speculation in
native lands. Twitchell’s report, later republished in El Palacio, the magazine of the
Museum of New Mexico edited by Twitchell’s longtime friend and collaborator, Edgar L.
Hewett, condemned Spanish “cupidity and despotic rule” that brutally subjugated a
“peaceful, quiet and industrious people.” Twitchell nonetheless highlighted the
inconsistent Spanish administration of Pueblo lands, which sometimes allowed the
intrusion of neighboring colonists but explicitly denied the right of Indians to sell their
land under both the Laws of the Indies which governed the colonization of New Spain,
and the Ordenanzas de Tierras y Aquas (Land and Water Ordinances), which sought to
protect the tribes resources. In retelling New Mexico’s Spanish-colonial land cases,
which he mastered while organizing the Spanish Archives of New Mexico, Twitchell
demonstrated how Spanish-Pueblo relations were a guardian-ward relationship, one that
changed with Mexican Independence and the Plan de Iguala.487
The Plan de Iguala, which held that all former subjects of the Spanish crown were
citizens of the Mexican Republic, transformed Pueblo Indians’s status from crown ward
to republican citizen. In its twenty-five years as a part of the Mexican Republic, New
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Mexico never elected a legislative assembly, meaning that even if Pueblos were indeed
citizens, they never had the opportunity to vote. New Mexico was generally governed
under late-Spanish-colonial laws and Mexican officials continued to protect Pueblo lands,
despite their own impulses to dismantle them and distribute them for wider benefit.
Twitchell, nonetheless, wrote little of Mexican governance of Pueblo lands. According
to him, the only significant action that Mexico took was granting Pueblo Indians
citizenship, a decision that in Twitchell’s mind, bound the hands of the Territorial
Supreme Court when it recognized the right of Pueblos to sell their lands. Twitchell’s
unbalanced report commended the effects of the New Mexico Territorial Supreme Court
to clear up the muddy land-tenure issue while it ignored the speculative habits of Justices
John S. Watts and Kirby Benedict.488
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and Stephen B. Elkins eventually owned the controlling interest in the Mora Grant, which
subsumed the Guadalupita Grant. When they partitioned the grant, only locals who had
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By May 1922 Twitchell, as special attorney for the Pueblos, threatened to push
forward with Hanna’s ejectment suits if Congress provided no relief measure before it
adjourned that session. Why Twitchell would threaten to go forward with legal action
that he had no power to apply is puzzling. Fall had already convinced Daugherty to stop
Neblett’s ejectment-suit decision until Twitchell compiled a study of Pueblo lands.
Twitchell had already issued the report and published it in El Palacio. He was also
advising Senator Bursum on creating legislation to ameliorate the situation. It is
perplexing to consider why Twitchell threatened to resume legal action while he was
already a part of a process to provide Congressional relief. Like land litigators before
him, he appears to have played all sides of the issue to feather his own nest.
Albert Fall’s actions and intentions were much clearer. As secretary of the
interior, he continued a life-long vocation, actively privatizing and corporatizing public
lands and resources. For Fall, Pueblo Indian lands, like all other native lands, were a part
of the public domain subject to national control and disposition. Keeping faithful to
Republican campaign promises, Fall resurrected a skeleton proposal made by Alois
Renehan. After the May 1920 Congressional hearings in Tesuque, Renehan had
proposed to create a commission to examine non-Indian claims. His suggestion was to
accept those dating before 1900 and examining the legality of those made afterward.
Although he had opposed Bursum’s appointment to his former seat, Fall now needed
Bursum to propose the legislation. Whether Bursum took up Fall’s plan out of naiveté,
for the sake of the Republican Party in New Mexico, or to advance his political career
remains unclear.

deeds protecting their land or took possession of common lands received anything before
Elkins and Catron received their share. See Ebright, “Coyote Creek State Park,” 14-16.
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The land tenure situation in New Mexico Pueblos still suffered from federal
inattention. On February 8, 1922, Tesuque Pueblo Indians disputed E. D. Newman’s
claim to an eighty-acre tract and cut down recently erected fences that marked his claim.
Newman warned everyone from Governor Mechem and Senator Bursum to Attorneys
Alois Renehan and Francis C. Wilson that without favorable intervention, he would resort
to his “only recourse – a Winchester.”489 Mindful that he needed to pursue legislation
quickly if he hoped to win his senatorial seat in the upcoming special election, Bursum
rushed two bills through Congress. (In the election, he faced none other than Richard H.
Hanna, the very man who filed the 1919 ejectment suits.) Bursum submitted them to the
Indian Affairs Committee, hoping to avoid review by the Interior Department, only to
have them recalled by Secretary Fall.490
An infuriated Fall summoned Renehan and Twitchell to Washington to work with
Bursum on a more sound bill that would satisfy both the settlers threatened with eviction
and the government liable to protect Pueblo lands. In May 1922, Renehan, already
representing non-Indian claimants in the Hanna ejectment suits, outlined for Bursum a
bill that recognized two classes of claimants. The first were those who had adverse
possession ten years prior to statehood and the second with adverse possession after
statehood. The second class would pay the Indians the value of their lost lands based on
their condition on January 6, 1902, ten years to the day before statehood and the date that
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separated the two classes of claimants. He also stated that he had been in conversation
with Governor Mechem, who agreed that water should be left out of the bill for
jurisdictional reasons, namely that it complicated the convenient division between Indian
and non-Indian acequia users.491
In July 1922 Renehan, Twitchell, and Bursum drew up Senate Bill 3855,
resurrecting the recommendation Renehan had made to the House Committee in Tesuque
two years earlier. According to the bill’s provisions, settlers claiming tracts within
Pueblo lands did not need to prove color of title, only adverse possession since 1910.
The federal government would replace Pueblo lands lost to settlers with parcels from the
public domain or with cash settlements. The 1914 Joy Survey, which many settlers had
attempted to use to patent or fence their claims and which Pueblo Indians denied, would
be applied to legitimate claims. Section 1 of the bill gave the federal government
unprecedented control over the Pueblos’s internal affairs, while Section 7 enabled federal
courts to establish boundaries by decree. Section 10 served to restrict Pueblo water rights
by time of decree, using the Joy Survey as prima facie evidence of boundaries. Nowhere
in the bill was there a recognition of the Indians’s wardship or need of government
protection. Unusual to lands claims, the burden of proof rested on Indians, not nonIndian claimants.492
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Renehan had spent the spring of 1922 simultaneously amassing throughout the
Tewa Basin clients who were fighting the ejectment suits, and drafting legislation to
ensure that a decision in Hanna’s cases would never be entered. He wrote the Mexican
ministers of foreign relations and finance to secure copies of codified laws of Spain and
Mexico, and conferred with nuevomexicano lawyer and historian Benjamin M. Read,
borrowing liberally from his extensive library and looking for evidence of Pueblo
Indians’s right to sell their land.493 Clara True continued to help Renehan raise money to
fund litigation and trips to Washington, and schemed to manipulate Española merchants
Frank Frankenburger and Frank Bond, the latter whom neither True nor Renehan fully
trusted.494 Renehan provided True with a copy of Twitchell’s El Palacio article, which
True, traveling from household to household, used to aggravate settlers and orchestrate
resentment and mistrust against Twitchell while she raisied funds for Renehan’s legal
expenses.
In their correspondence, Renehan and True invoked reliable stereotypes of the
“natives,” those Hispano settlers whom they claimed to defend. True suggested that they
aggressively court José Vigil of Velarde, a man who “has a million relations and his wife
a million more.” True also claimed that the natives elected her to the San Ildefonso
Commission and wished to send her to Washington along with Renehan because the
“natives tire of the natives” and of those “who take the money and double cross, native
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fashion.” And though Renehan for decades profited handsomely in defending Hispano
lands, often at their expense rather than to their benefit, both he and True claimed that
Hispanos’s cause lay near the heart. Writing to Bond, Renehan asserted that he was
motivated only by “humanitarian concerns,” and True informed Francis C. Wilson that
though she “no longer had any property interest inside any Indian grant, I have not lost
my human interest in the big subject.”495 In 1922, True warned Senator Bursum that the
situation “in the back counties” was so fragile and bitter that “someday a rabid Penitente
outfit will wipe a few Indian villages off the map of New Mexico unless something is
done.” True’s depiction of the Hispano population as uncontrollable and prone to
violence was held by many who believed that the Anglo population was like a dam,
holding back the flood of barbarity that was bound to wash across New Mexico’s
communities.496
Renehan, meanwhile, spent considerable time raising funds for his own expensive
defense of Hispano claims to Pueblo lands. The vast majority of Hispano claimants to
Pueblo tracts were so poor that they risked owning land with a cloud over its title. They
held little cash and barely more liquid assets. His attempts to enlist local commercial and
political leaders met resistance. Frank Bond, the Española merchant who more than
anyone else controlled Tewa Basin markets, initially rebuffed Renehan’s request for
support, even though Renehan had served as Bond’s legal counsel for more than a
decade. In May 1922, Bond asked Renehan to reduce his fee from $1,000.00 to $750.00.
He also suggested a number of “head men” among whom Renehan worked to raise funds.
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They included Ramón Sánchez of Peñasco, which sat on Picuris Pueblos lands; Tomás
Roybal for San Ildefonso claimants; Esquipula Girón and Martín Lujan of Pojoaque and
Nambé; and José D. Montoya of the village of Chamita, a sub-grant of the San Juan
Pueblo league.497 True informed Renehan that José Vigil, a partidario (a sheep renter) of
Frank Bond, was grazing one thousand ewes in the Valle Grande atop the Pajarito Mesa
and was unavailable to fundraise for San Ildefonso.498
Renehan asked Ramón Sánchez and Father Peter Küppers in Peñasco to raise
among their neighbors at least a hundred dollars to pay for Renehan’s Washington
expenses. In addition to Bond and Frankenburger, he even reached out to Mabel Dodge
Sterne, the Taos patroness, to aid in organizing and fundraising for Taos claimants.
Given that Dodge would soon marry Taos Pueblo native Antonio Luján, we might
assume that she would oppose any effort to recognize non settler rights to Pueblo lands.
But her house and twelve-acre lot, where she hosted renowned artists and writers, sat
within the boundaries of the Taos Pueblo Grant. Renehan hoped that he could enlist her
aid, or at least her pocketbook, without blatantly stating her obvious interest in the pro
settler legislation.499
Renehan also approached José Ynes Roybal, one of the biggest claimants of
Nambé Pueblo lands, to secure funds from Nambé claimants. Roybal had received a
portion of his claim from the Nambé governor as payment for repairing the pueblo’s
church after a wall collapsed in 1906. In November of 1922, Renehan informed Bond
that the National Federation of Women’s Clubs were paying “a man named John Collier
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$5,000.00 to raise propaganda” against the settler cause. Renehan also lampooned the
New Mexico Association on Indian Affairs for hiring Francis C. Wilson for a twentyfive-hundred-dollar retainer. It was peculiar, Renehan thought, to hire a lawyer who was
publicly associated with the demise of both Pojoaque and Pecos Pueblos. Renehan
claimed that Wilson and Collier were visiting Kiwanis and Rotary Clubs, or were “in
divers and sundry places, creating sentiment against the bill.”500
Renehan assured Bond that he was the most-learned and best-placed lawyer to
protect settler interests. He defended Senator Bursum but warned of the influence of
Charles Catron and Ralph Emerson Twitchell on Senate Bill 3855, the legislation
introduced by Bursum and derived from Senate Bill 2274, which Renehan solely
authored.501 By fall 1922, when Bursum’s bill was receiving national attention, Renehan
wrote him to disavow sections of S.B. 3855, particularly the Charles Catron authored
Section 8, which could ostensibly revalidate old claims to already adjudicated private and
community land grants. Twitchell reassured Renehan that this was not the case, but
Renehan had his doubts. Renehan also questioned the place of water in the bill and
believed that Catron and Twitchell underestimated the complications that would arise
over water jurisdiction or adjuducation.502
The complicity of the so-called and often self appointed “settler advocates” in the
typically previous but sometimes concurrent dispossession of Hispano community grants
begs a consideration: were men like Renehan, Bond and Catron now motivated by guilt
to defend of Hispano land claims to Pueblo lands? Did they feel it was their duty to
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protect the rights of the disfranchised Mexican masses against the growing assault of
progressive muckrakers and reformers? Among these unscrupulous operators, guilt was
an unlikely motivator. Renehan and his law partner, Carl Gilbert, still speculated in
community land grants while representing claimants in front of the Pueblo Lands Board.
Others involved in the settlers’ cause included Bond and Frankenburger. Frankenburger
had organized the Española State Bank in 1916 and was actively involved in Río Arriba
County politics. In 1923, when the small town of Española (population 500) was
incorporated, he was elected its first mayor. His interests in the settler cause seemed both
economic and political; he was reaching out to his eventual constituents. 503
Frank Bond’s involvement, however, was much more complicated. Ever since
Hanna filed the ejectment suits in 1919, Bond complained bitterly to Renehan and True
that he should not be expected to bear the expense of the settlers’ legal defense. He cited
what he considered to be his small claims within the Santa Clara Pueblo Grant, although
his companies and associates held some of the largest claims to lands within the Santa
Clara and San Juan grants as well as claims to San Ildefonso lands. In December 1922,
Bond wrote Renehan: “I do not feel it was up to us to pay for your fees and expenses to
Washington. Outside our buildings located in town, the land holdings of nearly any of
the Mexicans is greater than ours.”504
Bond’s motivation went even beyond protecting his own direct economic interest
in Pueblo lands. Since the 1912, he had steadily expanded his control over the lands and
economy of northern New Mexico. Called the “Gentlemen Sheepherder” by his
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biographer, Bond held partido (rental) contracts for hundreds of partidarios on tens of
thousands of sheep.505 He controlled lands throughout the Tewa Basin, often by outright
purchase. For instance, he came to own the sizable Ramón Vigil Grant skirting the
Jemez on its eastern slopes (roughly thirty thousand acres), and the enormous and
resource-rich Baca Location 1 Grant (estimated at ninety-nine thousand acres) in the
center of the plateau. When the common lands of the Las Trampas Land Grant offered
promises of timber, Bond bought in 1903 the twenty-six-thousand-acre ejido at an
auction prompted by land speculators who had partitioned the grant. 506
Over the next decade, Bond sold, and later repurchased, the Las Trampas Lumber
Company. The company extracted very little actual timber, but served to advertise the
grant for $160,000, a ten-fold increase in the 1903 purchase price. Knowing that the Las
Trampas grant conflicted with the Pecos Forest Reserve, Bond fixated on the idea of
selling or trading the land to the federal government. Bond never realized this dream: the
Las Trampas Lumber Company declared bankruptcy in 1926, and the George E. Breece
Lumber Company bought the grant and traded it to the U.S. Forest Service, which
incorporated the property into the Kit Carson National Forest.507
Bond’s failure at Las Trampas hardly restrained his power to control the economy
of the Tewa Basin. From the early 1890s through the 1920s, Bond systematically bought
up grazing permits to forest lands from Hispanos and controlled those he did not own by
owning the sheep that they grazed on these tracts. “Controlling the range by ownership
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and lease and its users by their debts,” writes historian Hal Rothman, “Bond created an
ironclad sphere of economic influence.”508 Bond shrewdly understood that in the
transition from a subsistence to cash economy lay economic opportunity. Thus, he gladly
forwarded credit to customers unable to pay in cash; credit sales were twice cash sales
and, though riskier, offered the greater potential profit, even if it meant employing
lawyers like Alois B. Renehan as debt collectors. The greater portion of the valley’s
Hispano population, along with significant numbers of local Pueblo Indians, were
indebted to Bond, either in store credit at one of his many area mercantiles, as renters of
his lands, or as partidarios, renters of his sheep.509
Bond’s extensive wool and sheep interests throughout New Mexico included
partnerships in Roswell, Grants, Taos, Cuba, Cuervo, Encino, Wagon Mound, and
Albuquerque. Española, where Bond made his home, was the headquarters of his empire.
Over three decades, Bond made himself the financial heart of the Española valley and
Tewa Basin economy. His continued domination of the valley’s economic life hinged on
his control of a Hispano population that faced displacement first through the threat of
ejectment suits in 1919-1921 and then through the debate and defeat of the Bursum Bill
from 1922-1924. If this population was forced off its claims inside Pueblo lands, Bond
would lose his customers, his debtors and tens of thousands of dollars of investments in
the form of unpaid debt. Whether or not Bond wholly embraced or cynically rebuffed his
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role as a patrón, his own personal financial interests compelled him to act on behalf of
the “settlers.”
Renehan understood Bond’s importance to underwriting his expenses, and he
urged Bond to use his influence to raise the funds that he refused to supply personally. In
December 1922, he wrote Bond, “You have in a sense lost interest in the fight concerning
settlers on Indian lands,” and added, “I can call to mind no one more interested than you
through your investments and through the investments of friends and the homes and little
farms of many of your customers in various places.”510 Bond and Renehan argued over
fundraising and Renehan’s travel costs, but Renehan leveraged monies from other
merchants by using the promise of Bond’s support as an incentive to contribute.
Bernalillo railroad promoter Sidney Weil, Chamita mercantile owner Sam Eldodt and
Taos merchant Alexander Gusdorf all contributed to a settler-defense fund that Renehan
labored to build.511
In the decade before the Bursum Bill, New Mexico politicians and attorneys had
grappled with the Pueblo lands question and the implications of the 1913 Sandoval
decision. Federal jurisdiction on Pueblo lands was stated in the 1910 enabling act but
was ignored by New Mexico political leaders. The Sandoval case offered the opportunity
for the federal government to affirm its guardianship of the Pueblos and their property
rights. Ambiguities persisted when the 1914 Joy survey became a tool of dispossession
rather than protection, for non-Indians considered the survey the federal affirmation of
their land claims to Pueblo lands. Pueblo attorney Richard H. Hanna’s 1919 ejectment
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suits forced the search for answers to legal questions about state and federal sovereignty,
and New Mexico’s jurists and legislators alike sought political solutions that offered
nuanced decisions that the law could not. Ameliorating decades of federal neglect would
nonetheless prove difficult.
The monumental change in almost four decades of property law offered life to a
state Republican Party that was losing ground and in danger of becoming irrelevant to the
Hispano population, a significant voting constituency that proved vital to progressive
candidates by the end of the 1920s. Attorneys Alois B. Renehan, Charles Catron, and
Ralph Emerson Twitchell defended Hispanos’s property rights to Pueblo lands that they
had appropriated by illegal or extralegal means. Beyond their mutual distrust, Renehan,
Catron and Twtichell all speculated in land to varying extents and with different success,
and shared an abiding proprietary interest in New Mexico’s history. Each of these
defenders would contribute to the Bursum Bill: Renehan drafted the skeleton proposal
after the 1920 Congressional hearings in Tesuque; Ralph Twitchell wrote a lengthy
historical report in the wake of the Bursum controversy, yet hid his own work authoring
sections of the bill; and Charles Catron attempted to use the bill to inaugurate yet another
era of land speculation by re-opening old land claims. All were active in the early years
of the board, but the land board proved most rewarding to Alois Renehan, an attorney
who spent the previous two decades dispossessing many Hispanos of their traditional
lands. Over the next decade, his will to defend non-Indian claims was matched by
progressive reformer John Collier’s determination to protect Pueblo property rights.
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Chapter 6: Lawyers, Advocates and the Battle over the Pueblo Lands Bill,
1922-1924
From 1922 to 1924 politicians, attorneys, and advocates engaged in a national
debate over the fate of Pueblo Indian lands. New Mexico’s political leaders fought to
maintain local control or state disposition over Pueblo lands, a status that had proved
disastrous for Pueblos during New Mexico’s long territorial period. Advocates, on the
other hand, fought not for Pueblo disposition over their own lands, but for the federal
government to resume its role as a fiduciary and take responsibility for the despoliation of
Pueblo land and water. While advocates envisioned the federal rebuilding of Pueblo
communities, New Mexico’s attorneys and politicians fought to maintain the status quo
in Pueblo affairs. Some, such as Charles Catron, hoped to revive the land market of the
territorial era, when a disinterested and detached federal government ignored the actions
of land speculators like his father, Thomas B. Catron, and their erstwhile collaborator,
Alois B. Renehan.
The political will of the fading New Mexico Republican Party was eclipsed by the
influence of progressive reformers. Whereas earlier generations of indiophiles sought
largely to preserve Indian culture from extinction and segregate it from the influence of
mainstream American society, many reformers hoped to imitate aspects of premodern
Indian culture and expose the capitalist individualism of modern society to native
communal ethos that might save American civilization from its inevitable decline. Both
Pueblos and Hispanos were largely voiceless in a national debate that centered on the
protection of their conflicting property rights.
This chapter discusses in depth the debate over legislation proposed to settle the
Pueblo land question. This debate pitted the Republican political establishment against
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progressive-reform advocates. Out of this rancorous debate emerged a discourse on race
that united both the establishment politician and the progressive reformer, a dialogue that
emphasized a stark distinction between Pueblo and Hispano communities. Although the
previous chapter discussed how politicians and advocates organized non-Indian claimants
in the Tewa Basin, this chapter pays close attention to debates among Pueblo advocates.
It reveals the control of Pueblo advocacy in transition, moving from conservative national
organizations to moderate, locally based, consensus-building organizations, finally to
radical national groups that fought for the total reform of Indian affairs across the United
States.
~~~
While attorney Alois Renehan built his legal war chest, Senator Holm Bursum’s
hasty bills and Fall’s hastier recall caught the attention of the Philadelphia-based Indian
Rights Association (IRA). Mindful of the political climate of New Mexico through Clara
True, who often served as its New Mexico field representative, IRA attorney S. M.
Brosius and stalwart Roberts Walker alerted Indian-rights advocates to the pending
legislation. Meanwhile, word of Bursum’s bills of May of 1922 was circulating among
Indiophiles across New Mexico, including Mary Austin, Mabel Dodge Sterne (Luhan),
and a disenchanted progressive reformer and California social worker named John
Collier. Invited by Sterne (Luhan) to New Mexico two years earlier, Collier found in
Pueblo civilization what he called the “Red Atlantis,” an almost-mythic communal
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society popularly believed to be extinct, one that he thought, if replicated, could be the
remedy for the afflictions of modern life.512
Collier came to New Mexico in 1920 seeking personal re-invention and, in the
process, reinvented New Mexico. Always willing to buck the status quo, Collier was as
zealous as he was unrepentant in his fight for Indian policy reform. Unlike his local
counterparts, most of whom resented his intensity and immediate rapport with Pueblo
leaders, Collier was willing to disrupt the local power structures which even radical
reform-minded New Mexico residents accepted. Some saw in his fanatical pursuit of
Native justice as an implicit criticism of their own reform advocacy. Others believed that
their patronage of Indian culture was trivialized by Collier’s activism, which reduced
their work to that of the shallow consumption of Indian culture. In less than five years,
Collier had alienated most local Pueblo advocates, while ingratiating himself with many
Pueblo leaders.513
To contextualize John Collier in the Pueblo lands battle and to explain why he
was so successful where others were not, it is useful to consider who Collier was and
where he came from when he drove onto the Taos mesa on a snowy day in 1920. Born to
a successful Atlanta family, Collier overcame the personal tragedy of a mother who died
of addiction and a father who committed suicide to find academic success at Columbia
University and the College de France in Paris. He developed a progressive social
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philosophy critical of the destructive effects of the modern industrial age on humankind.
In his analysis, western individualism and materialism had supplanted communal ideas
and social responsibility, to create a society and a culture that valued the ephemeral and
perishable over the permanent and sustainable.514
After working in settlement houses in the East, including the People’s Institute on
New York City’s Lower East Side, Collier moved to California in 1919. Many regarded
California as a Progressive paradise, a land where state and local governments funded
reform projects like Americanization programs that sought to create a healthy and an
integrated society. Collier found himself a bureaucrat in the California State Commission
of Immigration and Housing, directing the adult-education programs and engaging in
deeply unsatisfying work. Mabel Sterne had long invited Collier to visit Taos to see
Pueblo culture, and finally, in 1920 he took her up on her offer.515
In Santa Fe, meanwhile, writers, artists, and scholars united to form the New
Mexico Association on Indian Affairs in 1922. Led by Margaret McKittrick and
Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant and poet Witter Bynner, writer Alice Corbin Henderson,
Santa Fe New Mexican editor E. Dana Johnson, artist Gustave Baumann, the preeminent
anthropologist and School of American Research founder Edgar Lee Hewett, Ina Sizer
Cassidy and her husband, painter Gerald Cassidy, the NMAIA began to collect data
assessing the extent of Pueblo land incursions. Studies of San Juan, Tesuque, San
Ildefonso, Nambé and Santa Clara in 1922 revealed significant patterns. San Juan,
despite its location at the confluence of the Rio Grande and Rio Chama, lacked sufficient
food sources to support the pueblo and relied on high-priced food from Española,
514
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including meat that San Juan women took as pay for housekeeping in the Española
Valley. Tesuque and San Ildefonso, at the end of the Tesuque-Nambe-Pojoaque
watershed, lacked sufficient water for agriculture and had become dependent on wage
work and aid from the Northern Pueblo Agency. All the studied pueblos suffered from
childhood malnutrition, trachoma and tuberculosis.516
Whereas early reports had attempted a holistic review of the ills suffered by the
northern Pueblos, NMAIA investigators gradually focused their efforts on identifying
non-Indian claims on northern Pueblo reservations, paying special attention to large
parcels and those with a greater history of conflict. A series of March 1922 reports
presented to the General Council of Northern Pueblos provided a lengthy catalog of the
most flagrant violations of Pueblo property rights. Reports for San Juan Pueblo stated
that although “Indians concede a few sales [to non-Indians] in these claims, most of them
they acquired by fraud from individual Indians by the sale of whiskey, loaning small
sums of money, and trading inferior cattle, horses, etc. . . . Other schemes, too numerous
to mention, were made use of to get the Indian’s land. . . . Sales were made by outlaw
Indians who refused to obey Pueblo rules.” Among these “outlaw Indians” was one Juan
Chiniaguan, who in the mid-1700s, abandoned the Pueblo twice to observe Penitente
practices but accepted from the pueblo a “loan of land”which he sold to “Mexicans, who
enlarged their claim to 200 acres.”517
The San Juan report suggests that Pueblo land expropriation was the result of a
number a factors, including dissension among Pueblo members and speculation by
516
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surrounding settlers, but the nefarious nature of Hispano land claims and Hispanos
themselves was the focus of other reports. The Nambé report illustrated how the
Pueblo’s lands were lost to Hispano men who preyed on and married Pueblo women.
The author doubted the validity of land claimed by José Ines Roybal, one of the Hispanos
hired to repair the collapsed walls of the Nambé Catholic Church over a dozen years
earlier. “The Mexican Usurper,” the report closed, “has made great inroads on the
Nambe [sic] Pueblo Grant.”518
At San Ildefonso and Santa Clara, either Hispano purchases of land were less
despicable or its purchaser was less objectionable. The sixty-plus-acre claim of Clara
True, the former Santa Clara Day School teacher and sometimes IRA representative, was
once owned by “Spanish” Carlos Abreu, who was described as “one of the most
respected and well-meaning citizens in this section of the country.” Remarkably, the
report equated Abreu with the Pueblo Indians, whose land he had claimed before selling
it. In closing, the report stated that Abreu was “entitled to justice” along with “the
Indians who never received a cent in the transaction and should not be allowed to remain
outside of the pale of justice.” Field notes by NMAIA representatives on San Ildefonso
Pueblo obfuscated the distinction by identifying the “squatter lawyer” Felipe Tafoya as a
“Spaniard or Mexican.” What distinguished the “Mexican Usurper” from the “Spanish
citizen” remained ill-defined and vague, though financial and political standing was
likely part of the distinction.519
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While the NMAIA conducted field surveys, Collier made valuable contacts in
Stella Atwood, chair of the Indian Committee of the General Federation of Women’s
Clubs, and wealthy philanthropist Kate Vosburg. With the former’s recommendation,
Vosburg agreed to fund Collier as Atwood’s field worker in the fight against the evermore-infamous Bursum Bill. With the help of Taos Pueblo native Antonio Luján and
Mabel Dodge Sterne (Luhan), Collier visited nearly every New Mexico Pueblo in
September 1922. He received a copy of the Bursum Bill from Northern Pueblo
Superintendent C. J. Crandall, who was reinstated following the removal of
Superintendent Johnson. With ex-Pueblo attorney Francis Wilson, Collier completed a
thorough analysis of the Bursum Bill, which the NMAIA published and the General
Federation of Women’s Clubs distributed under the provocative title, Shall the Pueblo
Indians of New Mexico Be Destroyed? Published as a small blue book, the report
systematically addressed the many deficiencies of the Bursum Bill, illustrating where it
would fail to relieve the dismal situation at numerous New Mexico pueblos. Collier
advocated the creation of a presidentially appointed commission to hear claims, and the
creation or extension of existing irrigation works to “adjust the controversies between the
Indian and the settlers without hardship to either party.” He concluded: “The bill is so
full of inconsistencies, contradictions . . . to render it impossible of amendment . . . to
serve any purpose either for the Indians or for the claimants adverse to the Indians. It
should be utterly and wholly defeated.” Collier committed himself to that very cause.520
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While Collier and the NMAIA publicized the gross inequities of the proposed
Bursum Bill, the senator received ample warning of the controversies that would plague
his bill. In July 1922, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles H. Burke advised Bursum
that his bill should go through the Indian Affairs Committee (IAC), or even the
Committee on the Judiciary, rather than the Committee on Public Lands (CPL), which, he
pointed out, had no jurisdiction over Pueblo lands.521 Ignoring Burke’s warning, Bursum
pushed his bill through the CPL, where Secretary Fall believed he could exercise more
influence. On September 11, the Senate approved the Bursum Bill and forwarded it to
the House, where it sat as the Congressional session expired. Underestimating opposition
to his bill, Bursum sent notice of its Senate passage to newspapers in Albuquerque, Santa
Fe, and Las Vegas. He smugly wrote Twitchell, “I think that there will not be much
trouble when they give sufficient time to it.”522
Upon hearing about the bill’s passage, Collier and the NMAIA spent the next two
months attacking the proposed legislation and anyone associated with it. He and NMAIA
leadership, however, began to diverge as he took an increasingly radical position
advocating the removal of non-Indians en masse from Pueblo lands. As Collier travelled
to native pueblos, he encouraged Pueblo leaders to push for the repatriation of all lands,
regardless of circumstance of their loss. Members of the NMAIA became jealous of his
growing influence among the Pueblos and feared that his rhetoric was provoking hostility
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between advocates, Pueblos, and Hispanos. This rhetoric, he confided to Mabel Dodge,
was the “dramatic propaganda we must wage.”523
The New Mexico Association’s concerns were not without merit. At the
November 5, 1922, Santo Domingo meeting, where Pueblo delegates wrote up and issued
their memorial addressed to the American people, Collier’s influence seemed moderated
by the will of the Pueblos to defend their claims jointly. The All Indian Pueblo Council
(AIPC) itself was an organization whose image Collier manipulated. He stated that
Pueblo Indians had joined together to fight the Bursum Bill for the first time since the
Pueblo Revolt in 1680. His outspoken role in AIPC meetings often cast a shadow over
the organization and raised doubt about whether its activities were initiated by natives or
created by Collier and rubberstamped by unknowing delegates.524 But Collier’s
dominance of the later AIPC meetings worried New Mexico reformers who believed that
through their longer patronage of Pueblo culture, they understood the “Indian
psychology” better than their erstwhile radical ally. Collier arguably played the principal
role in creating the nationwide public protest that led Senator William Borah to recall the
Bursum Bill in November 1922. Through the end of 1922, the NMAIA and Collier
remained united and hired Francis C. Wilson, the former Pueblo attorney, as legal
counsel to represent both the NMAIA and the General Federation of Women’s Clubs.525
From the start, Collier and the NMAIA leadership were skeptical of one another.
Members of the Association were reformers, but they were among the political, economic
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and cultural elite of Santa Fe and were wedded to its power structures. NMAIA member
Edgar Lee Hewett and attorney Ralph E. Twitchell, who proudly claimed authorship of
the Bursum Bill, remained close friends and collaborators. Both were active in state
politics, and Hewett was able to secure state funding for both the Spanish Colonial Arts
Market and the Indian Market, which the NMAIA’s successor organization, the
Southwest Association on Indian Affairs manages to this day. Hewett expressed his
distaste for Collier and cast doubt on his grim portrayal of the socio-economic state of the
Pueblos.526 Their willingness to reform the Office of Indian Affairs from within, through
negotiation, distinguished them from uncompromising radicals like Collier, who were
willing to sacrifice everything to give Indians a square deal. E. Dana Johnson edited the
Santa Fe New Mexican, which was owned by progressive Republican Bronson Cutting, a
powerful force in local politics long before being elected to the U.S. Senate in 1927.
Even photographer Margaret McKittrick, writer Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, author-poet
Alice Corbin Henderson and folklorist Ina Sizer Cassidy, all whom considered
themselves reformers at best, were active in local politics, and circulated among the elite
in Santa Fe.527
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Members of the NMAIA believed that they had a broader interest in Pueblo
affairs than did Collier, his California patrons, and his East Coast associates. Alice
Corbin Henderson wrote of the “Death of the Pueblos” in the New Republic in 1922. She
attacked the inconsistencies of the Bursum Bill, questioning why the federal government
would blindly accept the private claims represented in the Joy survey after the
government “some four years ago, under an evangelical impulse, started proceedings to
oust all settlers from Indian land.” The real intentions of the Republican Harding
administration, argued Henderson, were “transferring all the disputed lands to the nonIndians, namely, the voters,” while it opened remaining Pueblo lands to a hurried
exploitation, another gross example of the “intellectual breakdown” in Indian affairs.528
Only a reasonable federal plan could solve decades of federal inattention. NMAIA
meetings rang with vows to maintain “harmony, before the Indians were committed to
any policy.” Their paternalist vision foresaw harmony among “societies, large and small,
and the various attorneys” interested in the Indian land issue, not between the advocates
and the Indians, or among the Indians themselves.529 Even further from their minds was
the long, deep, and complicated relationship between Pueblo Indians and Hispano
settlers.

1934, and by 1936 was director if the Works Progress Administration’s Federal Writers
Project. See Women’s Tales from the New Mexico WPA: La Diabla a Pie, ed. by Tey
Diana Rebolledo and María Teresa Márquez (Houston: Arte Público Press, 2000), 445.
Sizer Cassidy compiled a collection of newspaper clippings, now called the Pueblo
Indian Land Matters Collection, Fray Angélico Chávez History Library, Museum of New
Mexico, Santa Fe.
528
Alice Corbin Henderson, “The Death of the Pueblos,” The New Republic, November
29, 1922, 11-13.
529
See Minutes of Meeting of the New Mexico Association on Indian Affairs, August 30,
1923, SWAIA Records, NMSCRA. Santa Fe.
283

Collier’s earliest writings displayed a sensibility for native lifeways different from
that of many longtime New Mexico advocates and anthropologists. Many activists were
primordialists, who believed in isolating Indian society from modernism and restoring it
to a mythic and idyllic native utopia. Collier wanted to preserve Pueblo society to learn
valuable human truths from it. He believed Pueblo Indians offered a laboratory to study
long-standing productive and harmonious communal societies, something Collier saw
collapse in his years working among ethnic Europeans in eastern settlement houses and in
the California Bureau of Housing and Immigration. Among New Mexico’s Pueblo
population, he witnessed truth, virtue, and integrity. In the Pueblos, he found genuine
hope for all humankind.530
In October 1922, Collier and Stella Atwood wrote articles for The Survey, the
social-reform magazine founded and edited by Paul and Arthur Kellogg. Though
Atwood attempted to build support for the Pueblo’s cause in her article, “The Case for the
Indian,”531 Collier described the uniqueness of Pueblo society and the inability of New
Mexico’s population to appreciate its value. He especially took aim at the Taos art
colony, for which Mabel Dodge Sterne was the patroness: “No, the colony is not a utopia,
nor does it hint of a cooperative commonwealth. A rather severe individualism prevails .
. .. Their separateness from each other and from the Indians as human and social beings
is distressing . . .. The Indian artists are intensely social; they are, indeed, a community
itself consciously living in beauty. The white colony fails altogether to learn this Indian
530
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secret.”532 To Collier, Pueblo Indians held a sacred knowledge and formed a community
that was not dying, as contemporary anthropologists who hurried to study the “vanishing
Indians” believed. They were “a giver to the future of gifts without a price, which future
white man will know how to use.”533
Collier rejected the idea that Pueblos were somehow primordial, a glimpse into
the past of several evolutionary stages. He wrote: “The Pueblo is not primitive in the
sense of being primordial. Vast spaces of evolution and of the compounding of cultures
lie behind it. But it is primitive in that it has conserved the earliest statesmanship, the
earliest pedagogy of the human race.” While Collier argued for the complexity and
educational potential of Pueblo culture, his own paternalism still led him to describe the
Pueblos as “childlike,” a description that he used on nuevomexicanos as well.534
Collier subtly disparaged the surrounding Hispano population. He marveled at
the flawless authenticity of isolated Córdova but exoticized the “eerie chants” of the
“half-Pagan” Pentitentes, whose “childlikeness intermingled with their masochistic
glooms.”535 He lamented that “even the Mexican past and present” was excluded from the
lessons of the Pueblo day school. In his earliest article, Collier stated that the Hispano
population was of “secondary interest . . . and there is no space for describing them here.”
Collier argued that Hispanos were a lesser concern, a sentiment that endeared him to
Pueblos and alienated both Hispanos and other Indian advocates.536
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By the time Collier published his next national article, “Plundering the Pueblo
Indians,” in Sunset Magazine, he had received a copy of the Bursum Bill. He painted
rather benign relations between the Pueblos and the Spanish sovereign, even crediting the
Spanish and Franciscans for enabling Pueblo survival and tempering with Christian
morality their ancient wildness, but he excoriated the executive branch of the federal
government. He quoted at length from Twitchell’s report and applauded his work on
Pueblo lands, but reproached his work with Alois Renehan to construct the Bursum Bill.
He attacked the legislation for turning the Joy Survey, created as a weapon to defend
against non-Indian claims on Pueblo lands, “into an instrument against the Government
and the Indians.”537
While Collier and the NMAIA maintained their increasingly strained alliance,
Senator Bursum prepared to defend the bill on which he believed his political future
relied. Supporters encouraged him to champion the unqualified recognition of settlers’
claims to Pueblo lands. They also exposed the chauvinistic views of New Mexican elites
and land speculators. Former congressman Benigno Hernández, who had proposed
multiple ill-fated Pueblo land bills in 1920, wrote Bursum that the whole controversy had
pitted “the Indians versus the people,” revealing his distinction between Indians and
claimants. In a prejudiced and willful misreading of history, Hernández also claimed that
the Spanish Pueblo grants were not made to the Pueblo Indians specifically but to people
living within grants, regardless of color, and that Congress had recognized this point
when it mentioned the rights of third parties in the land patents issued to Pueblos.
Hernández implored Bursum to appeal to Senator Homer P. Snyder, chairman of the
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Indian Affairs Committee. According to Hernández, Snyder “knows that there are 8,000
people involved in this matter whose holdings are . . . valuable improvements worth more
really than the holdings of the Indians.”538
Hernández also encouraged New Mexico representative Nestor Montoya to take
up the fight for the Bursum Bill in the House. “The Bursum Bill,” claimed Hernández,
“is the product of a good deal of thought given to this matter by the Indian Bureau and
also by the real friends of the Indians in both committees of the Senate and House on
Indian Affairs.” Once again engaging in a charitable reading of Spanish-colonial history,
Hernández argued that the Indians gave land “to our ancestors” “so that they would come
and live as neighbors.” Hernández ended his rambling letter to Montoya by taking a shot
at both the pro-Indian reformers for seeking “cheap notoriety through the Indian” and the
Pueblo Indian for taking “advantage of all this sympathy in his behalf, and that makes
him a bad neighbor.”539 Amado Chaves, the aged orator of the territorial era, former
mayor of Santa Fe, and noted land grant speculator, suggested that the federal
government withdraw Pueblo lands to,
place a colony of practical, progressive American farmers on the Pueblo lands . . .
and utilize income from the colonization scheme for the purposes of educating
and civilizing these filthy people. With all of the land left to them that they could
possibly use, the few remaining Indians could live in their Pueblo homes and
continue ancient rites and customs but would be transformed into a clean and
civilized community. . . . It is a well known fact that by intermarrying for untold
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generations, the Indians have degenerated and unless an infusion of new blood is
introduced, they will soon become an extinct race.540

That Chaves was arguing for interracial marriage is unlikely given his lineage and social
class. His remarks, along with those of Hernández, nonetheless demonstrate the attitudes
of Hispano elites, political patrones whose defense of Hispano land claims was
intertwined with pejorative views of Pueblo Indians, arrogant attitudes of race based on
the celebration of Spanish colonialism, and a belief that Pueblos and Hispanos had
always lived parallel but separate lives.541
Relying on patrones such as Hernández, Bursum asked him to aid in procuring
photographs demonstrating the extent of improvements on non-Indian claims on Pueblo
lands in and around Taos. Bursum explained: “Show up the orchards, the old cultivations
. . . and also show the Indian places nearby so as to show that they are all living in the
same neighborhood. . . . These Indian rights people are making considerable of a fight on
us and we must win out. It is nothing but common justice.”542 While organizing a
defense of his bill, Bursum was flooded with letters from land speculators and claimants
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on Pueblo tracts who believed his bills were too kind to Pueblos. Arthur R. Manby,
infamous for his speculation in and around Taos Pueblo, reprimanded Bursum for being
“too charitable to Indians.” He reminded Bursum that his duty was to protect his New
Mexico constituents, not federal wards. Manby also claimed that the Santo Domingo
memorial publicizing the Pueblo plight was “no plan of the Pueblos but of some white
schemers” and that it threatened to open up Pueblo lands to “unscrupulous white men or
women who would marry Pueblo Indians to attain Pueblo land.”543
E. D. Newman aimed his criticism of the bill at both Pueblo men and the proIndian women reformers. Newman’s fenced claim on Tesuque lands brought publicity to
the growing controversy when Tesuque Pueblo Indians cut his fence in protest. He told
Bursum that he was “against a commission per the ideas of our long haired men and short
haired women.”544 Finally, Alphonse Dockweiler, who owned claims on Tesuque Pueblo
but nonetheless would serve as an appraiser on Pueblo Lands Board cases in 1930 and
1931, criticized the time and money expended educating Pueblo Indians: “The money
that is being spent in educating Indians should be spent helping them in their pueblos.
You cannot make a professor out of an Indian, he should be brought up to farm life. . . .
This would bring money into the pueblos, which in turn would be spent in the counties
and thus would help everyone in the state.” Evidently, Dockweiler saw no connection

543

Manby to Bursum, October 4, 1922 and November 25, 1922, Folder 2, Box 12,
Bursum Papers, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, UNM,
Albuquerque.
544
Newman to Bursum, November 27, 1922, Folder 8, Box 8, Bursum Papers.
289

between the Pueblo Indians’s desperate situation and his own non-Indian claim to Pueblo
lands.545
As Bursum prepared to defend his bill in1923, Collier and the NMAIA grew
further apart. Collier had already turned to Sunset Magazine, famous for its muckraking
articles, to exercise his indignation at the federal land and Indian policies. Sunset editor
Walter Woehlke shared Collier’s progressive-reform-minded politics and disdain for
politicians. In a 1921 article, “The New Day in New Mexico: Race Prejudice and BossRule Are Yielding to Progress in this Ancient Commonwealth,” Woehlke wrote that New
Mexico politically “still lives in the age of Billy the Kid.” He commented that large
cattle rings were represented by Albert B. Fall, a framer of the State Constitution, senator,
and secretary of the interior. They received the bulk of the public domain in rentals or
sales, but then dodged taxes, “an art that has reached its highest development in this
state.”546
Woehlke disparaged the native population as well, describing New Mexico as a
“swarthy island in a star-spangled sea” and admonishing the “so-called ‘native’ or
‘Spanish-American’ population” for “clinging to language, customs, and traditions to the
despair of the Americanization movement.”547 He compared the condition of irrigation in
the upper and lower Río Grande Valley and credited the Elephant Butte Dam with
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modern thinking and the “infusion of new blood,” which the upper-basin users have
resisted. A dozen years later, Woehlke would oversee massive federal projects under
Collier, working to improve the lives of the “so-called natives” across the “swarthy
island” of northern New Mexico. While Woehlke welcomed Collier’s provocative
articles defending Pueblo livelihood, attacking the federal government, and painting New
Mexico as backwards, their inflammatory attacks on the political figures angered
congressmen whom Collier and Atwood would face at subsequent hearings.548
Collier’s defamatory rhetoric wore on the NMAIA leadership too. Collier’s
national connections and notoriety on the East Coast and in California may have inspired
some jealousy among the NMAIA. The NMAIA, however, was filled with renowned
artists, poets, and activists including Gerald and Ina Sizer Cassidy, and Witter Bynner
and Margaret McKittrick, the chairs of the Association. Envy, then, was unlikely the
prime motivator. Rather, from its leaders to its rank and file, the NMAIA advocated
gradualism, diplomatic, and negotiated change. Collier, on the other hand, was
considered by most to be a revolutionary extremist, often tactless in his tirades against the
local and national political establishment, and was almost dogmatic in his fight to reform
the Office of Indian Affairs. Though Richard Hanna continued correspondence with
many NMAIA members throughout the hearings of the Pueblo Lands Board, Collier
wrote only Witter Bynner in 1927 to castigate him for his defense of former governor
Herbert Hagerman.549 As Collier’s inflammatory and divisive tactics brought only
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retaliation from Congress and the Office of Indian Affairs, the NMAIA became as eager
as Collier to end their relationship.
Neither Collier nor the NMAIA planned to cease efforts to organize the Pueblos
against the Bursum Bill and, later, to ensure the Pueblo Lands Act was justly
administered. Despite their long interest and activity in Pueblo Indian affairs, Collier
distrusted the NMAIA’s attachment to local politics and power structures, a relationship
that he believed clouded its judgment and restrained its advocacy. His assessment of the
NMAIA was not totally unfounded. By the 1920s, Edgar L. Hewett, a NMAIA stalwart,
had founded the School for American Research and served as the first director of the
Museum of New Mexico, first president of the New Mexico Normal School and founded
the Anthropology Department at the University of New Mexico, all by maintaining a
close relationship with the New Mexico State Legislature. Hewett remained a close
colleague of Ralph E. Twitchell, with whom he had worked with on the prize-winning
New Mexico exhibit at the 1915 Panama-California Exposition. By 1924, Collier well
understood Twitchell’s role in composing the first Bursum Bill. He remained cordial
with the special attorney for the Pueblo Indians, but distrusted his influence on Pueblo
Affairs.550
The NMAIA, on the other hand, distrusted Collier’s detachment from local
affairs. It believed that saving the Pueblos could not happen at the expense of stability
throughout northern New Mexico. During a meeting on August 30, 1923, NMAIA
members disagreed with the feasibility of Collier’s promises and plans for the Pueblos.
Indian Rights Association stalwart Roberts Walker, who would later play a central role in
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the resolution of the Pueblo Lands question, lambasted Collier’s New York-based
American Indian Defense Association (AIDA) for failing to consult with the NMAIA
properly and encouraged the revision of the Lenroot Substitute as the most sensible
course of action. Attorney Francis C. Wilson was much more belligerent, claiming
collusion by select Indian leaders and Collier in “strong-arming” the All Indian Pueblo
Council into accepting his plan as the only logical and feasible choice. Wilson assured
the audience that his disagreements with Collier and Berle were “not a personal thing,”
but that “their program is not a practical one.” He added that AIDA was but one voice of
the “friends of the Indians” and its promises “we in our hearts believe to be impractical
and not feasible.”551
Santo Domingo Pueblo native Martin Herrera offered a defense of Collier,
assuring the audience that Collier’s influence was being tempered by native leadership.
He told the NMAIA crowd, “We have to push him,” and that the plan presented by
Collier was, in fact, an Indian plan. Ina Sizer Cassidy and Witter Bynner, meanwhile,
attempted to moderate Wilson’s bitterness toward Collier. Bynner still doubted that
Collier was presenting all the options to the Pueblos in pursuing a bill that would address
their dire situation. He finished, “If I had been an Indian at and had been at that meeting
and heard the case presented as it was presented I would have voted unanimously too.”552
Collier and the NMAIA continued to feud long after a resolution to the Pueblo
lands controversy was realized in 1924. In a School of American Research published
pamphlet The Present Condition of the Pueblo Indians, Hewett expressed his distaste for
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Collier and cast doubt on the reformer’s grim portrayal of the state of the Pueblos. By the
1920s, Hewett had long enjoyed a positive working relationship with BIA officials, who
sought his advice and used his own scholarship and that of his mentor, Adolph Bandelier,
to train BIA field agents stationed in northern New Mexico. Hewett cautioned that
Collier was instilling a victim mentality and venomous hostility toward outsiders in the
Pueblo mind: “Nothing is gained and much is lost by arousing in them the feeling of selfpity. No good has come from inspiring in them hatred and distrust of the government or
of their white neighbors.” 553 One of the principle architects of the “Spanish colonial
heritage” of New Mexico, Hewett upheld the notion that Hispanos were Pueblos’ “white
neighbors.” He denied Hispanos mixed blood and their shared history with the Pueblos.
Hewett claimed that Collier and AIDA were “charlatans and shysters” and their
work was “misleading” and an “exaggeration.”554 He explained the poverty present in
New Mexico Pueblos away as the norm across all villages in northern New Mexico:
The entire native population of New Mexico exists on a scale to us that seems
very meager, but it is above the level of actual suffering and illustrates the fact
that happiness does not depend entirely upon material affluence. They, like the
Pueblos, are normally a happy and contented people. Moreover the Indians and
native New Mexicans have usually lived side by side on most friendly terms.
This fact is in part accountable for the gradual penetration of the Pueblo grants by
their white neighbors. This has led to some antagonism in recent years largely
worked up by agitators from the outside.555
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Discussing the pending legislative action regarding Pueblo title, Hewett believed
the Pueblos had enjoyed the support of the Office of Indian Affairs and that AIDA was
profiting from the Pueblo cause. He reasoned: “Scanning the list of lawyers who have
held the office of attorney for the Pueblos under the United States government one knows
that the Indians have not been without capable and attentive legal service, nor are they
now. Appeals for money to bring in more lawyers should be ignored by those who have
the interest of the Pueblos at heart.”556 In response, Collier and Elkus criticized Hewett
for discouraging Pueblo use of lawyers provided by the GFWC and AIDA. Hewett’s
advice would leave the Pueblos to trust the federal government to represent their case
against the federal government. Hiring their own legal representation with the aid of
advocate groups only defended their own interest. Curiously, though Collier criticized
Hewett’s harmful advice, he had proved just as disingenuous only two years earlier.
Amid the battle for compromise bills, he cast doubt in the interests of lawyers like Alois
Renehan and urged settlers to enter into the claims process without lawyers for their and
the Pueblos’s mutual benefit. Now, he decried the same strategy as criminal.557
Collier also attacked Francis C. Wilson, the lawyer retained by NMAIA and
GFWC to advise their organization on Pueblo issues. To the chagrin of Secretary Fall,
Wilson worked with Commissioer Charles Burke to craft a compromise that incorporated
parts of the Bursum and Jones-Leatherwood bills. The so-called Lenroot Substitute bore
the name of Wisconsin senator Irvine Lenroot, who created a special committee that
included New Mexico senators A. A. Jones and Holm Bursum. The bill emerged from
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lengthy Senate Committee on Public Lands Hearings on Pueblo lands with Wilson
commenting on and revising the final draft. It called for a three-man commission to
investigate the validity of non-Indian claims and recommend compensation awards to
annulled claims. Claimants were divided into those with “color of title” who possessed
their claim for twenty years and claimants who claimed ownership by possession for
thirty years without “color of title.”558
Collier immediately accused Wilson of caving into the Interior Department.
Wilson’s influence on the bill seemed obvious, though the presence of Senators Bursum
and Jones in its drafting was what annoyed Collier most. Described by his biographer as
a “gifted polemicist,” Collier wrote off all dissenters from his program as misguided and
corrupt. Collier’s zealous approach alienated NMAIA leaders, who took an increasingly
moderate position in part to distance themselves from Collier. While he professed a
moderate position, mindful of non-Indian property and the preservation of Hispano
towns, he simultaneously distanced himself from the NMAIA’s moderation. Collier’s
attack on Wilson continued through the spring of 1923, eventually firing the attorney
from the GWFC payroll after a heated exchange of correspondence in April. The
NMAIA sided with Wilson, however, retaining him as an expert in Pueblo legal affairs
and rebuking Collier, the “newcomer” to the Pueblo scene.559
In the midst of fighting with the NMAIA, and soon after the February House
hearings, Collier published an article in the Taos Valley News that urged settler support
for Jones-Leatherwood legislation. According to Collier, lawyers who sought to
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represent non-Indian claimants were their real enemies. These lawyers were motivated
only by greed and would use the Pueblo lands controversy to revive old land grant claims
that would call into question all land claims in the valley.560 Collier’s contention could
easily be substantiated: Alois Renehan was both the leading settler attorney and an
infamous land speculator. As an attorney, Renehan represented Española Valley
merchant Frank Bond and Tesuque claimant Alphonse Dockweiler; he also had interests
in multiple Tewa Basin grants including the Juan José Lobato, Polvadera, Caja del Río,
and Las Trampas grants, and, along with attorneys Thomas B. Catron and G. H. Howard,
was sued by Lobato heirs for extortion. Renehan himself confided to Senator Bursum
that portions of his bill authored by Charles Catron seemed to renew litigation on already
adjudicated claims.561 Collier easily cast doubt on the Renehan’s motivations; the same
doubt could just as easily have been leveled at his recently fired legal counsel, Francis C.
Wilson, who speculated in the lands of Pojoaque and Nambe Pueblos, the Polvadera
Grant, and in the estate of land speculator Napoleon B. Laughlin. All of these properties
lay in the Tewa Basin. Raising suspicion about the entire legal profession of New
Mexico was an easy rhetorical exercise, no challenge to the well-practiced Collier.
Collier assured readers that the AIPC and GFWC plan, embodied in the JonesLeatherwood Bill, would clear all bona fide titles without expensive litigation and would
provide an economic boon for all people of Taos Valley through irrigation works “for
many thousands of acres of non-Indian land as well as Indian land.” At the same time that
he deceptively advised non-Indian settlers to seek a resolution without attorneys, Collier
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worked to include in pro-Pueblo legislation measures that would allow Indians to dispute
findings and take non-Indian claimants to court. Under this scenario, Hispano and other
settlers would again be in court while facing a phalanx of Pueblo lawyers both appointed
by the federal government and provided gratis by advocacy groups like AIDA and
NMAIA.562 Despite Collier’s assurances, settlers formed committees, held meetings, and
turned to the very land speculators who mere decades earlier had wrangled lands from the
possession of their own families and communities.
To replace Wilson, Collier hired wunderkind Harvard Law School-graduate A. A.
Berle. During the summer of 1923, he formulated a bold plan that called for the
wholesale eviction of non-Indian settlers from Pueblo lands. In late 1923, amid the
debate on the substitute bills, Berle and Collier issued an AIDA pamphlet, In the Matter
of the New Mexico Pueblo Lands: White Claims upon Lands Granted to the Pueblos.
The pamphlet attacked the Lenroot Substitute Bill, as a “prejudicial foreclosure” of
Pueblo lands, and plotted a course of action that Collier would follow for years during the
operations of the Pueblo Lands Board. Berle spent about six weeks the 1923 summer
visiting almost every Pueblo and making a broad investigation of claims. 563
In his pamphlet, Berle broke all claims to Pueblo Indian land into three groups.
The first group, whose claims were undeniable and legitimate, would amount to less than
ten percent of all claims. The last group, whose claims were recent or blatantly
fraudulent, were an estimated fifteen percent. The remainder, some seventy-five percent,
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would constitute the second group of claimants who, AIDA believed, deserved
compensation but whose claims would invariably return to the Pueblos. These wild
estimations, based on AIDA theories, only infuriated federal and state officials. In
AIDA’s interpretation, US v. Sandoval had rewritten all tribal law dealing with the
Pueblos and rendered all portions of previous legal decisions and policies null and void.
Five plus years of Pueblo Lands Board activities, complemented by a district court
friendly to non-Indian claims, rejected Berle’s simple division and ostensibly worked to
achieve equity where Collier and Berle sought what, they believed, was justice for the
Pueblos.564
After his break with the NMAIA, Collier founded the American Indian Defense
Association (AIDA) in 1923 to fight both the Bursum Bill and the Leavitt Bill, also
known as the “dance order,” which sought to harshly crack down on ritual native dances
that conservative interests in Indian affairs considered savage and indecent.565 Serving as
AIDA’s executive secretary, he located its offices in New York. Collier believed the
NMAIA was too conservative in its policies and the Indian Rights Association
intrinsically too corrupt in its work with the U.S. Indian Affairs Department. Presenting
their plan at the August 25, 1923, meeting of the AIPC, Collier and Berle received Pueblo
support and aided the Indians in drawing up a resolution, which they quickly publicized.
Although the resolution blamed the federal government for the Pueblo land situation and
stated that it should pay restitution to all injured parties, the Pueblos nonetheless
proposed the eviction of all settlers because all claims, save townsites, churches and
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cemeteries, were illegal and lacked legitimate title. This extreme position drew the ire of
settlers and their allies.566
The NMAIA worked to build support for the Lenroot Substitute. To counteract
Collier’s and Berle’s pamphlet, it issued its own study titled The Pueblo Land Problem.
Authored by Francis C. Wilson, the pamphlet analyzed the Lenroot Substitute, which
Wilson influenced and claimed that he authored. He took a markedly different approach
from Berle’s attack. Advocating moral responsibility, safeguards for both Pueblos and
non-Indian claimants, and the need for a commission, the NMAIA affirmed its desire to
preserve Pueblo communities, but sought equity for both claimants and Pueblo Indians.567
While Collier and the NMAIA battled to exert and maintain their influence over the
Pueblos, E. Dana Johnson, the Santa Fe New Mexican editor and later NMAIA leader,
offered a voice of reason. In a note preceding the New Mexican’s publication of Collier’s
attack on the Lenroot Bill, Johnson remarked that he agreed to print Collier’s opinions
but “refused to vilify” the non-Indian settlers, whose “acting in good faith under previous
decisions can hardly be denied.” “On the whole we believe that both Collier and his
opponents are exaggerating the difference which separates them,” Johnson continued.
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“The Pueblo Indians form a unique asset of this state and nation. The real danger to their
continued existence lies in misguided controversies among their friends.”568
Collier’s growing influence with Pueblo leaders troubled and even offended New
Mexico Indian advocates. Nina Otero-Warren, who secured employment as a federal
Indian inspector, kept a close eye on Collier’s communications with Pueblo leaders.
Affronted by her antagonistic manner, many Pueblos confided that they would “never say
a word to that greaser!”569 Tesuque Pueblo leader Martín Vigil, who was of mixed
Hispano-Pueblo parentage, distrusted Otero-Warren. He told the NMAIA that she argued
that “the Mexicans must be friends with us” and cautioned Pueblo leaders from meeting
with Collier.570 NMAIA leaders had their own doubts about her intentions. The NMAIA
seemed of divided mind on the August 30 AIPC resolution that supported the CollierBerle plan. The association professed a conciliatory stance but criticized Collier for
purporting to “speak for the friends of the Indians.” Witter Bynner, an association chair,
commented that the August 23 resolution was “presented to the Indians by Mr. Collier
and Mr. Berle and not by the Indians to Mr. Berle and Mr. Collier.” Wilson dismantled
the resolution, pointing out the “Collieresque” statements. He doubted that the Pueblos
would have adopted the resolution’s “all or nothing” approach without the influence of
Collier. While the NMAIA leaders fought to maintain the good reputation of their
organization in the press and their influence with Pueblo leaders, they ignored the voice
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of the lone Pueblo Indian attending their meeting. Santo Domingo native Martin Herrera
bluntly stated, “John Collier is doing what the Indians want, and he is going to do it.”571
NMAIA representatives and their associates attempted to mitigate the impact and
influence of John Collier. Father Fridolin Schuster, a Franciscan priest stationed at
Laguna, had initially welcomed Collier, calling him a “wonderful man, very clever
thorough and a good organizer,” and commended the GFWC for hiring such a
“competent man.” A year later, Shuster considered Collier “a nut and a radical man.”572
Representing the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions, Shuster discouraged Acoma and
Laguna leaders from sending representatives to AIPC meetings called or attended by
Collier. He wrote James Miller, governor of Acoma, that “Collier is losing out more and
more every day” and that he should caution “your people not to go to the meeting.”
Collier had no power to get what he promised, only authority to sign “all kinds of
resolutions” in which nothing good is accomplished. “So on one side,” Schuster closed,
“are the Government and the real friends of the Indians, strong and powerful friends; on
the other side John Collier is alone.”573 Writing to Laguna governor Paul Johnson,
Schuster stated:
I will have nothing to do with John Collier. He is only an agitator and will only
hurt the Indian cause. Collier has not played square with the Pueblo Indians. I
will have nothing to do with Collier and my advice to the Laguna People is to stay
away from Collier as you have in the past. If Laguna would now join in with
571
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Collier and attend his meetings, it would be the greatest victory for Collier and he
would gain absolute and full control of all the Pueblos. After that he might agitate
and stir more and get the poor Pueblos into even more trouble.574
Schuster was temporarily successful: Laguna sent representatives to AIPC meetings that
Collier called, but they acted as observers and refused to vote.575
Collier’s influence nonetheless eclipsed the NMAIA. He offered something past
Pueblo advocates had not: an unrelenting and uncompromising policy toward non-Indian
claims on Pueblo lands. Like other Indian advocates, Collier saw in Indian Pueblo
culture something irreplaceable and inherently threatened by outside influence. He
departed from much of the paternalism that had framed federal Indian administration in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, one informed by Christian morality and
emphasizing assimilation. However, political maneuvering in the 1920s and
administration of Indian affairs in the 1930s still expressed the paternalism characteristic
of the Progressive Era reform.576
At the same time that Collier and other Pueblo advocates skirmished over their
defense of Pueblo lands, a discourse as clumsy as it was fascinating took place in public
speeches, private correspondence, newspapers and magazines. In testimony before the
Senate Committee on Public Lands, Twitchell, who had authored significant portions of
the original Bursum Bill and an influential report on non-Indian claims on Pueblo Lands,
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portrayed Hispano villages and Indian Pueblos as historically mutually dependent. In the
process, he contrasted their civilization with the “indios barbaros.” “Had it not been for
the cooperation on the part of these two races of people,” stated Twtichell, “in all
probability we would not be here today bothered with this question at all. They [the
Pueblos] would have disappeared.”577
Renehan, the outspoken attorney for the settlers, tried to counteract Collier’s
national publicity campaign. In a confusing, hour-long rant at the annual meeting of the
League of the Southwest, Renehan recounted centuries of Indian land policies applied by
Spain, Mexico and the United States. Renehan believed that contrary to Pueblo
advocates’ claims, sovereigns had sufficiently protected Pueblo land tenure. He drew
largely from past Congressional testimony and statements he made in the Sandoval case.
Renehan claimed that Pueblo-Hispano relations were peaceful but the two groups were
distinct and their bloodlines did not mix. Renehan claimed he represented “twelve
thousand people . . . in whose veins flows the blood of every important European race.”
He denounced “the spirit and methods of those [Pueblo Indians and their advocates] who
would arouse the ward against the guardian[,] inculcating into their primitive minds the
idea that the guardian is faithless to the trust and instilling the poisonous brew that the
United States is a felonious fiduciary.” Once again championing his clients’ Spanishcolonial past, Renehan declared, “Our people are not ‘squatters,’ but ancient pioneers,
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who have made the desert to blossom as the rose, who bared their breasts to the savage
foe with courage and determination.”578
Renehan was a confident orator. He “dazzled” his Santa Barbara, California,
audience with legal deeds, some as old as 1725, proof that Indians willingly sold land to
their Spanish neighbors. “At the risk of being tedious,” Renehan translated deeds
recorded in1837, wherein Bartolo and Dolores Martín of San Ildefonso Pueblo sold their
land to Manuel Roybal in front of alcalde Victor García; another recorded in 1713, in
which don Julian Quintana wrote of Felix Ruibal of Zia who sold his land to Gaspar
Martin for two-hundred and five reales; finally a third, from 1788, in which alcalde
mayor Manuel García de la Mora reported that Juan José Castellano, governor of San
Juan Pueblo, traded land to Antonio Beita, an Indian of the town of San Rafael.579
Renehan showed plats of the Town of Jacona Grant and the Town of Bernalillo
Grant, intruding on the lands of Tesuque Pueblo and Sandia Pueblo, respectively. The
issues of the Jacona Grant, argued Renehan, should have been cleared up by Court of
Private Land Claims, which restricted the size of the grant and confirmed its boundaries
outside conflicts with surrounding Pueblos. Bernalillo stood on the site sold by Sandia
Pueblo to twenty-three families in 1769, “evidence that the Indians possessed the power
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of alienation.”580 Renehan took parting shots at the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in U.S.
v. Sandoval and the reformers it roused and inspired. He declared, “And because we
have had confidence in the Supreme Court of the United States and attributed an irrestible
(sic) force to its opinions, our people are now trumpeted as robbers, land-looters, and
marauders . . . by men and women . . . seeking to constitute themselves a supergovernment, without possession of the instructed intelligence necessary to deal
effectively, justly, honorably and equitably with a problem so diversified and
complicated”581
If Renehan’s goal was portraying the Pueblo land situation as “diverse and
complicated,” he was likely successful. In his own complicated, even convoluted speech,
he cited colonial texts ad nauseum, littering his speech with two-thousand, even threethousand word quotations. He randomly strolled through Spanish medieval and colonial
law, and then sampled territorial statutes and correspondence by Mexican diplomats. By
the time Renehan delivered “The Pueblo Indians and their Land Grants,” he had a small
but stable politcal machine behind him. Led by Frank R. Frankenburger and W. D.
Chiles, the Española Chamber of Commerce endorsed Renehan’s legal analysis in a
resolution that exhorted all other municipal chambers of commerce to do the same. “We
condemn,” stated the resolution, “the abuse and attempted degradation of our people
living upon Pueblo Indian grants as trespassers, illegal intruders, and wrongdoers, as
resulting from a spirit of fight and contention for the sake of fight and contention.”582
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The Española Chamber formed the so-called “Settler’s Committee,” a selfappointed group of defenders of the good name of nuevomexicanos. The Committee
funded the publication of Renehan’s speech and attempted to distribute it widely to
counteract Collier’s successful publicity against the Bursum and Lenroot bills. To the
eighty-page pamphlet, the committee attached a statement by the NMAIA as evidence
that it had accepted the Lenroot Substitute and acknowledged its interest in “protecting
the rights and equities of Indians and non-Indians alike.” Renehan’s paper also included a
statement by Francis C. Wilson defending the Lenroot Bill and explaining the defeat of
the Collier-endorsed Jones-Leatherwood Bill. The pamphlets final piece was a
September 1923 letter from Collier to the AIPC in which he accused the NMAIA and
Francis C. Wilson of abandoning the defense of Pueblo property rights, signaling a
schism between “super-radicals” and “intelligent and equitable conservatives” among
Pueblo Indian advocates.583
By 1923, Wilson had spent over a dozen years in New Mexico, speculating in
land grants and serving as special attorney for the Pueblo Indians. Described by a
biographer as a “vibrant and rather imperious man,” Wilson struggled to keep up with his
comparably extravagant tastes in a Santa Fe isolated from luxury goods he had grown
accustomed to in his native Boston.584 Wilson’s testimony in the Lenroot Bill hearings
demonstrated an interpretation of Pueblo and Hispano people remarkably similar to that
of Indian advocates, both those in the NMAIA and in the Collier-controlled AIDA.
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Describing the expropriation of Sandia Pueblo lands by Hispanos, Wilson characterized
them as “encroachers” and referred to Hispanos as “Mr. Mexican.” Yet when Senator
Bursum asserted that Hispanos were committing fraud in claiming lands under the Joy
survey, Wilson defended them: “It is human nature. I am not saying it is going to be
peculiar to the native people, the Spanish-Americans. I guess some of the Americans
have been just as bad and worse. This Hobert (sic) Case is the worst case I know of, and
that was American. The difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the Spanish-American
is that when the Anglo-Saxon goes in he grabs the whole business, while the SpanishAmerican just takes a little bite here and there."585
Pueblo advocates undoubtedly disagreed with Renehan’s interpretation and
rhetoric, but they thought in similar ways about race and ethnicity in New Mexico.
Collier was no primordialist who placed Pueblo peoples on a continuum ranging between
the sacred and the profane, but he still created and defended neat, simple divisions
between peoples, the “red” and the “brown,” the “pure” and the “mixed,” to sell his story
of Pueblo lands and Pueblos rights to advance his and their agendas. His spats with
Pueblo leaders reluctant to follow him in the fight against the Bursum Bill revealed how
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easily and willingly he would define “true” all things Pueblo, its peoples, culture and
leaders.
Historian Margaret Jacobs points out that the essentialist views of racial
difference held by Mabel Dodge Luhan and Mary Austin relied on blood quantum to
identify those who were “truly Indian.” “Luhan believed,” writes Jacobs, “that Indian
culture would evaporate if Indians intermarried with other races.” Writing to Collier in
1933, Luhan admitted that “although I married an Indian . . . I do not believe in it for
others. I cannot bring myself to change from my previous hope that the Indian culture
may be saved as it cannot be if he becomes absorbed into the Mexican or the white
races.” In Luhan’s thinking, blood, not culture and history, made the Indian an Indian.
According to Jacobs, Luhan believed that, “Indians could lose their essential
primitiveness through racial intermarriage.” Thus, Mexican Americans, a “racial
mixture” of Spanish and Indian, seemed to antimodern feminists less primitive (and less
interesting) than Pueblo Indians.”586
Confronting racial mixing, the reality among many New Mexico Pueblos, would
have complicated the activism of white advocates on behalf of Indians; so reformers
embraced the Hispano-Pueblo or brown-red dichotomy. If Pueblo society was sacred,
then the Mexican society surrounding Pueblos was profane. Since Governor Calhoun
and the territorial era, Pueblo advocates played up Pueblo civilization to justify their
protection. In doing so, they also emphasized “Mexican” barbarity, almost as a corollary,
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as though in the great play of the American West, someone always had to play the
savage. This dichotomy simplified their politics and their mission.587
Luhan was arguably a primordialist. In her mind, her relationship with a Pueblo
man, Tony Luján, was improper and inadvisable for other Americans seeking to preserve
the Pueblo peoples. Her self-evaluation was arguably a superficial, conceited inner
monologue that assuaged herself of the guilt of soiling this perfect culture with her own
imperfections, but Luhan nonetheless reflected on her own impact on the Pueblo world,
something that Collier rarely did.588
Elsie Clews Parsons, the prolific sociologist who studied Pueblo society in
Laguna, Zuni and Isleta, was less reserved than Luhan or Austin in her defense of the
Pueblos. In January of 1923, Parsons chastised Senator Bursum for preying on Indian
land:
You treat the Indians as the equal of aggressive Americans or Mexicans in
protecting their rights under the law. Those who have studied and lived with the
Indians know that such is not the case. The old Indians do not speak our
language, they do not know our customs, a gulf separates them from the white
man, they are poor, they cannot spend money to hire the best lawyers and
aggressively assert their rights, they dislike intrusion and they are[,] therefore,

587

Ibid.
Mabel Dodge Luhan, Edge of Taos Desert: An Escape to Reality (1937; reprint, with
an introduction by Lois Palken Rudnick and a foreword bu John Collier, Jr.,
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987), 78-87. Her assessment of the
Hispano population, which she superficially differentiates as either “Spanish” or
“Mexican,” includes their contemporary resentment of Anglos for their preference for
Pueblo peoples, whom, she believe, they deceived into leading the Taos Rebellion against
Governor Bent decades earlier.
310
588

comparatively easy subjects for aggression. This bill legitimizes the
aggression.589
Parsons’s primordialist idea of Indians’s passive nature surely underestimated their
ability to defend their own claims, a power best demonstrated by the activities of the
AIPC. Her indignation at “aggressive Mexicans” invading the Pueblo league did not stop
her from violating Pueblo lands herself. She, along with Santa Clara Day School teacher
Clara True, was a co-claimant to lands within the Santa Clara and San Ildefonso Pueblo
leagues. Perhaps her land claim was a testament to the ubiquity of private claims on
Pueblo lands.590 It could also be reasoned that the mixed-race parentage common among
Santa Clara and San Ildefonso Indians and most of the six Tewa Pueblos omitted them
from the “pure Pueblos” that Parsons devoted much of her life studying.591
Parsons’s antipodal reading of New Mexico’s social landscape was far from
uncommon. University of Pennsylvania anthropologist Frank Speck disdained the
“thoroughly deculturated Indians who lose their pride enough to mingle and marry with
their social inferiors” and “lowered themselves socially to the status of our heterogenous
dark skinned masses.”592 Whether espoused by advocates, bureaucrats, or academics, the
racial politics of this era highlighted and amplified difference, seeking to illustrate the
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distinctions between the “naturally passive” Pueblos and their inherently aggressive
Mexican counterparts, once again, between sacred peoples and profane peoples.
Parsons’s onetime friend and co-claimant Clara True professed her impartiality in
the Pueblo lands issue, though she remained close friends with Renehan and welcomed
the rift between Collier and the NMAIA. True compared the poverty of “settlers” with
that of “poorest peasants of the old world.” She claimed that she no longer had “any
property interest inside any Indian grant,” but professed that she had not “lost my human
interest in the subject.” Although an ideological gulf separated advocates for settlers and
Pueblo Indians, their portrayals and analysis of Pueblo Indians and nuevomexicanos was
startlingly similar. True warned Senator Bursum that “someday a rabid Penitente outfit
will wipe a few Indian villages off the map of New Mexico unless something is done.”593
GWFC Indian Committee chair Stella Atwood shared True’s suspicion of New Mexico’s
native populations. In September 1921, Atwood had confided to Indian Commissioner
Charles Burke that “Indians are a primitive people. If you work with them and go over
the wrongs with them (and they have plenty of them) their passions are aroused, and like
all primitive men they get violent and unruly, they brood over their troubles and get
morose until they are ready for almost any deed of violence.”594
As Commissioner of Indian affairs, Charles Burke endured a barrage of criticism
in congressional hearings and in the popular press. His antedated policies, including a
crackdown on Indian religious practices, drew the ire of liberal and moderate advocacy
groups. Burke issued a statement defending the Indian Bureau’s work among Pueblo
Indians and admonishing the Pueblos for playing to the public and claiming the federal
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government offered no support. When comparing expenditures on Pueblos to national
averages for other Indian Affairs reservations, Burke felt vindicated by what he viewed as
the government’s protection of Pueblos. However, his statements demonstrated a feeble
response to the impoverished state of Indian Country across the United States.595
Although the NMAIA appeared moderate on Pueblo land reform policy,
especially in comparison to Collier and AIDA, it nonetheless presented the Pueblo land
situation in typical Indiophilic fashion, celebrating the pure Indian and denigrating the
mixed-blood Mexican. A particularly antagonistic article in World Work magazine
published in Garden City, New York, featured this portrayal of contentious Pueblos and
Hispanos. Photographs of Taos Pueblo and age-worn adobe houses compared the
dwellings of Pueblo Indians and nuevomexicanos as proof of Pueblo Indians’s advanced
civilization. The piece labelled the unassuming adobe homes of the non-Indians the
“Mexican Huts in New Mexico,” and implored readers to “compare these hovels with the
pretentious dwelling of the Pueblo Indian.” Under the photograph of Taos Pueblo read
“the Pueblo Indians represent a high grade of Indian civilization and culture – how much
higher than Mexicans is evident by the picture of the huts in which the Mexicans live.”596
In defending Pueblo rights, advocates once again drew a solid line, an unbreachable
divide, between Pueblo and Mexican culture, history, and society, idealizing the beauty
and purity of the archetypal Taos Pueblo to denigrate the mixed-blood Mexican. They
also provided welcome fodder that Renehan widely distribute to bring non-Indian Pueblo
property owners into the Bursum debate.
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While settlers and Indian advocates fought to capture the passions and sympathies
of the public, the debate over the Bursum Bill was coming to an end. Neither the
moderate and NMAIA supported Lenroot Substitution Bill nor the Collier/AIDA crafted
Jones-Leatherwood Bill emerged from committee. Angered by Collier’s disruptive,
muckraking and mudslinging ways, Congress offered what was perhaps a painful rebuke
of Collier: it allowed Senator Bursum to sponsor the compromise bill, Senate Bill 2932,
which would ultimately decide the fate of Pueblo lands. An illness kept Collier from
playing a large role in crafting a bill that would meet the demands of all interested
advocates. AIDA counsel Berle made certain that the application of territorial statutes of
limitation, requested by NMAIA attorney Wilson, were tempered with sections that
required settlers to demonstrate continuous payment of taxes since January 6, 1902, or
ten years before statehood, if their claim was based on adverse possession with valid title.
Claims supported only by adverse possession without color of title were given the date of
March 16, 1889, the first day the phrase “color of title” was mentioned in the territorial
legislature.597
Berle and Collier were confident that few claimants could prove such tax payment
and that Pueblos would get lands back. To be sure, Berle also added clauses that
allowed the Pueblos to file so-called independent suits where they disagreed with the
commission’s findings, ensuring that the bulk of territorial statutes of limitation
benefitting non-Indians were invalidated. Content that it had defended Pueblo lands,
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AIDA ceased its objections and the Pueblo Lands Act was unceremoniously signed into
law on June 6, 1924.598
The Pueblo Lands Act of 1924 almost immediately proved controversial. Despite
years of contentious public and political debate, the Act’s deficiencies immediately
hobbled its effectiveness. Chapter 8 discusses the actions of the Pueblo Lands Board, a
quasi-judicial, three-man commission that would ultimately decide the fate of thousands
of private claims to Pueblo lands. Both John Collier and Alois B. Renehan would
continue to play significant roles in the proceedings of the Board. Renehan represented
dozens of claimants in the Tewa Basin, especially at San Ildefonso, Nambé, and Tesuque
Pueblos. Collier, meanwhile, would strengthen his American Indian Defense
Association, and would take the Pueblo plight even further onto the national stage, where
he would advocate for the national reform of Indian affairs.
Both Collier and Renehan fought to shape how the Board interpreted the act.
Board members, meanwhile, worked to understand how Indian pueblos lost their land to
surrounding villages. Land losses continued in the first decades of the twentieth century.
When they spoke with Pueblo and Hispano villagers, and examined tax records and
archives, a story dissimilar to the sensational depiction of Pueblo affairs that dominated
the five year fight for legislation emerged. Observers recognized that Hispanos, too, had
suffered great injustice when they lost their lands in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. A more complicated narrative, depicting the traditional, social, and
economic relationship between Pueblos and Hispanos became coherent. Chapter 7
discusses this complicated story, concealed during the Pueblo lands controversy, but
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nonetheless informed by the decisions of lawmakers and jurists who upheld the legality if
Hispano land tenure on Pueblo lands.
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Chapter 7: The Analogous Careers of Pueblo and Hispano Land Tenure in
the Late Territorial and Early Statehood Era, 1900-1920
For all the passion that the Pueblo lands controversy provoked, the year 1924
ended uneventfully. An illness stopped John Collier from participating in the final
debates over the compromise bill known as the Pueblo Lands Act. Its passage remained
one of the top stories locally, but barely touched the national headlines. How the act
would be implemented was uncertain, to everyone including the members of the Pueblo
Lands Boards, which would hold hearings on claims and recommend titles and awards to
the federal district court. For five years, a dark cloud hung over the title of hundreds of
claimants to Pueblo lands, regardless of the nature of their claim.
When Special Pueblo Attorney Richard Hanna filed ejectment suits in 1919, the
federal government cast a pall over the entire small-tract land market of northern New
Mexico. But attorneys and politicians from Albert B. Fall to Holm Bursum, and from
Frank Clancy to Alois B. Renehan, assured their constituents and clients that their claims
would be protected. Title records and abstracts show that only a year later in 1920,
Indian Pueblos and Hispano villages across the Tewa Basin continued to engage in their
commercial affairs, exchanging, selling, and stealing land on a market apparently
untouched by the controversies over Bursum Bill.
At the time, the land market in northern New Mexico was experiencing a
significant downturn. Land barons like Frank Bond and his brother George were
marketing numerous tracts of land to which they were unable to attract investment or
develop with their own assets. Charles C. Catron was left with the land-rich estate of his
father, Thomas B. Catron, who died in 1921, unwilling to relinquish an empire that was
too large for even New Mexico’s greatest land speculator to manage. Lawyers,
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merchants, and entrepreneurs were saddled with the products of their unbridled greed.
Many of their properties sat on an unresponsive market for five, sometimes even ten
years, before they sold for a minimal profit, or even at a loss.
The small-tract land market of northern New Mexico was equally fragile, and
competing interests were remarkably speculative. Seemingly gone were the exciting days
of land grant adjudication, when tens of thousands of acres were wildly exchanged on a
tumultuous market. Instead, speculation became more targeted, focusing on tracts of land
typically smaller than twenty acres that sold to a buyer who was conscious of the tract’s
possibilities and limitations and who often wanted only a place for recreation, not
investment. Pueblo lands and suertes, the small privately-owned tracts of community
land grants, drew the interests of an onslaught of newcomers, emigrants from Europe and
Anglos from the East, artists and entrepreneurs, seeking a piece of New Mexico’s
mystique. As the Pueblo population spiraled downward, the still surging Hispano
population turned to Pueblo lands or the migratory wage trail for economic relief.
Just as the Pueblo lands controversy was reaching its apparent resolution in
1924, Hispano land grants entered a new phase of speculation. Confirmed community
grants, such as the Las Trampas Grant, were partitioned. Private grants recommended for
confirmation by the Surveyor General’s Office, such as the Juan de Gabaldón Grant, fell
to speculators while awaiting congressional action. Quasi-community grants, which over
the centuries had transformed from private grants awarded to well-connected individuals,
to community-used and managed grants, often with ejido lands, were reduced to smallholding claims and sold to timber speculators seeking to get rich quickly by providing
ties to the booming railroads. Still, the heady days of market manipulation by land
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speculators like Thomas B. Catron, Edward L. Bartlett, Eugene A. Fiske, and Alois B.
Renehan seemed numbered as investors and profits failed to materialize. Hispanos often
maintained their traditional use of these lands, disregarding the title of absentee owners
who had no connection to their communities and their needs.
This chapter explores this new era of speculation in both Hispano and Pueblo land
grant lands from 1900 to 1920. As I argue throughout this dissertation, the land tenure
experiences of Pueblos and Hispanos were remarkably similar when examined over the
centuries. Hispanos had largely lost their lands decades before the Pueblo lands
controversy and turned to the native Pueblos ill-prepared to defend themselves from the
booming Hispano population in search of relief from land displacement. By the 1920s,
the market for Pueblo lands was so normalized that federal officials expressed frustration
with Pueblo and Hispano practices that made Pueblo lands vulnerable to trespass,
squatting, and alienation. These practices, including the lease, purchase and seizure of
Pueblo lands, had begun centuries before American sovereignty, and the reeducation of
Pueblos and Hispanos to the nature of Pueblo land tenure was a slow and frustrating
process.
~~~
The improvement of Indian Pueblos had been a well-documented subject in the
wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1876 U.S. v. Joseph decision. Congress created
contingencies, including special acts funding Indian agents, farmers, and boarding and
day schools to deal with the Pueblo’s situation, but the condition only worsened. The
Pueblo population declined and encroachment in their their vacant lands proceeded.
Reports from the Board of Indian Commissioners and the Indian Rights Association,
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discussed in chapter 4, described the frustrations of Indian agents, who could do little to
slow the movement of squatters, whose actions were protected by territorial courts
controlled by their land-speculating peers.
Many Pueblos chose to lease land to non-Indians. Though these informal
agreements brought income to desperately cash-poor Pueblos, they also increased interest
and speculation in Pueblo lands and leases, which were often subleased to other grazers
who had no agreement with the Pueblos.599 Despite the U.S. v. Sandoval decision in 1913
and the Hanna ejectment suits in 1919, the 1920s seemed a time when the deplorable
conditions might cause the extinction of more than one native Pueblo.
The 1920s were also a somber and sobering time for land grants across the Tewa
Basin. Grants that were confirmed by the Office of the Surveyor General and the Court
of Private Land Claims largely received their patents from the federal government
between 1899 and 1909.600 Through 1904, speculators like Thomas B. Catron, his son
Charles Catron, George Hill Howard, Amado Chávez, Alois Renehan, Napoleon B.
Laughlin, and Edward L. Bartlett redoubled their efforts, both submitting claims to the
Court of Private Land Claims and pursuing confirmed claims (patented land grants and
those approved by Congress and awaiting federal patent), assuming a controlling interest
in numerous grants and predictably partitioning these grants once they had control.
The rapid pace of speculation slowed in the decade after statehood in 1912. The
market for former land grant lands stiffened when speculators such as the Catrons,
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Renehan and Bartlett, and merchants such as Frank Bond met the consequences of
overextending their often meager liquid assets to build paper empires. Across the Tewa
Basin, Hispanos and Pueblos transitioned from a subsistence to a cash economy
dominated by merchants like the Scottish emigrant Frank Bond and Prussian emigrant
Samuel Eldodt, whose Chamita mercantile sat squarely in the middle of the San Juan
Pueblo’s Grant. Partido contracts and land leases ensured that merchants and lawyers
held everyone, including one another, in debt. The only relieve from the transitional debt
economy for Hispanos was the migratory labor trail that at least allowed them to remain
in their home villages for part of the year. They planted small gardens and grazed few
animals on reduced and overused parcels. Poverty was rampant and prosperity was rare
among both Pueblos and Hispanos in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.601
Combined with tax delinquencies, the creation and expansion of U.S. National
Forests in the first two decades of the twentieth century exacerbated the dismal situation
in land grant communities. Already dependent on migratory labor to bring money into
their cash-poor economies, Hispano and Indian Pueblo villagers increasingly lost access
to the land they traditionally used to maintain their meager but stable livelihoods.602 The
expansion of the railroad, mining and agricultural industries from the 1880s to the 1920s
brought badly needed cash into local economies and drew people from overpopulated
villages already overusing dwindling resources.
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Droughts in the late 1920s and the stock market crash in 1929, however,
destroyed agribusiness throughout the Rocky Mountain West, closing the migratory labor
trail that extended from northern New Mexico to the Pacific Northwest. Even the
outwardly wealthy landowners left their flocks and orchards under the care or leased
them to their vecinos or extended family so they could earn the cash necessary to pay
taxes and buy dry goods that replaced their own yields. Pueblos, who faced harsh wage
and employment discrimination in the Intermountain West’s agricultural industry, were
less likely to venture north to the beet, onion and potato fields of Colorado, Utah and
Idaho. Many found work in the mines and railroads of western New Mexico. Some
Pueblo villages, like Laguna, found innovative ways of keeping tribal members far from
their Pueblo homes engaged in tribal matters. A few natives found success in the
growing regional art markets in Taos and Santa Fe, where their Hispano neighbors also
enjoyed a revival in the traditional crafts market, albeit one controlled by Anglo cultural
elites.603
For the communities of the Tewa Basin, the last twenty years of the territorial era
weighed heavily on what seemed to be a new and dark future. The increased
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expropriation of Pueblo lands fed into the changing economy that was centered in
Española, which had grown substantially since the railroad reached the area in1880.
Though the privatization of land seemingly worked in the young state’s favor, New
Mexico in statehood faced the same dismal revenue flows that had impeded government
and development in the territorial era. The new state pursued delinquent taxes more
vigouroualy that before to maintain state budgets.604
In 1899, the territory had attempted to tax Pueblo lands, interpreting them as
private property, before Congress struck down its bid in 1905.605 Likewise, in statehood,
New Mexico prosecuted all tax-delinquent lands, including Hispano land grants, whose
vast communally-owned acreages accumulated large tax debts, often forcing the sale of
ejido lands.606 In 1914, the state approved the bonding of the Santa Cruz Conservancy
District. The project touted economic progress, and advantaged commercially minded
Anglo landholders in the lower valley but excluded parciantes (water rights holders) in
Chimayó and along other tributaries. When it defaulted on its bonds in 1919, the debtridden district pressed hard to collect fees, but many landowners lost their property for
failure to pay.607 Already reeling from the 1897 Sandoval decision, which had denied
Santa Cruz Land Grant heirs ejido lands, Santa Cruzeños exhausted the resources of their
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private parcels, eventually turning to migratory wage labor to bring cash into the
changing valley economy.608
Scarcity was still common in the pueblos and villages of the northern and central
New Mexico in the quarter-century after statehood, despite the peoples’ earnest fight to
adapt their way of life to a cash economy. And that scarcity was no more apparent than
in the natural resources stretched to their limits. Land grants typically lost critical
grazing land through partition suits that recognized and confirmed the sitios or suertes
(privately held home tracts) but pursued the ejido lands to which heirs held collective
title. The 1897 Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Sandoval (not to be confused with the
1913 U.S. v. Sandoval case regarding Pueblo Indians federal status) held that the United
States had inherited title to common lands that U.S. Attorney Matthew G. Reynolds
argued, remained under the disposition of first the Spanish crown, then the Mexican
Republic, and finally the United States. After the 1897 Sandoval decision, the Court of
Private Land Claims enforced a more-conservative legal interpretation of land claims,
greatly reducing the acreage even of approved grants by detaching their common lands
and turning them into public domain. This stance by the CPLC, the 1897 Sandoval
decision, and ongoing partition suits, drove many Hispanos to maintain their livestock
herds by spilling onto Pueblo Indian and federal lands, and by overgrazing their herds on
smaller tracts. Eastern demand for New Mexico’s wool and beef and unsound grazing of
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massive herds of sheep and cattle reshaped the landscape and ecology of northern New
Mexico.609
Water scarcity continued to impact both Pueblo and Hispano users as well. From
the 1890s, new acequias brought new lands under cultivation. These ditches impacted
senior water rights, weakened watersheds and recreated conflicts that frequently colored
relations between tribes and villages. Ditch disputes pitted Nambé and Pojoaque against
their Hispano neighbors, many of them interlopers who took advantage of the declining
Pueblo populations to expand their acreages. By 1900, intermarriage was so common on
both Pueblos that their native populations were largely coyotes (mixed-bloods).610
Between 1900 and 1906 San Juan, Santa Clara and San Ildefonso all reported
acequia disputes to the Pueblo superintendent. Frequently, these conflicts were interPueblo contests that were erroneously portrayed as inter-cultural or inter-racial conflicts
with clear dividing lines separating the combatants, who were assumed to be neat
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divisions of Pueblos and Hispanos. San Ildefonso Pueblo sided with Hispanos in 1925,
renewing a 1919 dispute with Santa Clara Pueblo over its right to maintain headwaters of
ditches that irrigated their adjacent fields.611 San Ildefonso also fought Tesuque, Nambé
and Pojoaque’s upstream prior claim to irrigation waters of Tesuque-Nambé-Pojoaque
watershed. The resulting lawsuit sought the adjudication of water rights and led to by the
Office of Indian Affairs failed effort to drill wells in the silted waterbed and recover
water absorbed by the sponge-like channel that consumed all water before it reached San
Ildefonso’s ditches and fields.612
Hispano villages across northern New Mexico too faced the realities of the land’s
ecological limits. By 1903, a partition suit had broken up the Town of Las Trampas
Grant. Twenty-five years earlier, the Santa Barbara Grant, created from the eastern
portion of the Trampas Grant, was lost to speculators and timber interests. Land grant
historians Malcolm Ebright and William deBuys have provided convincing accounts of
Trampas heirs’ loss of their ejido at the hands of land speculators Alonzo B. McMillen,
Charles C. Catron, Alois B. Renehan, and Frank Bond. McMillen pursued David
Martínez Jr., a disaffected heir of Las Trampas living in Velarde, whose chronic debt
mounted to an unpayable one-thousand dollars, and who since 1892 had expressed his
desire to liquidate his interest in the Las Trampas Grant through a partition suit.613
When the special master assigned to figure out the fractional interests of the heirs
of the 150 year-old community grant, he reported to Judges Daniel H. McMillan and John
R. McFie that a physical partition was virtually impossible. Judge McFie called for the
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sale of the grant and partition of proceeds according to heirs’ fractional interest.
Martínez held 18.3 percent interest in the grant, followed by Alonzo B. McMillen’s 10.6
percent. Frank Bond bought the timber-rich ejido for $17,000 and Martínez “netted only
about $200.00 after his debt to First National Bank in Santa Fe was paid.”614 McMillen,
who failed to engineer a sale to his business partners when Renehan objected, received
$4,200 for his work “on behalf of the grant.”615

Figure 22: Las Trampas Grant, 1986. After the 1903 partition, forest lands essential to
Las Trampas and other grant communities became the property of timber interests before
the federal government purchased the lands and incorporated them into the Carson
National Forest. From William deBuys, Enchantment and Exploitation: The Life and
Hard Times of a New Mexico Mountain Range (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1985), 176.
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A 1915 photograph by Jesse L. Nusbaum evidenced the overgrazed and
deforested hills adjacent to Las Trampas, lands overtaxed when villagers were could no
longer graze their small herds or cut fuel wood farther from their plaza.616 Residents of
towns like Llano de San Juan Nepomuceno, Rodarte and Placitas slowly began to
encroach on the Picuris Pueblo Grant, overstaying leases and even seizing Pueblo lands.
But they also traded and bought land from their Pueblo Indian compadres (godparents),
suegros (in-laws), cuñados (sons- and daughters-in-law), and vecinos (neighbors). From
the 1850s, Peñasco, lying on the Río Santa Barbara, gradually grew and displaced older
villages as the economic center of the Jicarita Valley. Vadito sat on the eastern edge of
the Picuris Grant and severely impacted water resources of the Río Pueblo in dry years.
And Chamisal, which Picuris would be most successful in contesting, was soon the site of
a Presbyterian Mission School that attracted a new population of squatters seeking a
place to build their homes.617
Hispanos in the Tewa Basin did not exclusively or inertly turn to Pueblo lands for
resources when they were in need. Many continued or revived customary-use of land
grants, even community grants and private quasi-community grants, long lost through
adjudication or partition. The enormous Sebastian Martín Grant served as a safety valve
for Embudo, Velarde, and Alcalde and even Peñasco, Trampas and Truchas, allowing
villagers to graze their cattle unconstrained. Martín, a resident of Santa Cruz, had been a
captain in the New Mexico militia, fought in the Second Pueblo Revolt, and was
rewarded with the enormous 54,387 acre grant in 1703. In 1751, Sebastian Martín
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granted the settlers of Las Trampas a strip of land to aid the success of the settlement. By
1859, Mariano Sánchez, the sole heir of Sebastian Martín, petitioned Surveyor General
William Pelham for congressional confirmation by 1860.618
Through the years, villagers of Las Trampas still retained a tenuous connection to
the Martín Grant, using it for grazing when times were lean. Villagers of Truchas relied
on the nearby Francisco Montes Vigil Grant to graze their cattle. A colonial grazing
grant, it was treated over time as a community grant. By 1904, the C. L. Pollard
Company, an Española Valley business that often partnered with Frank Bond, had gained
title to the Montes Vigil Grant from Salvador Romero and other claimants who had
received a patent only five years earlier.
Pollard sought quickly to turn the land into profit and advertised the grant to
timber and lumber interests, even footnoting the Vigil Grant in Bond’s bills advertising
the sale of the Trampas Grant. Bond’s and Pollard’s investments eventually paid off. By
1906, the Montes Vigil Grant was owned by the Las Truchas Timber Company, a
competitor to the Las Trampas Lumber Company, which had bought the Las Trampas
Grant from Frank Bond three years earlier.619 In total, by the 1920s lumber interests
controlled nearly all the land along the Truchas and Trampas Rivers, including their own
ejido, and villagers would drive cattle a day’s journey to find adequate, free or cheap
forage.
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The Sebastian Martín Grant remained relevant to the larger regional population.
Used by the local elites, it was also utilized by the surrounding Hispanos who treated its
lands like the ejido of a quasi-community grant. The Ramón Vigil Grant, another large
private grazing grant that encompassing much of the land below the Pajarito Plateau was
used in a similar manner, though its owners guarded more jealously what they considered
to be superior land. Ramón Vigil was perhaps one of the richest men in the Tewa Basin,
and in 1856, represented by Territorial Supreme Court justice John S. Watts, submitted
his petition for confirmation of his grant, which was approved by Congress on June 21,
1860, the same day Congress confirmed the Sebastian Martín Grant.620
The Vigil Grant was eventually sold to Jesuit priest Father Thomas Aquinas
Hayes in 1879 and sold again in 1884 to midwestern investors before Texas cattle
interests and H. S. Buckman attempted to cut timber for the Denver and Río Grande
Railroad’s Chili Line around 1900. Still hoping to profit from the northern extension of
the D&RG, land speculator Napoleon B. Laughlin financed the Ramon Land and Lumber
Company, but eventually sold out to Ashley Pond in a transaction that netted Francis C.
Wilson eight thousand dollars for serving as the company’s lawyer. Historian Hal
Rothman writes that former Rough Rider Fredric “Fritz” Mueller nearly swindled the
grant from Pond, who held onto the grant and later sold it Frank Bond. Bond purchased
the grant from Pond and the Pajarito Land Company when Pond abandoned his idea of
providing a recreation club for his wealthy Detroit financiers. Pond would later build his
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ranch school on a purchased homestead atop the Pajarito Plateau. Bond, meanwhile, used
the Ramón Vigil Grant to cement his control of resources around the Española Valley.621
By 1922, the enormous Juan José Lobato Grant had long since passed from
George Hill Howard, the former special attorney for the Pueblo Indians, who took half of
the grant as his attorney’s fee. Howard worked with Thomas B. Catron and Alois B.
Renehan to partition the grant soon after gaining interest in the tract in September 1901.
José Rafael Lobato, a direct heir of Juan José Lobato, hired Francis C. Wilson and led
heirs in a 1908 lawsuit, asking the court to order Catron and Renehan to pay restitution
for “cheating and defrauding them, falsely and fraudulently representing the amounts due
to them under the terms of the mortgage decree in partition and sale.” While Catron’s
profit for his labors remains unclear, Renehan received $17,664.25 from Howard, who
claimed to be ignorant of Catron and Renehan’s speculative actions in the grant. The
lawsuit was evidently dismissed and heirs divided their interest in the southern portion of
the Lobato Grant, which eventually was bought by the federal government in the
1930s.622
After receiving the patent for the Juan José Lobato grant in 1902, Howard
attempted selling it but decided to develop the grant to inflate its value. In 1905, he
created the New Mexico Irrigated Lands Investment Company and began construction of
a dam and irrigation canals on the El Rito River. He sold the grant in 1908 to Charles L.
Tutt and Edward B. Skinner of Colorado. Colorado Supreme Court justice William B.
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Jackson bought the grant in 1915 and held it until 1942, when he perfected his title to the
northern portion of the Juan José Lobato Grant and sold it to the federal government in
1941 for seventy-three thousand dollars. The Lobato Grant, surveyed in 1895 at 205,615
acres, minus 33,000 acres of the Abiquiú, Plaza Colorada, and Plaza Blanca Grants,
garnered huge profits for Howard and Jackson, leaving the heirs of the quasi-community
grant without their patronage or adequate compensation.623
The nearby Juan Bautista Valdez Grant was long since rejected and residents of
the Cañon de Pedernales and Las Encinias Tracts continued to depopulate their
villages.624 North of the Española Valley, along the Río Grande, heirs of the Ojo Caliente
and Embudo Grants still farmed reduced tracts and grazed their animals on the almostbare surrounding hillsides. The Ojo Caliente Grant was still in possession of the many
heirs of Antonio Joseph, the land speculator who tore the grant from original and
legitimate heirs’ possession decades earlier and claimed to have consolidated or bought
out all opposing claims.625 Jesús María Olguín, an heir of original grantee Antonio
Olguín, filed a claim for the Ojo Caliente Grant, leading Antonio Joseph to file for an
inflated version of the Ojo Caliente Grant under the name “Antonio Joseph Grant.”
Through his lawyer, Napoleon Laughlin, Joseph submitted convoluted charts that he
considered abstracts of title. The Court of Private Land Claims combined the two claims
but rejected the 92,160 acres claimed in a plat and the 38,490.2 acres from a 1877 survey.
An 1894 decision confirmed the Ojo Caliente Grant as a tenancy in common but noted
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that the eastern and western boundaries confined the grant within the cañon of the Ojo
Caliente River, reducing the grant to 2,244.98 acres.626
Embudo, represented by speculating lawyers Napopeon B. Laughlin and Eugene
A. Fiske, was ultimately rejected by the Court of Private Land Claims, outside the small
private tracts, on implausible technicalities fashioned by U.S. Attorney Matthew J.
Reynolds.627 In 1786, grantee Francisco Martín had approached a local official, José
Campo Redondo, the alcalde of Santa Cruz de la Cañada, to request a certified copy of
the granting papers, which had worn with time. Malcolm Ebright points out that alcaldes
would serve as escribanos (notaries) on the edges of the Spanish Empire.628 Two justices
of the Court of Private Land Claims, Chief Justice Joseph R. Reed and Wilbur F. Stone,
argued that a great injustice would be done if the Court allow such strict interpretation to
disrupt its enforcement of the nation’s treaty obligations. Justices Thomas C. Fuller,
Henry C. Sluss, and William W. Murray disagreed and supported Pope’s argument. The
Embudo Grant was summarily rejected, excluding tracts owned by individual heirs, on a
technicality that ignored other supporting documentary evidence and nearly 150 years of
residence.629
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The Abiquiú Grant, Jacona Grant and Santo Domingo de Cundiyó Grant offer a
few success stories. Abiquiú was lost in the 1910s when Río Arriba County pursued the
grant for back taxes, an action typical for cash-starved counties whose large expanses of
federal lands left a small taxable land base. The Pueblo de Abiquiú Grant was
repurchased by a group of heirs who borrowed money from the federal government and
operated the grant as a grazing association. Located in northern Santa Fe County, the
Jacona Grant had been granted to Ignacio Roybal in 1702 and had survived ongoing
disputes with nearby San Ildefonso Pueblo, gradually transforming into a quasicommunity grant by common use. When it was surveyed in 1878, only seven thousand
acres remained after deducting overlaps with Tesuque, San Ildefonso and Pojoaque
Pueblos. Napoeon B. Laughlin, the former Territorial Supreme Court justice, was hired
by the Jacona heirs as their lawyer for the typical fee demanded by land speculators: una
tercera parte (one-third of the grant).630 Laughlin was less successful in identifying all
heirs who might counter his claim when the case entered court. When Judge John McFie
ordered the grant sold in 1909, Cosme Herrera organized 110 heirs to contribute to
purchase the Jacona Grant. After Herrera’s purchase, he created a contract, identifying
original Mexican owners.” Quoted in Mike Scarborough, Trespassers on Our Own
Land: Structured as an Oral History of the Juan P. Valdez Family and of the Land
Grants of Northern New Mexico (Indianapolis: Dog Ear Publishing, 2011), 252-253.
630
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the obligations of all heirs and deeded the 110 interests to grant heirs, who would
continue to operate their lands like common lands but be responsible for taxes on their 60
½-acre lots. In 1919, among the Hanna suits, Jacona was again threatened by tax
foreclosure, with heirs pressured to pay their delinquents taxes. In 1928, heirs who did
not pay taxes on their individual tracts lost their lands to the remaining heirs.
Transforming the grant from a community grant into a private one, and partitioning the
grant yet retaining control from Laughlin, saved their community land grant from
speculation and total loss through tax delinquency.631
At the turn of the century, the Santo Domingo de Cundiyó Grant was represented
by Ralph E. Twtichell, who lodged no protest when the grant was confirmed as a tenancy
in common rather than a community grant and its acreage reduced from over 20,000
acres to a paltry 2,137 acres.632 In 1926, when an adverse and flawed tax assessment
threatened the Cundiyó Grant with delinquency and dispossession, heirs united to fight
Río Arriba County and negotiated a lower tax bill.633 While keeping deeds and wills
remained inconsistent at best and efforts were made to exclude heirs from communal
rights, Cundiyó has to this day retained over two thousand acres of community lands,
without partitioning or dividing their lands into shares as the Atrisco Grant did between
1967 and 1970,634 increasing the grant’s vulnerability to speculative markets. In 1924,
heirs of land grants in the Taos region fought the extension of Carson National Forest
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Reserves, pleading with Governor James F. Hinkle to intervene for their sake and in the
interest of the state.635
By the 1920s and the time of the Pueblo lands controversy, land grants had been
reduced from vast expanses of mixed private and communal lands to communities of
private owners who shared a past but, only through water, a present, and potentially a
future. A strong market for these privately owned small tracts, especially those that
retained water rights, still thrived in northern New Mexico for a growing Hispano
population which sought even meager parcels to scratch out a living from. The practice
of treating Pueblo lands as private property had continued since the turn of the century
and animosities between Indian pueblos and Hispano villages, both anxiously fighting for
resources, churned on in the valleys and on the plateaus. The 1899 acequia case which
enjoined the Nambé Indians from impairing the rights of their Hispano neighbors, would
fail to resolve issues regarding Pueblo-Hispano shared use of the Nambé River.
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Figure 23: Nambé Pueblo, showing non-Indian claims (shaded). From Alvar Carlson,
The Spanish American Homeland: Four Centuries in New Mexico’s Río Arriba
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 48.
On the eve of Hanna’s ejectment suits, acequia commissioners representing
thirteen acequias that derived from the Nambé River wrote Northern Pueblo
superintendent P.T. Lonegran to protest the enlargement of irrigation ditches belonging to
or used by Nambé Pueblo.636 Their February 1916 protest was led by none other than
José Ines Roybal, who had received his lands from Nambé Pueblo in exchange for fixing
the collapsed walls of the pueblo’s church, and Cosme Herrera, the Jacona heir who in
1909 organized heirs against Napoleon Laughlin’s partition suit.
Pueblo superintendents and agents, frustrated with the unending sales, leases and
rentals of native lands, attempted to mitigate practices, even discouraging any
relationship, commercial or personal, between Pueblos and their Hispano neighbors.
636
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While the Indian agents, lawyers, politicians and board members pondered the Act, the
Pueblos were changing tactics. Pueblo agent and Santa Fe Indian School Superintendent
Clinton J. Crandall, who had dealt with Pueblo controversies at the turn of the century,
returned to New Mexico in 1923 to a wholly different landscape. In the past, Pueblo
leaders lodged protests against encroachments by neighboring Hispanos, Anglos and their
stock; now, they took direct action to abate such threats to their lands. Brazen actions by
Pueblo leaders led to the dismissal of Horace J. Johnson, Crandall’s predecessor.
Government officials felt Johnson did too little to quell the upsurge of Pueblo radicalism.
The actions of a group of Tesuque men in the spring of 1922, more than any other act of
resistance on the part of the Pueblos, represented how the Pueblo lands controversy
reshaped how Pueblos would fight to defend their patrimony.637
On February 8 and 9, 1922, Martín Vigil, the young lieutenant governor of
Tesuque Pueblo, led a group of Tesuque Pueblo men to the newly erected fence of E. D.
Newman and E. B. Healy, who, along with Alphonse Dockweiler, had gradually
expanded their land holdings in and around Tesuque Pueblo. This newest claim by
Newman was over three-thousand acres of land, a portion of which infringed on lands
that the Tesuque considered theirs. Tesuque Governor Elias Suazo, through Vigil, had
approached Newman as he began to clear the lands of piñon and juniper trees in late
January 1922. Protesting his actions, he informed Newman that he was enclosing lands
never before fenced or claimed by non-Indians.638 Vigil tried to be conciliatory, telling

637

Kelly, Assault on Assimilation, 195-198. See also, Crane, Desert Drums: The Pueblo
Indians of New Mexico, 1540-1928, 257-274.
638
Report by Indian Inspector L.A. Dorrington on the Tesuque Fence Trouble, Spring
1922, folder 50, box 2, Governor Merritt C. Mechem Papers, 1959-098, NMSCRA, Santa
Fe.
338

Newman, “I’m just giving you orders by the governor, remove your fence and that’s the
end of it, we will have no trouble.”639
Newman and Healy, emboldened by the ease with which they had previously
expanded their lands, ignored Tesuque’s request. Without the notice to or sanction from
superintendent Johnson or their government farmer, R. L. Hubbard, Vigil and a dozen or
so men tore down three and a half miles of fence on Newman’s and Healy’s ranches.
Newman was absent during the removal, but Healy famously threatened the group with a
shotgun. If the Indians did not stop, they were “going to stop a bullet,” he declared. 640
The Santa Fe New Mexican publicized the confrontation, heightening fears of violence
over an event that was almost routine among controversies across the Tewa Basin during
the previous thirty years.641
For the next few months, the Tesuque fence controversy drew in everyone from
the governor to U.S. senators, from the secretary of the interior to the commissioner of
indian affairs. An outraged Newman warned Governor Merritt Mechem, Senator Holm
Bursum, Judge Reed Holloman, and attorneys Alois Renehan and Francis C. Wilson that
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without favorable intervention, he would resort to his “only recourse – a Winchester.”642
To the Santa Fe New Mexican, Newman alleged that Pueblo superintendent Horace J.
Johnson had urged the Tesuque Indians to take down the fences after he became
frustrated with inaction by courts on Pueblo land matters. Johnson vehemently denied his
own involvement, called the articles “sensational reading for a day or two” that “sold a
few copies,” and assured Newman that he had intervened to stop the Indians from
destroying more fences and now contemplated an injunction against Tesuque Indians.643
Newman, meanwhile, placed blame on Healy for intensifying the situation but wrote that
anyone, “an American citizen, a Mexican or any one else, with the exception of the
Indians . . . would have been met by armed resistance.”644
Tesuque became a rallying cry for the Tewa Basin Pueblos. San Juan (Ohkay
Owingeh) governor José Ramos Archuleta offered his pueblo’s support. Over the next
few years, the San Juan governor and Tribal Council worked to reverse decades of
unravelling Pueblo authority. In January of 1924, Governor Archuleta and the San Juan
(Ohkay Owingeh) Tribal Council informed Pueblo superintendent Clinton J. Crandall
that they had elected to terminate the privileges of Isidro Archuleta, a San Juan Pueblo
native known to sell lands to non-Indians. “If the pueblo knows that he is selling his land
and offering to sell it to the non-Indian,” Governor Archuleta warned, “then the Pueblo
will seize the land…do not pay attention to him when he may come to you to
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complain.”645 By May 1924, San Juan took legal action to terminate leases originally
given to Hispano residents Luciano de Herrera and Enrique Córdova of El Yunque in
1876, ending a nearly half –century lease.646 Ironically, the Tesuque fence controversy,
the very act that impelled native pueblos across the Tewa Basin to unite and take action
against encroachment, also inspired New Mexico’s new senator Holm Bursum to pursue
legislation that would clear non-Indian title with an inequitable solution to the Pueblo
land problem.
At the height of the Pueblo lands debate in the spring of 1923, Alphonse
Dockweiler asked his lawyer, Alois B. Renehan, to request a survey of his lands by the
Indian Bureau before any legislation was secured. That Dockweiler feared his large land
claim on the edges of Tesuque Pueblo, which dwarfed the claims of Newman and Healy,
would be targeted seems doubtful. Renehan also asked Pueblo superintendent Clinton J.
Crandall whether his client could cultivate a twenty-five-acre tract of Tesuque Pueblo
land that he had been “accustomed to cultivate.” Crandall responded that Dockweiler
should vacate Tesuque’s lands and any leases at Tesuque would be in the hands of the
Pueblo governor, and would therefore unlikely be renewed.647
When Crandall served as superintendent of the Santa Fe Indian School from 1900
to 1912, he fought for political influence and yearned for a voice in Indian Affairs. In
1923, Adelina Otero-Warren, the niece of territorial governor Miguel Otero, was
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appointed Indian inspector, months after losing her congressional bid to Democrat John
Morrow.648 Instead of offering the Northern Pueblo Agency a voice through her political
connections, Otero-Warren often went above Crandall’s head, corresponding freely with
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Burke. Otero-Warren proved an enthusiastic
student of Pueblo affairs, traveling widely across Indian Country, requesting Pueblo
health and agricultural statistics and keeping abreast of Pueblo support for John Collier
and the NMAIA. She predictably sided with the NMAIA when Collier and the New
Mexico group split, and worked to limit his influence by encouraging the Pueblos to trust
the government to protect their best interest. Her meddling in Pueblo affairs met
antagonism from Pueblo leaders, who distrusted her intentions and felt she was on the
“Mexican side.”649
Otero-Warren quickly interceded on behalf of “progressive” Pueblo Indians,
“enlightened” natives who rejected traditional native religious practices and embraced
Western Christianity. Progressive Indians, who were a significant faction in many Indian
villages, were typically at odds with traditional leaders and reticent to perform obligatory
communal work and rituals. Otero-Warren wrote Crandall about Joseph Melchor at
Cochiti Pueblo, Desiderio Naranjo at Santa Clara Pueblo and José Romero at Taos
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Pueblo, each of whom complained to her of persecution at the hands of the Pueblo
governor or cacique.650
The progressive-traditionalist rift at Santa Clara Pueblo widened in the 1920s.
The factionalism had gripped Santa Clara since the Spanish colonial era was rekindled
with the influence of the U.S. Indian schools. Divisions between the Winter and Summer
moieties transformed into schisms between progressive and traditional leaders. By the
spring of 1924, as a Pueblo lands bill neared passage, Superintendent Crandall was
flooded with letters from Santa Clara progressives who complained of the despotic rule
of longtime Governor Santiago Naranjo. Bridal Gutiérrez wrote Crandall in March,
remarking that he, as a landless Indian, should not have to participate in a community
ditch cleaning from which he garnered no benefit.651 Unwilling to undermine the
authority of the Naranjo, Crandall replied that Pueblo governors were in charge of
internal affairs. The superintendent also reasoned that the Indian Service had recently
invested more than seventeen thousand dollars in the ditch in question and would like to
see it maintained.652 Finally, he assured the governor that he supported his decision to
disallow the use of land and water for those not performing “Pueblo work.” He also
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informed Naranjo that the commissioner on Indian affairs was clarifying this and similar
situations with a decision regarding a case in Cochiti.653
Santa Clara native Vidal Gutiérrez wrote Crandall about the increasingly
discordant relationship between progressives and conservatives. Gutiérrez was a Winter
moiety progressive who had witnessed the Summer moiety dictate Pueblo governance.
The Summer people broke Tewa Pueblo tradition in 1894 when they appointed the
Governor for the second consecutive year and refused to rotate the appointment with the
Winter people. The conflict even led to the building of a second kiva on the Santa Clara
Pueblo plaza, where Winter people worshipped separately from Summer people. By
1924, their thirty-year rule had worn out the Winter people, and a progressive splinter
group within the moiety would no longer tolerate it. Gutiérrez complained to Crandall
that Naranjo would not recognize Pueblo progressives and refused the idea of a joint
council comprised of members of both moieties. Gutiérrez wrote, “As the Governor will
not call us to his Councils. We want to make this request. From this date on we want to
be informed by you by letter the same as you inform the Governor on all matters relating
to Pueblo matters. Very Respectfully yours, Vidal Gutierrez and Councilmen.”654
Gutiérrez’s complaint marked another important event in the decades long split at Santa
Clara. For the next five years, from 1924-1929, Santa Clara elected two governors, the
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Progressive Vidal Gutiérrez of the Winter moiety and conservative Santiago Naranjo of
the Summer moiety. 655
A situation outside the Tewa Basin at Cochiti Pueblo illustrates how widespread
the progressive movement was among Pueblos and how the volatile the situation had
become. Beginning in September of 1923, Joseph Melchor wrote Pueblo Superintendent
Crandall on behalf of himself and his father Juan Pablo Melchor, complaining of their
poor treatment by Cochiti governors Marcial Quintana (1922), Alcario Montoya (1923)
and Louie Ortiz (1924). Both Melchors were progressives. Quintana punished the elder
Melchor the previous year for practicing the age-old tradition of derrota de los mieses, or
grazing the stubblefields. Dating back the Spanish-colonial era, grazing animals were
turned loose on agricultural fields after the harvest to remove the remaining plants and
enrich the depleted soil with manure. By using agricultural fields that were typically
closer to home for grazing, it also gave the opportunity for owners to bring animals closer
to their home in preparation for winter. Quintana corralled Melchor’s cattle and charged
a fee for their return. Joseph Melchor complained: “We are trying to progress, trying to
carry out what we learned at the schools. For this reason the governor and his men do not
like us very well.”656
When Governors Montoya and Ortiz attempted to force Melchor to participate in
ditch cleanings at the pueblo, he refused. He explained that he lived in “Sile, a little
Mexican town” and that his water rights did not derive from Cochiti Pueblo ditches.
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When Melchor stood his ground, Governor Montoya confiscated his and his father’s
lands. Melchor wrote Crandall: “I have done away with custom Mr. Crandall. I am
going to be a man with the rest of my fellow men.”657 Educated in government schools,
inculcated with so-called progressive ideas, Melchor felt that disavowing his native
traditions was an act of maturity, transforming him from a child to manhood, and from an
Indian conceivably to a white man.
During his previous term at the northern Pueblos (1900-1912), Crandall had
usually sided with progressive Indians and clashed with traditional Pueblo leaders. Two
decades later, he seemed to sense the impetus for Pueblo self-rule and the need for
traditional leaders to retain their authority. Despite Melchor’s complaint, Crandall
reminded him that he must conform to Pueblo regulations as determined by the governor
if he wanted to remain associated with Cochiti Pueblo. 658 Crandall wrote Melchor: “So
long as you must live in the Pueblo and get your land from the Pueblo, it is necessary that
you conform to all regulations of that pueblo. The U.S. Government has formally
recognized the Pueblo government.”659
Factionalism between progressive and traditional leaders persisted, as did disputes
with neighboring Hispanos. At Nambé, Crandall faced a Hispano population that for
decades had been expanding while the Pueblo, which housed many Pojoaque Pueblo
exiles, declined. Controversies over the use of a road to access firewood motivated
Crandall to secure a court injunction against Hispanos at Lower Nambé. Crandall
forwarded copies of the injunction to Governor Vigil and tribal council members J. D.
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Porter and Marcos Tapia. Crandall reminded them that it “prohibits FOREVER the
Mexicans from using the road or molesting your fence.”660 Hispanos ignored the
injunction and continued opening and closing Pueblo fences to access the road. José Inez
Roybal, who had received Nambé Pueblo lands in exchange for fixing the collapsed walls
of the church, yet later fought with the Pueblo over water rights, was particularly
aggressive in securing access to Pueblo resources. In the fall of 1923, Assistant
Commissioner of Indian Affairs E. B. Meritt wrote him, stating that the OIA would
advise Nambé Pueblo to not reopen an old wood road since an alternative passage was
found. Roybal, nonetheless, pursued local authorities and state representatives to
pressure Nambé Pueblo officials to re-open the road. Meritt advised Roybal to “accept
conditions as they are, and to discontinue your efforts to have the old road reopened.”661
Crandall’s fight against Hispanos invading Nambé Pueblo lands seemed more
critical in the context of the Pueblo lands battle of the 1920s. By the time Crandall
resisted non-Indian incursions, Pueblo agents had been struggling to protect pueblo lands
for nearly seventy-five years, and complaints by Pueblo leaders had routinely been
reported to their superiors in the Office of Indian Affairs. In May of 1924, on the eve of
the Bursum Bill’s passage, Crandall wrote J. D. Porter regarding Nambé Indian Petacio
Peña’s lease of land to Epifanio Valdez. A local Hispano, Valdez had opted to lease a
field from Peña rather than work the land as Peña’s employee. Crandall reminded Porter
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that the Council had rejected the lease. It troubled Crandall particularly because Valdez
refused to work the land for Peña.662
A letter from Crandall to Ramón García in August of 1923 offers evidence of how
complex the job of the Pueblo agent had become. García was a Hispano from Santa Fe
who had married Barbarita Mirabal, a Nambé Indian woman, and had taken up residence
with her and her family on Nambé lands, either the grant or reservation. García made a
habit of ignoring both Nambé Pueblo governor Juan Vigil and Pueblo agents, of drinking
liquor, and of quarreling with Nambé natives in a drunken state.663 Crandall informed
García that Nambé’s lands were Indian Country, where he was required to obey Governor
Vigil and was subject to his and Crandall’s authority. Crandall wrote: “I shall require
you to conduct yourself properly, to remain sober, and to cease introducing any liquor.
You shall cease to bring citizens or Spanish Americans into the Pueblo, especially
granting them rights of the pueblo private roads.” He later reiterated that he should not
“allow your Mexican friends to trespass upon the private roads and property of the
Pueblo.” If García failed to comply, Crandall would dispossess his family of all property
and have them ejected from the pueblo.664
Crandall’s interchangeable use of Spanish-American and Mexican suggests he did
not share the sensibility of many of his contemporaries, who differentiated between the
“Spanish American” gentry and the “Mexican” horde. His vast correspondence during
both of his tenures in New Mexico expresses his perpetual frustration with the Hispano
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population. Absent, however, are invectives explicitly expressing racial contempt. As a
federal bureaucrat, Crandall apparently sought only to do his job, protecting government
and Pueblo interests, and, for the moment, displayed considerable parity in doing so.
This changed with time.
More importantly, the case of Ramón García reveals that Pueblo-Hispano
intermarriage in the Tewa Basin was perhaps less rare then many believed. García’s life
in Nambé Pueblo complicated the job of government officials who, though not
responsible for the well-being of non-Indians, had to police their actions on the Pueblo.
García’s consumption of liquor on the Pueblo reservation also demonstrates that even a
decade after the Sandoval decision, Hispanos continued to introduce alcohol onto Pueblo
lands, ignoring U. S. prohibition as was much of the rest of the country. Finally, García’s
entertaining family and guests drew outsiders onto Pueblo lands, making them
susceptible to further outside interests.665
Nambé’s seemingly desperate condition was eclipsed by that of Pojoaque, a
pueblo that was essentially extinct by the 1920s. After José Antonio Tapia’s failed sale
of the grant in 1914, the pueblo remained abandoned, save for infrequent trips by Indians
who visited old family houses. The actions of Martín Vigil and the Tesuque Indians
compelled Pojoaque expatriates residing at Nambé to protect their lands and the Nambé
Pueblo council to treat Pojoaque’s lands as their own. This did not come without
complications. In June 1923, Superintendent Crandall cited Nambé Council members J.
D. Porter and Marcus Tapia for seizing and impounding cattle on the Pojoaque Grant. He
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informed them that they had no right to police the Pojoaque Pueblo Grant, despite the fact
that both claimed Pojoaque ancestry.666
Hispano cattlegrowers were apparently not the only ones taking advantage of the
absence of Pueblo officials on the Pojoaque grant. In July 1923, Crandall cited the
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company for executing their right-of-way on
the Pojoaque Grant without explicit notice to or consent from Pojoaque Pueblo officials
or his federal office.667 When activities at Pojoaque compelled Crandall to visit the grant,
he found its lands nearly overrun by cattle. He realized that he could not police its lands
from his office in Santa Fe and, in a reversal of his previous orders, enlisted Porter and
Tapia to help oversee the grant. Crandall authorized Porter and Tapia to issue grazing
permits and report those who failed to secure a permit to his office. In September 1923,
while citing Genaro Quintana for his cattle trespassing on Pojoaque lands, Crandall
reminded him that “Indian lands . . . are not public lands.”668
By 1900, Picuris Pueblo’s population had fallen to ninety-seven people, and it
cultivated a mere one-hundred acres.669 Nestled in the Sangre de Cristos at 7,500 feet in
elevation, among 11,000 foot peaks, Picuris was always beset by late-spring frosts and
mid-fall snows that shortened the growing season. The introduction of cold-climate-
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resistant winter wheat by the Spanish in the colonial era brought a reliable crop that the
Picuris came to depend on. But a population steadily declining since 1860 had left
Picuris unsuited to defend its lands against the surrounding Hispano population, which
simultaneously grew as it was displaced from its own land grants. Despite enmity
growing from trespass, Picuris Pueblo and the Hispano villages of Peñasco, Rodarte, Río
Lucío, Vadito, Placita, Tres Ritos, Chamisal, Ojito, Ojo Sarco, Las Trampas, Llano de
San Juan Nepomuceno, Llano Largo and Llano de la Llegua maintained remarkably
friendly relations. Hispanos and Pueblos baptized each other’s children, christened one
anothers marriages, and sometimes even married each other. Picuris men were even
members of Los Hermanos de la Fraternidad Piadosa de Nuestro Padre Jesús Nazareno,
more popularly called the penitentes, in Vadito and Chamisal, two of the Hispano
villages that encroached on Pueblo lands more than others.670 The two peoples
cooperatively maintained acequias, divided the waters and shared the shortages in dry
years. Hispanos apparently respected Picuris’ priority water rights.671
Trade relations also united Picuris and neighboring Hispano villages, but
complicated the work of Indian agents to regulate all economic and external relations of
the Pueblos. In 1920, Peñasco resident Porfirio Abreu purchased a wagon from Santiago
Povijua, a San Juan native who had married a Picuris woman. When Superintendent
Crandall notified Abreu in 1924 that Povijua owed $13.60 to the government on the
wagon and that he had no right to purchase the wagon, Abreu protested that he could not
afford to pay the difference at a moment’s notice and begged Crandall to relent in light of
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Abreu’s responsibility for his large family. Crandall remained firm and warned Abreu
that failure to pay the remainder Povijua owed would lead to a fine for purchasing United
States property and unlawfully trading with Indians.672
In 1923, Crandall also dealt firmly with Bernardo Martínez of Chamisal, who
claimed to have the permission of Picurís governor Manuel Durán to cut cedar posts on
Indian land. Crandall doubted that Martínez did have permission, especially to cut one
hundred to two hundred posts, and told Martínez that any permission was null and void
because Pueblo land was government land. Crandall assessed a fine of twenty-five
dollars and threatened prosecution in U.S. court.673 More alarming to Crandall than
resource extraction was the reported introduction of alcohol to Picurís by Hispanos. R.
W. Hodson was transferred from Acomita to Picuris as a government teacher at the day
school in early 1924, amid the Pueblo lands bill debates. He immediately reported the
consumption of liquor by Picurís Indians and the failure of his temperance meetings,
despite federal prohibition laws that forbade even Hispano citizens from making, trading
and consuming alcohol. With little evidence, Hodson suspected the “local Mexicans
about the villa” for importing liquor to the detriment of his “poor little Indians.”674
Hodson immediately attempted to enlist the aid of Father Peter Küppers, the
German immigrant priest famous for staffing local schools with German Dominican
nuns, but Crandall reprimanded him. Crandall complained to Küppers of liquor
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consumption at Picuris and among the “Mexicans of Peñasco.” Crandall believed the
Mexicans provided Picuris Indians with, la mula blanca or “white mule,” a concentrated
moonshine that became more popular with Prohibition. Küppers retorted that “it is
simply useless to work for the Indians unless they are educated morally" and reminded
Crandall that alcohol would be “the ruin of my Indians and Spanish Americans.”675
Hodson continued to pester Crandall for school provisions and clothing for the
children. His incessant letters evidenced his meddling in Pueblo affairs. Hodson
reported that two young Picuris men, Rolando Durán and Mardolino Vialpando, travelled
to Denver seeking work. In response, Crandall reprimanded Hodson for granting them
travel rights without consulting his office first. Hodson routinely complained about
liquor consumption: “Mex’s who came over Sun. to (Easter) Prog. brot (sic) 2 gal. of
white mule and drunk all night. Some fighting some cut with knives and early this morn.
Other Mex. brot (sic) another gal. over. I do wish these dirty Mexicans could be jailed. . .
. it was no time to be drinking on Good Friday and Easter.”676 A week later, Hodson
reported hosting a conference of Indians discussing the Bursum Bill at the order of the
governor Manuel Durán.677 Crandall replied: “I was under the impression that I advised
you not to meddle in these land matters.” Crandall instructed that government employees
were forbidden from discussing politics and even legislation and that as a government
employee he was not subject to orders from the pueblo governor to do otherwise.678
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Over Picuris Peak in the Taos Valley, Crandall was troubled by reports of the
routine leasing of Taos Pueblo lands to Hispanos. Taos war captain José de la Cruz
Concha and teniente (lieutenant) Juan de Jesus Archuleta continued leasing land to
Hispanos, this time to Malaquias Martínez, a former Republican candidate for state
Lieutenant governor who had served at the 1910 Constitutional Convention. Crandall
held that he had to sanction all land leases, even those issued by Pueblo officials, that all
contracts not approved by his office were null and void and that it was up to Martínez to
recover monies paid to Concha and Archuleta.679 Perhaps more disconcerting were the
actions of Arthur Rochford Manby, the land-speculating English transplant who
supported the paternalist management and acculturation of Pueblo peoples by Anglos,
and who claimed lands against Pueblo title. Manby sheltered a Taos Indian fleeing the
persecution of the elderly cacique, Antonio Concha, who sought to punish the young man
for acting out of turn. The young man was either José Romero or Antonio Mirabal, the
latter a somewhat progressive-minded Indian who served as Elsie Clews Parsons
informant on sacred Pueblo rites and who often worked for the government in various
capacities. Professing good intentions, Manby stated he only sought the “peace and
happiness and safety of this Pueblo as it existed before ill advised meddlers put them
divided and hostile to one another.” His intervention in pueblo affairs, nonetheless,
undermined the will of the pueblo’s traditional leader.680
Crandall had to maintain a delicate balance between the independence of
individual Indians and the authority of traditional leaders. While he supported with
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progressive and entrepreneurial values adopted by Pueblos who attended his government
school, he was charged with defending the sovereignty of the governor, a man appointed
by the cacique and typically bound by conservative Pueblo values. In April 1924, San
Ildefonso native Julian Martínez, the husband of famous potter María Martínez, wrote
Crandall about his desire to build a house at the Otowi crossing to sell his and his wife’s
pottery. Martínez complained that the governor and tribal council were unfairly
interfering when they forbade him from hiring a local Hispano from constructing the
house. Crandall applauded Martínez’s commercial efforts but upheld the governor’s right
to regulate who was allowed to work on the Pueblo.681
Perhaps mindful of controversies created by Clara True at Santa Clara twenty
years earlier, Crandall worked to reduce the influence of day-school teachers on the
Pueblos. He reprimanded Miss Marie Louden for taking up residence on the San
Ildefonso Pueblo, eventually replacing her with Alice R. James.682 Within a month of her
appointment, James wrote Crandall about the dissolution of the San Ildefonso Pueblo day
school and blamed the undesireable mix of “Mexicans” with the pueblo children. “The
children say they do not want to go to school with Mexicans,” claimed James. Crandall
agreed with her assessment and referred to the Hispano population as “hoodlums and
drunken citizens” who cast a pall over the progress of San Ildefonso Indians.683
The intermingling of Pueblo and Hispano children troubled Crandall, but seemed
trivial compared to other more-pressing matters. In 1924, a Santa Fe Conservancy
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District was proposed concurrently with the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
that stretched from Cochiti Pueblo in the north to Socorro County to the south. More
than one hundred land owners organized under the 1923 Conservancy Act of New
Mexico and pursued Judge Reed Holloman to approve the security on a bond to fund
early stages of the Santa Fe District’s planning and construction. The proposed district
sought to organize six-hundred-square miles and over 150,000 acres of land under one
entity. All streams from Picuris in the north and Santa Fe in the south would be
incorporated, including the Rio Pueblo de Picuris, Santa Cruz River, Nambé River,
Tesuque River, Arroyo Hondo, Galisteo River, Río Embudo, Río Chama and the Río
Grande.684
For Crandall, the proposed district threatened to impair the water rights of Tewa
Basin Pueblos in favor of commercial growers and development. The district promised
to store flood water and thereby protect property, regulating flow and saving the lower
valley from inundation. Its promoters stated it would control the flow of channels and
divert “in whole or in part, eliminate water resources” that were unused or misused.
They claimed that the program would not “not interfere with or impair vested rights,” but
that “lands sought to be improved and preserved, by irrigation and reclamation thereof,
now unproductive, or not fully productive” would be reawakened and northern New
Mexico would reach its economic and agricultural potential.685
Crandall wrote Judge Holloman in April 1924 to protest water disposition on any
river that serves Pueblo interests. “Continued strife and contention on a number of
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streams between the settlers and Indians” would only worsen, claimed Crandall. He
warned Holloman that “any attempt to impound these waters and transmit the same to
any other villages or districts would be a menace that would arise public indignation
throughout the nation, owing to the notoriety that has already been given over the Pueblo
situation.” Crandall questioned the legaility of state courts to interfere with Pueblo water
rights and remarked that many streams “will have to build dams and reservoirs for the
benefit of the Indian and citizen population.” He closed, “I pray that any motion to
impound of divert water from these streams will be denied.”686
As Crandall attempted to reserve Pueblo water rights, stop Hispano encroachment
on Pueblo lands, and to police morality and education on northern Pueblos, the Pueblo
Lands Board began its proceedings. If the Board abided by the statutes creating it,
encroaching communities would be pushed from Pueblo lands. Uprooted villages would
no longer sit near Pueblo villages. Hispanos would no longer send their children to
Pueblo day schools for lack of alternatives. And displaced Hispanos, described as
“hoodlums,” “drunken citizens,” and “dirty Mexicans,” would face difficulties in
maintaining their relations, commercial and personal, with Pueblos, whose lands would
be treated as “Indian Country.” If enacted to its fullest extent, the Pueblo Lands Act
would be a boon to Pueblo communities and the demise of many Hispano villages. But
just as the relationship between Hispanos and Pueblos in the Tewa Basin complicated
Superintendent Crandall’s work in the early twentieth century, it forced the Pueblo Lands
Board to rethink what many held to be a straight forward proposition.
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Through that correspondence, and through Board proceedings, members of the
Pueblo Lands Board recognized the complicated relationship and shared history between
Pueblos and Hispanos. They commented on similar land use, which they characterized as
inefficient, or the role that religious rites played in the maintenance of community
influence, and ultimately how enforcing the strictures of the U.S. v. Sandoval decision
was an untenable solution. Their reticence to bend to the will of Indian advocates and
reformers who killed the Bursum Bill reflected their own stubborn and paternalistic belief
that they, through their own experiences, knew what was best for both Pueblos and
Hispano villages. But it also demonstrated that they knew the histories of dispossession
and desperation that Pueblos and Hispanos shared and did not ignore them, even when
the Bursum Bill controversy shapred perceptions of justice in the Tewa Basin.
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Chapter 8: “A Noble Case of Buck Passing”: The Pueblo Lands Board and
the Southern Tewa Basin, 1924-1925
This chapter begins by discussing the early activity of the Pueblo Lands Board,
now reframed within the context of northern New Mexico’s unceasing land market rather
than the activism of the 1920s. The Board debated the requirements of the act,
determined its own duties and established legal procedures, all actions that give insight to
the disposition and philosophy of the entity charged with sorting out the Pueblo lands
problem. The Pueblo Lands Act, passed in June of 1924, was a deeply flawed piece of
legislation, which all sides feared would be overturned if its constitutionality were tested.
This chapter begins by discussing the early operation of the Board, when it sluggishly
attempted to understand the immensity of its task among desperately poor communities
walled in by federal and private properties built from the lands of their ancestors. New
Mexico’s officials, the local interpreters of the law, clung to territorial antecedents and
obsolete state laws when challenged with transforming federal statutes. The Board was
forced to break from these conventional intepretations of the Pueblo Lands Act.
This chapter ends with the Board’s first hearings, those regarding private land
claims on the Tesuque Pueblo Grant, the southern most of the six Tewa Basin Pueblo
grants. Tesuque was the site of important events closely linked with the Pueblo lands
fight. The House Committee on Indian Affairs held hearings regarding non-Indian
claims in May 1920, and Alois Renehan created a skeleton proposal for a commission
that influenced the Bursum Bill. Less than two years later, in February of 1922, Martín
Vigil lead a group of Tesuque Pueblo men to the newly erected fence of E. D. Newman,
which infringed on Pueblo lands, and tore it down, bringing the Pueblo lands controversy
further into the public eye. By 1925, the Pueblo Lands Board believed Tesuque, a pueblo
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long considered among the most pure and most conservative, would be the ideal place to
begin its hearings. Unlike nearly every other Tewa pueblo, intermarriage with Hispanos
or Anglos was exceptionally rare at Tesuque. Private claims against Pueblo ownership
were also comparatively recent. Most were a byproduct of the growing artist colony and
regional art market and production in Santa Fe. With under twenty-five claims totaling
less than five hundred acres at Tesuque, members of the Board wanted to use it as a case
to test how the Board would function under its interpretation of the Act. Instead, the
Board set a dangerous precedent by compensating Tesuque Pueblo for lost water rights
and recommending elaborate water schemes that it had neither the means nor authority to
implement. The Tesuque hearings would haunt the Board, particularly former governor
Herbert J. Hagerman, for the rest if its existence.
~~~
Tewa Basin Pueblos entered an era of marked change in the early 1920s. While
Pueblo Agent Clinton J. Crandall was beset by controversies and challenges in 1924, the
political storms surrounding the Pueblo lands bills were calming. In fact, the first year
following the passage of the Pueblo Lands Act was unexpectedly peaceful. The Act was
immediately claimed as a victory by Senator Bursum and Republicans and by John
Collier and his New Mexico counterparts. The death of Thomas Catron in 1921, Albert
Fall’s indictment in the Teapot Dome scandal in 1923 and the ascendancy of Progressive
Republican Bronson Cutting marked a new era for the Republican Party and the
opportunity for the reinvention of the party. Delivering on the protection of land tenure
would be a significant step in remaining relevant to Hispano constituents and could
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potentially hold off challenges by Democrats like A. A. Jones and his onetime secretary,
Los Chávez native Dennis Chávez.
John Collier and Pueblo advocates in New Mexico and across the United States
believed that they were also entering a new era, one that would protect Pueblo patrimony
and governance, and that would shame the federal government into the reform of Indian
affairs. As passed, the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924 held many of the provisions that Collier
and AIDA counsel A. A. Berle had fought for. These included payments to Pueblos for
lands lost based on fair and current appraisals; tax provisions that demanded proof of
payment of taxes throughout the possession of their claim, or lands would revert to
Pueblo ownership if any taxes for any year were unpaid; and the right of Pueblos to file
independent suits in decisions on claims found against them. Collier and Berle believed
that appraisals would include the value of water rights to Pueblo lands lost, that few
claimants would be able to demonstrate continuous tax payments and that the
independent suits would allow Pueblos to contest the Board’s decisions and retry claims
in courts whose decisions were bound by the Sandoval decision.
The bill that became law in the Pueblo Lands Act, nonetheless, closely resembled
the Francis C. Wilson-authored Lenroot Substitute. Statutes of limitations remained a
part of the bill, but as a part of Section 4, which demanded that claims based on
possession with color of title needed to predate January 6, 1902, ten years before
statehood (see Appendix A). Those without color of title needed to predate March 16,
1889, when the term “color of title” first appered in territorial statutes. AIDA attorney
Berle, who firmly believed that most adverse claims derived from the previous twenty
years, felt few could pass this test. Berle also ensured that Pueblos retained the right to
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reject the Board’s decisions and initiate ejectment suits against some or all non-Indian
claimants any time before patents were issued to non-Indian claimants after district court
decisions. Along with tax provisions that required claimants to prove continuous
payment of taxes on lands claimed, Berle envisioned multiple avenues whereby Pueblos
would regain their former lands.687
As passed, the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924 charged a three-member semi-judicial
commission with a series of complex tasks: examine non-Indian land claims to Pueblo
lands; evaluate evidence, such as deeds, titles, and tax documents, presented by claimants
defending these claims; assess the fair market value of the claim, including the value of
water rights and improvements made on the land; hold hearings to allow both nonIndians and their Pueblo counterparts to press their case; and ultimately make a
recommendation to federal district court, which would enter a decree and final judgment,
likely affirming the Board’s recommendation, but with the option to enter its own
decision. Indian title to Pueblo lands would either be extinguished, in which case
Hispanos would receive title and affected native pueblos would be compensated for the
lost properties. If Pueblo title remained unextinguished, meaning the Board rejected the
claims, and if no bad faith was evident in filing or sustaining a claim, the non-Indian
claimants were awarded compensation for their rejected claims and Pueblo title was
formally recognized by the federal government. More recent or more heinous claims
would be rejected outright, the lands in question returned to Pueblo patrimony, and the
claimants would receive no award, even for improvements they made on the land.688
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The Pueblo Lands Act was constructed under the theory established in US v.
Sandoval, which stated that Pueblo land tenure had always been federally protected
despite of the apparent lapse between the U.S. v. Joseph (1876) and U.S. v. Sandoval
(1913) decisions. By extending federal protection backward, the Court negated all claims
to Pueblo lands that had originated since 1848, when American federal jurisdiction
began. All non-Indians land claims would then fall under three categories: those claims
that would be approved, with compensation paid to Pueblos for lands lost; those claims
that would be rejected, but who claimants would receive compensation for the value of
the land in question and any improvements made upon the land; and those claims that
would be wholly rejected and whose claimants would receive no compensation.689
The act called for a three-man commission composed of representatives of the
president, the secretary of the interior, and the U.S. attorney general. John Collier felt
confident that, with the momentum on its side, AIDA would be able to influence the
selection of board members. Instead, Collier was shut out of all discussions on the
composition of the Board. Both the Department of the Interior and Congress wanted to
curb the growing influence and power of Collier and other Indian rights groups. Indian
Rights Association member and Wall Street attorney Roberts Walker, who owned land in
northern New Mexico and frequently summered in the Southwest, won the presidential
appointment. Walker had emerged during the debate over the competing Pueblo land
bills and urged interior Secretary Fall to compromise, but he was rebuffed. While Collier
initially celebrated Walker’s appointment, Walker considered Collier a “sensationalist,
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who has no apparent interest in the non-Indian settlers” and, during the Pueblo lands bill
debate, suggested that his IRA colleagues distance themselves from his radicalism.690
Herbert J. Hagerman, the popular yet controversial territorial governor of New
Mexico, was appointed to represent the secretary of the interior. President Theodore
Roosevelt had appointed Hagerman to clean up “Old Guard” Republican politics in New
Mexico in 1906. After removing Bursum as the head of the New Mexico penitentiary
under allegations of fraud and embezzlement, Hagerman feuded with Thomas B. Catron
and Albert B. Fall and became a liability to Roosevelt’s plans for the west, including the
expansion of federal lands. Roosevelt removed him as governor after only one year.
Hagerman’s appointment to the Board was considered by many as punishment to the
indicted former secretary Albert Fall, who resigned his post in March 1923 in light of the
Teapot Dome and Bursum Bill controversies.691
Lastly, Charles H. Jennings, a Department of Justice attorney appointed by the
U.S. attorney general, had the weakest connection to New Mexico, but proved the most
diligent in understanding the convoluted history of land claims in each pueblo. Where
Hagerman was ever the politician, seeking notoriety in his new appointment, and Walker
was largely absent in Europe during his early months on the Board, Jennings resided in
New Mexico and became a student of the laws, practices and problems of property in
New Mexico. Although Hagerman and Walker spent most of their time outside hearings
on other personal projects, Walker remained active in the IRA and Hagerman, as Special
Commissioner to the Navajos. Jennings was known to devote his additional time to
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augment Board processes. He would often visit court houses in search of additional
information on land titles or to assess the area’s record-keeping practices before a hearing
was to take place. Meticulous and studious, Jennings quietly pushed the Pueblo Lands
Board to scrutinize claims to an extent demanded neither by his fellow board members
not required by the Pueblo Lands Act. 692
Despite the negation of state control over Pueblo lands established by the 1910
Enabling Act, affirmed by the 1913 US v. Sandoval decision, and reaffirmed in the
prolonged congressional debates of the spring of 1923, the Lands Board and its legal
counsel were still hesitant to abandon completely the application of territorial statutes to
Pueblo lands. The commissioners debated whether Pueblo lands constituted “vested
property,” as indicated by their possession of federally issued land patents, and even
debated the very constitutionality of the act, which proposed to destroy the vested estates
of non-Indian claimants. They came to the conclusion that Pueblo Indians were wards of
the government, and their lands were considered vested property, but the title remained
with the federal government as guardian of Indian estates. And because Pueblo lands
were considered “Indian country” under the Sandoval decision, non-Indians’ private
claims were consequently not vested property.693
The early work of the board was almost purely jurisdictional, deciding the bounds
of its power and obligations to uphold Pueblo land rights. Confused over whether the act
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gave it authority to examine potential claims on Executive Order Reservation lands, some
of which dated back to 1877, the board was initially inclined to undertake claims made on
Pueblo grants only. Surprisingly, this choice meant the board would examine only nonIndian claims to lands deeded to Pueblo Indians by previous sovereigns and explicitly
avoid Pueblo title to lands that the United States itself granted to various Pueblos,
including both Nambé Pueblo and Santa Clara Pueblo in the Tewa Basin.694
As the work of the Pueblo Lands Board ran into its third and fourth year, the
Board more narrowly defined its jurisdiction. Perhaps mindful of the successes and
failures of the Office of the Surveyor General and Court of Private Land Claims, the
Board was apparently determined not to engage itself in solving the injustices of past
sovereigns and limited its decisions to incursions that had taken place in the American
period. The effect was the immediate recognition of the validity of non-Indian lands
claims that stretched beyond the American territorial era, regardless of the means by
which this land was obtained. This, the Board reasoned, represented a very small portion
of total land claims, as most claims derived from the period twenty years prior to
statehood.
Even though the Pueblo Lands Act resembled more the moderate Lenroot
Substitute Bill than the Jone-Leatherwood Bill, which Collier and Berle preferred, it still
had the potential to dispossess hundreds of claimants and displace thousands of people
from their claimed lands. Requirements for evidence of tax payments and the Pueblos’s
independent suits alone could dismantle the patchwork quilt of land ownership on Pueblo
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lands. If the Board enforced a strict interpretation of the Act and abided closely by the
Sandoval decision, then Hispano adverse claimants could face a disasterous outcome.
Unlike land grants that lost had their communal lands either through Court of Private
Land Claims decisions or partition suits, the Pueblo Lands Act took aim at the small
claims on which many lived and raised their families. Living in the ecological limits of
northern New Mexico meant that these small tracts were often the only stabilizing factor
that allowed poorer Hispanos to remain in New Mexico. Without these lands,
outmigration to an uncertain future was their only relief.
In the early months after the Pueblo Lands Act’s passage, there was surprisingly
little activity by the board. Upon appointment, Board members postponed actual
meetings, preferring private correspondence to in-person conferences. Uncertainty over
the financing of the board was quickly cleared up, but gave board members yet another
excuse to delay actual hearings. Board member Roberts Walker corresponded regularly
with the Board’s counsel, George A. H. Fraser, who replaced Special Attorney to the
Pueblos Ralph E. Twitchell as the Board’s legal advisor upon Twitchell’s death in August
of 1925.695 Twitchell had been assigned as counsel to both the Board and the Pueblo
Indians, meaning he represented both the plaintiffs and the quasi-tribunal in many cases,
but Fraser advised only the Board, and Walter Cochrane was hired to take the late
Twitchell’s place as the special attorney for the Pueblos.
The Ontario-born Fraser had earned his law degree in Denver in 1900, but spent
much of his time as a Latin professor at the University of Colorado in Boulder. As
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special assistant to the U. S. attorney general, he was assigned to the Board and initially
proved both pedantic and conservative in his interpretation of the law. At the outset he
disagreed wildly with Board members. Jennings, who lacked a grounding in western,
tribal and resource law, heeded Fraser’s advice. Hagerman, who served as special
commissioner to the Navajos, considered himself an expert in both western tribal and
resource law and argued with or ignored Fraser. He would later stand accused of
squandering the Navajos’s limited resources. Hagerman’s disagreements with Fraser and
Walker originated largely from his knowledge of New Mexico and state case law, which
gradually would be disregarded as it opposed federal tribal law.696
Roberts Walker proved the most able interpreter of law and through close
readings of Fraser’s own legal briefs, often changed the special counsel’s mind. Fraser
initially rarely strayed from the letter of the law, but Walker convinced him that the
Pueblo Lands Act was passed to ameliorate the problems caused by such strict readings
of the law and to offer equity where the courts could not. For example, Fraser did not
initially believe that territorial statutes of limitation could run in favor of settlers and
against Indians. He concurred with AIDA counsel A. A. Berle’s citation of the 1921
Patterson v. Carter case from Oklahoma, which stated that “as a dependent people these
Indians are still wards of the Federal Government, against which Statues of Limitation do
not run.”697 Gradually, though, Roberts Walker challenged Fraser’s contention by
reminding him that although his conclusions were constructed by the letter of the law,
Congress’ intentions were not. With Francis C. Wilson, he persuaded Fraser that
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congressional committees that debated and passed the act believed the territorial statutes
of limitation ran at least until statehood and that they should be invoked to achieve equity
and otherwise ignored.698
After years of debate, the tenuousness of the Pueblo Lands Act was still glaringly
apparent. A. A. Berle and John Collier, who worked in absentia while recovering from
surgery in San Francisco, had nearly killed the compromise bill, Senate Bill 2932, which
resurrected significant portions of the Lenroot Substitute. Berle and Collier wanted the
Board to retain the power to award compensation, something Congress prohibited
legislatively created bodies from doing. Rather, the Board would make recommendations
to federal district court, which would render final decisions. Congress ultimately
compensated both Indian Pueblos and non-Indian claimants whose title was
extinguished.699
Arable Pueblo lands in the possession of non-Indians sat at the heart of the Pueblo
lands controversy, which had climaxed with the Hanna eviction suits of 1919 and the
Bursum Bill of 1922. Most native pueblos had limited fertile and irrigable land. Many
had struggled with neighboring Hispano communities for control over sparse water
resources since the Spanish colonial era. But as Pueblo populations dropped and Hispano
populations increased, Pueblos were ill-equipped to defend themselves against a
politically active population that influenced territorial and state legislation and even court
decisions. Historian James Vlasich writes: “As the non-Indian population gained in
numbers, its influence dominated daily activities in the area. Amidst the turmoil wrought
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by disease, alcohol, relocation, and outright encroachment, American Indian
socioeconomic status reached a nadir.”700
Still, the Pueblo Lands Act only discussed water in sections 6, 7, and 19, which
deal with compensation for losses and the use of monies awarded to purchase lands with
water rights to replace those lost (see Appendix A). Perhaps more importantly, Francis
C. Wilson wrote into the bill provisions for the federal expansion of irrigation to aid both
Pueblos and non-Indians. No explicit statement was made as to the connection between
land title and water rights, or whether losing a land claim meant the loss of appurtenant
water. And the question over the applicability of the Winters Doctrine loomed over the
bill. Alois B. Renehan warned that the federal government would need “to settle part of
the army on each grant” to allocate water or effectuate evictions allowed in the act. 701
Despite Berle and Collier’s objection, Section 4 of the Lenroot Substitute, which
contained the provision allowing for the application of territorial and state statutes of
limitation, remained. Against the protest of Attorneys Hanna and Cochrane, the Board
had adopted a “limited construction” of provisions in Section 4 that would neither offer a
strict nor lenient application of territorial statutes of limitation. Secretary of the Interior
Hubert Work and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Burke, along with
representatives of the Justice Department, disagreed with the Board’s intended course of
action, believing that it would unnecessarily deprive Indians of their lands. Walker wrote
Hagerman that to the contrary he feared the entire act might be overturned on an
exclusive or strict application of the Section 4, which would destroy vested property
rights gained prior to the Sandoval decision. “To decide every last point in the Indians’
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favor,” Walker wrote, would only incite “AR and Charlie [Alois Renehan and Charles
Catron] to see if they can roar loud enough to get the law repealed. This would be . . . a
noble case of buck passing.”702
This and many other deficiencies of the Pueblo Lands Act became more apparent
as the Board began its operations. For instance, portions of the Pueblo Lands Act could
easily lock up the Board in a stalemate. The Act called for concurrence by the total board
on all decisions, on each and every claim to each and every parcel. The role of federal
district courts in approving or rejecting Board recommendation remained unclear. Was it
merely a rubberstamp to the Board’s actions, or could it hear evidence and hold its own
proceedings? These uncertainties slowed Board action and prolonged the controversy.
Other concerns loomed over the early years of the Board. While the Bursum Bill
and its successors had absorbed public attention since 1922, the ejectment suits filed in
1919 by Richard Hanna still sat unanswered on the docket of the First U.S. District Court
for New Mexico. For years, so-called settler attorneys like Alois B. Renehan filed
demurrers on behalf of settlers, attempting to delay legal action while they awaited
congressional action that would undermine the ejectment suits. The Pueblo Lands Board,
nevertheless, needed the suits to be dismissed to continue their work without the
possibility that it could be undone by independent judicial action. The Board approached
all settler attorneys to request that they agree to dismissal the suit without prejudice and
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then forwarded their consent to federal judges in New Mexico. The Hanna suits were
finally dismissed by the June of 1925, allowing the Board to begin its work.703
The Pueblo Lands Board began executive session meetings in May of 1925 to set
forth procedures and confirm duties under the Pueblo Lands Act. Roberts Walker was
vacationing in Europe during these early sessions and submitted memoranda before
departing from New York. Herbert J. Hagerman and Charles Jennings worked in his
absence to establish general procedures but did so with special reference to adverse
claims in the Pueblo of Tesuque, which they had already planned to review first. For the
next year, Board members altered the purpose, duties, and procedures of the Board.
Hagerman and Jennings reviewed recommendations from Walker and Francis C. Wilson.
Wilson’s memos, written less than three weeks after the Act’s passage in June of 1924,
outlined the Board’s duties, which included determining the exact lands granted or
confirmed to Pueblo Indians by the United States or previous sovereigns or acquired by
community purchase. The Board, according to Wilson, was to examine all title papers of
non-Indian claimants and determine whether continuous adverse possession since
January 6, 1902 had been achieved in claims supported by deeds and uninterrupted tax
payments. In these cases, Wilson suggested the Board demand affidavits by three
disinterested persons supporting the claim where Pueblo Indians lodged exceptions to it.
In cases based fully on continuous adverse possession since March 16, 1889, supported
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by no deeds, Wilson suggested that claimants be required to furnish six disinterested
people to attest to their claim.704
Wilson suggested the when determining compensation, the Board should examine
ancient deeds, dating before American occupation and determine whether claims deriving
from these deeds could have been settled within ten years of the signing of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848. If so, the owners could be removed. Others
claims antedating 1889 would determine the right of compensation to either Indians or
non-Indians, depending on the strength of the claim. Wilson also suggested that the
Board appoint three appraisers familiar with local land values and ancient recording
practices. Armed with this information, the Board could consider the benefit to Indians
of removing non-Indian settlers from Pueblo villages; the ethnological, physiological,
cultural and health questions; cost of removal given that lands would have to be
purchased from settlers; and benefits and justification of the cost or removal.705
Wilson suggested Board procedures as well. These included the use of the Joy
survey to identify claimants, contacting claimants by form letter and subpoena when no
response is received and requiring a petition and three affidavits of disinterested persons
sworn to support it. Three to four representatives chosen by a pueblo’s council would
then examine the documents and could file an exception with three affidavits disputing
the claim. In cases where Indians filed an exception, hearings would take place, with no
more than six witnesses for each side. The Board could then decide to approve or
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disallow the claim, though Wilson believed that many claims would be uncontested and
would be easily approved and confirmed.706
Roberts Walker’s memoranda touched little on the duties or procedures of the
Board, but addressed the Board’s purpose, an issue that seemed to have been resolved in
the legislative battles of 1923 and 1924. Walker stated: “These Indians, for three
centuries, have bought and sold lands. Their condition, if it existed, of wardship under
the United States as guardian, was obscure.”707 The Board awaited the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in the case of U.S. v. Candelaria, which would determine when Pueblo
Indians’s state of wardship began, either at American sovereignty in the Southwest or at
the U.S. v. Sandoval decision in 1913. Hagerman and Jennings, meanwhile, suggested an
exhaustive process, including the examination of wills, deeds, trusts, probate papers and
parish records by translators, paleographers and handwriting experts for accurateness.
Hearings would be arranged by the Board’s clerk, who would subpoena witnesses and
documents, arrange for interpreters and stenographers and serve as the Board’s fiscal
officer. In December 1925, amid their work in Tesuque and Nambé, Hagerman asked the
Board’s clerk, James J. Goutchey, whether it was necessary for the Board to determine
the governing authorities, both governors and officers, of each Pueblo at the time a
specific deed was issued.708
The Board also established limits on its transparency during the Tesuque hearings.
Copies of deeds used to substantiate or dispute claims would be provided at cost, but no
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copies of appraisers’ reports would be made available. The legal principles the Board
used to make its decisions would not be shared. The commissioners argued that their
decisions had no standing as precedents for legal cases and the Board functioned as
merely a fact finding body. Testimony was available for use at the Board’s Santa Fe
office, but translations of deeds were not available because not all were translated.709
According to Hagerman and Jennings, the Board should operate as a “poor man’s court,
and every method should be chosen with a view to saving claimants the expense of
counsel and giving them a informal friendly hearing.”710
The Board’s issuance of reports on each pueblo seemed engineered to obscure its
work, a problem that would invite scrutiny throughout its proceedings. These reports
would be limited to the decision itself and would not reveal or discuss the rationale
behind the decision. They obscured the Board’s process and hardly gave Pueblos or
Hispanos due process. Initial reports, issued for each grant to the First District Court for
the purpose of bringing a suit to quiet title, could group together claims and need not
define each claimant’s parcel. Subsequent and final reports would determine the property
limits and water rights, including the “area, extent and character of lands and appurtenant
water rights not claimed for Indians by the Board.” Reports called the “U.S. dereliction
reports,” were particularly interesting but rarely written. The dereliction report
documented whether Pueblo rights to land or water mentioned in other reports could have
been recovered for Indians by seasonal prosecution. The value and award report, which
brought equal scrutiny to the Board’s actions, would tabulate real values of both Indian
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and non-Indian losses. The final report, a so-called “banishment reports,” would offer the
Board’s recommendations as to deporting non-Indians whose claims were valid, an action
the Board briefly considered but ultimately rejected as too controversial.711
Just as the Board set about determining its practices, AIDA worked to define
which groups of settlers it would pursue claims against and which ones it would ignore.
Although Hanna’s 1919 lawsuits sought the wholesale eviction of all entities,
corporations and individuals violating Pueblo land rights, Collier and Berle realized that
they had to focus on claimants who that were less likely to arouse broad public interest.
Thus, AIDA targeted the poorest, weakest and most vulnerable Hispano claimants.
Churches, under the property of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, were excluded, but
properties with Penitente moradas, such as one San Juan, were included and targeted.
Railroad and utility companies, whose controversial methods in obtaining rights-of-way
were well known throughout the West, also posed a vexing question. Pressing railroads
would be difficult for many companies, such as the Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe
Railroad, could produce proof of payment for rights of way to Santo Domingo and
Cochiti, and these pueblos could not document proof of ever having received these
payments.712
Though Collier privately complained of Hanna’s actions as AIDA’s lawyer
representing the Pueblos, he publically lauded Hanna’s experience and integrity. Still,
Collier harbored same concerns for Hanna that he had for Francis C. Wilson, namely his
Hanna’s other clients whose interests ran against Pueblo rights. Collier had fired Wilson
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in 1923 when they clashed over Collier’s uncompromising approach to repatriating
Pueblo lands regardless of the nature of non-Indian title. Renehan wrote Collier in 1921,
ridiculing him for hiring Wilson, the lawyer who had nearly sold the Pojoaque Grant to
investors while he asserted a sanctimonious public persona. Collier retained an able
lawyer in Hanna, whose experience in land and water litigation in New Mexico eclipsed
A. A. Berle’s. But Hanna also represented the Santa Fe Northwestern Railroad
Company, whose lines ran through Jemez, Zia, Santa Ana, Santo Domingo and Cochiti
Pueblos, and whose controversial methods at retaining rights of way led to questions of
AIDA’s mission in battling for Pueblo rights.713
In a letter to Roberts Walker soliciting his legal advice, NMAIA Chairwoman
Margaret McKittrick wrote that Board actions might threaten bond companies backing
railroad companies if their lines lay on Pueblo lands. Section 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act
permitted pueblos to deed lands to companies with the approval of the secretary of the
interior (see Appendix A). Pueblo attorney Walter Cochrane, Board attorney George A.
H. Fraser and Hanna’s law partner, Fred E. Wilson, wrote Commissioner of Indian
Affairs Charles Burke to recommend that Congress pass a special act making New
Mexico statutes regarding rights of eminent domain applicable to Pueblo lands.
McKittrick wrote Walker, “I might say that Hanna is the lawyer for the railroad, and it is
rather amusing to find Collier’s lawyer representing a railroad which is endeavoring to
secure a right of way which the Indians do not want to have come across their land.”714
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Despite their controversial methods in obtaining rights of way, railroad and utility
companies were avoided because of their money, political influence and skilled and
powerful attorneys. AIDA also overlooked other forms of public right of way, such as
public highways, to avoid inciting further public opposition to Pueblo rights. As a
concession to settlers, and a way of avoiding controversies over churches and other
mutual buildings, AIDA and Collier advised native Pueblos to concede townsites and
omit them from Pueblo Lands Board proceedings. Beyond creating the appearance that
the Pueblos were willing to negotiate, this strategy ensured that merchants, bankers,
municipalities, city councils and the larger public were not galvanized to support the
settler cause. Collier, nonetheless, considered upholding or recognizing these rights as
merely a moral act, but by no means an imperative or obligation. Rather, conceding
church sites, public and private utilities and townsites would serve as public proof that
Pueblos were the good conscientious neighbors who exploitative Hispanos and Anglos
were not.
As the Board pondered its obligations under the Pueblo Lands Act, both Pueblo
and Hispano advocates and lawyers confronted the complexity of its many provisions.
The tax provision, constructed by A. A. Berle to repatriate the many lands on which taxes
were unpaid, was particularly vexing. While the federal government had expanded its
public lands through the Office of the Surveyor General, the Court of Private Land
Claims and the Forest Reserve Act, so that New Mexico territorial leaders worried that
when statehood came, New Mexico would have few lands worthy of taxation. Territorial
taxation statutes desperately attempted to levy taxes on all lands. When statehood
arrived, private claims on Indian lands, though theoretically nullified by the Sandoval
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case, were some of the richest non-corporate lands taxed by poor state and county
governments desperately in search of revenue wherever they could find it. Attacks on the
flawed Pueblo Lands Act came from all sides.
Addressing the New Mexico Bar Association, Alois Renehan attacked the Pueblo
Lands Act as “a hodge-podge and potpourri.” Since 1922, he had reminded Bursum, Fall
and anyone involved in Pueblo lands legislation that a semi-judicial commission was his
idea, which he had pronounced first in the 1920 Congressional Sub-Committee hearings
in Tesuque. Renehan also reiterated that he was the primary author of the Bursum Bill
before it was manipulated by Charles Catron and Ralph E. Twitchell, men who publicly
claimed authorship but were acting principally with their own legal practice and political
career in mind. 715 In his construction of the Bursum Bill, Renehan had worked to retain
as much power in the state as possible and wanted to subject Indian Pueblos to state laws
in battles for water rights just like any other water user.
Renehan was likely jealous that his old nemesis, Francis C. Wilson, had been
retained by the NMAIA, and that Wilson, not Renehan, would be ultimately involved in
the final composition of the compromise bill. Renehan impugned the Act for creating a
bureaucracy ill-equipped for solving the Pueblo lands controversy. He pointed out that
the Act required concurrence of the full Board in every decision, something not required
even in decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court. If Pueblo lands had indeed been under
federal protection since the beginning of American sovereignty and their title unbroken,
could taxes be lawfully assessed and levied? If so, tax payments, as stipulated by the act,
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were not only evidence and acts of good ownership, but were a requirement that
claimants might have ignored because levies by territorial and state government on
federal trust lands, perhaps even former trust lands, were arguably illegal.716
As Pueblo Lands Board members debated the parameters of the act among
themselves and with legal counsel George A.H. Frasier, Board hearings began to take
shape. Pueblo Lands Board staff, led by Clerk James J. Goutchey, set up an office in
downtown Santa Fe and asked claimants to bring all property records, land conveyances,
sales, deeds, titles, receipts and evidence of tax payments. A steady stream of documents
flowed into their office, and deeds were copied, translated, abstracted and typically
returned to their owners as the Board built up its own archive in a manner similar to the
Office of the Surveyor General. Board members, meanwhile, maintained correspondence
while on vacation, writing one another and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles
Burke on their plans while postponing any and all action.717
Before the Board had held even a single hearing, Roberts Walker and Herbert
Hagerman schemed on how they could manipulate hearings and how to deal with both
Collier and Renehan largely keeping Charles Jennings in the dark. The Board started its
hearings with Tesuque and Jemez, whose combine adverse claims numbered twenty-two
and totaled under five-hundred acres. Pueblo of Tesuque was the site of archetypal
events that, for many, represented the Pueblo lands fight. Congressmen, ignorant of and
reluctant to ascertain the gravity of the Pueblo lands situation, admonished Pueblos for
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allowing the expropriation of their lands and pondered the licentiousness of the
surrounding Hispano and Anglo populations, whom they suspected of mixing sexually
with their Pueblo neighbors. The House Committee on Indian Affairs held hearings
regarding non-Indian claims in May 1920, where Alois Renehan introduced the idea of a
commission that would evaluate all non-Indian claims to Pueblo lands, and clear title to
hundreds of acres of Pueblo lands.
Tesuque was also the site of the infamous fence controversy, which had
publicized the desperation that compelled Pueblos to destroy the property of encroachers.
The 1922 controversy indirectly led to the Bursum Bill and the Pueblo lands fight that
culminated in the Pueblo Lands Act. By 1925, the Pueblo Lands Board believed
Tesuque, a pueblo long considered among the most pure and most conservative, would be
the ideal place to begin its hearings.718 Unlike nearly every other Tewa Pueblo,
intermarriage with Hispanos or Anglos was exceptionally rare at Tesuque. Private claims
against Pueblo ownership were also comparatively recent. E. B. Healy’s, E. D.
Newman’s, and Alphonse Dockweiler’s large ranches proximity to Santa Fe markets
incited the avaricious extension of their lands and intrusion on Pueblo patrimony. With
few claims to a comparably small acreage, the Board wished to use Tesuque as a case to
test how the Board would function under its interpretation of the Act.
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Figure 24: Tesuque Pueblo, showing non-Indian claims (shaded) from Carlson,
Spanish American Homeland, 48.
Tesuque’s case provided an ominous sense of urgency in addressing non-Indian
claims to the pueblo’s lands. The Joy Survey and a subsequent study by Pueblo irrigation
engineer H. F. Robinson showed its non-Indian claims were larger than those typical of
other Pueblos. Claims averaged more than twenty-five acres and ranged from Spanish
American War veteran and Rough Rider Fredric “Fritz” Mueller’s claim of less than a
quarter acre to Santa Fe automotive dealer Paul Doran’s ninety-four-acre estate. Unlike
other Pueblos, there were also only a few Hispano claimants at Tesuque. Lucas Chávez,
Vicente Jiménez, Martín Domínguez, José P. Gonzales, Manuel A. Vigil and Joaquín
Jiménez claimed a combined eighty-seven acres, and their tracts averaged twelve and a
half acres, half the size of the average claim at Tesuque.719
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The Board held its first hearing on August 17, 1925, at the Bouquet Ranch in
Nambé. Roberts Walker was absent, recovering from illness and travel. Hagerman wrote
Walker and reported to him that John Collier, Tesuque Lieutenant Governor Martín Vigil,
AIDA attorney Richard Hanna and his law partner Fred T. Wilson, and new Special
Attorney for Pueblo Indians Walter C. Cochrane attended, but were not very active in
examining witnesses. Hagerman naively felt that all attorneys would comply with Board
directives and procedures, but remained suspicious of settler attorney Charles Catron
who, he believed, was “always inclined to make trouble.” Despite Hagerman’s
confidence, even Tesuque’s earliest hearings brought forth problems, including the
disputed interpretation of Section 4 of the act regarding statutes of limitation and how
water rights would be handled by the Board. He admitted to Walker, “While it is a fact
that we selected Tesuque because of its apparent simplicity, it is in some respects more
complicated than some of the other Pueblos.”720
Non-Indian claims on Tesuque Pueblo amounted to a seemingly insignificant 457
acres of a nearly 17,500 acre grant. But as historian Willard H. Rollings observed, the
457 acres were all irrigable acres and were a considerable portion (18.2 percent) of 2,500
acres of arable land.721 The government attempted to increase the arable acres at Tesuque
by constructing a dam in 1922 and 1923. Designed by Pueblo irrigation engineer H. F.
Robinson, who conducted intensive surveys of Tesuque lands, the dam was hoped to
subsume the silt laden riverbed when the sheer amount of water would saturate the
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ground and raise the water level.722 While it was somewhat successful, water problems
remained.
In 1924, toward the end of the battle over competing Pueblo lands bills, Special
Attorney for the Pueblos Ralph E. Twitchell filed a lawsuit to establish priority waters in
the Tesuque-Nambe-Pojoaque watershed.

After the first Board hearings, it became

clear that the case, United States ex rel., Pueblo of Tesuque v. Guy S. Exon, intruded on
the Board’s deliberations as water became central to the discussion of nearly any land
claim. Roberts Walker wrote from Europe that water issues should be left to state
jurisdiction. Hagerman, meanwhile, quickly began to realize that even the repatriation of
all Tesuque lands claimed by settlers would not solve the pueblo’s water problem. He
began to formulate an approach in which the Exon suit could recover water where the
board was unable to. Hagerman initially wished to pursue the Exon case and recover as
much land and water before any Board deliberations began, easing the pressure on its
Tesuque decision. In the spring of 1925, George A. H. Fraser joined Hagerman in a plea
to the Indian Service to appoint a water master that would supervise allocation on the
Tesuque, Nambé and Pojoaque watersheds.723 When the Exon case was delayed to await
hydrological reports, the Board was forced to act on its own and made decisions on the
belief that the Exon case would not recover waters for Tesuque Pueblo.724
While Hagerman believed in a multilayered approach to recover Tesuque water
rights, Walker doubted whether Congress or the federal courts could do anything about
722
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water. More than his fellow Board members, Walker was conscious of the opinion of
local officials. Walker understood that the very existence of the Pueblo Lands Board was
considered an unjust imposition by many state lawmakers, who felt that after New
Mexico’s long territorial fight, further federal interference was an insult. Getting in the
business of forced adjudication or determination of water rights and their priority would
only pit the locals (including officials) against the board, and could even cause locals to
ask for the repeal of the act, albeit for reasons different than Collier’s. Fearful of the
act’s vulnerability, Walker was again seeking an equitable solution rather than righteous
justice for the Pueblos.
The Indian service had yet to respond to Fraser and Hagerman’s request to supply
a ditch rider and the data needed to adjudicate the Exon case. Plans for a larger dam on
the Tesuque River were criticized by Pueblo attorney Walter C. Cochrane, who argued
that stopping upstream use would do little since any “saved water” would likely “sink
into the river,” or be absorbed by the sponge-like streambed.725 Cognizant of the 1897
and 1909 lawsuits against Nambé, Cochrane argued that the Indian Service would better
serve Indians by protecting them from local intimidation and lawsuits in local courts
brought by Hispano and Anglo neighbors. As special commissioner to the Navajos,
Hagerman witnessed the utility of drilling wells and constructing pumping plants to add
ground water to Indian streams. Cochrane agreed with Hagerman’s recommendation for
wells and pumping plants as an alternative to lengthy court cases, albeit an economically
unfeasible one.726
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Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Burke hoped that the Board could settle
water disputes outside and upstream from Pueblo lands. He obviously misunderstood the
Board’s jurisdiction, which was limited to adjusting claims inside the Pueblo lands and
was even further limited to original grant lands by the Board. Ignoring Burke’s appeal,
Fraser and Hagerman both pushed for the dismissal of the Exon suit. Fraser argued that
the lack of evidence based on adverse possession or use of water rights before 1902
meant that all that could be accomplished was a survey of present claims and not the
definition and confirmation of actual rights. Hagerman, on the other hand, argued simply
for practicality. In his opinion, stating the Exon case was “one of those impossible water
cases which seems to have no end.”727
Believing that Nambé and Pojoaque had no water shortage and that pumping
plants and wells at Nambé and San Ildefonso would do what adjudication could not
(“create more water”), Hagerman pressed even harder the dismissal of the Exon suit.
Fraser applied for and was granted the dismissal, without prejudice, by Judge Colin
Neblett in May 1926. With water rights moved aside, the Board focused on the land
claims of non-Indians at Tesuque. Many claimants, including heirs of the Cyrus
McCormick fortune, simply abandoned their claim and accepted an undisputed award.
These wealthy, largely eastern families had purchased lands as investment opportunities
or to build summer houses. They bought the land, but not out of desperation, and
willingly parted with their claim. But in the world of the Board, even this seemingly
uncomplicated action brought about controversy.728
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Alois Renehan and his legal partner, Carl Gilbert, represented Tesuque claimants
and advised their clients not to waver in pursuing their claims. Charles Catron was
retained by many of the wealthier families who wanted to avoid controversy that might
damage their family’s reputation and quietly went along with the Board’s
recommendations. When the Board disputed the claims of Renehan clients Sidney Well
and Alphonse Dockweiler but agreed to settle the claim of Catron client T. S. Mitchell,
Renehan cried foul. He later published in the New Mexico State Tribune an editorial
accusing Board attorney Fraser of interfering with his clients, undermining his cases and
giving them bad advice. Infuriated, Renehan criticized the Board and even tore at his
own clients: “The weakness, timidity and disloyalty of some clients are marked in
contrast with the loyalty, firmness and strength of the clients of Mr. Charles C. Catron
within the Tesuque Grant. His clients stayed with him and accepted his judgment. Under
these circumstances, the board came tumbling over itself to make a donation to Mr.
Catron’s clients, far beyond their deserving and their expectations.”729
Fraser refuted Renehan’s claim that he had interfered with his clients and
criticized Renehan for keeping his clients in the dark.730 Renehan ranted more, accusing
the government of manipulating the public through publicity, or “playing Collier’s
game.” Renehan’s clients, however, proved more than willing to press their cases and
were even competent in defending their Tesuque claims. Alphonse Dockweiler
abstracted his own title on many of the tracts he pieced together to assemble his over onehundred-acre claim. He traced his deeds back to the purchases by him and his father
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from Mariano, Roco and Francisco Roybal in 1886 and 1887, and from William Ute in
1889. All were documented in Santa Fe records as deriving from the 1840s and 1850s.
Dockweiler stressed the amount of labor he put into lands “overgrazed by Mexicans for
burros” and the thousands of dollars he invested to improve the land. Referring to the
interference of John Collier, Dockweiler wrote that the “Tesuque Indians claimed only
the lands of Newman’s Ranch up until that man in Española aroused the Indians.”731
Dockweiler’s letters and abstracts suggested that he had purchased lands from
people well-known in Santa Fe circles including Cyrus McCormick III and Carlos Vierra,
the famous painter and founder of the Santa Fe art colony.732 Anticipating the dispute of
his claim, Dockweiler attended NMAIA meetings to declare that his claims were
protected by 125-year-old deeds. He intriguingly doubted the almost-undisputedsuggestion that Tesuque Indians did not intermarry with Hispanos: “The people come up
from Old Mexico and get married with [an] Indian squaw and settled down. There was
not room in the pueblo so they settled outside of the Pueblo, which today you will find
the place which the ranchers call Coyotes, where the Indians of the Tesuque Pueblo
mixed. The place today is called Rancho de los Coyotes.”733 While taking Dockweiler’s
statement with a grain of salt, he was clearly cognizant of the proper terms for progeny of
Pueblo-Hispano unions (“coyotes”) and inferred that land loss by the Pueblo of Tesuque
had, in fact, occurred mostly through intermarriage with surrounding Hispanos.
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Dockweiler’s extensive knowledge failed to defend his claim, but it did secure him
employment as a Pueblo Lands Board appraiser for claims in San Juan and Santa Clara.
The Board completed its Tesuque hearings by late September and early October
and filed its report to federal district court on November 24, 1925. For 179.02 acres lost,
it recommended that Tesuque Pueblo be compensated $18,301.20, plus an additional
$11,000.00 for 110 irrigable acres lost, an award that exceeded the appraised value of the
lands (See Appendix C). It also recommended wells and pumping plants to offset the
loss of water rights. Controversies immediately ensued as Tesuque wanted the return of
its land, not compensation for its loss. Tesuque attorneys were advised to accept the
decision and not delay process for other Pueblos thorugh appeals, which would
jeopardize later awards.734 John Collier was initially angry at the size of the award,
believing the Board intentionally set it high to draw suspicion and create the likelihood
that Congress would reject the award. AIDA attorney Richard Hanna filed a protest
demanding that he be fully informed on how the Board reached its conclusions and about
the legal principles on which its decision was based. He demanded deeds and appraiser’s
reports on land and water values in addition to transcripts he was furnished, in order “to
discharge his responsibilities to his Pueblo clients.”735
The Board dismissed Hanna’s protest, believing that appeals should come from
Cochrane, the government-appointed Pueblo attorney, and not from AIDA. Fraser also
urged Collier to approach planned independent suits without testing constitutionality of
the Pueblo Lands Act, which would force the U.S. Supreme Court to consider whether a
settler’s claim to property based on territorial statutes of limitation would take precedence
734
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over the federal government’s responsibility to protect Pueblo lands under the
guardianship concept. He urged independent test suits, nonetheless, thinking that Judge
Neblett favored the Act and the Indians had nothing to lose. Roberts Walker, one the
other hand, was opposed to independent suits, believing they only unraveled the Board’s
work. To nearly everyone’s surprise, Congress approved the full amount of $29,301.20.
Hanna dropped the independent suits, which were only filed as a preemptive protest
against a reduced award, which never materialized.736
The Tesuque hearings exposed how difficult the process would be for the Board,
which privately confided that hearings might take two or three years for all pueblo
claims. The water rights and water woes of Tesuque, Nambé, Pojoaque and San
Ildefonso Pueblos complicated the process. The dismissal of the Exon case eased the
Board’s charge in Tesuque, but it left the adjudication of the entire watershed
unaddressed. Hagerman reasoned that because waters claimed by non-Indians at Tesuque
were now truly unrecoverable, Tesuque deserved a higher award that paid for not only
their extinguished Indian title to their lands, but also their water rights. His rationale
broke under the doctrine of prior appropriation, the Winters doctrine (which reserved
native water rights and was gaining headway in federal courts), and even did not stand up
under traditional Pueblo usufruct rights. When questioned, Hagerman stated that
Tesuque had not actually lost its water rights. He still offered no rationale for
compensating Tesuque for water rights the pueblo never lost. His convoluted
explanations would haunt him, especially in 1928 and 1931, when Congress scrutinized

736

Ibid, 38-44.
390

the work of the Board and Hagerman, more than any other government figure, came
under fire.
By 1931, both Hagerman and Fraser reneged on their advice for the dismissal of
the Exon suit and recommended action be taken to adjudicate its waters.737 Hagerman
held that the Tesuque award allowed for the further development of waterworks. He
continually dodged the question of whether Tesuque had, in fact, surrendered water rights
in accepting the award. But the Indian Service later rejected Hagerman’s pumping plan
and attempted only artisanal wells. Hagerman lamented that the government would have
to adjudicate the Tesuque-Nambe-Pojoaque watershed and quickly passed the buck and
moved onto Nambé Pueblo, where centuries of disputed claims would bend the Board
and nearly break its members under the pressure.738
Nambé differed greatly from Tesuque, a Pueblo that for so many, symbolized
both Pueblo conservatism and self-determination. Where most considered Tesuque’s
bloodlines pristine, observers had long noted that Nambé had intermarried heavily with
their Hispano neighbors. Some believed the Pueblo population was obscured by their
Hispano brethren. Others felt it was already extinct, gone the way of Pecos and Pojoaque
before it. How precisely Nambé blended with its Hispano neighbors became apparent in
the Board’s hearings, which told a story different from the customary one of Hispanos
overrunning a Pueblo grant.
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Chapter 9: “Indians on One Hand, Mexicans on the Other”: Debating
Ethnicity at Nambé Pueblo, 1925-1926
In December of 1925, José A. Ribera sat in front of the Pueblo Lands Board to
defend his claim to lands lying within the exterior boundaries of Nambé Pueblo. At
seventy, he was a man of considerable wealth by New Mexico’s standards, owning tracts
of land and dozens of head of cattle in both the Río Arriba and the Río Abajo. At the
time that he defended his claim to Nambé Pueblo lands, Ribera was familiar with
disputes over land and water, especially land and water claimed by Indian pueblos. Two
years earlier, in the summer of 1923, amid the debate over the infamous Bursum Bill,
Ribera was cited for allowing his cattle to trespass on Santo Domingo Pueblo and Cochiti
Pueblo lands. Northern Pueblo Indian superintendent Clinton J. Crandall reminded
Ribera that it was only fifteen years earlier that he had demanded the removal of a fence
Ribera had built to corral cattle and horses on Cochiti lands.739
More than two decades earlier, in 1899, Ribera led a suit against the Pueblo of
Nambé over the disputed water rights to the Río Nambé’s depleted waters. The Nambé
claimed that the three ditches in question were private because Indian users retained
rights among Hispano users. Hispanos argued that the ditches were public and communal
and merely flowed through Indian lands. The local court found in favor of Ribera and the
Hispano users, granting an injunction against Nambé Indians’s use and control of
acequias built by Hispanos decades earlier. Further, the court held that the Nambé
governor Francisco Tafolla had no authority over the ditch and could not impede the
actions of the “Mexican mayordomo.” Complications like these arose from mixed Indian
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and non-Indian land tenure that was common in Nambé Pueblo and across the pueblos of
the Tewa Basin. This intra-Pueblo land grant checkerboard of ownership grew at the end
of the territorial era, exacerbated by a growing Hispano population displaced from its
own former land grants and a shrinking Pueblo population ill-equipped to face the
Hispano pressure.740 Finally, Ribera’s victory in the acequia battle was not surprising in
an era where local courts’ rulings were founded on decades of territorial jurisprudence
favoring private over communal ownership and frequently marginalized traditional
practices and offices whether they were acequia mayordomos or Pueblo caciques.
By 1925, these resource contests had become almost routine. Ribera was calm
when pressed by Pueblo Lands Board members Charles H. Jennings and Herbert
Hagerman, and Pueblo attorney Walter C. Cochrane. All questioned the validity of
Ribera’s thirty-five-year-old purchase of a fourteen-acre tract from two Nambé Indians:
Francisco Tafolla, the former Pueblo governor, whom he had faced in court in the
acequia dispute; and a native named Antonio Tapia, whom he believed was a lieutenant,
or a principal of the pueblo. Ribera claimed that all his transactions were validated in
deeds, which lay before the Lands Board. Dating back to 1892, these documents were
signed by the Nambé Pueblo governor and his two principales (lieutenants). Ribera
believed that these deeds were legal recognition of a valid sale of Indian land. While the
Board generally rejected Ribera’s claim, his case brought up difficult questions it would
face for the next four years, namely whether deeds issued by individual Indians, even
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governors and principales, constituted color of title.741 They nonetheless recognized his
rights to compensation by the federal government based on adverse possession. The
Board came to acknowledge that the sale of Pueblo land by a Pueblo official complicated
their decision and would draw the attention of the First District Court, which certified the
work of the Board. This complication led the Board to reconsider Ribera’s claim,
validate it, and recommend compensation to Nambé Pueblo, extinguishing the pueblo’s
title to land within its own exterior boundaries.
Beyond the procedural practices of the Board, Ribera’s testimony revealed the
convolution of Pueblo and Hispano land and water rights in the Tewa Basin. His claim,
supported by deeds signed by Pueblo officials, demonstrated the willing sale of land by
Pueblo natives, a far cry from the violent Hispano seizure of lands portrayed by John
Collier, the NMAIA, and AIDA during the battle against the Bursum Bill. Even more
revealing and perplexing for the Board were Ribera’s answers to questions suggesting
that Pueblo and Hispano relations were more than merely economic. Cognizant of past
water rights battles in the Nambé area, Board member and self-styled water czar Herbert
Hagerman asked Ribera whether Indians and non-Indians presently had sufficient water
to irrigate their respective lands. Ribera responded, “I don’t know, but if the gentlemen
will excuse me, what do you call an Indian? They are more Mexicans than Indians.”
Implying that Nambé Indians were of a mixed Pueblo and Hispano racial heritage
apparently annoyed Hagerman. Interrupting Ribera, he declared, “I am talking about
Indians on one hand and Mexicans, such as you, on the other.” Ribera seemingly poked
fun at the former governor’s question: “That’s one thing I don’t know; the Indian women
741
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are married to Mexican men and the Mexican women are married to Indian men.”
Hagerman then asked, “Are you an Indian?” Ribera responded, “I don’t claim to be, but I
might be.”742
Ribera’s testimony disrupted the Board’s understanding of race and ethnicity.
Years of contentious debate were predicated on an understanding that Pueblo Indians and
Hispanos were distinct and disparate groups, who shared little beyond their time in court
rooms challenging each other’s claims to precious and scant resources. Between 1913
and 1933, a period which I term the Pueblo Lands Board era, Pueblos’s and Hispanos’s
historic relationship was debated and recast by advocates, attorneys, and bureaucrats and
by Pueblos and Hispanos themselves. Both Pueblo Indians and their Hispano neighbors
were racialized into essentialized versions of themselves, into naturally discrete cultures
and opposing lineages. With so much at stake in this untangling of the knot of mixed
Pueblo and Hispano land tenure, many participants in this struggle simply accepted and
reaffirmed the separation of Pueblos and Hispanos into distinct racial categories. While
the political and legal struggle over the Bursum Bill cast them as natural adversaries, the
actual work of the Pueblo Lands Board from 1925 to 1931 provided plenty of evidence of
political, economic, cultural and even familial ties that both drew Pueblos and Hispanos
closer together, and simultaneously drove Pueblos, like Pojoaque, to near extinction.
This chapter continues to examine how land tenure and the politics of ethnicity
were expressed in the Pueblo Lands Board era.743 The importance of this era to the
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development of New Mexico as a state has long been understated. The Pueblo Lands
Board era linked the early statehood period to the New Deal. An era defined politically
by Republican Thomas B. Catron gave way to one defined by Democrat Dennis Chávez.
This transition began with the young State of New Mexico fighting the exercise of the
federal authority in state affairs and ended with an economically depressed New Mexico
welcoming, even begging, for federal intervention. Chapter 9 focuses on the continued
activities of the Pueblo Lands Board in the Tewa Basin, where Pueblo-Hispano mixing
had occurred for over three centuries and was thus more common than elsewhere in New
Mexico. The example of the Tewa Basin challenged simplistic divisions between Pueblo
and Hispano communities. Examining how the Board understood Pueblo and Hispano
land tenure produces insight into how bureaucrats, lawyers, advocates, and even these
native populations subject to the Board’s decisions understood and articulated Pueblo and
Hispano race and ethnicity.
~~~
In the Tesuque case, the Pueblo Lands Board set troubling precedents in both its
hearings and in its final reports and recommendations to the First District Court. The
sheer size of the recommended Congressional award and the actual payment to Tesuque
for lost water rights were both unforeseen. But the Board’s ability to influence ongoing
state and federal cases, particularly attaining the dismissal of the Exon case, was
downright astounding. In subsequent hearings, the Board was challenged by advocates,

work discusses changing Mexican American identity, which was shaped by larger
national policies regarding immigration and by the political environment of the twentieth
century. These ranged from xenophobic and explicitly anti-Mexican to grudging
acceptance of Mexican labor. Many white Americans remained leery of Mexicans’s
ability to adapt to life in the United States and of their impact on society.
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attorneys, and even Pueblo Indians and Hispano claimants for its interpretation of their
land tenure rights and for its recommendations to District Court. The Board was left to
examine closely the peculiarities of each native pueblo’s situation.
Although Collier and Indian advocates could generalize the plight of the Pueblos
in propaganda that sometimes only nodded at the facts, the Pueblo Lands Board was
forced to reckon with the problems unique to each Pueblo village. Even so, a few
generalizations still stand. On each Tewa Basin pueblo, Indian leaders had either lost
control over their land and individual Indians sold it at their own profit, or, governors and
council members used their authority to sell or trade, or otherwise to alienate land from
their pueblo, sometimes purposefully and sometimes unintentionally.
Work patterns developed early in board proceedings. Roberts Walker was either
too ill or too busy vacationing in Europe to have a direct impact on early hearings. With
Walker absent, his duties as Board chair fell to Hagerman, who gladly embraced the role.
Hagerman corresponded extensively with Walker, keeping him abreast of hearings and
the actions of Hanna and Collier in early meetings. The controversial yet popular exgovernor earned the sobriquet, “the statesman,” for his inclination to represent the
Board’s opinions, however inaccurately, at the drop of a hat. Hagerman had grown up
the ranch that his railroad-mogul father built in Roswell, and largely remained in New
Mexico after serving as territorial governor in 1906.744 In 1907, he authorized the
territorial water code which created a centralized water authority in territorial government
under the territorial engineer. The easterner Walker had always been fascinated with the
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Southwest and, as a graduation present from his parents, travelled Hopi country on
horseback in 1897. He travelled frequently to the Southwest and was fairly well known
in Santa Fe and for his work in the Indian Rights Association.745
The Tennessee-born Jennings had almost no connection to or knowledge of the
Southwest. But he proved the most diligent in assessing records, both those remitted in
cases and others he would research himself to supplement his knowledge of particular
land claims. His deep research in land cases brought before the Board earned him the
epithet, “the mole”: he relentlessly dug in public records for more information when his
fellow Board members felt above such tasks.746 In November 1925, Walker wrote
Hagerman and Jennings that he was “dissatisfied at the rate of progress” made by the
board and suggested “radical changes in the conduct of the operation.”747 He also wrote
Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work that speed was highly important and that “since the
board does not render final decisions, it is more important to have matters decided than to
have them decided right” and claims should be “pushed rapidly” to be “actually
adjudicated in court.”748 Hagerman complained to Walker of Jennings’s slow methods:
“The whole trend of Mr. Jennings[’s] thought as to the operations of the Pueblo Lands
Board, as opposed to my own, is towards thoroughness as opposed to expedition. Talk of
expedition antagonizes him . . . . The scaling of two peaks [referencing the Nambé and
Tesuque hearings] would have been indefinitely delayed if not for you . . . . If there were
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two syncline followers on the Board [Hagerman and Walker] and one inexpert peak
climber [Jennings], it would be had.”749
Resenting Jennings’ diligence, Walker and Hagerman remained in contact and
worked behind the scenes, leaving Jennings out of their conversations. Beyond
communicating and scheming on how they could manipulate hearings or how they should
deal with both Collier and Renehan, the Walker-Hagerman letters provide insight into
how their ideas of race were well formed before they entered the hearings. Bureaucrats’
notions of race hinged on their ideas of progress, and neither Pueblo Indians nor their
Hispano counterparts met these standards. In January 1925 Hagerman complained to
Walker that both Indians and Mexicans suffered from their lack of progressive use of
land and from their imprudent use of water resources.
Certainly if, with the water they have here, it were in the hands of progressive and
active people, several times as much the value in crops could be raised off the
land as is now the case of with either the Indians or the natives . . . . This whole
area could . . . be a veritable garden spot if it were in the hands of progressive,
energetic, peppy people, but it is not and it is not likely that it will ever be. I do
not think that the Mexicans are any more thorough in their agriculture than the
Indians.750

Lands Board members saw similarities between Pueblo and Hispano peoples, something
they used both to downplay conflicts between the two groups as well as to cast doubt on
the racial integrity of many Pueblo Indians. After visiting San Juan Pueblo in December
1924 and January 1925, Hagerman wrote his fellow Board member of his observations of
Hispanos:
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As for the natives in and adjacent to this Pueblo, it does not seem to me that they
are very much more ambitious or progressive than the Indians, perhaps less so.
They are mostly all strong Penitentes, who spend three or four months of every
year in doing nothing but attend to their Penitente performances, - religious,
social, and otherwise. That is apparently their life, just as the ceremonials of the
San Juan Indians constitute their life. I do not think that there is any particular
bitterness or animosity between these Indians and these Mexican Penitentes; on
the whole, they are very much the same human beings.”751
Walker echoed Hagerman, stating the Indian population of Nambé was “minute and
dilute.” He closed, “It has been a Mexican settlement for decades.”752 Walker also wrote
Secretary of the Interior Work, caustically writing of Nambé “pueblo” and referring to
the tribe as “Indians of highly dilute stock.”753
For all the paternalism embedded in these statements, Hagerman and Walker
recognized significant aspects of Pueblo and Hispano relations. The similarity of Pueblo
and Hispano land-use practices, dual and often conflicting acequia systems, and the need
for and tradition of shared watershed management were discussed by Walker and
Hagerman. Walker’s statement about Nambé revealed that he understood the reality of
Pueblo-Hispano intermarriage and that these relationships may have had a bearing on the
expropriation of Pueblo lands.
At Tesuque, the Board was fortunate to contend with many out-of-state claimants
who had purchased lands to enrich lavish lifestyles when compared to that of the typical
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claimant, who was dependent on their lands for their very livelihood. Tesuque and
Nambé were exceptional in that the Board worked with extreme license and spent time
and money immoderately. It closely examined titles, consulted records in Santa Fe, and
employed translators and transcribers to examine hundreds of deeds, wills, and bills of
sale. The massive archive of testimony that the board members created and furnished to
both Hispano and Pueblo attorneys was never reproduced in subsequent cases. The
Tesuque and Nambé Pueblo hearings are the only ones that we can truly examine through
extensive primary resources.
At the time of the Board’s hearings at Nambé, the pueblo’s population was
estimated at 119. Hispanos claimed large portions of the northern half of the grant. Their
242 claims totaled 3,841.37 acres, which left Nambé Indians upstream of Hispano
claimants with only 225 cultivated acres. Since 1897, Nambé and its Hispano neighbors
had become embroiled in lawsuits over the control of the waters of the Río Nambé. After
Simón Romero led a successful attempt to enjoin the pueblo from a large disputed tract
within the grant in 1897,754 José A. Ribera filed a suit in 1899 to terminate the Nambé
governor’s authority over acequias running through the grant and led the charge in
another case in 1901 to further adjudicate priority rights to the acequia.755 The pueblo
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filed a countersuit to affirm its superior water rights, but the partition of water rights was
rejected by Judge John McFie, who cited his own decision in the 1899 Ribera case.756
Nambé had long dealt with the outright encroachment of non-Indians and their
use or acquisition of its lands through leases and sales. In 1916, Nambé sought federal
assistance to construct a new ditch on its 1902 reservation lands, an action Hispanos
immediately protested.757 Pueblo irrigation engineer H. F. Robinson undertook an
investigation that revealed numerous court cases, lawsuits, injunctions, and agreements
among acequia parciantes and Pueblo Indians. Even more complicated was that the
combatants did not fall neatly along racial lines. After the Mcfie decision in 1900,
parciantes on the Acequia Nueva entered into an agreement on May 31, 1901 for shared
use of the waters of the ditch, circumventing the decision and proving continued PuebloHispano collaboration in light of other disputes.758 Robinson found that digging a ditch
would impair the waters of as many as thirty-one acequias dependent on the Río Nambé.
He also investigated the possibility of building a dam at the site of the Nambé River falls.
A 1909 report by his predecessor suggested the dam would need to be eighty feet high
and would only impound two thousand acre feet of water.759
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When Hispanos resurrected the dam proposal in 1918, Nambé Pueblo wrote
Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs E. B. Meritt to protest the construction of a
water reservoir “proposed by the Mexican people.” Later that year, Nambé parciantes,
with the weight of court decisions behind them, asked the State Engineer James A.
French to assign a water master to the Río Nambé.760 French complied, but he gave the
water master the authority only to observe water use and withheld authority to actually
distribute waters. Another attempt by the Indian Service for a new ditch to serve the
Indian population at Nambé was made in 1919 but rejected as impractical and likely to
provoke more litigation.761 Pueblo leaders requested another ditch, but shared the Indian
Service’s fear that it would immediately be litigated in unfriendly courts. By 1925
Robinson, who tired of writing endless memos regarding the Nambé water situation,
informed yet another commissioner of Indian affairs of water problems at Nambé. He
presented a plan to remove ten thousand yards of bedrock, creating a reservoir to hold
only 1440 acre feet. At a total project cost of $600,000 to construct, the reservoir would
amount to an unjustifiable $450.00 per acre foot.762
The Board began the Nambé hearings in November 1925 at the Catron Building
in downtown Santa Fe and considered 242 adverse claims through March 1926. It also
conducted hearings at the Bouquet Ranch in Pojoaque. Many experts acknowledged that
Nambé contained some of the oldest non-Indian claims against Indian title in the Tewa
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Basin, with several supposedly dating back to the 1740s.763 Two claims in particular
accounted for a considerable portion of Nambé’s lost lands. The first arose from the
1854 sale of pueblo lands to Manuel Romero and Vicente López, both lawyers hired to
defend Pueblo leaders accused of witchcraft.764 The nearly twenty-four-hundred acre
tract was worth about $5,900, or $2.50 per acre. Nearly the whole parcel was composed
of the pueblo’s uplands cut by the arroyos and lying above the acequias and, therefore,
not irrigable. For decades, the Pueblo Indians and Hispano villagers shared the tract as a
commons on which they grazed their livestock. Anxieties in the 1900s led to lawsuits
and growing animosity between Hispanos and Pueblos, and Manuel Romero’s heirs, led
by Simón Romero, successfully barred Nambé Pueblo and Hispanos from using the
tract.765 By the twentieth century, the tract was old enough and so well known that people
referred to it as the “Romero Grant in Nambé Indian Pueblo.”766
The age of the Romero-López claim was old enough that it did not need the
support of or proof by written deeds, and it was assumed the Board would confirm the
claim. The difficulty lay in discerning tax payments on the property, which had been
claimed and divided. Romolo Luján, Simón Romero, José R. Valdez, Atocha Romero,
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José Ines Roybal, Pedro Romero, José A. Rivera (Ribera), Pablo Valdez and Julian Ortiz
were among the largest claimants of López’s and Romero’s former lands. With no
evidence of legitimate deeds or tax payments, the mass of users of the vast tract had no
defensible claim to the land, leaving only the heirs of Manuel Romero and Vicente López
with a genuine claim, albeit a divided one that the Board would have to discern.
The Board also scrutinized a 1908 claim by four Hispano men who said the
pueblo paid them in land for repairing the collapsed walls of the Catholic Church.
Nambé had lacked artisans capable of fixing the church and the Archdiocese of Santa Fe
had threatened to withdraw Catholic services until the church was repaired. One of the
four men was José Ines Roybal, a recognized leader in the Hispano community, who led
the 1916 protest against the pueblo’s expansion of its ditches, and who was approached
by attorney Alois B. Renehan to raise money to defray his expenses in 1922.767 Nambé
Pueblo leaders either disputed the four claims or maintained that they had been enlarged
beyond their original allotted size. Roybal was reportedly paid one hundred acres in
exchange for his labors, but by the Joy Survey of 1916, his claim had been enlarged to
231.47 acres. The exchange of land to repair the church had been a controversial
decision and had divided the pueblo, as many believed a minority faction of practicing
Catholics had given away the land for its exclusive benefit.768
The López-Romero and Roybal claims, however, were far from typical at Nambé.
Secundino Roybal’s two-and-a-half acre claim was far more illustrative of the
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expropriation of pueblo lands at Nambé. Roybal had married a Nambé Pueblo woman,
began paying taxes on their joint lands, and declared them as their own. Likewise,
Fermín Luján claimed lands by right of inheritance, which the NMAIA and General
Council of the Northern Pueblos doubted in a 1922 report, despite the fact that his mother
was a Nambé Indian. That report, casting doubt on all claims in Nambé, stated, “The
Mexican Usurper has made great inroads on the Nambé Pueblo Grant.”769 Its author
erected the wall of race between Pueblos and Mexicans.
Cases in Nambé seemed particularly frustrating to the Board. In a December
1925 hearing regarding a tract claimed by Ignacio García, the Board faced the difficulty
of finding witnesses knowledgeable of the land-title history of specific tracts like
García’s. In this case, the twenty-seven-year-old García was absent to work in mines in
southern Colorado, leaving his eighteen-year-old wife, Juanita, to defend his claim.
Juanita confused dates, first stating that their tract was covered by a deed dated 1902.
When challenged by Charles Jennings, she vacillated. She argued that a 1904 deed
covered the claim before asserting that an office in Santa Fe had lost a 1902 deed.
Jennings then pressed Juanita García, who produced a receipt showing that the 1902 deed
was filed with the Santa Fe office of the Pueblo Lands Board, which had apparently
misplaced the document.770
The Board established through Juanita García’s testimony that Ignacio’s tract had
been deeded to him by his father, Luciano, and that both father and son had paid taxes
since their purchase from Valentín Valdez in 1902. A witness named José de Jesús Ortiz
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stated that Váldez was “a Mexican” who got the land from his grandfather Juan Lorenzo
Valdez. But Eufracio Trujillo, the standing governor of Nambé Pueblo, testified that the
elder Valdez was a native of Nambé Pueblo. Further, Trujillo stated that the governor
had no authority to deed away the lands of the pueblo through sales or land exchanges, or
to relieve Pueblo debt, even if deeds had the signature of his two principales. The entire
Pueblo Council, Trujillo claimed, would need to approve such sales and even the council
would have to confer with the entire pueblo.771
This statement complicated nearly all transactions involving Pueblo leadership.
In grazing leases, sales of goods or services, or permits to remain on Pueblo lands as a
farmer, a doctor, or an artist, a Pueblo governor commonly entered into an agreement
witnessed by his two principales. All three men signed the document, affirming their
leadership of the pueblo and their representation of the its members’ consent. Eufrasio
Trujillo’s claim that only the Council and with the consent of the entire Pueblo could
enter into an agreement would have negated all non-Indian title over Pueblo lands. Yet
as powerful a statement of Pueblo sovereignty as his was, the remainder of Trujillo’s
testimony revealed that neither he nor his predecessors had even a modest knowledge of
the extent of non-Indian ownership of Nambé lands.
Board member Herbert Hagerman questioned Trujillo about whether the Council
discussed past land conveyances. Trujillo answered that it did. Current Council
members Juan Antonio Mirabal and Gabriel Trujillo had served on the Nambé Council
when Augustín Vigil, another member, sold the tract of land in question. When
Hagerman asked whether the Council had discussed the sale, Trujillo stated it had, “after
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1915, after the Joy Survey.” The Council’s realization that the tract had been lost to
García’s ownership came only when a government survey informed the body. Trujillo
also testified that the Council members “protested amongst themselves” when they
learned of the loss of this parcel. His admission suggested that the Nambé Pueblo
Council had little account or record of land transactions on the Pueblo league, and may
have also been unaware that Nambé’s own Council members had sold land out from
under Nambé Pueblo.772
Outside concerns over Pueblo governance, the case of Ignacio and Juanita
García’s claim also reveals how claimants’ mixed heritage complicated the racial
dialogue that had been established and renegotiated throughout the Pueblo lands
controversy during the past decade. If Juan Lorenzo Valdez was a Nambé Indian, his act
of passing a land parcel to his grandson Valentín was considerably less heinous than the
squatting and outright seizure of land that Pueblo advocates had alleged in the acrimony
of the Bursum Bill debate. Valentín’s sale to Luciano García in 1902 had marked the
proper date for the loss of land by the Pueblo of Nambé. Pueblo land sales in light of the
Vigil and Valdez instances were seemingly ubiquitous in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries in Nambé.773
The hearing for the private claim of Florentino Ortiz repeated the patterns seen in
the García and Ribera claims. Ortiz was represented by J. H. Crist, the former Pueblo
attorney who had preceded Richard Hanna in the post and served during the 1916 Nambé
ditch controversy. His wife, Celestina Romero Ortiz, arranged for Crist to serve as
counsel and for witnesses to offer testimony in her husband’s absence. Miguel Herrera,
772
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who had sold the land to Ortiz after he purchased it from Nambé governor Francisco
Tafoya (also spelled Tafolla), testified on behalf of Ortiz, who, like Ignacio García, was
absent to work in the mines of Telluride, Colorado. Herrera claimed that he had
purchased the lands in about 1896, which matched Francisco Tafoya’s tenure as governor
of Nambé Pueblo. As postmaster for the area, Herrera had frequently travelled the area’s
roads for twenty-five years and had observed the changes in land tenure at Nambé.
Herrera later subdivided the land, selling Ortiz a piece. According to the postmaster,
Ortiz consistently grew corn, wheat, and alfalfa on the small tract which was bordered on
the north and east by an acequia.774
The Ortiz claim was confusing and conflicted. Augustín Vigil, the former Nambé
Pueblo Council member who had sold tracts to Ignacio García, then testified that the
parcel sold by Francisco Tafoya to Miguel Herrera was one that he himself planted. Both
Herrera and Celestina Romero, the wife of Florentino Ortiz, testified that their deed to
this land had been signed by Tafoya and one of his principales, Antonio Tapia. Although
acknowledging that Tafolla was governor in 1896 at the time of the purchase, Vigil
denied that there was ever a Council member named “Antonio” Tapia. The person in
question, he suggested, “ought to be Antonia Tapia . . . the wife of Francisco Tafolla.”
The deed for the land sold to Miguel Herrera and resold to Florentino Ortiz and Celestina
Romero was signed not by the governor of Nambé and one of his principales, but by the
governor and his wife. The couple seemed to have executed the sale as its sole owners.
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The buyers, Herrera and Ortiz, had misinterpreted the transaction as a purchase of
communal property from the legal representatives of the tribe.775

Figure 25: Private land claim of Agapito Herrera, also displaying neighboring claims
of Camilo Garcia (E), Florentino Ortiz (NW and N). folder, 123, box 13, Folder 123,
Erik Sverre Collection (formerly known as the Carmen Quintana Collection), New
Mexico State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Absentee claimants, such as García and Ortiz, were common in Nambé. Emiliano
López was working in Greeley, Colorado, was represented at the hearings by attorney
Manuel Sánchez, the former U. S. surveyor general for New Mexico. Lٕópez had
inherited his claim from his father, Nestor. Witnesses for López testified that the claim
had been non-Indian land for as long as they could remember, or since they had “reached
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the age of reason.” Another portion of López’s claim was inherited by his wife, Eloysa
Romero López, from her father, Atocha Romero, whose father was Vicente Romero, the
son of Manuel Romero, the attorney representing Nambé leaders in the 1854 witchcraft
trial.776 Camilo García, who was away herding sheep in Navajo Country, was represented
by his father-in-law, Agapito Herrera. According to Herrera, García purchased his land
directly from the governor of Nambé. Although Herrera did not recall the governor’s
name, he dated the purchase at 1899, precisely when Francisco Tafoya was governor.
Tafoya had, again, demonstrated a propensity for selling Nambé Pueblo land.
Another portion of Camilo García’s claimed lands came from sales by other
Nambé Indians. Clara Trujillo de Rivera sold land in 1903 and José de la Ascension
Peña in 1908 that García later purchased from non-Indians. These sales by one governor
and a handful of Indians troubled the Board. Hagerman, Jennings, and Walker worked to
cast doubt on the validity of these transactions. The testimony of former governor
Augustín Vigil (1911-1913) complicated matters even further. Pueblo attorney Walter C.
Cochrane called Vigil to testify, believing that he would dispute sales by Indians to nonIndians. Instead, Vigil defended the pueblo’s process for alientating land: if the Council
felt the need was great enough, it approved a sale. He claimed, however, a deed signed
by the Council alone was not recognition of a valid or legal sale of land. Vigil did not
elaborate on how to distinguish a legitimate from an illegitimate sale based on papers,
many of which were signed by the governor and two principales. Vigil claimed that in
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these instances, the governor was merely selling his own land within the exterior
boundaries of the pueblo without the approval of the Council.777
Vigil’s contradictions frustrated the Board, which pressed for clarification.
Vigil’s statements suggested that Nambé lands were the property of the Pueblo and the
Council had the sole authority to allow or disallow sales. He reiterated his stance on
Pueblo rights when he testified in hearings on the claim of Canuto Ortiz. Ortiz pieced
together his land claim over nearly thirty years. The sixty-two-year-old Ortiz’s claim
originated from José de Jesús Ortiz’s 1892 purchase from Nambé Indian Antonio José
Vigil. In 1896, Ortiz purchased lands directly from the Pueblo of Nambé, and produced a
deed signed by Governor Francisco Tafoya and principales Antonio J. Vigil and Joaquín
Tafoya. Yet another portion was added from an 1899 purchase of adjacent lands from
Lorenzo Mirabal and María Eufemia Vigil de Mirabal, both Nambé Pueblo natives. The
sale was again approved by Governor Tafoya and prinicpales Vigil and Tafoya. Aware of
impending controversy, Ortiz had his land re-deeded on April 20, 1920, by Governor
Francisco Tafoya and principales Marcos Tapia and Antonio Trujillo. Ortiz could also
demonstrate tax payments for most years from 1896 to 1924.778
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Figure 26: Private land claim of Canuto Ortiz, 1926. folder 3, box 8 Nambe Pueblo,
Renehan-Gilbert Papers, NMSRCA, Santa Fe.
The legitimacy of Ortiz’s claim, supported by nearly complete a series evidence
save a few tax receipts, was indisputable. Again, former Nambé governor Augustín Vigil
testified about the identities of the Nambé officials, confirming that they were, in fact,
Indians and members of the Nambé Pueblo tribe. Pueblo attorney Cochrane asked Vigil,
“Do you know anything about the supposed sale by these three parties or any land now
claimed by Canuto Ortiz?” Vigil responded, “I believe that these tracts were sold by
these Indians because this land was divided at that time among the Indians for the
purpose of making sales.” Vigil’s statement now suggested that these sales were not
random acts by Pueblo officials or individual members of the tribe, but that Pueblo
officials purposefully subdivided Nambé Pueblo lands for the explicit purposes of selling
tracts to the local Hispano population.779
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Canuto Ortiz’s attorney, H. B. Hamilton of the Renehan-Gilbert Law Firm, then
pressed Vigil. He asked Vigil whether the pueblo exercised the “habit of letting a settler
come in there and take up a piece of land and start cultivating it without any title or right
to it of any kind” or whether “it is pretty well understood that whenever there is a nonIndian cultivating, that the Indians feel he is in there under right?” The Board grew
incensed at the questioning, well knowing that Hamilton was attempting to get a Pueblo
official to state on record that all non-Indians on Nambé lands were there with the
permission of the pueblo and were thus not squatters. But the damage of Vigil’s
testimony had already been done. The Board was now forced to consider carefully every
claim of a settler who purchased his lands in the 1890s, during the term of Nambé Pueblo
governor Francisco Tafoya, whose name was attached to nearly every legitimate claim of
Nambé Pueblo lands.780
Revisiting José A. Ribera’s claim, which introduced this chapter, demonstrates
the impact of testimony such as Vigil’s. The Board was initially inclined to reject
Ribera’s claim, but offered no substantiation or cause. Just as the Board refused to reveal
the legal principles of its decisions to Indian advocates and lawyers, it equally left
Hispano claimants uninformed and unable to defend their cases. Ribera’s claim does not
deviate wildly from others. His claim was supported by an 1892 deed acknowledged by
the realtor-like Nambé governor Tafoya and his principales. That document was not
presented in the hearings but had been recorded in Santa Fe County records. The Board
questioned whether a deed issued from an individual Indian, whether or not he was an
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official, constituted color of title.781 The Sandoval decision suggested that it did not, but
still offered no explicit legal remedy.
Pigeonholed as a “liquor case” in state courts, Sandoval cast doubt on even the
possession of Pueblo lands by non-Indians. It assumed that all non-Indian claims to
Pueblo lands were based purely on adverse possession, treated those claims as so-called
squatter’s rights, and allowed no possibility of or consideration to Indian sales. Sandoval
only reaffirmed the fiduciary duty of U.S. Congress to Pueblo Indians and held that
Congress had the authority to regulate the commerce of all tribes, including land sales,
but the decision did not pursue federal guardianship of Pueblo lands retroactively, leaving
a gap in federal protection from the U.S. v. Joseph decision of 1876. It was not until
Richard H. Hanna filed the ejectment suits in 1919 that the statutory authority of the
federal government under Sandoval was enacted.782
Again, it was Ribera who disputed the Board’s neat division of the local
population. He labelled the Nambé Indians “more Mexican than Indian,” and even
entertained the possibility that he too was part Indian. Ribera’s quick tongue and petulant
responses angered the Board. He interrupted the questioning of witnesses and posed his
own questions to defend his claim. This included Nambé Indian Loreto Vigil, who
supported his testimony. Despite testimony by Ribera and other witnesses, solid
evidence in deeds and above-average tax payments, the Board considered rejecting his
claim. (Suggesting that the Board was retaliating for Ribera’s dismissive attitude may be
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pure conjecture.) The Board’s absolute reversal implies that the convincing evidence of
Nambé Pueblo’s sales of land softened its stance toward Ribera’s claim.783
While the Board debated whether color of title was achieved by Indian sale,
another case in the U.S. Supreme Court offered the possibility of clarifying Pueblo
Indians’s status. In 1922, the United States had brought a suit in the Federal District
Court for New Mexico against José Candelaria and others to quiet title in the Indian
pueblo of Laguna. The suit was brought on the theory that Laguna Indians were wards of
the United States, and that the federal government “therefore has authority and is under a
duty to protect them in the ownership and enjoyment of their lands.” The case was
decided and then appealed to federal appellate court, which forwarded the case to the U.
S. Supreme Court for a decision under the case United States v. Candelaria. Rumors of
the pending Candelaria decision swirled throughout the winter and spring of 1926, and
the Board postponed issuing its final report to District Court until it could align its
recommendations with the decision.784
The Candelaria decision had the potential to not only unravel not only all sales of
Pueblo land by Indians, but to cast a pall over all sales of any land by Pueblos inside or
outside their Pueblo. It would impact the legal foundation of Pueblo ownership and their
right to sell land as an individuals outside their status as a protected tribe to which they
belonged. It might also confirm that Pueblo grants were perfected community grants,
which no individual member owned. The U. S. Supreme Court finally issued its ruling
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on June 1, 1926: the United States possessed the authority and obligation to intervene in
land claims on behalf of Pueblo Indians. The court stated, “The Indians of the pueblo are
wards of the United States and hold their lands subject to the restriction that the same
cannot be alienated in any wise without its consent.” The decision ignored actual Pueblo
land sales and cast doubt on land tenure in New Mexico, embracing orthodox legal
principles and ignoring legal realism. The ruling also established that the federal
protection of Pueblos began in 1850 with New Mexico territorial status, not in 1913 with
the U.S. v. Sandoval decision. The thirty-seven-year lapse of guardianship between the
Joseph and Sandoval decisions was thus either bridged or eliminated.785
The Candelaria decision also constrained the Board’s liberal interpretation of
territorial statutes of limitation. Applying them would save countless Hispano claims. In
Board hearings, Hispano claimants routinely asserted possession of their Pueblo land
claims for more than forty years, establishing the minimum standard needed to prove
adverse possession. Allowing the application of statutes of limitation would restrict
United States prosecution on behalf of the Pueblos. At face value, Hispano claimants
were seemingly coached by their attorneys to introduce a claim of appropriate length. In
reality, the 1880s and 1890s had been decades of relentless speculation, a period when
numerous Hispano land grants lost lands in anticipation of the Court of Private Land
Claims and through its decisions.
The jurisdictional dispute between territorial statutes of limitation and federal
guardianship pitted the federal government’s and state government’s sovereignty claims
against one another. Indian advocates and even many government officials, including
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Pueblo attorneys Walter Cochrane and Ralph Twitchell, claimed that no statute of
limitation could be imposed on federal guardianship. For the federal government’s
fiduciary duty to Pueblo Indians was perpetual: it was unconstrained by the policies of a
lesser sovereign. The slew of officials who had attempted to limit federal power over all
resource decisions in the drafting of the Pueblo Lands Act now scrambled to diminish the
impact of the Board’s decisions and threw themselves headlong into the confused
deliberations. All of this was moot, however, as the Candelaria decision, unlike
Sandoval, was explicit on federal guardianship.786
Candelaria ended squatter’s rights on Pueblo land, emphatically questioning
claims based solely on adverse possession. The Supreme Court’s decision prompted the
Board to reject all land claims not supported by title, regardless of their age. Guided by
Candelaria, the Board threw out the massive 1854 Romero-López tract and
recommended payment to the many heirs of Manuel Romero and Vicente López, despite
the fact that the claim the Pueblo Lands Act standards for claims based on adverse
possession by thirty-five years. John Collier believed that Candelaria would also end the
Board’s interpretation of the controversial Section 4 of the Act, which held that territorial
and state statutes of limitation ran against the Pueblos (see Appendix A). While the
decision made itself a party to all lawsuits regarding Pueblo lands, it did preserve one
legal vulnerability regarding Pueblo lands. The Court cited and concurred with the New
Mexico court’s Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa decision, which declared a native pueblo
and its people were juristic persons capable of suing or being sued. This ambiguity
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created another question: were Pueblo Indians individually capable of executing deeds on
their own behalf or on behalf of their Pueblo?787
While the Board considered Candelaria’s impact on its hearings at Nambé, it
fended off controversies surrounding its proceedings. By December 1925, AIDA
attorney Hanna had filed protests with the secretary of the interior and commissioner of
Indian affairs. He demanded that the Board issue a definition of the legal principles
applied in its hearings and decisions and provide copies of all claims appraisals. Beyond
these reasonable requests, he insisted full transcripts of all hearings, all Spanish deeds
and their translations, and blueprint maps showing all claim improvements, materials that
the Board produced only when needed for its own uses. Jennings assured Hanna that all
the information was available for his use or reference in the Board’s offices in the Catron
Building in downtown Santa Fe. Hanna nonetheless complained that Indian advocates
were “in the dark unless you make the following available to us.”788
The work of the board was also constrained by the so-called “Coolidge
economy.” The policies of Republican president Calvin Coolidge rolled back the
obligations and spending of the federal government even further than his Republican
predecessor Warren G. Harding. Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon pressured
Congress to reduce government oversight, regulation and costs. Mellon believed that
fiscal responsibility and economy in government would spur economic growth and
prosperity. The Board’s first hearings at Tesuque and Nambé were costly. The Board
produced full transcripts of proceedings and provided copies to both the plaintiffs and
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defendants often at nominal costs. AIDA lawyers Richard Hanna and Fred Wilson and
the young, new Pueblo attorney, Walter C. Cochrane, complained bitterly that the Board
was denying them information to which they were entitled when it refused to furnish
copies of deeds and abstracted titles at no cost. Alois Renehan, who played a surprisingly
meek role in the hearings themselves, also petitioned the Board for an agreement to share
documents more freely and without high costs.789
If Hanna believed that the Board was intentionally withholding information, he
was right. Early in debates on procedure, Walker told Hagerman that his intention was
“to consider the territorial statutes if that seems to be the only way by which we can do
equity, but not announcing our rules of law unless and until we find it unavoidable.”790
Again, Walker aimed at achieving equity rather than justice and was willing to embrace
secrecy to do so. Walker warned Jennings that Hanna and Collier were also pondering
the request of an amendment to the Pueblo Lands Act that would forbid the Board to
consider territorial statutes of limitation in its decisions.791
While awaiting the Candelaria decision, Walker issued a memorandum regarding
what he called “certain circumstances particular to Nambé.” He explained that the
“Pueblo has been occupied by non-Indians (almost wholly Mexicans or the descendants
of Mexicans married to Indians) since the early part of the eighteenth century. . . . The
Indians themselves have for decades occupied only a few acres in the extreme southeast
corner of the Pueblo grant.” He continued, “The Indians seem to have been almost
entirely cooperative in the granting of deeds.” In light of the Candelaria decision,
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however, the Board still rejected titles derived from Indian officials if a shadow of a
doubt remained on their origin.792
The Board was thoroughly exhausted after the Nambé hearings, even as Walker
considered the Board’s decisions not as final but only a “coarse screen,” with title
determinations left for the courts. In his opinion, the whole board need not attend all
hearings, and even the clerk could conduct hearings in the Board’s absence. Indeed, in
February 1926, Walker had a heart attack and continued his prolonged absences from
Board hearings. Still, he refused to vacate his position until President Coolidge
demanded it. Walker resigned on May 24, 1926, less than a week before the Supreme
Court issued its Candelaria decision.793
Collier was disappointed that the Board seemed reluctant, even unwilling, to
dislodge settlers. The “Board is disposed to leave the white settlers and claimants largely
undisturbed and to award compensation to the Indians,” wrote Collier.794 Collier and
Hanna believed that they were bringing Jennings to their side and hoped that George A.
H. Fraser, the pragmatic attorney assigned to the Pueblo Lands Board by the U. S.
attorney general, would be appointed to Walker’s seat. Instead, Lucius Embree, a career
political appointee from Missouri, was named.795
When the Board finally issued its report and recommendations for Nambé in
August 1926, controversies multiplied. Nambé Pueblo received a larger land share by
acreage, but the commissioners awarded most of the irrigated land in dispute to non-
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Indians. For the 654.36 acres lost, the Board awarded Nambé only $19,630.80, less than
the amount awarded to Tesuque for three times the land. Extinguished claims, those on
which the Board ruled that Indian title remained and which adverse claimants had to
vacate, were awarded a total of $18,881.43 (See Appendix C). The Board recommended
a small award to losing claimants and greatly deviated from an appraised market value of
$65,674.77, rewarding less than a third of the appraised value. The low award was
valued at $5.00 per acre, plus an additional $25.00 for water rights lost per acre. The
pueblo lost very few acres of arable land, the Board argued; therefore, the water rights of
the pueblo were not eroded or lost. In fact, the Board stated, Nambé Indians were
entitled to priority rights over non-Indians for Nambé River waters. The report virtually
ignored the Pueblo Lands Act’s tax provisions when it recognized that “not 2% of
claimants could meet such a requirement.” Pueblo attorney Cochrane, who had
participated heavily at the Nambé hearings, agreed with Hagerman and Walker’s
construal of tax provisions and pursuit of equity.796

Figure 27: Private land claim of José A. Ribera, 1926. folder 10, box 1, Pueblo of
Nambé Affairs, June 30, 1925-May 18, 1926, PLB Records, NMSCRA, Santa Fe.
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Though the Board recommended an exceptionally low award, it did reject the
larger adverse claims at Nambé. While approved claims constituted 73 percent of all
claims, the 177 approved claims totaled only 654.36 acres, meaning they averaged 3.69
acres. The claims of Canuto Ortiz, Emiliano López, Florentino Ortiz, and Ignacio García,
each less than six acres, were all approved. The Board, on the other hand, rejected 65
larger claims that constituted 3,187.61 acres, averaging 49.04 acres per claim. This
included the massive 2,340-acre Romero – López tract, which the Board rejected despite
the age of the claim, its detailed documentation and the apparent willing sale to Hispanos
by Pueblo officials. Perhaps the Board anticipated that allowing such a large claim
would have caused an uproar among Pueblo advocates. It may have also understood that
the heirs of Romero sought to profit off lands that they once shared with the Nambé
Indians, and that many dispossessed heirs would prefer a financial award to recognition
of title to lands they could no longer access. José A. Ribera’s thirteen-acre claim was
also among those rejected by the Board, as well as Camilo García’s small, two-acre but
well irrigated claim.797
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Figure 28: Private land claim of Camilo García, 1926
Source: Box 1, Folder 5, Hearings before the Pueblo Lands Board, July 17, 1924February 18, 1926, PLB Records, NMSRCA, Santa Fe.
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Figure 29: Private Land Claims at Nambé Pueblo, 1929, detail. Non-Indian claims at
Nambé amounted to the majority of its irrigated lands. Tracts depicted in the northeast
corner of the grant were part of the Romero-López tract and were ultimately rejected.
folder 1, box 26, Pueblo Indians, Nambé Pueblo, 1933-1935, Manuel A Sánchez Papers,
NMSCRA, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Hagerman defended both the low Nambé award and high Tesuque award. He
reasoned that in Tesuque, where water was a serious issue, the Pueblo needed funds to
develop ground-water resources. So Tesuque was granted a sizable award with the
advice that pumping plants be installed to supplement the Río Tesuque’s fragile waters.
This distinction was especially important in light of the dropping of the Exon suit, which
would have established priority but could have pitted the Pueblos against one and other.
425

At Nambé, Indians lived upstream of Hispanos and had first access to water and priority
to surplus waters. So their awards were lowered to $30.00 per acre, more than a third less
than Tesuque’s $105.00-an-acre award. The Nambé award was still far below the
assessed fair-market value of the land, which ranged from $74.00 to $125.00 per acre.
The $30.00 award was only defensible on the theory that it was value of land without
water rights, which the Pueblo theoretically retained.798 Hagerman claimed to Secretary
Work that he had applied the Winters Doctrine to Pueblo lands, reserving their water
rights. It begged the question of whether Hispanos won confirmation of their claims
without water rights. The Winters Doctrine maintained that Indians held a priority right
of water use and that all other adjudications were inapplicable. The First District Court
rejected this theory as running contrary to beneficial use, which guided equitable water
distribution. Hagerman’s bizarre logic was kept secret, and Hanna and Collier could not
object. Thus, the Nambé decision initially went uncontested.799
The Nambé hearings shattered any ideas that the Pueblo lands question was easily
solvable. Tesuque’s claims were so few that the Board could afford to compensate the
pueblo generously for lands that it lost and water rights that were impacted by non-Indian
claims. Nambé had more than ten times as many claims for more than eight times as
much land. The Tesuque and Nambé Pueblo populations were also very different. If
Tesuque was widely considered conservative and intermarriage with Hispanos was rare,
then Nambé seemed to dissolve into the Hispano population that surrounded the pueblo
and had gradually taken over its lands. The hearings revealed a complexity that was not

798

Hall, “The Pueblo Land Grant Labyrinth,” 121.
Kelly, “History of the Pueblo Lands Board,” 69; Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564, 1908.
426
799

seen at Tesuque, a convolution that the Board ignored. It dealt instead with the impact of
the Candelaria decision on the hearings, financial restraint demanded by the Coolidge
administration, and recommending distressingly low awards that troubled the Board for
the next three years.
Over the next year, the Board moved in new directions, attempting to hasten their
hearings across the state while scrutinizing claims and fumbling over water rights. In the
Tewa Basin, hearings in Picurís, San Juan and San Ildefonso presented new challenges.
Picurís’s and San Ildefonso’s population continued to plummet and their arable lands
were largely in possession of Hispanos. San Juan, on the other hand, had a large and
comparably stable population, and although Picurís and San Ildefonso lost their lands a
few acres at a time, San Juan had a whole Spanish colonial grant on its lands.
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Chapter 10: Ethnicity and Equity, I: Picurís, San Juan and San Ildefonso,
1927-1929
By 1927, the Pueblo Lands Board was nearly half a decade removed from the
controversies over the Bursum Bill. Lawyers and advocates had fought to shape the bill
that created the Board, a commission that supporters hoped would forestall judicial action
by rendering parity. Although the courts were bound by the Sandoval and Candelaria
decisions, the Board could, through its hearings, evaluate each claim on every native
pueblo and seek an equitable outcome. In action, at Tesuque and Nambé, the Board had
found difficulty creating a replicable process, a way of conducting hearings and assessing
claims that both pueblo advocates and the claimants and their lawyers could accept.
If Tesuque and Nambé forced the Board to reconsider the Pueblo lands problem,
then hearings at Picurís, San Juan and San Ildefonso proved how unpredictable the Board
was. Picurís was one of the smallest Indian Pueblos in New Mexico. Its high elevation
limited agriculture, making it vulnerable even in good years. By the 1820s, the Pueblo
was nearly fully encircled by Hispano grants and Hispano communities had grown to
wholly encroach on Pueblo lands a century later. San Ildefonso was arguably in a more
desperate state. Sitting at the bottom of the Pojoaque-Tesuque River, the Pueblo
intermittedly faced water shortages for mare than a century. Its population plunged in the
late nineteenth century and decades-old divisions within the pueblo continued, with
artists and potters influencing one faction. While San Juan had lost more net acres to
non-Indian claims, it also had the better access to water than Picurís and San Ildefonso
and the greatest potential to develop adjacent lands.
San Juan, Picurís, and San Ildefonso presented unique challenges to the Board.
The inconsistency of the Board’s recommendations led to the implementation of
428

contingencies designed by A. A. Berle and John Collier to subvert decisions only in
worst-case scenarios. After years on newspaper headlines, the Pueblo lands controversy
and the Board faded from public interest. The ebb and flow of Board hearings confused
attorneys, enraged Pueblo advocates and bored a weary public. By 1929, the Great
Depression diverted public attention from the Pueblo lands controversy, just as Congress
began to investigate the Board’s dysfunction. This chapter discusses this period, when
the Board faltered between the the seeming ease of Tesuque and the complications of
Pojoaque.
~~~
Despite the Board’s attempts to mitigate controversy through secrecy, its actions
drew wide public attention. In September 1926, Alois Renehan filed a lawsuit that
questioned the constitutionality of the Pueblo Lands Act, arguing that his clients at
Tesuque and Nambé had been denied an actual trial in court. Confiscating their lands
without trial, complained Renehan, was unconstitutional. He further alleged that the
Board members advised his clients to forego hearings and accept their recommended
awards yet awarded Charles Catron’s clients their full claim with little or no
contestation.800 Board counsel George A. H. Fraser fervently denied allegations that he
had tampered with Renehan’s clients, and admonished Renehan and his law partner, Carl
Gilbert, for withholding information from their own clients for their own personal gain.801
The Board met Renehan’s offensive with pleas for cooperation from the public and
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promising to pursue “equity . . . for the best interest of settlers, Indians and the public
generally.” It called the Pueblo Lands Act imperfect but “salutary and workable,” and
implored claimants to consider the larger community interest rather than their own selfinterest when they questioned the efficacy of the Board and its processes.802
While the Board attempted to control public protest, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs Charles Burke actively worked to undermine John Collier and AIDA. Worried
about their influence over the Pueblos, Burke attempted to supplant the traditionalist-led
All Indian Pueblo Council, which worked actively with AIDA, with government-friendly
progressives in the “U.S. Pueblo Council.” Hagerman, who had led a similar scheme in
Navajo Country in 1923, would convene the Progressive Council’s meetings, typically
held at the Santa Fe Indian School, as its ex-officio chairman. The U.S. Pueblo Council
brought the fledgling Progressive Pueblo Indian Council, formed in 1924, under its wing.
Hagerman’s activities with the Council earned the undying hatred of Collier, who already
disliked him because of his connection with Navajo oil leases.803
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When the Board committed itself to seeking equity in its recommendations, it
undermined A. A. Berle’s provisions in the act that AIDA confidently assumed would
oblige the commissioners to follow strictly the act, guide its work, and limit, even inhibit,
legal interpretation. Independent suits provided for in the act nonetheless allowed Native
pueblos to pursue lands in claims where they disagreed with the Board’s findings and
gave them a day it court, which their Hispano counterparts were denied. Collier was
frustrated with Richard H. Hanna’s restraint in pursuing independent suits, especially for
lack of tax payments. Collier promised Charles Y. de Elkus that if Hanna failed to act
aggressively, he would challenge the constitutionality of Board or, if nothing else, fight it
politically and attack its funding in Congress.804 If Collier decided to move against or
without Hanna, Collier would offer Santa Fe attorney Charles Fahy the job.
Unbeknownst to Collier, Fahy confessed to Hanna a conflict of interest because he
represented settlers in Taos and Picurís.805
Board members were surprised during their Taos Pueblo hearings when the
pueblo, ignoring the advice of Collier and Hanna, agreed to exempt the Town of Taos
from consideration. That decision reduced claims from 500 to 300. The Pueblos hoped
that the concession would aid consideration of its claim to sacred Blue Lake, which was
lost to the creation of federal forest reserves in 1906.806 Hanna thought that the Board’s
pursuit of equity admirable and politically advisable, and he eventually agreed with Taos
Pueblo’s concession of claims comprising the Town of Taos. Collier, nonetheless,
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considered the recognizing of Hispano land rights as merely a moral act, but by no means
an imperative or obligation. To Collier, Taos Pueblo’s decision was proof that the
natives were the good conscientious neighbors that Mexicans could never be. What he
believed to be moral concessions and generous negotiations, George A.H. Frasier
believed to be necessary to sustain the constitutionality of the Pueblo Lands Act.
Although faced with the dilemma of a Board soft on settlers, Collier remained
aggressive and uncompromising. Hanna, on the other hand, criticized by San Francisco
attorney and AIDA legal counsel Charles Y. de Elkus for being too passive toward and
supportive of the Board’s professed search for equitability. He felt the Pueblo cause held
the high ground on all points, legal and moral. During the Board hearings and when
Board decisions were certified by the District Court from 1929-1931, Collier grew
annoyed by Hanna’s caution. Was Hanna too closely tied to New Mexico’s political
elites to execute an aggressive legal strategy that would ultimately repatriate as much
land to the Pueblos as possible? Collier began corresponding heavily with Dudley
Cornell, a counselor in Hanna’s office, whom he trusted to report on the Board’s
activities. In Collier’s mind, Hanna, the former State Supreme Court justice and
Democratic gubernatorial candidate seemed fearful of alienating his would-be
constituents.807
Despite his reluctance, Collier had no choice but to put his faith in Hanna and his
judgment. As Pueblo attorney in 1918, Hanna had filed the ejectment suits that his
predecessors were hesitant to execute. Compared to his predecessors, Hanna was a man
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of impeccable moral standards. George Hill Howard had speculated in Hispano
community grants while serving as U.S. Indian inspector in the early 1880s and
continued to do so as the first attorney for the Pueblos a decade later. Howard learned
that speculating in small-parcel claims on Pueblo land was risky, and though he
aggressively pursued land claims in the vicinity of San Juan Pueblo, he was cautious to
avoid the lands with a cloud over their title. William H. Pope notably ruled against
Pueblo wardship in the U.S. v. Sandoval case, but was overturned by the U. S. Supreme
Court.808 His successor, A. J. Abbott represented adverse claimants to Pueblo lands,
including the swindler of nearly half of Santa Clara Pueblo’s lands.809 Francis C. Wilson
infamously served as Pueblo attorney while assisting in the sale of the Pojoaque Grant to
California investors and was a prime mover in selling the lands of Pecos Pueblo. Despite
his duplicity, he was still employed by the New Mexico Association on Indian Affairs,
which embraced him as much for his opposition to Collier as for his competence in
serving the Pueblo cause. The only other attorneys who equaled Wilson’s and Howard’s
experience in Pueblo litigation and knowledge of their contentious history with their
Hispano neighbors were Ralph E. Twitchell, who died in 1925, and Alois Renehan, who
represented Hispanos and opposed the Pueblo cause.
While Hanna and Collier diverged on their approach to independent suits, the
First Judicial District Court took action on the Tesuque and Nambé claims. When the
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suit to quiet titles at Nambé began in July 1927, two questions regarding the controversial
Section 4 of the Pueblo Lands Act immediately arose. First, despite the Candelaria
decision, federal judge Orie Phillips considered whether non-Indians could invoke
statutes of limitation to protect their claims. Phillips also considered what period of time
adverse claimants had in order to produce evidence of tax payments. During the case,
filed as Pueblo of Nambé v. David Herrera, Hanna argued that awards at Nambé were
too low. Board attorney George A. H. Fraser agreed but defended the Board’s broad
interpretation on how to compensate claimants for improvements. Phillips largely agreed
with the Board’s recommendations but increased the award from $30.00 to $65.00 on 489
of the 654 acres of extinguished Pueblo lands, increasing the total award by $7,038.93.
But the court also revived thirty-two rejected claims, shifting the percentage of approved
claims from 73 percent to 86 percent (See Appendices C and D).810
In July 1928, Federal Judges Orie Phillips and Colin Neblett issued a joint ruling
on Pueblo of Nambé v. David Herrera. Collier and Hanna were pleased that the justices
rejected the use of statutes of limitation by adverse claimants, firmly adhering to the
Candelaria decision. They further held that claims could only stand if they were in
compliance with Sections 4a and 4b of the Pueblo Lands Act, which made proof of paid
taxes necessary to confirm all claims. An important caveat in their ruling stated that tax
payments were necessary but only in the years in which they were lawfully assessed.
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Further, Phillips ruled that tax payments would be recognized if paid within four years of
their assessed due date.811
Amid the Nambé decision, Judge Phillips was elevated to a Circuit Court
judgeship, leaving Colin Neblett to write the final opinion for the Nambé case and to hear
all remaining cases. When Neblett elaborated in the full written decision, he extended the
window for claimants to pay taxes, allowing delinquent tax payments or good-faith
efforts to execute payments until the suit to quiet title was filed in District Court. He also
overturned thirty-two of the sixty-five claims rejected by the Board. Among natives and
Pueblo advocates, Neblett demonstrated a disquieting bias for Hispano claims and against
Pueblo Indians.812 Fraser exposed his own prejudices as well, stating that the results of
the Nambé case could be blamed on the “good testimony of the settlers chief spokesman”
(perhaps referring to José A. Ribera or José Inez Roybal) and the “corresponding
imprecision” of the “dull and ignorant Indians” upon whom he was forced to rely.813
The mixed results of the Nambé case left many participants and observers
pondering the role and authority of the Board. Although it sought equity in its
recommendations, it was powerless when its parity was dismantled by the First District
Court. After the Tesuque and Nambé hearings, the Board took a few months to hear
claims in the Río Abajo, including Sandia, San Felipe, Santo Domingo and Isleta lands.
811
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The Board took up hearings at Picurís in the late summer of 1927. By the time of the
Picurís hearings, the Board had filed reports for Taos Pueblo, and the case Pueblo of Taos
v. Gerson Gusdorf was lodged in District Court. The Taos case bore directly on Picurís,
as Picurís attempted to emulate Taos Pueblo’s strategy by recognizing select claims in
exchange for the consideration of others. 814
When the Board held its hearings for Taos in 1926, the pueblo agreed to
recognize 224 of 503 claims, including the entire Town of Taos. This plan reduced the
number of claims that had to be tried before and heard by the Board from approximately
500 to 300. The Pueblo anticipated that these concessions would gain the Board’s and
Indian Bureau’s support for the return of the sacred Blue Lake, which was lost when
President Theodore Roosevelt created the Taos Forest Reserve in 1906. In practice,
foresters had initially reserved the use of lands surrounding Blue Lake for the Pueblo.
The Pueblo nonetheless tried securing an executive order reservation to protect Blue Lake
in 1914 and again in 1916. Taos Pueblo’s efforts accelerated in 1918, when forester
Elliott Barker issued grazing permits and promoted tourism near the lake with improved
trails. The Board agreed with the strategy, and Taos forwent $300,000 in compensation,
but was betrayed when the Board failed to appeal for the return of Blue Lake.815
Always wishing to hasten the Board’s work, Hagerman held that Taos Pueblo’s
recognition of claims meant that the Board was not compelled to examine the claims, but
Embree and Jennings argued that the proof of possession, which claimants had to
814
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establish, came only from formal hearings.816 Picurís attempted a similar compromise,
offering to accept the oldest claims, including many in Vadito and Peñasco, in exchange
for some of the more-recent ones, but the arrangement fell apart when settlers at
Chamisal refused to budge. Secondly, AIDA attorneys Hanna and Fred T. Wilson, along
with Dudley Cornell, filed independent suits at Taos and Picurís when they became
dissatisfied with the federal District Court’s affirmation and extension of Board rulings
already generous to non-Indians’s adverse claims.

Figure 30: Picurís Pueblo, showing non-Indian claims (shaded). The shaded area
shows the extent of Hispano claims on the Picurís Grant, which continued to grow
throughout the territorial period and accelerated when area Hispano grants, including the
Santa Barbara Grant (not shown) to the south of the Picurís league was partitioned, lost to
tax delinquency and bought by timber companies. Carlson, The Spanish American
Homeland, 48.
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With a population estimated at 125 in 1900 and 97 in 1939, the shrinking Picurís
Pueblo had contended with large-scale Hispano invasions since the late 1800s (see
chapter 3).817 By 1927, the result was 677 claims for 2,691.09 acres. Claims averaged
less than four acres. Intermarriage was rare at Picurís, though some claims may have
derived from Hispanos bequeathing Pueblo lands to their mixed-race heirs. More
common at Picurís was the sale of Pueblo lands by Picurís officials or individuals. At
Tesuque and Nambé, the Board recommended the rejection of adverse claims that
demonstrated insufficient payment of taxes, but at Picurís, it reacted to Neblett’s tax
ruling by recommending claims for approval despite tax delinquency.818
The Board approved Picurís claims at a rate similar to Nambé. Of the 677
adverse claims, the Board rejected 128 for 622.84 acres, and approved 549, or 81 percent
of all claims, for 2,068.25 acres (See Appendix C). Although Nambé and Tesuque
contained a mix of claims, those at Picuris were remarkably uniform. Rejected claims
averaged 4.86 acres, only a little over one acre larger than approved claims, 3.76 acres on
average. Even rejected claims were only 12 to 15 acres large at best. The land had not a
high, inherent value: most of the properties’ appraised value came from improvements
like houses, corrals, ditches and orchards. For instance, claimants Timoteo Martínez,
Demecio Gurulé, Diego Chacón and Teófilo Medina were all well-compensated for their
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rejected claims. Each property had numerous improvements and each was more than
forty years old by the time of the Picurís hearings.819
Though the Board kept Judge Neblett’s tax ruling in mind when assessing claims,
the District Court nonetheless reversed 102 of the rejected 128 claims for 503.6 acres.
The combined actions of the Board and the District Court repatriated a mere 119.24 acres
to Picurís Pueblo, or 4.4 percent of lands claimed by non-Indians (See Appendices C and
D). The Board recommended that Picurís be compensated $47,132.90 for 2,571.85 acres
lost to non-Indian title, and that Hispanos who lost their lands be compensated
$11,474.73 for 119.24 acres. The difference in real compensation was more than five-toone, with Picurís receiving about $18.32 per acre for extinguished lands while their
Hispano counterparts received $96.23 per acre lost. The Board seemingly tossed aside
attempts for equity in Picurís, something they touted at Nambé.820
The extraordinary gap between the Board’s recommendations and the District
Court’s decisions and awards at Picurís made it a prime candidate for a legal test, which
Collier urged Hanna to undertake. After long correspondence and consultation with
AIDA counsel Herbert L. Stockton, Howard S. Gans, and Charles Y. de Elkus, Hanna
and his junior legal partner, Dudley Cornell, prepared independent suits and delivered
them to George A. H. Fraser to contest Board and District Court findings at Picurís and
Taos. The Taos case, Pueblo of Taos v. Wooten, met quick and hot opposition, and the
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appeal was dropped when the United States solicitor general and Department of Justice
instructed Fraser to abandon it. One of the central contentions in the appeals was that tax
provisions ignored by Judge Neblett destroyed an important proviso of the Pueblo Lands
Act, undermined the Pueblos’s rights to land, and neglected congressional intent.
The solicitor general and the Justice Department nonetheless acknowledged that
tax delinquency was not uncommon in New Mexico and that testing a claim’s legitimacy
by this measure was erroneous and prejudicial. Further, both feared that a successful
appeal could undermine the work of the Board and Congress. The latter explicitly
created the Board to avoid legal battles. Hanna then attempted to file the appeal without
Fraser, only to be rejected by the Tenth Circuit Federal Appellate Court, which refused to
accept the case from any authority but the U.S. attorney general. 821
Left with few acres but considerable funds, Picurís tested the feasibility of
purchasing land from adverse claimants whose title was confirmed by the Board or
District Court. The Office of Indian Affairs created elaborate repurchase plans with
Pueblo superintendents and agents, and with Pueblo leaders.822 They identified desirable
land and sought individuals who might be willing to sell their land back to the Pueblos.
A few claimants did so. Pablo Mascareñas sold over ten acres to Picurís Pueblo in 1934
and a relative, Juan D. Mascareñas, even had the value of his tracts reassessed by the
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Taos County Treasurer to reach a lower price that the Pueblo would be willing to pay.823
The Mascareñas proved to be the exception.
Much to the frustration of Pueblo attorneys and agents, Hispanos generally
refused to sell their land. Those interested in selling lands back to the Pueblo demanded
sums beyond the actual market value of the land. The contentious climate of the past
decade undoubtedly informed their unwillingness to sell in part. But the overzealous
planning of the Office of Indian Affairs ignored the likelihood that Hispanos refused to
depart with the land for the same reason they seized it in the first place; they desperately
needed the land. With the general failure of the Picurís land repurchase program,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Rhoads even suggested a drastic solution: that
Picurís be abandoned and moved to land near or on San Juan Pueblo, with whom it had
longstanding social and marital relations.824
Rhoads’s plan was predicated on the idea that water resources could be developed
in San Juan to create a surplus beyond the needs of San Juan Pueblo Indians. The OIA
drew up plans for Picurís to develop 160 acres above the confluence of the Río Pueblo de
Picurís and the Río Santa Barbara by digging ditches and bringing new lands under
irrigation. But short growing seasons in tight and narrow 8,000 foot valleys limited the
efficacy of these plans, as did the impact on two-hundred-year-old non-Indian water
rights and likelihood of litigation if new ditches were attempted. Unlike Picurís, San
Juan Pueblo had the advantage of sitting right on the confluence of the Río Grande and
the Río Chama, the two largest rivers in north central New Mexico. It also had one of the
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largest Pueblo populations, which was estimated at 500 in 1928.825 Hagerman and
Walker both believed that San Juan had “as much land and water as they need,
irrespective of the conflicting claim of settlers.”826 The two commissioners also agreed
that developing water resources at San Juan would not severely or immediately impact
other water rights, Indian or non-Indian, and San Juan possessed lands that boasted a
comparatively long growing season.827

Figure 31: San Juan Pueblo, showing non-Indian claims. Carlson, The Spanish
American Homeland, 48.
The seemingly constant Río Grande water supply feeding San Juan, however,
faced a significant threat, this time from downstream users north and south of
Albuquerque. A Middle Río Grande Conservancy District bill was submitted to U. S.
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Congress in 1928. Its architects envisioned massive irrigation and reclamation works to
control and stabilize the water supply of the Río Abajo (Río Grande valley south of Santa
Fe), from Cochiti Pueblo in the north to Elephant Butte Reservoir below Socorro in the
south. The project purported to limit flooding that hindered the economic vitality of
commercial agriculture in the valley and impaired residents as well. The costly project
was debated from the mid-1920s through the 1940s. John Collier and AIDA initially
opposed the project when he believed it would cause the allotment of Indian lands, and
limit the land and water rights he was fighting for in the Pueblo Lands Board. Collier at
first argued for the rights of Pueblos and Hispanos, linking their priority rights and
encouraging the joint activism of the AIPC and the Liga Obrera, which represented many
Hispano farmers. Collier ultimately supported the MRGCD bill when Pueblo priority
rights were assured and discouraged Pueblos from engaging in activism jointly with
Hispanos. His about-face earned him the undying hatred of Representative Dennis
Chávez and many Hispano farmers across the middle Río Grande Valley.828
The Pueblo Lands Board also underwent personnel changes. Louis Embree was
pressured to resign after both Hagerman and Jennings complained incessantly of his
advanced age and inability to maintain the workload required of Board members. Louis
H. Warner, a well-connected Washington, D.C., attorney, was appointed by President
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Coolidge to replace Embree and was immediately made chairman of the Board.829
Hagerman, who was relieved of his contentious roles as Special Navajo Commissioner
and head of the U.S. Pueblo Council in 1928, continued to maintain that no provision in
the Pueblo Lands Act required the Board to demand tax receipts as evidence of payment,
nor were they obliged to look through county records to ascertain the veracity of
claimants’ declared payments. The Board would rely on the testimony, and in
Hagerman’s mind, this liberal reading of the tax provisions would level the field for
Hispanos, most of whom had no legal representation, unlike the Pueblos, who had both
government and private attorneys to represent their cases.830
By the time of the Board hearings in the winter of 1929, San Juan Pueblo’s
population was approximately 500 people, making it one of the most populous
Pueblos.831 The Pueblo faced 740 claims totaling 5,697.14 acres and averaging 7.69 acres
per claim. San Juan had survived decades of Spanish-colonial oppression. Adjacent to
Juan de Oñate’s settlement San Gabriel del Yunque in 1599, San Juan was also the home
pueblo of Popé and played a significant part in the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. Since the
Spanish reconquista in 1692, its relationship with Spanish settlements had improved.
The massive Sebastián Martín Grant to the east of the San Juan Pueblo league provided
pastures for both San Juan Indians and their Spanish colonist counterparts. San Juan
natives even claimed that Martín granted a piece of land in the valley in exchange for
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digging the first large irrigation ditch east of the Río Grande.832 Over time, however, the
close proximity of Spanish settlements to San Juan encouraged relationships, some
consensual but most coercive, that impacted the Pueblo’s control over its lands. The net
result was nearly 750 adverse claims for more than 5,000 acres of land within the exterior
boundaries of San Juan Pueblo.833
After the Tesuque fence controversy, San Juan Pueblo acted to reverse decades of
unravelling Pueblo authority. In 1924, San Juan governor José Ramos Archuleta, who
had been embarrassed at the Tesuque Congressional hearings in 1920, led the tribal
council to terminate the privileges of Isidro Archuleta, a San Juan Pueblo native with a
history of selling lands to non-Indians. The Pueblo also took legal action to terminate
leases contracted to Luciano de Herrera and Enrique Córdova, ending a nearly halfcentury lease.834 On the eve of Board actions, then, San Juan took action to reclaim its
lands and defend Pueblo patrimony.
At San Juan, the Board was confronted century rather than decades old claims,
including the Chamita Grant and the Juan Chinaguan claim (see Chapter 2). The
Chamita grant was rooted in a controversy that began in 1713, when Antonio Trujillo was
granted a piece of land by Spanish governor Juan Flores Magollón (1712-1715) and put
in possession by Sebastian Martín, the Santa Cruz alcalde who owned the vast nearby
grant. Nearly a decade later, Trujillo petitioned Governor Juan Domingo de Bustamante
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(1723-1731) to revalidate his grant, and Bustamante complied. In 1740, a Spanish court
heard the protest of San Juan Pueblo against the Chamita Grant, but no administrative
action was taken against it. Over the next century, Chamita served as a trading center
and, by the 1850s, had grown into a town of thirteen hundred inhabitants.835
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Figure 32: Hernández, San José and Chamita, 1915. The long-lots, charatersitic of
northern New Mexico land tenure patterns, demonstrate the effect of dividing land
amongst heirs for generations. The Chamita claim, sitting at the confluence of the Río
Chama and Río Grande, was gradually divided and expanded to form the communities of
San José and Hernández. Carlson, The Spanish American Homeland, 44.
In July of 1859, Manuel Trujillo, a direct heir of Antonio Trujillo, petitioned
Surveyor General William Pelham to request confirmation of the grant. Pelham obliged
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and recognized the towns as having legitimate title. He investigated the claim and
quickly forwarded his recommendation for confirmation to U. S. Congress. Less than a
year later, Congress approved the Chamita Grant. An 1877 survey estimated the grant at
1,636.29 acres and reported that it sat wholly in the San Juan Pueblo Grant, which was
confirmed two years before the Town of Chamita and thus senior to the Town of Chamita
in every respect. For this reason, the Chamita Grant went unpatented for decades.836
In 1920, in light of the 1919 Hanna ejectment suits, Antonio Trujillo’s heirs
renewed their campaign to patent their grant. Federal Land Commissioner Clay Tallman
noted the approval of the grant in 1860 and believed that Congress intended to issue a
patent that acknowledged the conflict with the San Juan Pueblo Grant. This would leave
the task of settling the claims to the courts. But in 1923, Federal Land Commissioner
William Spry revoked Tallman’s decision, ruling that the federal land office lacked legal
jurisdiction and would only add confusion to the standoff between San Juan and Chamita.
All court action was suspended, pending action by the Pueblo Lands Board, which finally
heard the case in the fall of 1928.837
Just how the Board would treat the large Town of Chamita claim, surveyed in
1877 at over sixteen-hundred acres, was unclear. At Nambé, the Board had rejected the
large López-Romero tract, and residents at Chamita feared the Board would invoke a
similar recommendation on such a large tract. The late Samuel Eldodt had founded a
mercantile in Chamita in 1863, and used his small store to become a political anchor in
836
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Rio Arriba Democratic Party for six decades, ultimately serving as a delegate to the New
Mexico Constitutional Convention of 1910. Understanding the importance of fighting
the Hanna ejectments suits and the Bursum Bill, Eldodt partially funded Alois Renehan’s
lobbying efforts in Washington, D.C.. Eldodt died in 1925. Without his influence, many
residents feared the Board would reject the Chamita Grant.838
To the surprise of many, the Board approved the Chamita claim in principle but
reduced its size. It seemed to attempt to achieve the equity it had abandoned at Picurís.
The Board found that Antonio Trujillo’s heirs had held continuous, exclusive and adverse
possession of fifty-two tracts covering 838.814 acres within the Pueblo of San Juan Grant
since March 16, 1889. This greatly reduced the original surveyed area of 1,636.29 acres
and returned nearly 800 to San Juan Pueblo. But Chamita was far from the only large,
ancient claim at San Juan. 839
The 1744 Chiniagua claim had also survived the Spanish, Mexican and American
periods. It originated from the land claim of Juan Chiniagua, a San Juan Pueblo Indian
who had petitioned for a parcel of land in order to leave the Pueblo and live as a vecino, a
Spanish-colonial citizen. Seeking to limit Spanish influence in the Pueblo, San Juan
leaders reportedly granted his request. Chiniagua’s three-hundred-yard-wide tract
allowed him to live apart from the Pueblo and again live as a practicing hermano, or
Penitente brother. Upon Chiniagua’s death, however, his three children, all full-blooded
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San Juan Pueblo Indians, divided the tract and sold it to the surrounding Hispano
population. Their progeny allegedly expanded this claim to 1,600 acres of the best
irrigable lands at San Juan Pueblo.840
Another large tract of 1,680 acres dated from 1802, when a camp used by Spanish
soldiers fighting Ute incursions drew permanent settlers. The area, then called San José,
had grown to include the community of El Duende. Settlers on the tract claimed rights
through the nearby Bartolomé Sánchez Grant, which did not cover or conflict with this
western edge of the San Juan Pueblo Grant. On the eastern portion of the grant sat
Alcalde, a 10-acre tract with twenty-seven claims, as well as the claim of Julian Sánchez,
a 134-acre tract that he had purchased from San Juan Pueblo Indian José D. García.
Reports from the General Council of Northern Pueblos, a precursor to the Eight Northern
Indian Pueblos Council, stated that lands at San Juan were gained by Mexicans through
“deliberate fraud and theft” and that they often used whiskey to induce Indians to part
with their pueblo’s land. Pueblo historian Joe Sando (Jemez) agreed, and characterized
Hispano methods for obtaining land as “insidious ways” and “habitual trickery,” a “litany
of incorrigible corruption practiced upon Pueblo people.”841
The diversity of claimants at San Juan was startling. The Hermanos de la
Fraternidad Piadosa de Nuestro Padre Jesús Nazareno, or Penitentes, held on to a small
tract of less than one-third acre under hermano Juan C. Valencia. But Valencia and the
hermanos abandoned their claim before the hearings when their morada burnt down. The
Archdiocese of Santa Fe was again a claimant, this time holding title to two half-acre
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tracts on the edge of the central plaza, where St. John the Baptist Church stood. Even
Charles C. Catron, the wily son of the late Thomas B. Catron, held tracts he had inherited
from his deceased father. The eight tracts ranged from a quarter acre to seven acres in
size. The younger Catron, who authored the most controversial parts of the 1922 Bursum
Bill, clearly understood the implications of holding Pueblo lands. He neither filed his
claim nor submitted any evidence to hold onto his land. Instead, he readily accepted
payment for lands that would be repatriated to San Juan Pueblo.842
Also among claimants at San Juan were San Juan Pueblo Indians themselves,
many of whom had paid local taxes and who claimed individual title above that of their
own pueblo. As a rule, all Indian claims were rejected. Approving Indian title to a
private claim against the ownership of his or her own pueblo would cast doubt on tribal
ownership and smacked of severalty. Not only were Indian claims rejected but Pueblo
Indians who privately held pueblo lands were not compensated either for their tracts or
their improvements when title returned to their Pueblo.843
Some Indian claimants were products of mixed unions. Pueblo-Hispano intermarriage gradually alienated lands when their progeny claimed their parents’ tracts for
themselves, as Indians had done at Nambé. The heirs of José and Avelina Talache were
such a case. In 1892, José Talache, a San Juan Pueblo Indian, and his Hispano wife,
Avelina, purchased two tracts of land from Avelina’s father, Antonio María Valencia.
According to San Juan Pueblo governor José Ramos Archuleta, Valencia had owned the
properties for at least fifty years. Upon José Talache’s death in the early 1920s, the
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combined fifteen acres, which included the Talache’s modest two-bedroom home as well
as two other houses, were handed down to his children. The Talache’s son and daughter,
half-San Juan Pueblo and half-Hispano, were recognized members of the tribe, so the
Board rejected their claim and declared Pueblo title unextinguished. However, since the
title derived from Valencia, a Hispano, and they were “half-Mexican,” the Board and
District Court reconsidered and awarded the Talache family the full appraised value of
their land, plus improvements.844
Indian claims at San Juan were common. Juan José Chávez, Maximiano Cruz,
Eulogio Cata, Fabian Cata and Juan Bautista Agueno all held claims that were rejected by
the court without compensation. But no Indian claims were quite as surprising as those
of Sotero Ortiz. Born in 1877, Ortiz was the son of José Dolores Ortiz, a Hispano, and
María Reyes Atencio, a member of the San Juan Summer moiety, and was raised at San
Juan Pueblo and steeped in its traditions. At a young age, Ortiz met Thomas B. Catron
and worked for him intermittently, staying at the Catron residence in Santa Fe and
reading profusely in Catron’s extensive library. Already fluent in Spanish and Tewa, he
improved his English and became a translator, later securing a job in the Indian Service
as a policeman. When he began to represent San Juan at the All Indian Pueblo Council
meetings, Ortiz’s influence began to flow from San Juan to other Pueblos.845
The fight against the Bursum Bill introduced Sotero Ortiz to John Collier, who
took with him to Washington, D.C. and New York to publicize the plight of the Pueblos
and the injustice of the legislation. Ignoring his own parentage, he characterized the
Hispano population as “descendants of the soldiers of Spain who fought against our
844
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people, and Mexicans from Old Mexico who drifted into our country.”846 By 1923, Ortiz
had been elected chair of the All Indian Pueblo Council, and travelled to Indian Pueblos
in his Cadillac, spreading the word against the Bursum Bill. Through the 1920s, Ortiz
remained in close correspondence with Collier, keeping him informed of actions by the
Indian Service and the NMAIA. Collier, in turn, fed Ortiz information, which he spread
among the other Tewa Pueblos. Ortiz became one of the most well-known Pueblo
leaders in the battle against the Bursum Bill. Yet in half a decade of correspondence
with Collier, he never discussed his own land claims against his own Pueblo.847
Sotero Ortiz acquired four tracts of land totaling ten plus acres from 1910 to 1920.
Every tract was acquired after the Sandoval case (1913) and most after the Joy survey of
1915. Ortiz even acquired tracts after the 1919 Hanna ejectment suits, when a cloud cast
over upon all title claims to Pueblo land. Most of Ortiz’s lands were acquired through
exchanges with Juan B. Sánchez, a man who traded heavily in San Juan Pueblo land.
How Ortiz acquired other claims remains unclear. While purely speculative, a few
scenarios at San Juan and other Pueblos offer the potential for understanding how Ortiz
could make a property claim against of his own native community. The simplest one is
that Ortiz claimed lands allotted him by his tribe (by the San Juan governor, his
principales, the cacique and the Council) and considered these lands his own private
property. This scenario took place on nearly all other Tewa Pueblo, save perhaps
Tesuque. Another possibility is that Ortiz gained a portion of his lands from a claim he
inherited from his Hispano father. Though of mixed parentage, Ortiz grew up at San
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Juan, steeped in their traditions, beliefs and rituals. His father, a Hispano, however, could
have claimed his lands as his own and bequeathed them to his son. A third possibility is
that his relationship with the Catron, who owned multiple tracts at San Juan, might have
brought lands into Ortiz’s possession.
Regardless of how Sotero Ortiz came into possession of San Juan Pueblo lands,
the fact remained that one of the Indian stalwarts in the battle to save Pueblo lands was a
claimant against his own pueblo’s title. In a ruling typical of Board actions regarding
individual Pueblo Indian claims, the Board rejected Ortiz’s claims and recommended no
compensation. Its justification was that Ortiz was “a member of the tribe,” and he was,
“entitled to share equally with other Indians claiming lands in the Indian Grant.”848
Whether they accounted for or ignored his mixed-race heritage is unknown. There is
little evidence that the Board attempted to determine the nature of Ortiz’s ownership,
from where it derived, and whether San Juan Pueblo objected to his land claim.
Of the 740 adverse claims at San Juan, the Board approved some 525, or 70
percent in whole or in part. At San Juan, Hagerman caved to pressure from Jennings and
Embree to reject a number of claims for insufficient evidence of payment of taxes.
Again, the Board rejected larger claims, those averaging approximately ten plus acres,
and approved smaller claims averaging less than six acres. In total, 3,499.72 acres in
claims were approved and 2,197.42 acres were rejected and, thus, recovered for San Juan
Pueblo (See Appendix C).849
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The Board, once again, departed wildly from the assessed land values in
recommending awards for San Juan. The value of lands lost to claimants was assessed at
$60,758.94, but the Board recommended an award of only $29,090.53. The District
Court’s decision rendered October 28, 1930, only inflicted more damage to San Juan
Pueblo’s land tenure, resurrecting 47 of the 215 rejected claims without increasing the
Board’s recommended award (See Appendices C and D). The Board argued that San
Juan, like Nambé and Picurís, was not compensated for irrigable lands because it still
retained priority right to waters associated with lands lost to sustained non-Indian
claims.850
Under Hagerman’s water theory, San Juan Pueblo, which lost much of its arable
lands to non-Indian claims, could develop its significant water resources to open new
lands to irrigation. To Hagerman, San Juan represented the “maximum of prosperity to
which other pueblos might attain.” The confluence of the Río Chama and Río Grande
was at the center of the Pueblo, and these two combined rivers were among the strongest
water resources in northern New Mexico and their intersection was a site long considered
the center of a potential conservancy district. Because of this capacity, including a Board
scheme to develop hundreds of acres west of the Río Grande, Hagerman reasoned that
San Juan did not need full compensation, whether or not it was entitled to full
compensation.851
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The only consistency in Hagerman’s treatment of water issues is that he typically
sided with non-Indians, despite claiming otherwise. Though he would not compensate
San Juan for the real value of its lands and lost water rights, he fought to retain for the
pueblo waters that were in danger of being appropriated by the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District. For Hagerman, however, San Juan needs were hardly fully at
heart. He endorsed a so-called “San Juan Project,” which proposed to open fifteen
hundred acres of land east of the Río Grande and south of the pueblo league through
massive irrigation works for the benefit of San Juan natives and others lacking resources.
While simultaneously fixing San Juan’s award at only a portion of its appraised value,
Hagerman worked to ensure that water for the project was requested before all water
appropriations were complete.852
The Board consistently maneuvered to undermine the legal strictures imposed by
the Pueblo Lands Act. John Collier and Richard Hanna felt they had no other recourse
but to file independent suits that offered to circumvent both the Board’s and the District
Court’s actions. In 1927, in conjunction with the First District Court’s Nambé decision,
Judge Orie Phillips ruled that only the federal government, as guardian of the Pueblos,
could appeal Board and Court decisions and file independent suits on behalf of the
Pueblos. Phillip’s decision proscribed private attorneys like AIDA’s Richard H. Hanna
and the NMAIA’s Francis C. Wilson from representing the Pueblos outside Board
hearings. Phillips’s ruling contradicted the 1926 Candelaria decision, which considered
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Pueblos to be a “juristic person” capable of being sued but also of filing suits on their
own behalf. It also inflamed Collier, who widely attacked the decision.853
While Collier and Hanna both contested and evaded Phillips’s 1928 decision, the
Board began hearings for San Ildefonso. This pueblo provided significant counterpoint
to San Juan and shattered Hagerman’s illogical rationale regarding assessed valued, water
rights and recommended awards. The Board immediately saw the desperate situation at
San Ildefonso, and initially had planned to hear its case first to provide quick relief. In a
April 1925 letter to Roberts Walker, Hagerman wrote: “Altogether, it is the most sad and
pitiful situation imaginable. Is seems very apparent that unless something is done and
done promptly that the Pueblo will be exterminated in a short time.”854 Hagerman
described the San Ildefonso Pueblo natives as “very decent, very intelligent, and very
patient people,” an important counterpoint to the opinion of Assistant Commissioner of
Indian Affairs E. B. Meritt, who believed that funds expended at San Ildefonso would be
wasted on “unindustrious people.”855
San Ildefonso represented perhaps the most pressing case for the Board, save the
arguably extinct Pojoaque Pueblo. For years the San Ildefonso consistently verged on
starvation and collapse. Trapped between encroaching Hispano grants since the early
1700s, San Ildefonso had suffered the appropriation and expropriation of its natural
resources. Though it sat at the confluence of the Río Grande and Río Pojoaque, its waters
were severely depleted by upstream users, both Hispanos surrounding the pueblo and
those settled within its boundaries, and by Tesuque, Nambé and Pojoaque Pueblos.
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Attempts to move water down the Río Nambé-Río Pojoaque watershed to San Ildefonso
were impractical for the streambed had become inundated with silt, which absorbed
nearly all waters before they reached San Ildefonso’s acequias. Efforts to pump the
streambed for “captured waters” were equally unsuccessful. Anthropologist William
Whitman, who did fieldwork at San Ildefonso in the mid-1930s, described the grant as “a
wilderness of arroyos, dry washes and mesas dotted with cedar and piñon.”856
A dire state of agriculture had existed at San Ildefonso since the 1880s, and left
the population ill-equipped to fight foreign disease, something that decimated their
colonial-era population in the form of smallpox epidemics in the 1780s. Their water
rights had been lost through court decisions that favored of their Hispano neighbors. In
1901, the Pueblo attempted to file an ejectment suit against Edward F. Hobart, the former
New Mexico surveyor general and Santa Fe Indian School superintendent, who
speculated in both Santa Clara and San Ildefonso Pueblo lands. The case was thrown out
because of a “want of prosecution,” in other words, by imposing the statute of limitations
on San Ildefonso’s complaint.857 In June 1918, Hispano settlers badgered the pueblo to
accede to the authority of a ditch rider appointed by the state engineer and help pay a
portion of his salary to oversee public and pueblo ditches. The government farmer at San
Ildefonso, J. A. Chaves, advised the pueblo not to sign any agreement.858 In that same
year, the 1918 Spanish flu epidemic killed perhaps a third of San Ildefonso’s population,
devastating the Winter People moiety and leaving only two families, who could no longer
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carry out the group’s ritual duties and who were eventually absorbed by the Summer
People.859

Figure 33: San Ildefonso, showing non-Indian claims (shaded). Carlson, The Spanish
American Homeland, 48.
By 1922, at the time of the Bursum Bill controversy, San Ildefonso’s population
had dropped to a nadir of ninety-one. Roughly two-thirds of the population lived in the
northern village of the grant and a third in the southern village, the result of a split
between 1910 and 1920. Sometime around 1923, the cacique, Ignacio Aguilar, and the
presiding governor, Juan Gonzales, led a movement of people to the south village, the
traditional and ancient heart of the Pueblo, but the great majority of San Ildefonso
Indians, swayed by the increasingly influential pottery group, opted to stay in the North
village. A separate kiva was constructed. Even the plaza was divided and a row of
houses was constructed to delineate the boundary between the North People and South
People. This kind of factionalism came to replace and disturb, the moietal duality that is
859

Sandra A. Edelman, “San Ildefonso Pueblo” in Handbook of North American Indians,
Southwest. Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1979), 9: 309310.
459

the centerpiece of Tewa religious and social organization. The North People, the larger
group, retained control of the civil organization of the Pueblo, appointing governors
whom the South People routinely ignored.860
Factionalism had plagued San Ildefonso for decades. The original move from the
traditional southern village to the northern village took place sometime in the midnineteenth century, supposedly when a faction that had come under the influence of
witches or sorcerers forced the move. Factionalism was likely at work when, in the
1830s, a rash of sales by San Ildefonso natives, their governors and their principales to
surrounding Hispanos.861
When the Board began to examine land claims at San Ildefonso, it found that
considerable lands had been alienated from San Ildefonso almost a century earlier.
Unlike A. A. Berle’s 1923 assessment for AIDA, which estimated that more than 85% of
all Pueblo claims were less than ten years old, the non-Indian appropriation of Pueblo
lands appeared much older. Many questionable claims derived from the controversial
1763 land claim made by the heirs of Juana Luján, whose land infringed on both San
Ildefonso and Santa Clara Pueblos. The presence of cattle close to Pueblo lands broke
protocols in the Laws of the Indies, which demanded adequate space to separate Hispano
and Pueblo land and to ensure that Hispano cattle would not trample and feed on Pueblo
fields. Non-Indian claimants at San Ildefonso also consistently traced their title to the
1830s, when a core of Pueblo natives apparently sold their land en masse to surrounding
Hispanos, most of whom had already had claims on Pueblo lands. This process seemed
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less an assault on Pueblo land than the exploitation of an open market that boomed in the
1830s and intermittently bubbled during the nineteenth century.862
By the time of the Board hearings, San Ildefonso enumerated 455 claims for 1,616.63
acres, each claim averaging 3.55 acres. A startling number had roots much deeper than
the 1890s, when non-Indian claims boomed across the Tewa Basin. Historians Myra
Ellen Jenkins and John Baxter opined that only three legitimate pre-American era sales
were executed at San Ildefonso. Abstracts complete for Pueblo Lands Board hearings,
however, show a spate of sales from 1832 to 1837. They doubted the legitimacy of an
1820 sale of 1,416 varas of land by Governor Juan José and his principales to don
Francisco Ortiz, who owned an estancia at Caja del Río, or White Rock Canyon. 863
In New Mexico, Pueblos from Santo Domingo and San Felipe in the south to
Nambé, Picurís and San Juan in the north faced an assault on their lands by neighboring
Hispanos. Aware of the changed status of Pueblo Indians, Hispanos petitioned for the
alienation of so-called surplus Pueblo lands. Pueblo Indians also altered their petitions
for protection to demand their rights as Mexican citizens rather than a special class of
Spanish subjects. San Ildefonso lacks any documented cases of petitions by Hispanos
for its lands during the Mexican period. They were likely aware of the claims at Nambé,
San Juan and Picurís and perhaps sold their lands rather than see them claimed with no
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compensation. Though conjecture, changed status could have obliged San Ildefonso’s
natives to participate actively in a land market and sell their pueblo’s patrimony.
As at San Juan Pueblo, claimants at San Ildefonso were diverse. The Catholic
Church retained tracts “given” by the pueblo in the colonial era, when San Ildefonso was
a mission church of Franciscans and natives were coerced to provide land and labor for
the resident priest. Cosme Herrera, the Jacona land-grant activist who fought Nambé
claims to water rights, purchased tracts from San Ildefonso natives Natividad Peña and
Encarnacion Vigil de Peña in 1901, adding to San Ildefonso tracts he purchased six years
earlier from Ralph E. Twitchell and his first wife, Margaret, who bought the lands from
San Ildefonso governor Domingo Peña.864 Herrera later sold this land to Clara True and
anthropologist Matilda Coxe Stevenson, a onetime friend.865 Together they invested in a
large tract with anthropologist Elsie Clews Parsons, who later criticized the exploitative
practices of non-Indians during the Bursum Bill debate, either ignorant of her own claim
864
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or concealing it from her Pueblo-advocate allies.866 Clara True, who came to New
Mexico as a day school teacher at Santa Clara Pueblo, often served as a representative to
the Indian Rights Association and aided Santa Clara in defending against non-Indian
claims, even while she was a claimant at San Ildefonso. Attorney Alois Renehan
received power of attorney from Stevenson and, after her death, sued True to consolidate
her estate, bought the tract from True and sold it to Carlos Abreu for nearly six thousand
dollars.867 Advocates immediately cast Abreu as a “Spaniard” as opposed to a Mexican,
and an unknowing victim of the machinations of the Mexican’s lawyer, Alois Renehan.868
Again, like at San Juan, a number of Pueblo claimants also held claims against the
title of their own tribe. While he served as the governor of San Ildefonso, Atilano
Montoya acquired land from Teresita Martínez, another San Ildefonso native. Montoya
became well known throughout the valley as the companion of Edith Warner, who owned
a house at the Otowi bridge river crossing on San Ildefonso Pueblo land. Warner and her
beloved “Tiano” operated their house as a salon where they later entertain the culturally
isolated Los Alamos scientists working on the secretive Manhattan project during World
War II. Like Taos Pueblo native Tony Lujan, who was the companion of the wealthy
Madel Dodge (Luhan), “Tiano” came to typify the Pueblo Indian for the friends and
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associates of Warner, while maintaining a relationship with an adverse claimant to his
tribe’s lands.869
Adam Martínez, the son of famed Pueblo potters Maria Martínez and Julian
Martínez, brother of potter Popovi Da, was also a claimant of lands he purchased from
Andrés Martínez, a fellow San Ildefonso native.870 Pueblo Indians like Adam Martínez
saw their land claims unconditionally rejected by the Board, which reasoned that as “a
member of the tribe,” they were “entitled to share equally with other Indians claiming
lands in the Indian Grant.” Regardless of the veracity of their claim and the purity of their
title, Pueblo Indians were categorically denied compensation for their claims, while their
Hispano co-claimants were at least eligible. The work of the Board subordinated
Pueblos’ individual rights to communal rights of the tribes of which they were members.
Given the Board’s previous actions at Nambé, Picurís, and San Juan, both natives
and their attorneys worried that the Board would recover little land or water for San
Ildefonso Pueblo. The board had approved, at least in part, 70 percent of adverse claims
at San Juan, 73 percent at Nambé , and 81percent at Picurís. Notwithstanding his
apparent bias for non-Indian claims, Hagerman acknowledged the grim situation at San
Ildefonso and the need for relief. He acquiesced to Jennings’s and Warner’s pressure to
apply tax measures stringently at San Ildefonso in an effort to repatriate lands to the
pueblo and to achieve equity in their recommendations. The Board initially
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recommended that San Ildefonso Indians move west of the Río Grande, adjacent to a
1929 Congressional reservation of 4,430.72 acres.871 Tracts on the west side of the Río
Grande were more isolated from speculation, and buffered by a reservation. Claims by
Hispanos could be rejected and lands recovered for the Pueblo. Otherwise, Hagerman
believed there might be a need to resurrect the Exon suit and adjudicate waters to
guarantee a sustained flow for San Ildefonso.872
When the Board issued its reports and recommendations for San Ildefonso, many
were astounded. The Board rejected 162 of the 455 adverse claims, roughly thirty six
percent, a number well above their previous decisions (See Appendix C). At San
Ildefonso, the Board largely took a hardline on water rights, finding creative ways to
reject seemingly legitimate claims at San Ildefonso, where the pueblo need was great and
the conditions most dire.873 Some credited the influence of Louis H. Warner, an amateur
historian who later published work based on his experience with the Board.874 Others
believed the growing influence of Collier in Congress and their fear of his reprisals
convinced the Board to reject such a large number of claims.875
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Again, the work of the Board was dismantled by the First District Court, which
reversed forty-one rejected claims, shifting the percentage approved from 64 percent to
73 percent. Reversed claims were generally uplands, unirrigable tracts with a strong
claim and valuable to their claimant. Judge Colin Neblett had made a habit of undoing
the work of the Board, reviving rejected claims at San Juan (47) and Picurís (102),
increasing the percentage of claims approved from 70 to 77 percent at San Juan and from
81 to 96 percent at Picurís. The compensation award to San Ildefonso was slashed in half
from the appraised value of $52,128 to $24,441.05, an action that drew the attention of
the U.S. Senate, which was investigating the actions of the Board by 1929 (See
Appendices C and D).876
The wild variation in the Board’s decisions gave many pause. Inconsistency in
how it treated claims to Pueblo lands was disquieting even among politicians who were
unattached to the situation on the ground across the Tewa Basin and at Picurís. At
Pojoaque, the Board resurrected a collapsing and expiring community, arguably saving it
from the fate of Pecos. But Santa Clara, where more than half of the pueblo’s lands lay
in non-Indian hands, where Española, the largest Tewa Basin town, continued to grow,
tested the Board in ways that no other pueblo did. The economy of the Tewa Basin
centered in the Española Valley and the Board could quite easily upset the commercial
center of north central New Mexico.
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As the Board entered its last phase of action, controversies over discrepancies
between appraised values and its recommended awards eventually led to what was
popularly called the second Pueblo Lands Act in 1933. As it tackled Santa Clara and
Pojoaque, Hagerman’s intangible water theory unraveled. But where compensation could
easily be adjusted and increased, irrigation works and water resources were much harder
to develop. The massive investment in infrastructure needed to save the pueblos of the
Tewa Basin was considered during the New Deal, but the numerous small holdings made
the project unmanageable when compared to the middle Río Grande Valley. Instead, the
Board continued its hearings, adhering to Herbert Hagerman’s bizarre theories, even
when faced with Santa Clara, which lost nearly half of its land to former government
officials, and Pojoaque, which almost vanished as its population joined Hispanos in a
regional diaspora.
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Chapter 11: Ethnicity and Equity, II: Santa Clara, Pojoaque and the End of
the Pueblo Lands Board Era, 1929-1933
The Pueblo Lands Board faced a new set of problems in its hearings in the Tewa
Basin. Santa Clara and Pojoaque tested the board’s willingness to recognize the enormity
and diversity of Pueblo land loss. Although Picuris, San Juan and San Ildefonso each had
unique sets of problems, similarities linked them. Picuris and San Ildefonso faced
plummeting populations and mass encroachment by surrounding Hispanos; both Picurís
and San Juan accommodated whole grants within their external boundaries; and San Juan
and San Ildefonso sat north and south, respectively, of Española, which had become the
economic heart of the Tewa Basin and whose growing economy guaranteed continued
interest in Pueblo lands.
Santa Clara and Pojoaque, however, present divergent stories of dispossession and
posed a whole new set of challenges for the Board. Santa Clara had lost nearly half its
lands to Santa Fe attorney Derwent Smith and former surveyor general Edward Hobart.
Together they enlarged a thirty-acre claim to more than seven thousand acres and then
sold off the majority to the surrounding non-Indian population. At Pojoaque, the Board
saw a pueblo that was seemingly extinct. Years of invasion by and intermarriage with the
surrounding Hispano population “diluted Pojoaque’s stock.” As the pueblo declined, the
gradual and often willful expropriation of Pojoaque’s land culminated in the near sale of
the entire pueblo grant to California investors in 1913, at precisely the same time that the
U.S. v. Sandoval case committed the federal government to protect Pueblo lands.
Controversies over the Board’s conduct and decisions plagued the whole process
of examining and adjudicating Pueblo land claims. Public scrutiny also eventually
exposed Herbert Hagerman’s deceptive chairmanship. John Collier perhaps rightly saw
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Hagerman as a vestige of Republican machine politics and the corrupt administration of
Indian affairs. Their feud was symbolic of larger divisions between the old regime of
Indian affairs and reformers who felt that America owed a debt to native tribes. This
chapter ends with Collier’s aggressive dismantling of Hagerman’s reputation, a fitting
transition to the New Deal and Collier’s rise to commissioner of Indian affairs.
~~~
Of all Tewa Basin Pueblos, Santa Clara suffered the most adverse claimants and
the largest acreage claimed, and was second only to San Juan in Indian population. Santa
Clara also had the largest non-Indian town, Española, within its exterior boundaries. As
the burgeoning railroad center of north-central New Mexico, Española brought diverse
interests to the Tewa Basin, drawing capital, investors, merchants and speculators. It was
the home of the Settlers Committee, chaired by Española’s first mayor, Frank E.
Frankenberger, and funded in part by Frank Bond, the man who by 1929 had built an
economic empire anchored in the Tewa Basin.877
Non-Indians claimed 7,757.75 acres of the 16,899-acre Pueblo grant. Santa Clara
had long contended with incursions by surrounding Hispano settlers. Bordered by the
Pojoaque Pueblo, Nambé Pueblo and Jacona Grants to the south, the Santa Cruz de la
Cañada Grant to the east, and the Bartolome Sánchez Grant to the north, Santa Clara
undertook litigation during the Spanish and Mexican periods to protect its lands from the
clutches of surrounding settlers. When the heirs of Juan and Antonio Tafoya began to
plant crops illegally on their Cañada de Santa Clara Grant in the mid-1700s, Santa Clara
877
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Pueblo successfully fought to keep it designated a grazing grant, meaning that the
Tafoyas could not take waters from the Santa Clara Creek and impact Pueblo irrigation.
In 1763, Governor Tomás Velez de Cachupín voided the Tafoya grant and transferred
Cañada de Santa Clara lands to the Pueblo (see chapter 1). Surveyor General George
Julian confirmed the grant in 1885, but confined it to the area immediately adjacent to
Santa Clara Creek. He removed hundreds of acres used by Santa Clara Pueblo for
pasturage under the impression that the small Pueblo, whose population was an estimated
two hundred persons, did not need the land.878
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Figure 34: Santa Clara Map, c. 1930. All lands east of the Río Grande, pictured at the
center of the map, were taken by attorneys Derwent Smith and Edward Hobart in the late
19th century and sold in parcels. The arrival of the railroad hastened the growth of
Española, formerly called la vega de los Vigiles (Vigils’ meadow) largely on the eastern
portion of the Santa Clara Grant, folder 112, box 7, Santa Clara Pueblo, Jennie M. Avery
Papers, New Mexico State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Former Surveyor General Edward F. Hobart’s absurd 1909 claim to the eastern
half of the Santa Clara Grant had withstood legal challenges by the pueblo. Santa Clara
grew over the next two decades and by the time the Pueblo Lands Board began its
hearings in 1929, its population was an estimated four hundred souls. Santa Clara
possessed a potential bargaining chip in the vast number of claims to its former lands,
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including the entire town of Española. At Taos, Pueblo leaders had used this same
situation to bring Town of Taos leaders to the table, where they hammered out an
agreement in which the Pueblo would recognize the land rights of land owners in the
village of Taos in turn for non-Indian support for the Taos Pueblo Blue Lake claim and
the Tenorio Tract. Picurís had unsuccessfully attempted to take the same action. And
unlike Taos, where artists and advocates helped negotiate their deal, settlers and business
leaders in Española would prove an insurmountable obstacle. Española was the home of
the so-called “Settler Committee,” instigated by Clara True and Alois Renehan,
supported by the Española Chamber of Commerce and backed by Frank Bond and future
mayor Frank Frankenberger, two businessmen with reputations for intransigence and
bullying.
Of course, there was potential for fractures in the settler’s cause. Lawyers such as
Renehan feared that those claimants with stronger title might abandon settlers with
weaker claims. He spent time calming Bond, who felt he was bankrolling Renehan's
expensive defense and was funding the defense of land claims inferior (smaller in size,
shorter in tenure, with more dubious purchase or settlement history, with weaker records
of tax payments) to his own. Settlers’ advocates recognized that fissures in their cause
might lead the Indian Service and Pueblo Indian lawyers to pursue settlements with the
few who had both a clear chain of title and proof of tax payments since 1889 or 1902: the
majority of non-Indian claimants, they knew, had neither.
The Pueblos faced the possibility of divisions as well. Santa Clara had
historically dealt with threats to the unity of their community and threats to the authority
of its religious and political leaders. Dissident Santa Clara native Roque Conjuebes and
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his heirs nearly won hundreds of acres of Santa Clara land in the Spanish and early
Mexican eras by arguing their wish to “progress” into Spanish civilization.879 By 1879,
well into the American territorial era, the Winter moiety ended the cyclical, shared rule
with the Summer and Winter moieties when it appointed the governor in successive
years. The Winter People held power over the next fifteen years, until 1894, when U.S.
Indian Agent Thomas M. Jones confiscated the ceremonial Pueblo canes and awarded
them to the Summer moiety, which held on to the canes and all political power for almost
forty years. 880
Summer governors attempted to coerce members of the Winter moiety into
participating in ceremonies and public works, and Winter members, like their
counterparts in San Ildefonso, habitually disregarded calls to perform religious rites and
maintain irrigation ditches. The influence of industrial boarding schools at Santa Fe and
Albuquerque only exacerbated the schism between the Summer and Winter moieties
when a progressive faction within the Winter moiety led by Francisco Naranjo began a
protest of Summer moiety authority. During the four-decade-long schism, ceremonies
ceased to be performed and large segments of the Pueblo population refused to accede to
the authority of the pueblo, often leaving Santa Clara governors incapable of protecting
Pueblo lands.881
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While progressives were typically a small minority of Indians on Pueblo
reservations, their relationships with BIA officials, superintendents, agents school
teachers and other federal representatives gave them a distinct advantage over
traditionalists. For example, when Santa Clara progressives (Winter moiety) felt
persecuted by traditionalists (Summer moiety), they turned to Santa Clara Day School
teacher Clara True, who forwarded their complaints to Clinton J. Crandall, the Northern
Pueblo superintendent. True, who held private claims to lands on San Ildefonso Pueblo,
also employed the aid of BIA inspector Nina Otero Warren and Attorney Alois B.
Renehan to interfere in Pueblo governance.882
Remarkably, despite the large number of discordant outside interests, and amid
concurrent Pueblo factionalism, very few Santa Clara Pueblo natives held land claims
against their pueblo. In fact, of the 902 adverse claims at Santa Clara, only two were held
by Indians. Juan Naranjo claimed a two-and-a-half acre tract he purchased in 1918, and
Nestor Naranjo claimed a four-bedroom home he purchased from María Francisca Luján
sometime in the 1910s, when Luján, a Hispana, left the valley to live in Antonito,
Colorado. This tiny number of Indian claims set Santa Clara apart from all other Tewa
Basin Pueblos and was particularly surprising, given the vast number of adverse claims
against it.883
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In contrast, non-Indian claimants at Santa Clara proved to be plentiful and
diverse. They ranged from Father Salvador Gené, the Spanish-born pastor at Santa Cruz
de la Cañada church, to Dr. Tobías Espinosa, the brother of historian and genealogist
Gilberto Espinosa and of Ymelda Espinosa Chávez, wife of Congressman Dennis
Chávez. Glen McCracken, the energetic pastor of the United Brethren Church north of
Santa Cruz, was also a claimant, as were the Hermanos de la Fraternidad Piadosa de
Nuestro Padre Jesús Nazareno (penitents) and Sociedad de la Santisima Trinidad, or
trinitarios, a lay religious confraternity, or cofradia, unique to the Española Valley.
Alejandrino Naranjo, father of future Río Arriba political patrón Emilio Naranjo and
uncle to eminent Pueblo sociologist Alfonso Ortiz, also claimed a small tract at
Guachupangue. Though his ancestry included significant Santa Clara Indian blood and
he was perhaps even a descendent of the colonial-era Pueblo military hero José López
Naranjo, Alejandrino was neither listed as nor considered an “Indian” by the Board,
although he had been assigned tracts by the Pueblo.884
Merchant Frank Bond and his brother, George, were claimants, as were
entrepreneurs and speculators Orville Cook, John Block, and Frank Becker, among the
men who controlled the development of the Tewa Basin. Fletcher Catron, son of Thomas
B. Catron and brother of Charles C. Catron, retained lands claimed by his father’s estate.
The Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, represented by none other than the Renehan-
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Gilbert law firm, claimed a right of way, purchased chiefly from Hispano land holders,
through the grant.885
One of the Hispanos who sold a right-of-way to the Denver Rio Grande was my
great great grandfather, Juan Luis García. A survivor of Navajo captivity as a boy, 886
Juan Luis was the first successful Pajarito Plateau homesteader and raised his family both
at the foot of the Jemez Mountains and in the Española Valley. With his sons, Adolfo
(my great grandfather), Ezequiel and José Luís, García claimed well over one hundred
acres in Guachupangue, a largely Hispano village within the Santa Clara Pueblo Grant,
and held additional lands in San Pedro, east of the Rio Grande.887
Adolfo García’s Guachupangue lands differed from most non-Indian land claims
in that they were west rather than east of the river. A portion of my great grandfather’s
claim dated to a 1772 sale made by Santa Clara Pueblo governor Diego Casidi to
Cristobal Maese. The transaction was witnessed by Esteban García de Noriega, brother
of Santa Cruz alcalde Salvador García de Noriega and the heir of Captain Juan Estevan
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García de Noriega, all of whom are also my ancestors.888 Adolfo García purchased the
lands in 1892, five years after his father, Juan Luís, applied for a homestead on the
Pajarito Plateau. When Adolfo applied for his own homestead in 1910, the nearby
location of his home at Guachupangue allowed the Garcías to remain close to their García
Canyon homesteads. 889 His weaker claims to range lands east of the Río Grande were,
however, ultimately rejected by the Board for unpaid taxes from 1908-1911 and because
their title “was not sufficient to warrant extinguishment” of Indian title.890
The Board’s actions on García’s and other Santa Clara claims once again
demonstrated the blatant inconsistencies of their “custom” approach. Ever since the
Bursum Bill controversy, which led to creation of the Pueblo Lands Board, its members
had adjusted its decisions to changing political climate and judicial decisions. The action
of Herbert J. Hagerman, the self-appointed spokesman for the Board, invited public
scrutiny. At Santa Clara, Hagerman took a sudden interest in dissecting land claims.
Board chair Louis Warner wanted to expedite the process and extinguish all Indian title
east of the Río Grande. Jennings surprised no one when he wanted to pour over deeds
and tax receipts for each and every Santa Clara claim. He opposed the wanton
expropriation of Pueblo lands without due process. But that Hagerman joined Jennings
was unexpected by everyone. Aware of increasing political pressure and the growing
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power of John Collier, Hagerman wanted to appear to be exercising due diligence in the
examination of Santa Clara claims. The results and recommendations for Santa Clara
Pueblo were, nonetheless, typical of the Board.891
Of the 902 claims at Santa Clara, 656 or 72% were approved (See Appendix C).
Again, the Board targeted larger claims, rejecting those averaging 17.64 acres or more
and approving those averaging 8.6 acres. Similar to its Tesuque and Nambé decisions,
the Board returned more land (4,341.39 acres) to the Pueblo than it approved to nonIndian claimants (3,416.46 acres). But again, like at Nambé, these were largely uplands
and not the richer, more fertile bottom lands that the Pueblo needed to subsist. The towns
of Santa Cruz and Santo Niño, both with dozens of claims, some even hundreds of years
old, were excluded from the Pueblo grant. Despite land appraisals that estimated Santa
Clara’s extinguished claims at $226,366, the Board recommended an award of $86,821,
about 38 percent of their actual value (See Appendices C and D).892
Pueblo attorney Richard H. Hanna suffered health problems in the summer of
1930. With Board member Charles H. Jennings’s encouragement, Dudley Cornell took
up the Santa Clara case and filed an appeal.893 When Cornell won appointment as United
States attorney, he still attempted to file the San Juan appeal, but Judge Neblett nearly
threw out the case on a technicality: Cornell could not simultaneously serve as attorney
for a plaintiff in a case against the government that he represented. Santa Fe attorney
Charles Fahy took up both the San Juan appeal and the Taos case, U.S. v. Gusdorf, et. al.,
891
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with little time to prepare. He lost both cases and would later lose the Santa Clara and
Pojoaque appeals as well.894
It was unclear what actions the Board might take at nearby Pojoaque Pueblo.
Board legal counsel George A. H. Fraser was unsure whether the Board would even hear
claims at Pojoaque. He speculated that the Board would merge Pojoaque with Pecos
Pueblo and pass on hearings. Francis C. Wilson had written Board chair Roberts Walker
on January 23, 1925, to clear his name in the 1913 sale of the grant and begged the Board
to consider what even he considered an extinct grant.895 The lack of Indians at Pecos and
Pojoaque raised the question: was the Board in the business of resurrecting extinct
Pueblos? Although settlers and claimants at other pueblos received notice of Board
action and were subpoenaed to hearings, Pojoaque claimants were never issued a notice.
In fact, they contacted the Board to ask whether land cases would be heard for Pojoaque
Pueblo.896
The case of the near demise of Pojoaque Pueblo had enabled speculators to
engineer, with the help of those charged to defend the pueblo (Pueblo attorney Francis C.
Wilson), the willful sale of tribal lands by the last remaining heir. The investment in the
scheme by the Collier group of California demonstrated both its confidence in its control
of the local political and economic situation and its ignorance of the extent and limits of
federal authority and its fiduciary duty to protect the lands of the Pueblos. This ignorance
was commonplace and quite willful. As Em Hall shows in Four Leagues of Pecos, the
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extinction of Pojoaque Pueblo would likely have transpired with little protest or notice
until Francis C. Wilson’s greed and self-confidence outweighed his caution and ethics.897
By the time the Board heard claims at Pojoaque Pueblo in 1928, it had for three
years held hearings at the Bouquet Ranch House, which sat on the edge of the Pojoaque
Pueblo Grant. The Bouquet Ranch had been established by Frenchman Jean Bouquet and
his wife, Petra Larragoite, who had begun to reassemble the old Ortiz claim.898 Pojoaque
Pueblo’s population had fallen by the turn of the century and the surrounding Hispano
population was occupying or exploiting its vacant lands. In 1891, Pueblo agent Nathaniel
C. Walpole concluded that so many Pojoaque residents had moved to Nambé that he
considered the Pueblo extinct.899 Fredrick W. Hodge’s Handbook on North American
Indians described Pojoaque Pueblo as abandoned in 1907, and John P. Harrington’s 1916
Ethnobotany of the Tewa Indians confirmed that conclusion during fieldwork in 1909.
No Pojoaque Indians lived at the Pueblo, though two families lived in Santa Fe and one
in Nambe.900 By the time of the congressional sub-committee hearings in Tesuque in
1920, Pojoaque was declared extinct by Pueblo agents and other government officials.
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Figure 35: Pojoaque Pueblo, showing non-Indian claims (shaded). Carlson, The
Spanish American Homeland, 48.
Hearings on Pojoaque Pueblo claims revealed a situation similar to that in Nambé.
Deeds at Pojoaque routinely dated as far back as 1860. For instance, an abstract of title
of Secundino Romero’s claim dated the original sale of pueblo lands to 1863, when
Pojoaque Indian Guadalupe Tapia had sold the land to Romero.901 A similar sale
originated in 1861. That year, Luciana Arce de Ortiz bought two parcels of land, still
measured as “307 and 212 Castilian varas,” a Spanish-colonial measurement, although
the sale was executed well into the American period. 902 A second phase of land sales
occurred in the mid-1890s. One such transaction was the sale by María de la Cruz
Jaramillo de Tapia, a hispana married to a Pojoaque Indian, to Tomás García and Josefa
901
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Quintana de García in 1896. Two years later, Governor Antonio Montoya and four other
Indians sold forty acres of Pueblo land to Ramón Quintana, claiming they composed the
entire adult population of the pueblo at the time.903 Sales by both individual Pojoaque
Indians and Pueblo officials accelerated from 1908 to 1914, when the remnant Pojoaque
Pueblo population, living either in Santa Fe or at Nambé, sold the lands of their declining
pueblo. This included José Antonio Tapia’s attempted sale of all remaining Pojoaque
lands in 1913, claiming he was the last surviving Pojoaque Pueblo Indian.904
The sale of Pueblo lands created controversy and division among Pojoaque
Indians. Two factions coalesced. One group retained a connection to Pueblo lands and
was ironically led by José Antonio Tapia, the same Indian who had attempted to sell them
to D. C. Collier in 1913. The other was led by James D. Porter, a Pojoaque expatriate
living at Nambé. Critical of the Tapia group, Porter had the ear of Northern Pueblo
superintendent Crandall, who frequently turned to him to police the vacant Pojoaque
Pueblo grant. Since his attempted sale in 1913, Tapia maintained that he and his
extended family were the sole owners of the grant, for other Pojoaque Indians who were
then living on the grant in 1913 had left the reservation and severed their right to its
lands.905 After leaving Pojoaque Pueblo in 1912 for Colorado, Tapia returned
periodically, first, in his attempt to sell the grant, and later to attempt to resettle the grant.
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It was not until the 1930s, well after Pueblo Lands Board hearings, that Tapia returned
permanently to Pojoaque and ironically led the resettlement of the grant.906
A New Mexico Association of Indian Affairs report stated that the Pojoaque
Indians opposed to the José Antonio Tapia approached Francis C. Wilson not to protest
the sale of the grant, but to assert their right to a portion of the proceeds from the sale.
Ignoring the role that Wilson played in Pojoaque’s dispossession, and the welldocumented centuries of Pojoque-Hispano blending, the report closed: “The Pueblo
Indian is a very fair type of Indian. He is wise in his own way, but unable to cope with
the trickery of the wily, treacherous people, who have been camping on the outskirts of
their village for the last three centuries.”907
The actions of the Lands Board were simply ignored by some Pojoaque claimants.
Deeds of sale demonstrated that Cyrus McCormick III, who claimed lands at Tesuque,
bought seventeen separate tracts in 1929, concurrently with the Board’s hearings at
Pojoaque.908 McCormick also approached Nambé Pueblo, about purchasing the
unresolved land claim of Reyes Trujillo and Eufemio Rivera, and sought Pueblo approval
in the event that the Indians retained title.909 The Board eventually heard 472 claims
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totaling 2,084 acres.910 It rejected 67 claims and upheld 405 claims (85 percent of all
claims) for 1,722 acres (See Appendix C). The Board ignored the dire water situation at
Pojoaque, having called for the dismissal of the Exon suit two years earlier, and
recommended Pojoaque Pueblo awards comparable to those at Nambé Pueblo.911 The
Pueblo lands controversy of the early 1920s and the actions of the Pueblo Lands Board
seemed to have inspired Pojoaque expatriates to reclaim their grant. Again, like at other
Pueblos, the First District Court reversed some claims rejected by the Board, resurrecting
31 more claims for 143.37 acres and increasing the percentage of extinguished claims to
92 percent (See Appendices C and D). Still, a government award for Pojoaque, an
estimated $51,679.79, which was later adjusted to $56,524.21, offered an incentive for
the tiny Pueblo to re-occupy its lands, now vested with funds to develop irrigation and
purchase and recover the pueblo’s more-fertile lands.912
Notwithstanding the possibilities of resurrecting the nearly extinct Pojoaque
Pueblo, the actions of the Board generated seemingly endless controversy, especially the
contemptuously low awards it recommended. From its first recommendation at Tesuque,
which compensated Indians for water rights lost, the Board deviated under Hagerman’s
inexplicable water theories, which he argued were tailored to the needs of each Pueblo,
but found consistency only in paltry awards for Pueblo Indians. The Board’s arbitrary
findings begged explanation, but Board members Herbert Hagerman and the late Roberts
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Walker had long resolved to conceal them. These inequitable actions drew the attention
of Pueblo advocates, settler attorneys and less-partial observers of the Pueblo conundrum,
not to mention the Pueblos and Hispanos whose land tenure systems were undergoing
swift and vast revision. The District Court’s 1928 Herrera decision (Nambé) brought
even more public scrutiny and the attention of the Brookings Institute, which had begun
an unprecedented national survey of Indian Affairs in 1926.
Legal specialist Ray A. Brown examined the work of the Pueblo Lands Board and
found that the board was overburdened not only by the magnitude of its task, but by the
indifference of two of its members, Embree and Hagerman.913 Brown explained:
If all three members of the board had the health, time, and ability to do the
persistent, grinding work that is now being done by one member in going directly
to the Indian communities, there to interview the Indians, the claimants, and their
witnesses, and to gather the evidence necessary for a proper determination of the
conflicting claims, the whole matter could be concluded without delay and the
disturbing controversies arising out of these claims made a matter of history.914
Brown was referring to Charles H. Jennings, the so called “mole,” whose incessant need
to gather information aggravated his fellow Board members. Brown also made
observations regarding the Pueblo factionalism, the altruism of the Anglo-dominated
urban areas and Hispano control and corruption of local courts:
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Within some of the separate pueblos there exist two parties, the conservatives
who resent any inroads on native customs and ideals, and the progressives who
desire to follow more closely the life and habits of the white folks about them.
Parties, or clans, within the pueblos exercise strong political power and dominate
in the election of pueblo officers. To render the situation doubly difficult, many
good people in Santa Fe and Albuquerque have interested themselves in these
Indians, and the government in any action it takes must count on their influence
with the Indians. The local courts, particularly the justices of the peace, are
controlled by the Mexican element in the population, and the one thing concerning
which opinion is unanimous is that it would be most unwise to subject the Indians
to their jurisdiction.915
Brown’s brief survey of the Board was fairly accurate. Pueblo agents from John
Calhoun in the 1850s to Clinton Crandall in the 1920s complained bitterly of the
“Mexican element” and their control of local courts. But it ignored the role that the
political and economic elite played in shaping the territorial jurisprudence, including the
consumptive habits of largely Anglo speculators who worked with members of the
Hispano elite. Brown’s ethnocentrism aside, he gave a narrow-minded and highlypragmatic assessment of the task the federal government faced in reforming Indian
affairs. In fact, Brown criticized advocates more than the federal government itself:
The benevolent desire of the United States government to educate and civilize the
Indian cannot be realized with a tribe which has any considerable unsatisfied bona
fide claim against the government. The expectation of large awards making all
members of the tribe wealthy, the disturbing influence of outside agitators seeking
personal emoluments, and the conviction in the Indian mind that justice is being
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denied, renders extremely difficult any cooperation between the government and
its Indian wards.916
Brown’s editorializing aside, pueblos had legitimate complaints against the
federal government in the proceedings of the Pueblo Lands Board. The Board
recommended that Picurís Pueblo’s compensation award be $47,132.90, about two-thirds
of the appraised value of $71,898.14. San Juan and Pojoaque Pueblo awards were
recommended at less than half their value, San Juan receiving only $29,090.53 of its
$60,758.94 value and Pojoaque $51,679.79 of an appraised value of $113,254.03. Even
Tesuque Pueblo’s award of $29,301.20, which reformers believed was too high and
would only draw suspicion and ire of Congress, deviated from its potential value, fixing
land prices at $105.00 per acre where actual land values went up to $125.00 per acre.
Board recommendations at Nambé Pueblo and Santa Clara were lowest of the
Tewa Basin and drew considerable attention and protest. Nambé’s award was
recommended at $19,630.80, less than a third of its appraised value of $65,674.77. Santa
Clara’s was recommended at $86,821.87, slightly more than a third of its appraised
$226,366.43 value. Compensation awarded to Hispano claimants for rejected claims was
generally closer to the appraised values of their land plus improvements. Hispanos
nonetheless protested or rejected claims and low compensation recommendations that
undervalued structures like houses and orchards, which were often considered equal to
gardens and cultivated land. The Board’s low compensation awards affected Hispanos in
other ways as well.
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Many non-Indians with confirmed claims wanted to sell these lands but for more
than the low figure of $35.00 per acre to which Pueblo compensation awards were
reduced. The Board’s unwillingness to adopt a consistent policy regarding water rights
only confused the situation. Citing appraisals that valued lands at up to three times the
$35.00 per acre awards, non-Indians firmly believed that the sale value of their land was
higher because their claims included what they considered to be unburdened water rights.
Their theory, both self-serving and practical, was irrelevant because their water rights
were never affirmed. The convoluted reasoning of Hagerman also held that awards were
lowered because Pueblo water rights were never lost. Legislation seemed more and more
necessary to cure the deficiencies of the Board’s decisions and low awards.
Years of Board hearings and District Court decisions proved that the Pueblo
Lands Act would repatriate very little land to New Mexico’s native Pueblos. Collier and
AIDA’s belief in the efficacy of the Pueblo Lands Board dwindled, and they believed
they had no choice but to pursue individual eviction suits that would bypass the Pueblo
Lands Act, and that targeted every claimant separately. Though similar to Hanna’s 1919
ejectment suits, which had anticipated the Bursum Bill controversy, these new eviction
suits targeted lands confirmed to non-Indians in Board decisions, lands on which Indian
title was extinguished. The suits paradoxically affirmed the Board’s work that upheld
Indian title and disavowed Board recommendations that extinguished Indian title.
Hanna and Collier, with advice from Hanna’s law partners Fred T. Wilson and
Dudley Cornell and AIDA legal advisors Howard S. Gans and Nathan R. Margold,
decided to file ejectment suits at Taos and Picurís. Adding a suit for Santa Clara would
thereby include the towns of Taos, Peñasco, and Española, three of the largest Tewa
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Basin towns on Pueblo lands, and invite not only criticism, but also publicity. Collier
wrote the governors and Council members of Taos and Picurís in mid-December 1930,
explaining that ejectment suits were the “only way to protect your rights and to recapture
as much of your land as ought to be recaptured.” “These new suits,” continued Collier,
“are intended to recover much land that was decreed away from you by the Pueblo Lands
Board, but which is still actually owned by you. Your title has not yet been
extinguished.” Collier urged the Taos and Picurís pueblo leaders to maintain secrecy,
even within their own tribe, and not to speak of the suits with any white people, save
Hanna, Fred Wilson and himself.917
Collier has long been credited with both the strategy and the decision to pursue
independent eviction suits as the only course of action available to the Pueblos. Historian
Lawrence Kelly writes that Collier’s correspondence with the board of directors of AIDA
in December of 1930 secured the commitment of eastern Indian advocates to support
these suits and see them through.918 In fact, Richard Hanna, who was “supervised” by
AIDA counsel Charles de Y. Elkus, had originated the strategy in 1926, when the Board
began its hearings. In an October 1926 memo to Collier, Hanna wrote that while the
Pueblo Lands Act stood on shaky constitutional ground, attempting its repeal would
“doubtless involve considerable criticism” and would allow the “Indian office to
seriously attack our friendship to the Indian cause.” Instead, Hanna suggested that the
“Board be allowed to function,” and assemble data that Pueblo advocates could then use
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to protect Pueblo land rights. These new ejectment suits were the tactical fruit of that
legal strategy.919
Specifically, Hanna advised that the Pueblos’ private attorneys prepare ejectment
suits against adverse claimants and file them concurrently with Board deliberations or
Congressional compensation decisions to guarantee that the two-year statutes of
limitation would not run against the Pueblo. Hanna further hoped that suits would put
pressure on Congress and the Board to award satisfactory sums and that the threat of
pending ejectment suits would compel the Board and the courts to act within the
framework of the Pueblo Lands Act. This, believed Hanna, would be the most plausible
way that the Pueblos could regain the agricultural land, if not through direct decision or
with the use of compensation funds, then through the individual ejectment suits that
would precisely target the arable lands.920
AIDA legal advisor Charles Y. de Elkus disagreed with the filing of ejectment
suits, especially the inclusion of all town-site claims in Taos and Picurís. He believed
that the suits would only further provoke local political leaders and general public
opinion against the Pueblo cause. As president of the Central and Northern California
Indian Defense Association, Elkus was one of Collier’s valuable connections to donors
who helped fund Hanna’s, Wilson’s and Dudley’s legal defense of Pueblos in Board
proceedings and in District Court decisions and appeals. Collier ignored Elkus’s advice
and boldly pressed on. The Picuris and Taos suits were prepared with little fanfare, and
threat of ejectment loomed. Collier believed that the suits would push settlers to move
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for a compromise and legislative solutions, and that the increase of Indian awards would
result.921
John Collier now worked to rebuild the solidarity between Hispanos and Pueblos
that he had worked for years to destroy. Over the previous decade, he worked tirelessly
to portray the Pueblos and Hispanos as completely, almost-inherently, separate. He
ignored the mixed race background of Hispanos at Nambé and Pojoaque and portrayed
the blending of their Pueblo and Hispano communities as a Mexican intrusion. Similarly,
he downplayed or wholly ignored the mixed blood in some of his closest Pueblo Indian
allies, particularly Tesuque’s Martín Vigil and San Juan’s Sotero Ortiz. After his
schemes failed and the safeguards he and A. A. Berle built into the Pueblo Lands Act
were ignored and avoided, Collier was left to pursue a strategy that legally bound Pueblo
and Hispano fates together.922 He stubbornly accepted that they remained connected as
long as they were dependent on the same resources and that he could only save a trickle
of justice by uniting “settler” and Indian interests and securing legislation that benefitted
both Pueblos and Hispanos.
By 1929, John Collier’s influence in the government had grown and a political
solution to the controversies over the Pueblo Lands Act seemed more possible.
Confidence in the Harding and Coolidge administration’s corporate friendly government
began to wane and then broke on the stormy shores of the Great Depression. While
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President Herbert Hoover pursued moderate federal reforms addressing symptomatic
economic problems, Collier and like-minded reformers continued to seek the larger,
structural transformation of federal Indian affairs. Their efforts were rewarded when
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Burke was forced from office with the end of the
Coolidge administration. Charles J. Rhoads, who had succeeded Herbert Welsh as the
president of the Indian Rights Association, was appointed commissioner and served
under new Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur. The appointments of Rhoads
and Wilbur, both devout Quakers, were celebrated by Collier, who considered the men
“revolutionary type[s] from the standpoint of the Indian Bureau old-guard.” Collier and
AIDA hoped their influence in Indian affairs under Rhoads and Wilbur would grow with
the change. He outlined an eleven-point program to reform Indian affairs, which
included the end of allotment laws, the closing of Indian boarding schools and the
protection of tribal culture and resource rights. Their proposed reforms included a
recommendation that the Pueblo Lands Act be amended.923
Though publically confident that federal Indian affairs were transforming in
beneficial ways, Collier still pursued dual reform processes. He challenged the Pueblo
Lands Board in court through appeals and eviction suits while he attempted to amend the
Pueblo Lands Act in Congress. He worked closely with New Mexico senators Sam
Bratton and Bronson Cutting, who had succeeded Holm Bursum and A. A. Jones, to build
congressional support to amend the Pueblo Lands Act. To discredit the Board further,
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Collier focused years of frustration on Herbert J. Hagerman, the Board chair whose
dismissive attitude toward Pueblo advocates tarnished the Board’s work.924
John Collier and Senator Lynn Frazier, a progressive Republican who chaired the
Committee on Indian Affairs, tried to stop the First District Court from hearing Board
recommendations until the U.S. Supreme Court rendered the Pueblo of Taos v. Gusdorf
decision. In the meantime, Frazier organized senate subcommittee hearings that began in
January and continued in May 1931. The hearings were a part of the larger “Survey of
Conditions of Indians in the United States,” which were encouraged by the 1929 Meriam
report on Indian Affairs. Collier had prepared accusations against the Board and the
Office of Indian Affairs for malfeasance in their implementation of the Pueblo Lands Act.
At the center of the controversy were the Board’s remarkably low compensation awards,
which were characteristically less than half of the appraised value of Pueblo lands.925
Board members Hagerman and Jennings both testified that after the Tesuque
hearings, they were instructed to remain mindful of the “Coolidge economy” when
considering the amount of their recommended awards. Collier believed that political
motives were at play as well, and blasted the Board’s loose interpretation of the tax
provisions. Jennings claimed that the policy of allowing payment of tax debts any time
before claims hearings was enacted following the First District Court’s Nambé decision,
which had diluted Section 4 of the Act.926
Collier’s sensationalistic attack on Hagerman brought to light his work as a
Navajo commissioner, especially Hagerman’s role in the sale of the Muñoz-Rattlesnake
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Oil Lease, which served Indian interests little but enriched speculators on the Navajo
Reservation. Though associated with progressive Republicans, Hagerman apparently still
exercised philosophies of the Old Guard, including the full utilization of public lands for
corporate profit. Historian Lawrence Kelly writes that Hagerman’s preposterous waterpriority theory exposed inconsistencies in the Board’s approach and in its decisions,
despite the long tenures of Hagerman and Jennings. Pueblo attorney Hanna’s lengthy
testimony early in the hearings built the extensive evidence that Collier expounded on
before the subcommittee.927
Hagerman, nonetheless, defended the Board’s action, particularly his bizarre
water theories. He claimed that the abnormally high award at Tesuque, which even
exceeded some appraisers’ estimates, was so substantial because upstream water usage
made it impossible to recover waters. The large award included payment for waters lost
with the recommendation that the funds be used to develop irrigation through wells and
dams. According to Hagerman, the Board’s decision did not mean that Tesuque
necessarily lost these water rights. It only meant that that the Board was neither charged
nor empowered to adjudicate water rights outside the external boundaries of the Pueblo,
and water was, thus, unrecoverable.928
The high award at Tesuque, averaging about $105.00 per acre, addressed the
reality of the water scarcity, but did not state there was an actual or legal loss of water
rights. On every other Tewa Basin decision, the Board avoided any pronouncement on
927
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water rights. In his statements to the committee, Hagerman reasoned that Nambé,
Picurís, San Juan, San Ildefonso, Santa Clara and Pojoaque Pueblos were not
compensated for lost water rights because the Board believed that waters were
recoverable, either through adjudication or through extensive reclamation works.
Hagerman’s almost gymnastic backpedaling cast even more doubt on his actions. After a
1932 report by Indian irrigation engineer John Truesdale and his assistant, José Armijo,
determined water priorities for Pojoaque, Tesuque, Nambé and San Ildefonso Pueblos,
Hagerman recanted his 1926 recommendation that the Exon adjudication suit be dropped.
The Truesdale-Armijo report established water priorities, awarding Nambé and San
Ildefonso more waters than Tesuque and Pojoaque.929 It made many recommendations for
adjudicating Pueblo waters, including lawsuits to establish water priorities legally and
legal injunctions to protect Indian water rights temporarily. Above all, the report
suggested the continuation of verbal agreements, privileging local common law tradition
and local water governance over federal and judicial arbitration.930
Hagerman’s muddied water theory aside, the Pueblo Lands Board failed to make
a discernable statement on water rights. Nothing in the act empowered or obliged its
members to do so. Not only did the Act fail Pueblos by ignoring water rights, but it left a
cloud of uncertainty over the water rights on approved tracts by claiming that Pueblos did
not lose water rights on lands whose title was extinguished. Add the low compensation
929
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awards to given to Pueblos, which averaged $35.00 per acre, and the land market of
north-central New Mexico was even more complicated. Non-Indians whose rights were
affirmed by the Board wanted to sell their land, but for more than the $35.00-per-acre
average that the Board affixed to Pueblo lands. Sellers claimed that their land value
included water rights. Hagerman’s contention that Pueblos did not lose water rights
suggested otherwise.931
Collier’s attack on Hagerman did not come without consequences. His
engineering of congressional hearings and the spectacle of assassinating the character of
the mendacious Hagerman offended even Pueblo supporters.932 Senator Bronson Cutting,
who had worked closely with Senator Bratton and Collier on a compensation bill,
labelled Collier an “autocrat” and “supercilious.” Many New Mexico observers
considered Collier’s attack on Hagerman nothing more than a witchhunt. It seemed that
New Mexicans across the political spectrum defended the corrupt and crestfallen
Hagerman. From former political officials too stubborn to accept the Sandoval ruling to
Pueblo advocates who resented Collier’s methods and rapport with Pueblo leaders, New
Mexicans stood by their former governor, perhaps more in opposition to Collier than in
support of Hagerman. One example stands out. After the Congressional hearings
Hagerman returned to New Mexico to find a motorcade of supporters, who escorted their
former governor to the Santa Fe Plaza. In the motorcade were NMAIA members,
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including Witter Bynner, who read a poem honoring Hagerman and ridiculing Collier.
Bynner then joined the crowd as they burned Collier in effigy.933
Senators Cutting and Bratton kept at work on a bill (Senate Bill 2914) to amend
the Pueblo Lands Act. Representative Dennis Chávez worked on a similar bill in the
House (House Resolution 9071). Both bills aimed to increase compensation awarded to
Indians. Neither included any language regarding water priorities, save statements in the
House bill that “left room for judicial determination.”934 In House hearings, Chávez grew
frustrated with government testimony, and complained, “My folks who have lived there
for a hundred years . . . should they just move out?” But rather than addressing the issue
of water priorities, the House inserted an amendment into the bill that stated, “Nothing
herein contained shall in any manner be construed to deprive any of the Pueblo Indians of
a prior right to the use of water from streams running through or bordering on their
respective pueblos for domestic, stock-water and irrigation purposes for lands remaining
in Indian ownership, and such water rights shall not be subject to loss by nonuse or
abandonment thereof as long as title to such lands shall remain in the Indians.”935
Senator Lynn Frazier saw both bills as excessive in their scope and in the
proposed increased awards granted to Pueblos and non-Indians. Each bill would die in
committee, but a compromise bill eventually emerged. During testimony regarding the
Senate bill, Richard Hanna stated that Pueblo water rights were not claimed under the
Winters doctrine. Citing the lack of formal treaty between the Pueblos and the federal
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government, Hanna concurred with the Board’s division of water rights into Indian
versus non-Indian rather than primary versus secondary rights. Hagerman, meanwhile,
called for a Northern Rio Grande Conservancy District bill that imitated the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District.936
A Northern Rio Grande Conservancy District, equal to the MRGCD, was an
unattainable dream. Unlike the Río Abajo, lands in the Río Arriba were cut into smaller
parcels and sat largely on Pueblo lands. While wealthier land owners had large gardens
and raised the chile crops that made the valley famous, there remained a lack of corporate
agriculture that could effectively lobby for a bill. Shorter growing seasons and a lack of
water in large parts of north central New Mexico also meant only costly enginerring work
could surmount the ecological limitations that impeded development. In many ways, the
situation in and around the northern native Pueblos impeded the negotiations of the
Board. Unlike the southern Pueblos, where the Middle Río Grande Conservancy District
ostensibly could create the surpluses that could be shared, the lack of water resources and
the reluctance of Congress to settle and prioritize claims set northern New Mexico on a
course of resource conflict that continues to this day.
By 1933, Louis Warner resigned from the Board and was replaced by Guy P.
Harrington, the district cadastral engineer for the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. In a letter
to Northern Pueblo superintendent C. E. Faris, Harrington questioned whether Abiquiú
should have been considered by the Board. The former genízaro community included
detribalized Hopis, Plains Indians and Tewa Indians. Five years earlier, herederos of the
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Abiquiú Grant voted on whether to pursue status as an Indian pueblo or to continue
operating as a Hispano land grant community, as they had done for the last several
decades.937 Vélez Cachupín treated Abiquiú as an Indian community and settled
genízaros there in the 1740s, creating an Indian pueblo from exiles and former Indian
captives. Spanish-colonial documents referred to the settlement as the “Pueblo de
Abiquiú,” and territorial Indian agents often treated Abiquiú as an Indian community.
Leslie Poling-Kempes reasoned that “their Native American neighbors were treated so
poorly by the government that it would behoove the community to become a village, not
an official Indian pueblo.”938
Relenting on the issue Harrington wrote: “There is nothing in the records to
indicate the race of these people. There is no doubt that many people of Abiquiú have
Indian blood. However, they are regarded at the present time as native Spanish
Americans.”939 Harrington’s confusion was shared by the Assistant Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Henry J. Scattergood, who was puzzled when attorney Richard Hanna
continually referred to the Hispano population as the “native people” of the state.
Scattergood asked Hanna to clarify: “What do you mean by ‘native people’? Native
people or Mexican people?” Hanna offered a compromise, clarifying his statements by
using the term Spanish-American, which was gaining traction by the 1930s. A past
candidate for governor and for the U.S. Senate, Hanna displayed a sensitivity for the
growingly popular use of “Spanish-American.” His usage aligned with a public dialogue
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that emphasized the whiteness of Hispanos to differentiate them from the “redness” or
“brownness”of their Pueblo Indian neighbors.940
By 1933, a second Pueblo Lands Act was passed to address the deficiencies of the
1924 Act. The second act increased Pueblo compensation and made statements regarding
Pueblo water rights without explicitly committing federal protection, paving the way to
legal controversies that continue today. By 1934, the United Pueblos Agency began its
task of aggressively pursuing the purchase of former Pueblo lands confirmed to nonIndians and other adjacent lands. This Pueblo Land Acquisition Program successfully
brought tracts back into Pueblo possession.941
Controversies remained and expanded, especially with the appointment of John
Collier as the commissioner of Indian affairs in 1933. Since 1924, Pueblo leaders,
supported by John Collier, had expanded their legal priorities from defending land and
water rights to guaranteeing Indian religious freedom.942 Now, as Indian commissioner,
Collier could achieve the comprehensive reform of federal Indian affairs that he had
sought since visiting Taos Pueblo in 1920. However, non-Indians across Indian Country
in the Southwest dreaded the prospect of Collier’s administration of Indian affairs.
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Despite its deficiencies, the Pueblo Lands Acts arguably revived Pojoaque
Pueblo, which was nearly extinct in 1924. Its repopulation was led by none other than
José Antonio Tapia, the Pojoaque Pueblo native who had attempted to sell the pueblo to
California investors on the eve of statehood. An important, though perhaps unintentional
function, of the Board was the attempt by the federal government to normalize relations
between Pueblos and Hispanos. First, the federal government regulated economic
relations between Pueblo and Hispano communities. It abided by its role as a fiduciary
and disallowed the sale of Pueblo lands to non-Indians, unless the need was extreme and
the Pueblo and BIA approved. It also dispossessed individual Indians of their private
claims against their own pueblo’s title, empowering the Pueblo community over the
individual Indian. Still unanswered were questions about the status of lands owned by
Pueblo Indians outside Pueblo boundaries, especially as the State of New Mexico resisted
recognizing the rights of Indians as citizens.943
Social relations were affected as well. The Board either misunderstood or denied
connections between Pueblo and Hispano communities. It ignored signs of PuebloHispano intermarriage as it complicated their seemingly impossible task of “unraveling
the Pueblo knot.” Instead, it accepted simple divisions between Pueblos and Hispanos
and understood the two peoples as inimical to each other. Their contests over land and
water had hardly ended. The Pueblo Lands Board seemed a betrayal to Pueblo advocates.
With the First District Court that codified its recommendations, the Board upheld
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hundreds or claims to thousands of acres of Indian land. For advocates, the results
seemed little different than the Bursum Bill they had defeated more than a decade earlier.
For claimants, the Board’s work was a vindication of their acquiring Pueblo lands.
But their success in holding title to their lands was not celebrated by weary claimants. In
fact, many sold their lands and took up their traditional vocations in the post-feudal
economy, pasturing sheep in the southern Rockies as partidarios, picking beets, potatoes
and onions in the Intermountain West and finally moving west to California, a land of
economic opportunity.
During the New Deal, land-relief projects would once again put Pueblos and
Hispanos in competition with one another. Ideas of Pueblo-Hispano relations and of the
racial makeup and ethnic identity of both groups that were created during the Pueblo
Lands Board era found new life during the New Deal. This discourse, created at a time
of great strife, was influential during the New Deal, when ideas of Pueblo and Hispano
relationships and especially Hispano racial identity hardened. It was none other than
John Collier, the man who came to Taos almost by accident over a dozen years earlier
and defied the power of the Republican Party, who would pursue justice on behalf of the
Pueblos and attempt to restore the Pueblo world.
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Chapter 12: The Tewa Basin Study and the Promises of a New Deal, 19331939
As the Board held its final hearings in the Basin in 1929, conditions worsened
when the drought and economic collapse that pervaded the nation destroyed regional
employment in mining, in agriculture and on railroads. The Second Pueblo Lands Act of
1933 rectified the administrative deficiencies of the Board, but the land tenure problem in
the Tewa Basin was far from resolved. By 1933, many of New Mexico’s villages were
overpopulated, their agricultural lands overused, and their pastoral lands overgrazed. The
collapse of the migratory wage trail, which for decades had offered economic relief to
Hispanos and, to a lesser extent, Pueblos, only exacerbated the acute poverty in the Tewa
Basin’s Hispano villages and Indian Pueblos. When the New Deal brought relief
programs to New Mexico, reformers came to the Tewa Basin to re-educate Hispano and
Pueblo farmers and save their ancient agriculture and pastoralism through modern,
scientific conservation methods.
Political changes in the federal government shaped land tenure in the Tewa Basin.
John Collier, the progressive reformer who had helped topple powerful Republican
leaders like Albert Fall, Holm Bursum and Herbert Hagerman, emerged in 1933 as the
commissioner of Indian affairs under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. An empowered
Collier spent the next dozen years reforming Indian affairs across the United States. In
New Mexico, Collier used the New Deal to pursue justice on behalf of the Pueblos and
achieve land reforms that were blocked by a Pueblo Lands Board and District Court, both
of which sought equity. In doing so he relied on convenient racial and ethnic categories
that, again, emphasized clear divisions between Pueblo and Hispano communities that
suffered the same privations and proved to be equally dependent on federal relief.
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Dennis Chávez, the native son who, as a congressman, had fought Collier
continued to battle him as a U.S. Senator. Collier’s and Chávez’s land reform battles
took place in an era of unprecedented federal attention to the land problems that plagued
New Mexico. While Collier used his influence to guide relief to benefit New Mexico’s
Indian populations, Chávez worked to ensure that non-Indians would also benefit from
Collier’s projects. Chávez also worked to thwart Collier’s plan among the Pueblos.
When the commissioner attempted to use provisions of the Wheeler–Howard bill to
ameliorate longstanding divisions at Santa Clara Pueblo, the senator became a voice for
disenfranchised and progressive Pueblo Indians who resisted the power of traditional
leaders.
The conflict between Collier and Chávez influenced federal relief in the Tewa
Basin. Though early programs ignored the ecological and economic limits of the Basin’s
resources, later projects focused squarely on the problems of overuse and erosion. The
federal government actively bought land grants from speculators who eagerly sold their
failed investments, often at a loss. These lands were initially used for land reform
projects. Gradually, the New Deal transitioned from relief-oriented programs to those
aimed at repairing the ailing economy. Instead of distributing purchased grants, the
federal government incorporated the grants into federal forest reserves, creating a modern
legacy of bitterness in the region that grew after the World War II.
~~~
The Pueblo Lands Board ceased its hearings 1931, two years before the second
Pueblo Lands Act was passed. Herbert J. Hagerman left his position in disgrace for his
duplicitous actions in both Pueblo and Navajo affairs. Charles H. Jennings quietly left
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New Mexico, disillusioned from his experience. After seven years on the Board, his
expertise in Indian affairs netted him a job as the superintendent of the Tongue River
Agency in Lame Deer, Montana. Guy Harrington, the water engineer who joined the
Board in its waning days, remained its only active board member, handling all issues
regarding compensation payments for Hispano claimants. As the Pueblo Lands Board
era drew to a close, a larger national political shift was underway. The once-powerful
Republican Party’s inadequate response to the Great Depression spelled its doom
nationwide, and Democrats, led by Franklin D. Roosevelt, ushered a new era of activist
governing into national politics.
The 1932 election was a nationwide rejection of the Republican Party. Democrats
won state and local offices at an unprecedented rate, although political power had shifted
away from the Republican party two years earlier. In New Mexico, Democrat Arthur
Seligman defeated two-term incumbent governor Richard C. Dillon in 1930. Dillon’s
tenure as governor had begun as a high-point for the New Mexico Republican Party, for
the racially divided Hispanic and Anglo factions suspended their traditional animosities
to defeat Democrat Arthur T. Hannett in 1926. By the end of his second two-year term,
Dillon was known more for his foibles than his accomplishments, and New Mexico’s
already feeble economy lay in the ruins of the governor’s administrative inefficiency and
what he considered to be “sound business principles.”944
Seligman came from an upper-class family of Jewish ancestry that had settled in
Santa Fe as merchants and bankers in the nineteenth century. He was a mildly popular
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politician whose politics differed only slightly from those of his Republican opponent.
He too preached a sermon of efficiency and “strict business principles” in government.
Seligman’s victory can largely be attributed to the endorsement of the immensely popular
Republican senator Bronson Cutting. No more able than his predecessor to heal the
economic scars of the depression, Seligman died of a heart attack while in office. It fell
to his Republican opponent, Andrew W. Hockenhull, to administer the New Deal
programs and restrain federal authority in New Mexico.945
While Governor Hockenhull reiterated Seligman’s plea for federal emergency
relief, President Roosevelt’s chief federal relief administrator, Harry Hopkins, mobilized
the resources of the Civil Works Administration (CWA) for employment across New
Mexico. In the state, the CWA developed a reputation for unsystematic, project-minded
employment and, in 1934, was replaced with the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration (FERA), which emphasized workers’ training. Hockenhull lost his bid
for reelection to popular Albuquerque mayor Clyde Tingley in 1934. Though he was
more vocal than his predecessors, Tingley was no more able than Hockenhull to slow
federal growth in the state, but did channel the federal largesse into his preferred
programs that ultimately modernized much of New Mexico. 946
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At the state level, longtime state legislators fell victim to their own inability to
change with the times and turn away from customary territorial politics. Traditional
advocacy issues like taxation and water rights failed to gain many voters as local taxes
remained unpaid and whole regions were gripped by a multi year drought. Hispano
politics in the early statehood period were arguably in a period of transition. Though
disillusioned by Old Guard Republican patronage, Hispanos hardly saw the Democratic
Party as a viable alternative. At the national level, the party had been dominated by the
conservatives in the American South, and only one Democratic president had held the
Whitehouse since 1897.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, nearly all political appointments
to positions in territorial government went to men affiliated with the Republican Party.
Amado Chaves, the renowned Republican orator and first territorial superintendent of
public instruction, gained his prominence while speculating in grant lands with powerful
Anglos, especially Thomas B. Catron. Octaviano Larrozolo famously broke with the
Democratic Party in 1911 when he again failed to secure his party’s nomination for
governor. Larrozolo charged that the Democratic leadership failed to look beyond his
race and preferred Anglo candidates, despite the fact that Hispanos composed almost
two-thirds of the state’s population. Larrozolo only met success when he switched to the
Republican Party, where he was elected both governor and U.S. senator, representing a
party desperate to remain relevant to the native Hispano population.947
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In The Spanish Redemption, historian Charles Montgomery writes, “Anglos and
Hispanos coexisted in a precarious balance of power, a sometimes cooperative yet always
suspicious arrangement.”948 He cites an unspoken agreement between the Democratic and
Republican parties to evade the race question by two means. First, both parties almost
always ran ethnically and racially similar candidates against each other, ensuring that a
given election would not evolve into a racial contest. Secondly, certain positions,
including minor county and local seats as well as the secretary of state and auditor were
traditionally held by Hispano candidates, and Anglos seeking the nomination for these
offices were discouraged by their respective parties from running. Under this tacit
arrangement, the wealthy Anglo minority held the positions and sympathies of judges and
territorial governors.949 Hispanos controlled local and county offices, but rarely held
higher office in either territorial or early statehood government. 950
At the turn of the century, the Republican Party felt the heat of a growing
Progressive movement, which extended the rhetoric of free labor to questions of land
ownership and began displacing the Gilded Age robber barons in party leadership.
Through the 1880s and 1890s, Felix Martínez led a Las Vegas centered pro-labor faction
that publicly criticized the implicit and explicit racism of Anglo economic and political
dominance in New Mexico, most effectively advocating this critique through his
newspaper La Voz del Pueblo. Martínez and his followers set the stage for the political
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success of Governor Ezequiel C. de Baca, who offered a moderated reform program that
spoke to Hispano interests. By the early twentieth century, Hispano politicians had long
carved out a niche for themselves in the northernmost counties. In the 1920s, Hispanos
Benigno C. Hernández and Nestor Montoya won congressional seats as Republicans.
Both men were, however, reliable Old Guard Republicans, unlikely to disturb the status
quo.951
The loss of land grants through adjudication, partition suits and tax seizures begs
a few questions: why did not politicians, be they Democrats or Republicans, Anglo or
Hispano, intercede to protect Hispano land claims? They had, after all, proved willing to
protect Hispano claims within Pueblo Indian land grants. Why did they choose not to
protect Hispanos’ legitimate claims to lands outside of the exterior boundaries of
pueblos? For one, nearly any politician of consequence in both parties actively
participated in land grant speculation. Republicans Thomas B. Catron, Stephen B.
Elkins, Albert B. Fall, Alois B. Renehan, LeBaron Bradford Prince, John S. Watts, and
Ralph Emerson Twitchell famously served in a host of political positions, from special
attorney for the Pueblo Indians, to U.S. attorney for the Territory, delegate to Congress,
Territorial Supreme Court justice, and even U.S. senator, all the while actively buying
interest in land grants and representing heirs and claimants in front of both the surveyor
general and Court of Private Land Claims. So did Democrats, including Napoleon B.
Laughlin, Antonio Joseph, and A. A. Jones, who also served as Territorial Supreme Court
justice, territorial governor, and U.S. senator, respectively. With land grants enveloping
most property of value, land speculation was ubiquitous and resource-rich land was in
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short supply. Defending undivided Hispano land rights offered little political gain for
politicians courting voters. Perhaps more importantly, it offered even less of a financial
gain for politicians whose own personal portfolios guided their business-friendly
governance of official state affairs.952
Amid the beginning of the New Deal, New Mexico state politics were seemingly
in flux. New Mexico came to rely heavily on the federal benefits secured by a
progressive congressional delegation throughout the New Deal. Dennis Chávez, who
served consecutive terms as representative from 1930-1934, vacated his seat in 1934 to
run for the U.S. Senate against popular incumbent Bronson Cutting. 953 Born into a
wealthy New York family, Cutting had come to New Mexico in 1910 as a health seeker
and bought the Santa Fe New Mexican in 1912. He inserted his progressive agenda into
New Mexico politics and immediately came into conflict with Old Guard Republicans
Albert B. Fall and Holm Bursum.954 He was equally hated by Democrats, including
Arthur Hannett, who labelled Cutting a “race agitator.”955
New Mexico historian William H. Pickens claims that the “Spanish Americans
adored Cutting,” who “employed their brothers, fought for their candidates and conversed
in their tongue.”956 Writing three decades earlier, Thomas C. Donnelly portrayed Cutting
in a similar light, lauding his ability to blend with the Spanish-speaking population
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socially as well as politically.957 Historical sociologist Phillip B. Gonzales rejects this
characterization as “received wisdom” of the innate ability and talents of “dynamic
outsiders” to exert influence over nuevomexicanos. Gonzales argues that Cutting offered
Hispanos an alternative to a southern-controlled and openly racist Democratic Party that
was especially important after Octaviano Larrazolo’s fall from power. He characterizes
their relationship as a mutually beneficial political bond rather than a simple and
feudalistic patrón-peón relationship.958
Dennis Chávez’s background was unmistakably different from Bronson Cutting’s.
Born in Los Chávez, New Mexico, in 1888 to a working-class family of staunch
Republicans, Dionisio “Dennis” Chávez embraced the state Democratic Party as a vehicle
of opportunity. He married Imelda Espinosa of the prominent Espinosa family in 1911
and worked as an engineer for the City of Albuquerque. After serving as an interpreter
for Senator A. A. Jones and putting himself through law school at Georgetown, Chávez
returned to Albuquerque in 1920, where he operated a successful law office. He was
elected to one term (1922-1924) in the New Mexico House of Representatives and, in
1930, was elected to New Mexico’s lone U.S. Congressional seat, which he won again in
1932. 959 In 1934, Chávez announced that he would vacate his seat in the House to run
against Senator Cutting.
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The 1934 senatorial election was a hotly contested one, as Chávez challenged
Cutting and readily discussed race in his attempts to reach Hispano voters. Like
Octaviano Larrozolo before him, Chávez violated the unspoken agreement to leave
explicit discussions of race out of political campaigns. But he understood that he needed
to reach members of Cutting’s voting bloc, especially Hispano voters in north-central
New Mexico. Chávez was successful in there, winning Santa Fe, Río Arriba and Taos
Counties (the Tewa Basin plus Taos and Santa Fe) by nearly one thousand votes. But he
lost badly among Hispanos in his native Río Abajo. When Chávez lost the election by a
mere 2,284 votes, he accused Cutting of voter fraud. 960
Cutting died in a plane crash in May 1935 while en route to Washington to defend
himself against the voter fraud charges, and Governor Hockenhull appointed Chávez to
Cutting’s seat.961 Cutting’s progressive and reformist allies were dismayed with Chávez’s
appointment and a group of southern Democratic senators even walked off the Senate
floor when Chávez was introduced.962 When he won his seat outright in a special election
a year later, he completed a fully Democratic delegation, which included Senator Carl
Hatch (1933-1949), and Congressmen John Dempsey (1935-1941), Clinton P. Anderson
(1941-1947) and Antonio M. Fernández963 (1943-1956). The liberal-minded, progressive
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goals of New Mexico’s delegation matched those of the Roosevelt administration, and
the state’s senators and representatives were able to direct substantial federal funding to
New Deal projects and programs throughout the state.
Roosevelt and the Democrat-controlled Congress built on electoral victories in
1932 and 1934, creating a liberal-Democrat dominated “New Deal Voting Coalition.” A
combination of the traditional Democratic constituencies, the coalition included the urban
North, the South, and big-city political machines, but also new constituents, such as
union-hungry urban workers, anti-Prohibition immigrants, African Americans, women
and rural voters. This New Deal political machine overwhelmed progressive Republican
Kansas governor Alf Landon in the presidential election of 1936.964 The 1936 victory
was arguably not a victory for Democrats at large, but a “ratification of the New Deal,”
and the cementing of the new liberal coalition that arguably shaped the Democratic Party
for the next six decades.965
Early New Deal programs in New Mexico eased the way for Democratic victories
in state and local elections. After President Roosevelt laid out his “New Deal for
America” in the election of 1932, Harry Hopkins immediately began organizing new
agencies and funding their work across the nation. With twelve-hundred Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC) camps spread across the nation by the end of 1933, the CCC
stood as veritable proof of the Roosevelt administration’s commitment to immediate
employment through public works. In New Mexico, CCC camps were often the first
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opportunity for young Hispano men to earn wages for their labor. A CCC camp was
established in Frijoles Canyon in the southwestern part of the Tewa Basin in 1934. For
the next seven years, workers constructed roads, a new lodge and visitor’s center, and
miles of trails for the struggling Bandelier National Monument, whose remote location
prevented substantial tourism. Historian Maria E. Montoya demonstrates that the CCC in
northern New Mexico imposed racial divisions of authority and labor. Camp
administrators even brought young men from Texas and Oklahoma to serve in higherpaying leadership positions over nuevomexicanos, despite their knowledge of the local
ecology.966 CCC labor was rarely, if ever, used in early land projects for the Tewa
Basin’s struggling Hispano communities.
The Rural Rehabilitation Corporation (RRC), a subsidiary of the independent
Resettlement Administration (the precursor of the Farm Security Administration) was the
first federal program to offer relief to Hispano villages. The RRC came to New Mexico
in late 1933 and began offering loans to farmers along the Río Grande watershed as early
as 1934. The Resettlement Administration, however, lacked a clear understanding of the
economic situation in New Mexico, and apparently made little effort at doing so. RRC
loans encumbered already indebted farmers who had nearly no capital and were likely to
never have the means to repay their debt and almost certainly worsened their economic
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situation.967 Farmers in Santa Cruz used relief loans to pay excessive back-taxes owed to
the Santa Cruz Irrigation District rather than to invest in improvements on their land. The
RRC advocated change, but did not work with the residents to guide or inform it.
Consequently, the program, offering ample capital but little practical advice, failed to
yield considerable improvements. 968
The situation in Santa Cruz was only a small symptom of larger economic and
ecological issues that affected the entire Tewa Basin. From the inception of the New
Deal, the majority of New Mexico’s population was eligible for direct relief and
Hispanos represented well over 80 percent of the New Deal relief load.969 The worsening
conditions in the Tewa Basin can be traced back to the mid-1920s. The effect of the
failing of regional labor markets was evident during Pueblo Lands Board hearings, which
spanned four and a half years, from 1925 to 1930. When the Board heard claims in
Tesuque and Nambé in 1925 and 1926, it was common for claimants to press their cases
in absentia. Many claimants were working in mines and fields across the Intermountain
West and were represented by their wives and by attorneys at the hearings. By the San
Ildefonso and Santa Clara hearings in 1929-1930, claimants often presented their own
967
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claims at hearings, signaling that they were no longer working outside New Mexico.
They also more often presented their claims without legal representation, which most
could no longer afford. The Pueblo Lands Board hearings happened at critical time when
the lack of access to cash made Hispanos depend more squarely on land resources that
they often illegally appropriated from their Pueblo neighbors. At the same time many
relocated permanently, leaving Basin villages for communities in Colorado, Wyoming,
Idaho, Washington, and Oregon. Most of those who stayed in the Tewa Basin faced an
uncertain future and turned to federal relief for assistance.970
The Hispano population, booming since the 1880s, had pushed villages to their
ecological and economic limits by the 1920s. The carrying capacity for the Tewa Basin
had been stretched since the 1880s, when the railroad connected the Basin to regional
markets and increased competition for resources. The expansion of the railroad and of
mining and agricultural industries from the 1880s to the 1920s injected necessary cash
into local economies and drew population away from villages already overusing their
dwindling resources. Droughts in the late 1920s and the stock market crash in 1929,
however, destroyed agribusiness throughout the Rocky Mountain West, closing the
migratory labor trail that extended from northern New Mexico to the Pacific Northwest.
By the beginning of New Deal programs in the 1930s nearly every village in northern
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New Mexico qualified for federal assistance. Three years later, the whole region, Indian
Pueblos and Hispano villages alike, was a federal dependency.971
The collapse of the regional labor economy led to the repopulation and
overpopulation of Hispano villages. Ojo Sarco offers an example of the effects of
overpopulation. Ojo Sarco sat on the boundary of the Sebastián Martín and Las Trampas
grants, on the eastern slopes of the Rocky Mountains in the eastern Tewa Basin. It had
engaged in acequia disputes with Las Trampas since the Spanish-colonial era. The
conflict ended in a 1928 when a legal decision awarded Las Trampas primary water
rights to the springs and streams that fed both communities.972 The effect was immediate.
Ojo Sarco’s population, which grew from 224 in 1910 to 239 in 1920 dropped to 189 in
1930, reducing the pressure on meager and diminishing resources. The start of the Great
Depression in 1929 was coupled with droughts in the Intermountain West in 1930 and
1931, leading to the collapse of the regional economy and the massive and sudden
repopulation of Tewa Basin villages. Ojo Sarco’s population surged to 258 in 1935, an
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increase of over 35 percent a year after the village experienced its worst drought in over
four decades.973
When federal relief began to trickle into New Mexico in 1929, Ojo Sarco would
have seemed a candidate for Herbert Hoover’s well-intentioned but inadequate relief
projects. State officials were either ill-informed about or in denial of the decaying state
of New Mexico’s villages. Governor Richard Dillon ignored the dependence of villages
like Ojo Sarco on migratory wage labor. In 1929, he assured officials in Washington that
New Mexico faced no unemployment problem since most of its people were pastoralists
and were not in “sharp competition in the matter of earning a livelihood.”974 By the mid1930s, over twenty thousand Hispanos lived in the Tewa Basin, composing somewhere
between 80 and 90 percent of the total population. This was estimated at between 10-20
percent above the Basin’s carrying capacity, leading to the overuse of pastoral lands, to
considerably smaller yields in agricultural fields and to larger ecological damage. When
federal relief agencies began projects in the Basin in 1933, they found almost every
village overpopulated.975
The start of the Great Depression and the droughts of the 1930s only accelerated
and exacerbated problems in the Tewa Basin, processes that had been underway for
decades before they came to a head in the late 1920s. In the early statehood period, New
Mexico’s choicest properties were firmly in federal hands. The state had a small tax
base, and state government pressured other units of government and private landowners,
including counties and community land grants, to pay delinquent taxes. Cash-poor
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communities, barely achieving subsistence, were forced to sell off portions of their
common lands to pay these debts. Communities like Santa Cruz had lost land to
irrigation districts created by commercial growers to control water rights and seize taxdelinquent lands.976 Parciantes, or water rights holders, along the upper Santa Cruz
River were marginalized by outsiders and newcomers such as John Block, who owned a
small mercantile and contracted with Frank Bond to provide supplies to the weak
regional produce market. When these schemes failed, the state often inherited the land,
along with the tax liability and the debt left by defunct irrigation districts. Collecting on
tax delinquencies enlarged state lands for two decades, until federal relief finally ended
this practice in 1934.977
Combined with tax delinquencies, the creation and expansion of U.S. National
Forests in the first two decades of the twentieth century exacerbated the dismal situation
in land grant communities. Already dependent on migratory labor to bring money into
their cash-poor economies, Hispano and Indian Pueblo villagers increasingly lost access
to land and resources that they had traditionally used to maintain their meager but stable
livelihoods.978 For some, these lands were part of ancestral properties. Villagers in
Chamita and Velarde still travelled to the Juan José Lobato and Sebastián Martín grants,
respectively, for fuelwood. The private owners of these grants either approved of or
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overlooked these customary uses. This would change when the federal government
purchased the Martín and southern portion of the Lobato grant for relief programs by
1935, before transforming them into federal forest and rangelands and restricting access
by local users.979
The Tewa Basin was an area desperate for relief when New Deal agencies came
in 1933. Hispanos still depended on seasonal employment in cotton fields, sheep
ranches, lumber camps and regional mines to supplement their small agricultural yields.
In the spring of 1933, railroad companies permanently laid off 60 percent of their
workforce and coal mines operated at one-third of their capacity. By November of 1933,
relief workers estimated that 90 percent of the relief load in New Mexico consisted of
seasonal employees, and that 80 percent of these unemployed and underemployed
workers were “Spanish Americans.”980 The New Mexico Child Welfare Department was
flooded with requests. Truchas, Ojo Sarco, Cordova and Española requested aid from the
Red Cross. Lydia Eicher Haystead, a field representative from the New Mexico State
Relief Office, visited Chama after a petition sent to Governor Seligman implored aid in
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securing employment, but not direct relief. Residents in Tierra Amarilla displayed the
same stubborn independence, asking only for aid to feed their stock.981
Those lucky enough to produce an agricultural surplus faced the dilemma of
moving their products to market. Many farmers were unable to convert their surplus to
the cash necessary to survive winter. Field agents remarked that most Tewa Basin
communities were isolated, and the lack of passable roads made programs like the
national Farm to Market impossible.982 Early New Deal programs, however, ignored both
the grave situations and their practical solutions.
The RRC was among the first programs introduced to the Tewa Basin. The
centerpiece was a low-interest-loan program modeled on farm operations in the Midwest.
Along with the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the RRC encouraged farmers
to re-invest the loans into their land. Barely able to yield enough crops for the little cash
they relied on, these farmers were an obvious loan risk. By the end of 1933, the RRC had
loaned thousands of dollars to farmers in Santa Cruz, who gladly accepted the money but
did not invest it directly into their overburdened and dry fields. Most Santa Cruz farmers
immediately paid the Santa Cruz Irrigation District for outstanding debts. The Irrigation
District, bonded by private investors and approved by the state, had for two decades
confiscated the lands of farmers who failed to pay their yearly fees. Lands were then sold
to the highest bidders, typically Anglos who initiated the district as a means of taking the
once-rich agricultural lands from small land holders and combining the tracts into
commercial agricultural farms. The loans, then, stabilized an irrigation district that had
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provided little of the water stability it promised and had consistently dispossessed
Hispano farmers of their land.983
This blindness characterized early federal efforts in the Tewa Basin. The RRC
implemented farming practices developed in Iowa for commercial farming in and around
Española, including Santa Cruz, and ignored the fact that the area had hardly produced a
surplus in the past decade. Perhaps most injurious to the Santa Cruz farmers was that,
unbeknown to them, they were immediately made ineligible for any direct federal relief
upon accepting the RRC loan until they paid back the entire amount. By 1936, Santa
Cruz farmers had petitioned Governor Clyde Tingley for work in New Deal projects.
The petition, signed by nearly three dozen Santa Cruz heads of family, read:
We the undersigned relief clients from the counties of Santa Fe and Rio Arriba
wish your aid, requesting the Rehabilitation Administration to develop some kind
of project so that we can get work. . . .. We have tried to get work on W.P.A.
Projects and have been informed that only relief clients are permitted to work. . . ..
We owe money to the government and have not been able to meet obligations
because we have no work. . . .. We earn no cash and our crops are small this year.
. . .. We are informed of WPA project[s] for Santa Cruz River bank protection for
[the] town of Riverside which was not started due to shortage of Relief Clients.984
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By ignoring the reality of the subsistence economy of the area, Rural Rehabilitation
“completely failed to touch the realities of the economic plight of the Tewa Basin.” 985
While the Resettlement Administration shifted its focus to experimental farms in
the Southwest,986 a newly transferred and transformed Soil Conservation Service began
work in New Mexico and Arizona. Originally created as the Soil Erosion Service in the
Department of Interior in 1933, the Service was renamed by the Soil Conservation Act
and reestablished in the Department of Agriculture in 1935.987 The head of the reformed
Soil Conservation Service (SCS), Hugh Hammond Bennett, who was previously with the
Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, expounded on the state of erosion across the nation’s
parched and overused lands, both public and private.988
Bennett immediately used his post to criticize FERA’s conservation efforts.
FERA’s plans included building ponds and terraces to prevent water wastage and soil
erosion. Bennett argued that such action was a piecemeal solution to a grave nationwide
problem. He was suspicious of FERA’s plans and its influence on untrained state
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extension services that implemented their programs.989 With the support of Secretary of
Agriculture Henry Wallace, Bennett worked to create state conservation laws that
recognized the SCS as the authority on all things conservation.990 Drawing on his difficult
experiences while serving in the Department of Interior, he passionately fought to ensure
that the SCS was untethered and that it exercised all the authority allowed by the 1935
Soil Conservation Act and 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act. In a 1935 talk, Bennett
claimed to “propose a plan of land conservation that replaces the old system of
exploitation.”991
New Mexico’s land was in a critical condition in 1935. Some experts estimated
that as much as 85 percent of all land was in a state of mass erosion. Sparse and
inconsumable grasses, which failed to hold onto soil grew. This meant that topsoil could
easily be lost to winds or torrential rains. The widespread erosion across New Mexico
eventually led to the establishment of a SCS regional office headquartered in
Albuquerque. Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier, however, worked behind the
scenes to ensure that the SCS would not impede his programs in the Southwest. He
recommended that Hugh G. Calkins, whom Collier had met when he served as the chief
of operations of the Forest Service in New Mexico and Arizona, serve as director of the
Region Eight Albuquerque office. Calkins was appointed the Regional Conservator, and
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the SCS immediately embarked on numerous cooperative studies with the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the U.S. Forest Service.992
Collier urged Calkins to cooperate on a study of the Indian lands in Arizona and
New Mexico. The Indian commissioner created the Indian Land Research Unit in the
spring of 1933 and named Eshref Shevky its director. Born in Turkey and schooled in
England, Shevky had completed his Ph.D. in sociology at Stanford in 1922, where he
developed a reputation for brilliance. Shevky was widely read in anthropology,
sociology, economics, colonial administration and education. He met Collier in the late
fall of 1922, and Collier, engaged in his massive campaign to stop the Bursum Bill,
convinced Shevky to undertake a study of health and economic conditions of Taos
Pueblo.993
Complementing Collier’s hiring of Shevky, Calkins created the Technical
Cooperation with the Bureau of Indian Affairs program (TC-BIA).994 Collier immediately
placed Shevky in the Navajo Reservation and at several New Mexico pueblos to direct
field studies. The Indian commissioner was pressured to extend his studies of poverty on
Indian Pueblos and the Navajo Reservation to surrounding Hispano villages, something
he was reluctant to authorize. 995 While Senator Bronson Cutting urged Collier to
reconsider, Representative Chávez openly criticized Collier’s plans in congressional
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committee hearings and in the press, an action New Deal scholars have consistently
interpreted as political grandstanding.996 Though Chávez’s motivations may be
debatable, the results of his and Cutting’s advocacy are not. By the fall of 1934, Shevky
formally suggested to Calkins that a broad survey of north-central New Mexico,
including both the Indian Pueblos and Hispano villages, was necessary. Collier relented
and ceased his protest.997
Shevky and Calkins immediately transferred crews engaged in field research on
the Navajo Reservation to the Tewa Basin of north-central New Mexico.998 Building on
studies started by Calkins in 1934 as Forest Service chief, teams of economists, rural
sociologists and cultural anthropologists engaged in human-dependency surveys, and
conservation and economic surveys under the auspices of the newly formed SCS. From
March through July of 1935, the SCS executed fieldwork for its monumental Tewa Basin
Study, visiting all six Tewa-speaking Pueblos and Picurís, and over three dozen Hispano
villages. Led by Eshref Shevky, the Indian Land Research Unit of the Office of Indian
Affairs and the SCS doggedly pursued new data on the Indian Pueblos and the Hispano
communities that surrounded them.999
The study immediately set itself apart from previous efforts by its ambition and its
scope. It also marked one of the earliest field applications of applied anthropology, an
aspect of a growing functionalism movement in American anthropology that refuted
Franz Boas’s “culture history” methods in favor of a more-sociological look into the
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present condition of their subjects.1000 The instructions given to the field workers are
more telling of the intentions of the Tewa Basin Study than the study itself. Field workers
were given a question chart and a set of instructions that were intended to guide their
“leisurely conversations” with subjects. They were advised to “not [to] press or insist
upon an answer if one was not forthcoming,” and to “explain what you want as clearly as
possible and in more or less the same way to the different groups.” “In other words,”
stated the instructions, “standardize your stimuli so that reactions can be comparable.”1001
The three-volume report that resulted from these intensive field studies became a
standard reference for land reform projects over the next four years.1002
While academically trained sociologists and anthropologists were employed as
field workers, the study nonetheless relied on local hispanahablantes (Spanish speakers
conversant in native colloquial Spanish) who could effectively communicate with
Spanish-speaking Pueblos and Hispanos to complete field work. Ernest Maes and Juan
Archuleta visited the majority of the Spanish-speaking households, making initial contact
1000
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before the full survey was conducted. Antonio Mirabal, a Taos Pueblo native who had
served as Elsie Clews Parsons’s informant for her work on Pueblo religion, and who
would later befriend Dennis Chávez in mutual opposition to Collier, served as the Pueblo
field worker.1003 The analysis of the data that they acquired was nonetheless reserved for
the trained academicians. Informed by the paternalistic values of broker-state advocacy
that marked most New Deal programs, the SCS stated that understanding the situation in
the north “evolves neither from individual insight nor from a lifetime of experience. It
emerges only from organized studies of the institutional activities of people.”1004 In the
Cuba Valley, for example, initial fieldwork and reports were completed by Ernest Maes,
but analysis and interpretation were left to social economist Lloyd H. Fisher. 1005
The Tewa Basin Study, along with other early SCS and TC-BIA studies, exposed
the decaying state of both Indian Pueblos and Hispano villages, whose populations had
been venturing north for decades to work in industries from the Intermountain West to
the Pacific Northwest. At its height in the 1920s, from 7,500 to 10,000 workers from
14,000 largely Hispano families the Upper Rio Grande Valley travelled along the
migratory wage trail.1006 By 1935, less than two thousand successfully found work
outside the state.1007 Historian Sarah Deutsch writes that this sudden decrease in migrant
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work led to the collapse of the regional community in northern New Mexico and southern
Colorado.1008
At San Ildefonso, fieldworkers found that the situation had improved little since
the Pueblo Lands Board hearings five years earlier. Twenty-six Pueblo families, totaling
126 people, were no match for Hispanos totaling 130 families of 618 people that lived
within the league, an increase of 68 residents (12%) since 1930. Fieldworkers remarked
that San Ildefonso was undergoing a transition from the native blue corn, nixtamal, used
for atole and chaquegüe (two forms of corn gruel), to yellow corn used to feed stock,
suggesting also a growing dependence on flour likely purchased from one of the
Española valley’s merchants. Chile was the only cash crop, but any produce was
vulnerable as both San Ildefonso Pueblo and the Hispano village that flourished inside its
boundaries had inferior irrigation rights to the Pojoaque River and only had the rights to
use its waters one day a week. The Hispano population on the Pueblo grant had also
grown dependent on the Ramón Vigil Grant for grazing, compelling Frank Bond to hire
Abel Sánchez, a San Ildefonso Indian, to patrol its boundaries to stop firewood harvesting
and to issue grazing permits. Hispanos were also dependent on the use of agricultural
equipment at the pueblo, especially a threshing machine purchased in 1933 with early
New Deal funds.1009
At Nambé, the Study reported a wholly different situation. Although fieldworkers
portrayed San Ildefonso as a native Pueblo exploited by surrounding Hispanos, they
found that decades of “racial infiltration” had created a cohesive and “unusually friendly”
community. They noted, “Here, more than anywhere else in the area, where the Indian
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and Mexican have been living side by side for as long as they can remember . . . there is a
definite tendency to mix.” The Study further remarked that Nambé Indians used Spanish
more than their native Tewa and had even in their appearance become so “Latinized” that
young Pueblo men attending dances in Santa Fe and Albuquerque “passed for
Mexican.”1010
SCS studies illustrated the differences between the east and west sections of the
Río Grande watershed. The western section was dominated by the partido system, while
the eastern part was a collection of small, communally operated land holdings, averaging
3-4 acres, or 10-12 acres at their largest. Landholding in the Tewa Basin confirmed the
report, even down to the micro-level. By 1935, western basin grants like the Baca
Location No. 1 (which included the Valle Grande) and the Ramón Vigil Grant had
gradually fallen into the hands of Frank Bond, who continued indebting the local
partidarios with unpayable loans. Land holdings in the eastern portion of the Basin were
either still communal or were broken into small parcels, such as the remnants of the Santa
Cruz, Truchas, and Trampas Grants.1011
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Figure 36: Tewa Basin Map, 1937. By 1937, federal land purchases controlled most
former land grant lands in the Tewa Basin. Lands colored white remained private
property, which included the Francisco Montes Vigil grant; Montes Vigil was later
purchased and incorporated into the Carson National Forest, as were the former land
grant lands of the Las Trampas Grant. Piedra Lumbre remained in private hands. The
northern half of the Juan José Lobato Grant was purchased by the federal government as
well, its land incorporated into the Santa Fe National Forest. The Plaza Blanca and Plaza
Colorada grants were pieced out into private ownership. The Truchas, Abiquiú, and
Cundiyó grants retained their common lands, despite speculation and tax seizures. Other
government purchases, including the Ramón Vigil, Caja del Río, Juan de Gabaldón and
Sebastian Martín Grant were incorporated into Forest Service and later Bureau of Land
Management lands. Soil Conservation Service – Region Eight, Annual Report, 1938,
folder 10, box 12 SCS Records, CSWR, University Libraries, UNM, Albuquerque.
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The Study criticized Frank Bond and Edward Sargent as the powers who caused
both the economic and ecological degradation of the Basin and its people. Bond had
weathered the storms of the Pueblo Lands Board era and expanded his holdings,
increasing his sheep yields by toughening his practices. Amarante Serna, for example,
had been a partidario for Bond for over thirty-five years. His agreement to increase the
one hundred head of sheep he rented from Bond by twenty ewes was typical. Serna also
paid three pounds of wool for every ewe rented. He met the agreement as long as each
ewe weighed fifty-five pounds, but was not compensated for additional weight. Before
1916, Serna easily met this requirement and returned as many as fifteen hundred lambs in
one season. After several good seasons, he had accumulated over eight hundred sheep of
his own. Serna, however, could not find winter rangelands to forage his flock. Bond
controlled nearly all the regional rangeland for sheep through either direct ownership, by
his rental of rangelands, or by renting sheep to other partidarios, whose names were on
grazing permits but nevertheless grazed Bond’s rented sheep. Serna was forced to sell
most of his flock to Bond, who rented the sheep back to Serna the next season.1012
The effect of these manipulative grazing practices was the destruction of nearly
all foraging lands in the Basin. The Study estimated that 52.5 percent of all land,
including Indian Pueblo land, was overstocked with sheep and cattle. Waterways had
become clogged with silt. Agricultural fields were overused and topsoil was washed
away when droughts were followed by floods. The SCS’s studies found that dominant
forces driving this downward spiral were the “increasing press of population on
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dwindling land resources, seasonal wage labor reduced by drought and depression, the
unstable market for cash crops like chile and fruit, the extreme polarization of wealth,
including the semifeudal partido system, and the excessive relief load throughout the
basin, much of it deriving from ill-conceived loans and unsuitable agricultural methods
encouraged by early New Deal entities, including land use methods from Iowa.”1013
Later assessments of the Tewa Basin Study have considered it a foundational
work, “developing ideas and methodologies for the analysis of the link between culture
and environment.”1014 The study is also a marked departure from racialized reporting that
attributed the socio-economic poverty of Hispanos to their mixed-race ancestry. Rather,
it recognized that “problems did not result from variations in human aptitude but rather
from the deterioration of resources in the area.”1015 By ignoring the consanguine history
of the Río Arriba, these New Deal bureaucrats swiftly refuted race-based explanations
and utilized anthropology and sociology in a region long dominated by racial science and
the hard sciences.1016 Shevky’s human-dependency studies led to a greater understanding
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of the socioeconomic ills that affected the Tewa Basin. But it was John Collier who
ensured that the SCS studies aligned with his designs for Pueblo land reform.
As Indian commissioner, Collier now had the authority to enact across the Tewa
Basin land reform that had been unachievable after the Pueblo Lands Board decisions.
He ensured that the SCS’s work in New Mexico merged with BIA programs. In New
Mexico, Collier removed Indian affairs employees whose loyalty to him was
questionable, and he immediately drew criticism when he reunited the Zuni, Northern and
Southern Pueblo agencies into the United Pueblo Agency. He chose Dr. Sophie Aberle, a
graduate of Yale Medical School, who also had a doctorate in anatomy, to head the
agency. Aberle first travelled to New Mexico in 1925 to study the sexual practices of
San Juan Pueblo Indians. By 1935, she had published widely on child birth and mortality
among the northern Pueblos.1017
Aberle immediately came into conflict with Pueblo agents, Pueblo advocates and
traditional Pueblo leaders. Collier defended Aberle from critics, who included Taos
Pueblo natives Antonio Mirabal and Antonio Luján, and his wife, Mabel Dodge Luhan, a
self-proclaimed expert, who accused Aberle of not understanding “the Indian
psychology.”1018 In return, Aberle was loyal to the Indian commissioner and kept him
abreast of Pueblo affairs in New Mexico, particularly the actions of advocacy groups
working against him.
In 1934, Collier resurrected plans for a Pueblo land-acquisition program that had
been developed during the second Pueblo Lands bill (see Appendix B) debate from 1931
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to 1933. It identified desirable parcels of land that Pueblos had lost to non-Indians when
the Pueblo Lands Board confirmed their adverse claims. The program planned to use
compensation monies awarded to Pueblos by the Board to regain traditional lands.1019
Purchases were attempted at Picurís in 1932, but Hispanos seemed uninterested in selling
their lands. With the general failure of the Picurís land repurchase program,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Rhoads even suggested that Picurís be
abandoned and the population relocated to land near or on San Juan Pueblo, with whom
Picurs natives had longstanding social and marital relations.1020
Under Collier, the Office of Indian Affairs developed elaborate repurchase plans
with Pueblo superintendents and agents and Pueblo leaders.1021 They sought out
individuals who, they believed, would be willing to sell their land back to the pueblos.
Pablo Mascareñas, a Hispano resident of Vadito, which sat wholly on the lands of Picurís
Pueblo, proved willing to sell his lands to Picurís.

Represented by former Surveyor

General Manuel Sánchez, Mascareñas sold over ten acres to Picurís Pueblo in 1934 and
1935.1022 He and his cousin, Juan D. Mascareñas, even had the value of their lands
reassessed by the Taos County treasurer to reach a lower price that the Pueblo would be
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willing to pay. By 1936, both men had moved to Wamsutter, Wyoming, in search of
work.1023
The Mascareñas cousins proved to be the exception. Much to the frustration of
Pueblo attorneys and agents, Hispanos generally refused to sell land back to Pueblo
Indians. If they agreed to sell, many demanded sums beyond the actual value of the land.
The contentious climate of the past decade undoubtedly played a part in their
unwillingness to sell. But the overzealous planning of the OIA ignored the likelihood
that Hispanos refused to part with the land for the same reason they bought or seized it in
the first place: they needed it.1024
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While re-acquiring former Pueblo lands proved difficult, the Office of Indian
Affairs turned to New Deal programs, particularly the Resettlement Administration, to
purchase lands to replace Pueblo losses. A land-acquisition plan developed for the Tewa
Basin focused on former land grant properties that, by the 1930s, had been traded several
times after being lost or sold by heirs. By September of 1934, H. H. Dorman, a New
York native and close personal friend of Senator Bronson Cutting, sold the 68,848-acre
Caja del Rio Grant to the federal submarginal-land program. Dorman owned a house in
downtown Santa Fe and was a neighbor to former Pueblo attorney Francis C. Wilson.
Dorman had represented Cyrus McCormick when the wealthy Santa Fe transplant
speculated in Pojoaque and Nambé Pueblo lands in 1929.1025 He was also a founder of
the New Mexico Progressive Party and aided Cutting in managing the Santa Fe New
Mexican. He received $1.25 per acre for the Caja del Río grant, which was badly
overused and offered little forage land.1026
The Indian Affairs land-acquisition plan also identified as candidates the Black
Mesa Grant, the Mesa Prieta Grant, and the Cañón de San Diego Grant, all of which were
owned by Frank Bond or controlled through his own leasing.1027 It also examined the
Plaza Blanca Grant and the Plaza Colorado Grant, and the northern half of the Juan José
Lobato Grant, which was owned by Colorado State Supreme Court justice William S.
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Jackson. The Town of Abiquiú Grant also attracted federal interest. Though he did not
realize his dream of developing irrigation on the Lobato, Jackson had witnessed a decade
of decreasing rainfall and was happy to sell the land to the federal government. The
Town of Abiquiú Grant, on the other hand, rejected entreaties to sell its lands.1028
Historian Doris Avery argues that even though the Abiqueños’ genízaro past had helped
them preserve their lands, they continued to adopt a Hispano identity.1029 In 1928,
herederos voted to determine their community as either an Indian Pueblo or a Hispanic
village. Lesley Poling Kempes opines that witnessing how “their Native American
neighbors were treated so poorly by the government” may have influenced their decision
to “become a village[,] not an official Indian pueblo.” This decision resulted in a tax
burden for the residents of Abiquiu.1030
Individuals paid their taxes on private land, but one individual was designated to
collect the taxes on the communal lands and turn the revenue into the state. At some time
during the mid-1930s, the state of New Mexico seized most of the Abiquiu grant for
delinquent taxes. Avery writes: “Evidently, J. M. C. Chávez, the designated collector,
had been pocketing the taxes. In response, the village pulled together to reinvent
themselves yet again to form the Abiquiu Cooperative Livestock Association and gained
the aid of Senator Dennis Chávez to stall the sale of the land until they could raise
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enough money to buy it back.”1031 Apart from Abiquiú’s reluctance to sell its lands, the
Resettlement Administration was largely successful in convincing land grant owners to
sell their land to the federal government. Abiquiú was a community grant that retained
communal ownership of the grant, but most grant lands that the federal government
targeted for purchase were private grants, many of which operated as quasi-community
grants.1032
Advised by the Office of Indian Affairs, the Resettlement Administration
purchased the 50,529-acre Sebastián Martín Grant from a collection of heirs, and Anglos
who had purchased tracts in early 1934. Santa Fe Indian School superintendent Chester
E. Faris wrote field agent Mark W. Radcliffe in September 1934 to applaud plans to clear
the eastern portion of the grant to create access roads and ease Indian use. Like many of
his Indian affairs counterparts, Faris ignored traditional use by the communities of Las
Trampas and Truchas and was surprised when Hispano communities began to protest the
extensive purchase of lands for Indian projects.1033
The layering of federal programs continued to hinder progress. Four years into
the New Deal, agencies continued to duplicate projects and administrators complained of
overlapping jurisdictions. In 1937, Secretary of the Interior Harold I. Ickes and Secretary
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of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace created the Interdepartmental Rio Grande Committee.
It included representatives of every major federal agency working in the greater Río
Grande watershed, including the Indian Service, the Division of Grazing, the General
Land Office of the Interior Department, and the Forest Service, Soil Conservation
Service, and Farm Security Administration of the Department of Agriculture. Chaired by
Walter V. Woehlke of the Indian Service, other representatives included experts familiar
with the problems that plague the watershed, including M. M. Kelso from the Farm
Security Administration and Eshref Shevky from the Soil Conservation Service.
The Committee was successful insofar as it served as a clearinghouse for data on
the population and the natural resources of the area. The ecological deterioration of the
watershed proved that only limited commercial agriculture and a relatively small
livestock industry was possible without causing irreparable harm to the environment.
The Committee recommended the coordination of federal activities in the watershed and
the reform of land use practices among the native populations, primarily by the creation
of an Interdepartmental Rio Grande Board that would permanently coordinate federal
activities.1034 From its inception, the real charge of the Committee was to formulate a
plan where “the relief load now carried by the federal Government might be abolished or
materially reduced.”1035
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While the Board looked for ways to end federal obligations to Pueblos and
Hispanos, Collier exerted extraordinary influence over the early activities of federal
programs in the Tewa Basin. While Collier and the Office of Indian Affairs identified
lands and planned agricultural education and demonstration projects for New Mexico’s
Pueblos, Hispano land grant heirs began to protest Collier’s policies and actions. Though
residents of Velarde and Chama had no proprietary rights to the Sebastián Martín and
Juan José Lobato grants, they maintained usufruct practices and depended on the grants
for grazing, firewood and for traditional community uses, such as food and herb
gathering, to augment their agricultural yields or for use in their remedios (folk
remedies).1036All the while, Collier’s influence secured land rights for Pueblo and Navajo
Indians, often at the expense of Hispano villagers.1037
While Collier maneuvered to shape New Deal reform, he met steady opposition
from Dennis Chávez, first as a congressman and later as a senator. Chávez and Collier
were already familiar with one another before they were strengthened or empowered by
the growing federal programs of the New Deal. Collier had been well known in New
Mexico politics for over a decade. Although regarded as an agitator and muckraker,
Collier made a formidable bureaucrat, even a dangerous power to some enemies. By
leading the national protest against the Bursum Bill, he not only torpedoed the political
career of Holm Bursum, but also exposed the corruption of former senator and then
Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall. During the hearings of the Pueblo Lands Board,
Collier revealed the fraudulence of former territorial governor Herbert J. Hagerman.
Collier fed disparaging information to the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, where
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Hagerman admitted that he had acted unilaterally against the recommendations of the
other board members, particularly in relation to water rights, and had sold oil leases in
Navajo Country with little or no consultation with the tribe.1038
The uncompromising Collier was willing to alienate even potential allies,
accusing all of smallmindedness at best, or even worse, duplicity or corruption.1039 And
Collier was unintimidated by powerful politicians, despite being summoned before
congressional committees where he would have to meet face to face with those
politicians whom he criticized. For Chávez, Collier, like Cutting, had helped to dislodge
the Old Guard Republican dominance of New Mexico politics and created opportunities
for young Democrats like himself. Indeed Collier assisted the undoing of Albert B. Fall,
Holm Bursum, and Herbert J. Hagerman, three of the strongest leaders whose careers
spanned late territorial and early statehood period of New Mexico.
But however dangerous Collier was, Chávez was undaunted, even fearless. As a
congressman, Chávez had sponsored failed legislation intended to resolve the Pueblolands-compensation issue. He saw this effort as an appropriate and important political act
and fought to increase the awards of both Pueblos and Hispanos. Collier, on the other
hand, believed that Chávez's sponsorship was only a symbolic gesture, a mere concession
to keep New Mexico's political waters calm and amenable to reform. In 1931 Indian
Affairs Committee hearings, Chávez bickered with Pueblo attorney Richard H.
Hanna.1040 Hanna, an old Democratic political rival, considered Chávez a dirty
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“Mexican” politician and tried to embarrass him by contesting nearly every statement
Chávez made during the hearings. Though both Chávez and Collier recognized that they
typically stood on opposite sides of any issue concerning Pueblos and Hispanos, the two
maintained a cordial relationship through 1934. This would change when Chávez took
Cutting’s seat upon the popular progressive senator's death the in 1935, and when he won
the position outright in 1936.
Chávez eventually attacked the center of Collier’s reform of Indian affairs in the
United States, the Indian Reorganization Act. Proposed by Montana Senator Burton K.
Wheeler and Nebraska Congressman Edgar Howard in 1934, the legislation restored
aspects of Indian self government, ended allotment policies enacted under the Dawes Act
that had destroyed Indian title for nearly fifty years, and created a supposedly impartial
Indian court system where natives could have a voice in tribal law and order.1041 The oldguard in Indian affairs, including many Christian, assimilationist Native Americans
employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, decried the regression to traditional tribal
practices and rallied to defeat the bill.
The centerpiece of Collier’s plan to restore tribal authority were tribal
constitutions, which allowed tribes to essentially become federal municipalities under
Chief Justice John Marshall’s “domestic dependent nation” doctrine of the 1830s. To
Collier’s surprise, most tribes opted not to adopt tribal constitutions, which would have
extended demoncratic electoral government over customary tribal governments and could
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have subverted traditional governance.1042 His opponents deemed his plans socialistic,
especially the transformation of individualized land tenure to communal decades after it
left collective tribal ownership.
As opposition to Collier’s Pueblo land reform effort mounted, especially from
non-Indians across the region, he ingeniously expanded the scope of federal programs in
the upper Rio Grande and enlarged his influence on the programs under the
Interdepartmental Rio Grande Committee. In 1937, the IRGC attempted to contain the
tension between Hispanos and Indians in areas like the Tewa Basin by identifying a new
common enemy, commercial stockmen. The next year the Committee, now made
permanent and called the Interdepartmental Rio Grande Board, identified Chávez as the
politician most swayed by commercial operators.1043 This was hardly suprising, given
that Walter V. Woehlke and Allan G. Harper, who were Collier’s reformer allies and
colleagues in the Indian Service, headed the Board.
Despite this depiction of Chávez as a politician who would only sway to
commercial grazing demands, small farmers still approached him as the only person who
could thwart Collier’s reforms. Hispanos, through protests and petitions, fought to shape
land reform to maintain their economic independence, rather than accepting a permanent
place on relief rolls. As a congressman, Chávez was contacted by representatives of First
Savings Bank and Trust, who asked that he use his influence to force the approval of the
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sale of the Caja del Rio, La Majada and Ramón Vigil Grants to the Indian Service of the
federal government.1044 The majority of correspondence, however, came from persons
opposing the massive land tenure shift taking place with federal dollars. First National
Bank president Paul A. F. Walter contacted Senator Chávez to express his apprehensions
over the loss of tax income through the purchase of private lands by the government and
their transfer to Indian use and federal ownership.1045
Henry Quintana submitted petitions signed by residents of Santa Cruz, Santa
Clara (Pueblo), San Ildefonso (Pueblo), and the mixed communities of Pojoaque, Nambe
and Tesuque and asking for “fair treatment” from the Indian Department.1046 Río Arriba
County residents filed a similar petition protesting the purchase of the Sebastián Martín
Grant for the exclusive use of Pueblo Indians in March 1936. Led by Lebanese merchant
M. J. Merhege, the residents cited their customary use of and dependence on the Martín
Grant and preferred that it be turned into national forest land or open government
domain.1047 Two months later, Santa Fe County clerk Frank Ortiz forwarded to Chávez
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the complaints of Chupadero residents that Tesuque Pueblo was inflating land prices by
paying top dollar for irrigable land, which would gradually drive up property taxes.1048
In May of 1937, Taos County Democratic Party chairman J. E. Borrego wrote
Chávez to protest Indian Affairs projects in Taos County, claiming mistreatment of
Hispanos by Indian Affairs field agents.1049 Four years later, as New Deal land reform
projects waned across New Mexico, Chávez still engaged his office in defending Hispano
land interests. He emerged as the champion for the land rights cause in Costilla and
Amalia. Facing the potential sale of the Sangre de Cristo Grant, land grant heirs fought
to retain legal rights to their private tracts. The ejido had long been lost by land grant, but
was still used for fuelwood by heirs. Losing legal rights to their private tracts would have
made them even more vulnerable to displacement.1050
Former Democratic National Committee chairman and General Motors chairman
John J. Raskob purchased over one-hundred thousand acres, including the Sangre de
Cristo Grant, and established Raskob Acres and the Costilla Land Development
Company. Some believed that Raskob was emulating Bronson Cutting and wanted to
make a political run for the U.S. Senate. When Raskob became delinquent in tax
payments, his business partner, Thomas D. Campbell, interceded. Campbell was one of
the largest land owners in the West, owning huge tracts in Montana and North Dakota.
He had earned the moniker, “the wheat king,” for his work under President Herbert
Hoover and for the Soviet Union, advising them on massive wheat production. Campbell
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envisioned extending his wheat empire into the Sangre de Cristos and convinced the New
Mexico State Tax Commission to allow him to pay Raskob’s delinquent taxes in
anticipation of his purchase.1051
When Costilla and Amalia heirs protested to Chávez, his office interceded and,
with Governor John Miles, hammered out an agreement whereby the Farm Security
Administration would loan money to buy a portion (less than 10,000 acres) of the
100,000-acre tract from Campbell, who would retain the balance. But the May 1941
agreement was negated when the FSA attorneys brought by the Interdepartmental Rio
Grande Board advised against the loan to the Sangre de Cristo heirs.
Ignoring their decision, Chávez aggressively pursued the renegotiation of an
agreement. In August 1941, he vowed to use “political force if necessary to bring about a
just settlement.”1052 He and the Costilla and Amalia heirs charged that the State Tax
Commission was a pawn in a subterfuge that allowed Raskob to retain his interest in the
grant when Campbell, his business partner, bought the grant with barely a public notice
and no public sale.1053 Campbell and Raskob had successfully used a similar tactic five
years earlier, when Campbell bought the tax-delinquent 216,000-acre Sevilleta de La
Joya Land Grant near Socorro from Raskob. Their 1936 transaction was not brought to
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light until Campbell purchased Raskob’s Raskob Acres, also through tax-delinquency, in
1941.1054
Chávez lambasted the State Tax Commission for allowing what amounted to a
direct sale and not forcing the land to go up for public auction. Sangre de Cristo heirs
pressed for the FSA loan to no avail. The State Tax Commission held firm and
prohibited the FSA from interceding. Chávez took to the newspapers, criticized the tax
commission for following the letter of the law, but losing its “sense of right and wrong in
the process.” 1055 The tax commission responded by meeting with the Interdepartmental
Rio Grande Board to negotiate the purchase, which fell through when the FSA refused to
get involved in what was becoming an acerbic political dispute played out in the
papers.1056
In an address before the state legislature, Senator Chávez called the state tax
commissioners “hard hearted” and stated that they “sold out” Sangre de Cristo heirs. He
attacked Miles for abandoning a plan set out by FSA representatives Vance Rogers,
Ralph Will, and Alfred Hurt, all of whom also served on the IRGB. Pressured by Chávez
and public outcry that he had engineered in the press, Governor Miles held meetings with
state tax commissioners and Campbell. When Miles doubted whether the state could
back out of the sale, Chávez encouraged the Costilla and Amalia heirs to pursue a
lawsuit, and even sent his brother-in-law, Attorney Gilberto Espinosa, to meet with
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heirs.1057 Campbell eventually relented, recognizing the right of heirs to their private
tracts, but his recognition in no way bound later owners to follow suit.1058
Senator Chávez came to serve not only Hispanos whom he represented as a
senator; he also offered aid to disfranchised Indians excluded from Pueblo governance
backed by Collier. Though Collier went to great lengths to portray Pueblos as
remarkably peaceful, he was soon confronted with the acrimonious factionalism in many,
if not most, Tewa Basin Indian pueblos. By the 1930s, Santa Clara1059 and San
Ildefonso1060 were both experiencing their fiftieth year of serious division. Factions
fought to maintain control of the revived Pojoaque Pueblo in 1929.1061 Nambé, which
likely experienced the most intermarriage with Hispanos, was in crisis in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, when governors routinely sold off Pueblo lands.
Rooted in splits between clans or moieties and exacerbated after the influence of Indian
Schools in Pueblo life, conservative-progressive camp factionalism continued to
undermine Collier's efforts at reform.
Though he was arguably not a primordialist, as many of his reform-minded
colleagues were, Collier still routinely sided with more conservative factions and worked
with tradition-minded Pueblo leaders in advocacy and reform. He would even go so far
as to malign Pueblo leaders whom he saw as too acculturated. Most famous of his breaks
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were those with Diego Abeita of Isleta and Antonio Mirabal and Antonio (Tony) Luján of
Taos. In May 1936, Mirabal criticized Collier in an open letter, in which he complained
of Sophie Aberle’s and Collier’s administration of federal funds. Mirabal also sharply
protested the practice of Indian Service employees serving as delegates to the All Indian
Pueblo Council.1062 Factions in Santa Clara and San Ildefonso presented a challenge to
Collier's plans to reform Indian governance and land tenure. In 1936 Progressive factions
at Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, Taos, and Cochiti sought out Chávez to intercede as they
were increasingly marginalized by an Indian Service that valued native tradition over
modern innovation.
A year earlier, in 1935, Santa Clara became the first Indian Pueblo to adopt a
tribal constitution under the Indian Reorganization Act. Collier believed that an IRA
constitution would cure the Pueblo of the factionalism that plagued it for decades. The
tribal constitution did open up tribal governance Pueblo women for the first time.1063 The
progressive faction of Santa Clara, led by José and Santos Naranjo, and Andrés and Vidal
Gutiérrez, nonetheless fed Chávez information to undermine Collier’s IRA reforms.1064
Chávez also fed newspapers information on the controversial sale of the Ramón Vigil
Grant to San Ildefonso from Pueblo Land Board compensation monies, a sale Collier
nixed in the belief that he could leverage Resettlement Administration funds to purchase
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the grant. Collier’s intercession reduced the lands granted to San Ildefonso to the 6,000acre Sacred Area of the grant, and San Ildefonso natives asked Chávez to investigate why
had Collier blocked the outright purchase of the entire 26,000-acre grant.1065
Chávez’s advocacy on behalf of pueblo progressives benefitted him in many
ways. For one, proved that he was not, in fact, anti-Indian, as he was commonly
portrayed in the press. And Indians who approached Chávez for intervention proved that
Collier's vision of reform was not accepted by all of the Pueblos. The senator was able to
slow or even to stop the progress of Collier's Indian New Deal. This was especially
important in projects and programs that affected the non-Indian voting public, which
sometimes benefited but more often suffered from Pueblo and Navajo land projects,
particularly those withdrawing lands from the public domain. These non-Indian Hispano
constituents in northern New Mexico were a valuable part of the Chávez political
machine. They were people whom Cutting consistently had won over, even when he was
challenged by Hispano candidates.1066
Collier immediately used his federal office to enact reform to benefit Indian
communities in New Mexico. He used the Resettlement Administration to purchase
lands on behalf of Pueblos, achieving what he could not in the Pueblo Lands Board era.
He could not redeem the lands Pueblos lost through invasion and sale, but he could
extend Pueblos’s land base with federal dollars, acting as a true guardian and virtuous
fiduciary of Indian lands while simultaneously extending their autonomy over their
affairs through the Indian Reorganization Act. Collier was critical to identifying and
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directing the purchase of lands, many of them former land grants lost through speculation
or tax seizure.1067
Collier not only flooded the Indian Office with allies, but worked behind the
scenes to place his friends in important positions in New Deal projects across the Basin.
Both Calkins and Shevky were Collier’s longtime friends before they ran humandependency surveys, which Collier used to substantiate the need for funding. Pueblo
lawyers Nathaniel Margold and William Brophy became field workers and
troubleshooters before taking important federal positions. Margold went onto the
Solicitors Office and Brophy into the Bureau of Indian Affairs, where he would succeed
Collier as commissioner in 1945.
Many of Collier’s associates were longtime reformers. Sunset magazine editor
Walter V. Woehlke was among them. Writing in 1921, Woehlke disparaged the Hispano
population as a “swarthy island in a star-spangled sea” and admonished the “so-called
‘native’ or ‘Spanish-American’ population” for “clinging to language, customs, and
traditions to the despair of the Americanization movement.”1068 Woehlke became the
director of the Interdepartmental Río Grande Committee and Interdepartmental Río
Grande Board. Allan G. Harper, who succeeded Collier as head of the American Indian
Defense Association and also headed the Indian Rights Association of Philadelphia,
worked as a troubleshooter for Collier in 1936. From 1937-1939, he headed the Soil
Conservation Service’s TC-BIA. Through Harper and the TC-BIA, Collier was able to
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control the Soil Conservation Service by allowing or blocking its access to Indian New
Deal labor, including native CCC enrollees. Eventually, Harper took the helm of the
Interdepartmental Rio Grande Board and, from 1939-1941, purged it of critics of
Collier’s Indian policies.1069
In July 1937, amid the possible repeal of the Indian Reorganization Act, Senator
Chávez delivered his speech, “Lo, the Poor Indian,” on CBS radio. He criticized Collier
for imposing reform rather than self-governance, took aim at stock reduction and
characterized Indian Bureau employees as “professional uplifters” and “white experts,”
who ignored Indian perspectives and excluded natives from their own salvation. Finally,
he said the Indian was “handicapped by the Bureau.”1070 Collier hardly took this assault
lying down: he called Indians the "victims of Senator Chávez."1071
When Chávez successfully dislodged federal programs from Collier’s control and
influenced federal support of non-Indian projects, Collier discredited their work. In
1939, UPA superintendent Sophie Aberle submitted to Collier a confidential report
evaluating the Soil Conservation Service’s administration of Pueblo Lands from 19351939 and criticizing the service for spending too much on administration and too little on
actual work.1072 In 1941, Collier opposed the $12,000,000 construction of the White
Rock Canyon Dam, which was proposed by John J. Dempsey, undersecretary of the
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interior and former New Mexico congressman. Dempsey claimed the dam would
generate hydro-electric power and aid flood control and water conservation in the
Española Valley. The dam, countered Collier, “will obliterate an ancient and deep rooted
civilization” and drive “twelve hundred pueblos Indians and twenty-five hundred Spanish
Americans from their land.”1073
Despite the lengths to which Collier and the BIA sought to redirect the enmity of
Pueblos and Hispanos, two decades of relentless battles over land use perpetuated hostile
sentiment. In 1941 Andrew Córdova, a field worker with the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics working in the Taos County Project, recorded the ongoing protest of the
expansion of tribal lands. Referencing some of the few claims that were overturned by
the Pueblo Lands Board , residents of Chamisal wanted the land “that Picurís took from
them a dozen years earlier.” Hispanos in Arroyo Hondo, Colonias, and Los Córdovas,
near Taos implored the federal government to block the transfer lands of the former
Antonio Martínez Land Grant to Taos Pueblo.1074
Hispanos not only fought projects designated for the Pueblos. They also rejected
federal programs aimed to modernize their traditional irrigation systems. In the face of
federal innovation, Hispano communities refused to abandon the age-old technology of
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their acequia systems. In the summer of 1939, FSA plans for a waters facilities program
in Córdova and Chimayó were thwarted when parciantes on the community acequias
became suspicious of the program and blocked or filibustered votes to approve the
program. When difficulties arose, the Interdepartmental Rio Grande Board and the FSA
sent Hispano field representatives to meet with the parciantes and qualm their fears.
Under instructions, Lawrence K. Sandoval, Ernest Maes and Américo Romero attempted
to meet with only the comisión, the elected board that governed Córdova’s acequias.1075
Parciantes refused to allow their opinions to be ignored, and Sandoval, Maes and
Romero spent weeks meeting with parciantes to discuss proposals that included widening
ditches to increase flow and capacity and create storage facilities for seasonal surpluses.
The practice of capturing waters that a parciante could not use flew in the face of
communal ethics, expressed in the saying, aqua que no has de beber, déjala correr
(“water that you will not drink, let it run”). Maes and Romero initially reported that old
communal fissures were at fault for Córdova parciantes’ reticence.1076 On July 6, 1939,
Americo Romero reported that both Córdova and Chimayó feared that their ditches and
lands would meet the same fate as those at Santa Cruz, where the Santa Cruz Irrigation
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District created additional expenses, indebtedness, rising land values, higher tax
assessments and eventual loss.1077

Figure 39: Córdova, 1941. Parciantes in favor of the FSA water facilities plan were by
and large those on the upper ditch (western), while those opposing were largely those on
the lower (eastern) ditch. Harper, Cordova and Oberg, Man and Resources in the Middle
Rio Grande Valley, 1943, 71.
As the New Deal shifted from relief and reform to more moderate measures that
aimed at preserving the economy, projects on former land grant land took increasingly
conservative forms. From 1939-1941, federal projects on land grants, especially those
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slated for Hispano use, were more working classrooms aimed at reforming land use
practices than programs that sought to return of alienated lands to land grants. The
radical land reform suggestions of the Soil Conservation Service, including outright land
transfers to communities, were modified and reprised in the suggestions of the
Interdepartmental Rio Grande Board in 1937. But the Board only discussed the
restoration of limited and well-supervised usufruct rights, a far cry from restoring fee
simple title.1078
The Soil Conservation Service’s call for radical land reform in 1933 started with
the re-education of both Pueblo and Hispano farmers in efficient and environmentally
friendly agricultural methods. This program brought the SCS into immediate conflict
with the New Mexico State Extension Service, which complained to Governor Clyde
Tingley that the well-funded SCS was intruding in its jurisdiction. The SCS’s push for
radical land reform fell on deaf ears and the bulk of its studies remained unpublished.
After criticizing and alienating most other government programs, the SCS stood alone in
its conflicts. In 1939, a severely weakened SCS published and disseminated the Tewa
Basin Study, perhaps as a last gasp to prove its theories relevant. Releasing public and
federal lands to local use and restoring usufruct rights were among its most radical ideas,
all of which were aimed at restoring economic self-sufficiency and rolling back relief.
While the Tewa Basin drew early federal aid and programs, interest waned. The
Middle Río Grande valley had, by this time, the patronage of Senator Dennis Chávez, and
the Mesilla Valley was under the close combined supervision of both the SCS and the
State Extension Service. The latter worked closely with the Agricultural College in Las
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Cruces. Even Taos, just north of the Tewa Basin, had the Taos County Project, an
experimental social study with massive federal funding, developed largely from the
suggestions of George I. Sánchez in his classic 1940 study, The Forgotten People: A
Study of New Mexicans.
In Forgotten People, Sánchez observed that “the cornerstone of Taos County –
communal land holdings – has been destroyed by taxation and by uncontrolled
exploitation.”1079 Of Taos County’s 1,448,743 acres, federal lands amounted to 666,502
acres, state lands to 102,528 acres, and private land to 679,683 acres, with decreasing
amounts of the private land owned by Hispanos. The rancherias and agricultural plots,
most smaller than six acres, had been sold by a growing but increasingly transplanted and
transient Hispano population. Sánchez noted the high price that Hispanos paid for land
and water rights in Taos forced many locals to sell their land and move to the outskirts of
town, which provided little solace from the high taxes close to town. This new form of
land speculation had greatly altered the population of Taos County as more and more of
the native youth were forced to seek employment and education in either Santa Fe or
Albuquerque. 1080
Sánchez, long a tireless advocate of New Mexico’s Hispanos, had leveled his
criticism against state and federal programs a few too many times and when the Taos
County Project emerged, J. T. Reid, who taught traditional woodwork at the University of
New Mexico, was appointed project head, even though he had little experience or
knowledge of the socioeconomic issues that plagued Taos County. Sánchez criticized

1079

George I. Sánchez, Forgotten People: A Study of New Mexicans (1940; reprint;
Albuquerque: Calvin Horn, 1967), 60-61.
1080
Ibid, 61.
560

studies that claimed Hispano and Pueblo poverty was the result of mental deficiencies
and detrimental racial, cultural, and social mixing. Since the late 1920s, Sánchez rallied
against mental tests and those who advocated their viability, pointing out the deep
cultural misunderstandings that marred meaningful or thoughtful interpretation. When he
left New Mexico for being passed over to head the Taos County Project, which sought to
ameliorate the conditions he exposed in The Forgotten People, norteños lost their most
vocal and most articulate activist.1081
The early 1940s also marked the stronger effort to coordinate federal and state
activities across the Tewa Basin. The Interdepartmental Rio Grande Board played a
surprisingly small role in the management of federal programs, especially after Allen
Harper removed members of the Soil Conservation Service from federal projects. The
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State Interagency Council emerged with representation from the federal Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, Farm Credit Administration, WPA, FSA, Forest Service, and
SCS, as well as the Extension Service, Vocational Education program, Highway
Department, and State Planning Board. With no clear leader and the inability to exert
influence over its many members, the Interagency Council changed into a clearinghouse
where members shared information, but disassociated and pursued their own agendas.1082
M. M. Kelso, regional representative for the Farm Security Administration and
later of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, reported that “the relationship between the
State Planning Office and the Extension Service on the one hand and the Rio Grand(e)
board on the other have been anything but cordial.”1083 Even the Taos County project,
whose director, J. T. Reid, and assistant director, Andrés S. Hernández, met difficulties
from agencies unwilling to relinquish control of their projects. At the beginning of
World War II, federal employees left for assignments in the military, foreign service and
other agencies in federal government. A. G. Sandoval, Andrew Córdova and Kalvero
Oberg left New Deal programs to work for the State Department in Latin America, as did
Olen Leonard, who authored later works on community grants and Irving Rusinow, the
now well-known New Deal photographer. 1084 Córdova and Oberg co-authored Allen G.
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Harper’s final report on the Interdepartmental Río Grande Board’s activities, published as
Man and Resources in the Middle Rio Grande Valley in 1943.
As the once abundant New Deal projects waned, the federal government
considered what to do with the hundreds of thousands of acres it had purchased for
demonstration and conservation projects. The fading IRGB recommended that the
federal government abide by 1936 agreements, which gave preferential use of the
Sebastián Martín, Ramón Vigil and Caja del Río Grants to Pueblo Indians, but allowed
Hispano grazing rights on surplus project lands. Under the agreement, the southern half
of the Juan José Lobato Grant would be reserved for Hispano use and the unassigned
Polvadera grant, would serve as a surplus, to be assigned upon demand.1085
By the spring of 1939, the Department of Agriculture was changing its
administration of project lands. A January 30, 1939 memoranda approved by Secretary
of Agriculture Henry Wallace demanded that the five remaining project areas in the Tewa
Basin administered by SCS for intensive rehabilitation be transferred to the U.S. Forest
Service, except timbered areas, which could be opened to commercial use. Timbered
areas of the Lobato, Polvadera, and Sebastián Martín Grants would also be converted into
commercial timber lands and transferred from SCS to Forest Service. Other woodland
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areas would remain with the SCS, but the memorandum questioned where forest
boundaries should be established and whether lightly wooded sections of the Lobato,
Martín and Polvadera should remain with the Conservation Service. The SCS protested,
but to no avail.1086
In the summer of 1939, John Hatcher, acting chief of the Division of National
Forest Planning and Establishment in Washington, visited New Mexico to discuss forest
boundaries. Hatcher was anxious to see that tracts of public domain in northern New
Mexico that were managed by the SCS and most land grants acquired in New Deal
programs would eventually be transferred to the Forest Service. When he saw the
denuded forests on the SCS-administered Ramón Vigil, Juan José Lobato, Abiquiú,
Sebastián Martín and Polvadera Grants, he suggested that portions at highest risk of
erosion be transferred to the Forest Service. Hatcher also drove through Nambé,
Cundiyó, Trampas, Peñasco, Ojo Sarco, Truchas and saw portions of the Francisco
Montes Vigil and Rancho del Río Grande Grants, and commented on the need to
incorporate the grants into the Carson and Santa Fe National Forests as soon as
possible.1087
Throughout the New Deal, both Pueblos and Hispanos fought to shape reform,
particularly land tenure reform, in their favor. Pueblos were arguably much more
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successful; many lands purchased for Indian projects were incorporated into Pueblo
reservations or reserved for their exclusive use. Project lands designated for Hispanos
use, on the other hand, were gradually incorporated into U.S. Forest Service or Bureau of
Land Management lands. While Chávez and Collier dominated the debate over federal
projects on Tewa Basin Lands, the native communities proved more willing to force both
politicians and reformers to heed their concerns.
With the beginning of the United States’s involvement in the Second World War,
the safety valve that had allowed village populations to escape poverty before the
depression once again opened. Wartime jobs in agriculture, mining, and timber
industries and even in the shipyards of California offered new destinations for Hispano
villagers, many of whom would not return as they had fifteen years earlier, when regional
droughts had forced them home.1088 The economy of the Tewa Basin continued to shift.
Frank Bond had held grazing rights the Valle Grande (Baca Location No.1) atop the
Pajarito Mesa since 1918. With his brother, George, Bond purchased the entire grant in
1926 sold timber leases, and ran his sheep flocks on the rich fields of the Valle Grande.
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which had mortgaged the Valle Grande’s
timber to various lumber companies since 1933, released it in 1942. When Frank Bond
passed away in 1945, his son, Franklin, abandoned the partido system in favor of hiring
shepherds and cowboys seasonally.1089
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The Bond Family continued to control the traditional economy of the Española
Valley. This changed when J. Robert Oppenheimer was assigned the task of finding a
site for a secret nuclear weapons laboratory. Oppenheimer he looked no further than the
Pajarito Mesa, where the New York-born scientist had spent summers hiking the Frijoles
Canyon as a child and returned occasionally as an adult. He believed its geographic
isolation would be ideal.1090 To maintain secrecy the federal government consolidated
the lands below the mesa, including the Ramón Vigil Grant and homesteads both atop
and below the mesa. The federal government negotiated with the Los Alamos Ranch
School and it was paid a fair-market value, some $335,000, or $225 per acre. Twentythree homesteaders were offered less than $5,000, or between $7,000 and $15,000 per
acre, with no opportunity to negotiate. When homesteaders refused to part with their
property, the federal government condemned the property and homesteaders, most of
whom had no legal representation, were instructed to receive their checks at the federal
district courthouse.1091
My great grandfather, Adolfo García, was among those evicted from his
homestead. His father, Juan Luís, had escaped captivity by Navajos as a boy when his
adoptive Navajo mother aided his return to the Tewa Basin.1092 , and, with his sons, won
homesteads on which they farmed and later operated a lumber mill. The loss of his
nearly-three-hundred-acre homestead, for which he was paid less than seven-hundred
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dollars, created a bitter legacy. My mother, María Juana Barbara (García) Rodríguez
(Baca) was a child when eviction took place, but the stories of government eviction
during for the Manhattan Project sat with her until adulthood; they became my bedtime
stories. In the year after their eviction, my grandmother, María Marina García Rodríguez
(Adolfo’s daughter) and grandfather, José Filadelfio Rodríguez, relocated to Jerome,
Arizona, where my grandfather worked in copper mines. He returned home when his
mother died and found a job in Los Alamos with the Manhattan project, working as a
maintenance man at the very institution that had dispossessed his in-laws and dislocated
his family.
The effects of Los Alamos on the Tewa Basin economy were widespread. The
changing economy had an immediate impact on the land ethic held by both Hispanos and
Pueblos. Anacleto Apodaca, a federal extension agent working in the Tewa Basin in
1951 noted a difference in attitudes of older men, who were generally reluctant to
abandon traditional methods for innovation, and young men, who accepted new
technologies and yearned for a good-paying job in Los Alamos.1093 Another observer
noted similarities in nearby Pueblos, especially at the poverty-stricken San Ildefonso
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Pueblo, where a native remarked, “If you can find a retired Indian, he worked at Los
Alamos!”1094
The change came with consequences. The National Laboratory at Los Alamos
had a limited number of jobs, leading many Tewa Basin residents to turn, again, to
migratory wage labor on the manito trail.1095 Wartime mobilization initially stabilized
the economy, but jobs were won at the cost of leaving the village, sometimes
permanently. Parallels between the 1920s and 1950s are alarming. Like the twenties, the
fifties saw increasing numbers of laborers journeying north to work in agricultural fields
across the Rocky Mountain West, this time migrating with their entire families. In spite
of the efforts of New Deal reformers to preserve the villages of northern New Mexico,
village and pueblo depopulation accelerated as families flowed to growing cities like
Albuquerque and Denver. Also like the twenties, the fifties were fraught with dubious
federal land policies and the corporatization of forest resources, favoring timber
companies and capital production over subsistence users.1096
Unlike the twenties, the fifties were not followed by half a decade of intense
federal relief programs. Rather, in the 1960s, the federal and state governments
continued ignoring the situation in both Hispano villages and Indian pueblos. Uneven
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economic development drew Hispanos and Pueblos from their villages to growing
economies in Los Alamos and Albuquerque. Federal termination-and-relocation policies
did not affect Pueblo communities as deeply as they did other tribes. Historian James
Vlasich nonetheless points to this change in policy as the “death knell for Indian
agriculture.”1097 The Pueblo agricultural character, once again, differentiated them in the
minds of the federal government, and organizations like the All Indian Pueblo Council
and United Pueblo Agency curbed the effects of federal relocation policies and fought to
assure pueblos superior water rights were upheld in decades-long water adjudication
lawsuits.
Dependency on federal and state programs grew during the New Deal and
continued, even as the population became increasingly urban or semi-urban. As
Hispanos became more and more alienated from land, their demands for economic,
cultural and environmental justice were supplanted by calls for the maintenance and
extension of government welfare programs. With prospects for land repatriation absent,
Hispano poverty conditioned their relationship to the state. Rather than demanding
justice, the asked only for survival.1098
By the early 1960s, wages earned Los Alamos had supplanted local production in
subsistence economies throughout the Tewa Basin, while the laboratory waste caused
untold ecological harm to Pueblo and Hispano communities in nearby watersheds. The
alienation from traditional farming and increased poverty created a seedbed for political
radicalism, but a radicalism unlike the militant, youth-oriented Chicano and American
Indian Movements that grew more and more vocal across the nation. Traditional tribal
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religious leaders, not a radical youth faction, led Taos Pueblo’s fight for the return of
Blue Lake from the U.S. Forest Service. Likewise, the membership of the Alianza
Federal de Mercedes, founded in 1963 by former Pentecostal preacher Reies López
Tijerina, was primarily comprised of older land grant heirs including Korean, World War
II and even World War I veterans, who had lost faith that the federal government, who
owned the land grants of their ancestors, would provide relief.
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Epilogue
The end of the New Deal marked a series of transformations. Two men that I
argue defined the era in New Mexico, John Collier and Dennis Chávez, guided
transformative changes for Indian affairs and the modernization of New Mexico.
Collier’s reforms changed the administration of Indian affairs, preserving traditional
power structures and empowering native communities and recognizing their sovereignty
to a greater extent in the previous century. The Pueblo lands question also transformed
how Pueblo Indians pressed for the protection of their lands from outside interests.
During the early American territorial period, they fought for protections under the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, as fee simple owners of their land grants. Simultaneously, Pueblo
Indians and their agents fought to extend federal guardianship for both pueblo peoples
and their lands. By the middle of the twentieth century, they fought the State of New
Mexico, who attempted to withhold their right to vote, limit their rights as citizens, and
still tried to tax their lands. They joined dozens of other Indian nations around the United
States in the Indian Claims Commission; many pueblos fought for payment of
compensation promised by the Pueblo Lands Board twenty-five years earlier. They
began the American period arguing for protections due to them as wards, today, they
have reclaimed rights as sovereign tribal nations.
Chávez guided federal monies to New Mexico for two more decades after the
New Deal programs began their decline in 1942. The senator arguably modernized New
Mexico, bringing monies to improve transportation, commerce and communication. As
New Mexico’s economy matured, the reliance on land and water for traditional uses
lessened. Water reclamation projects created reservoirs in north central New Mexico that
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fed growing urban or semi-urban communities in the middle Río Grande valley and agribusiness in southern New Mexico and Texas. New Mexico grew by way of the military
industrial complex, creating arms never to be used in a Cold War economy. By the time
of his death in 1962, the pastoral and agricultural economy that Chávez was born into
seventy-four years earlier was extinct. One year later, in 1963, Reies López Tijerina, a
Texas born land grant heir who sharecropped and served as a Pentecostal preacher,
founded the Alianza Federal de Mercedes, and vowed to regain land grants stolen by the
federal government. Many land grant heirs that maintained traditional agro-pastoral
economy found a new leader in Tijerina, simultaneously rejecting Senator Joseph M.
Montoya, Chávez’s heir apparent and demanding the federal government restore access
to traditional lands it had briefly reestablished during the New Deal.
After the Tierra Amarilla Courthouse raid in 1967, Tijerina’s Alianza began a
decade long descent. While Taos Pueblo celebrated the repatriation of its sacred Blue
Lake, Tijerina and many of his followers faced imprisonment for assaulting federal
officers and destroying federal property. He inspired a generation of Hispanos and
Chicanos across the nation. To reiterate Sylvia Rodríguez’s observation, nuevomexicano
identity and ethnicity after the civil rights era, was understood through its ongoing
relationship to land and water, which crystallized as the symbol of Hispano cultural
survival and social self-determination.
Modern land grant acivists struggle to break free from the shadow that Tijerina
continued to cast over land grant activism. Episodes as Tierra Amarilla in the 1980s
inspired former Lieutentant Governor Roberto Mondragón’s creation of the New Mexico
Land Grant Forum, which in turn inspired the creation of the New Mexico Land Grant
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Consejo. The 2001 and 2004 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo reports by the General
Accounting Office inspired a new wave of activism, bringing clarity, coherence, a
renegotiated relationship with state government and the promise of a future for dozens of
mercedes in New Mexico.
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Conclusion: Tenemos el Sangre de Indio: Somos Indigena
Nuevo México querido,
no hagas caso al mitote
entre indios y Americanos
toditos semos coyotes

New Mexico beloved,
pay no attention to rumor,
among Indians and Americans
we are all coyotes [mixed bloods].
-

Traditional music verse1099

Throughout this dissertation, I have examined Hispanos’s complicated
relationship with Pueblo Indians, one popularly defined by conflict that has repeatedly
rendered their relationship two dimensional. Scholars continually write about HispanoPueblo relations highlighting areas of conflict that make headlines and find their way into
the archives of governments, lawyers, and bureaucrats. Like John Kessell, I believe that
a sole focus on tension obscures complex relationships, and that in these relationships lie
stories that can inform us about how Hispanos appropriated Pueblo lands in extralegal but
perhaps less-devious ways. By reading Hispano and Pueblo land tenure together, we can
find parallels and patterns that lead to a deeper understanding of their shared experience.
This dissertation began with modern aspirations, but the project gradually
transformed as I attempted to connect the histories of Hispano and Pueblo dispossession.
Again, it seems that in studying New Mexico, even self-proclaimed modernists invariably
must tip our hats to the colonial era. Understanding New Mexico as a post-colonial
space, where the oppressions of centuries past loom, presents arguably the most
satisfying and accurate portrait of our history. But it obscures as well, and
representations gradually inform our interpretation of the past, leaving little room for
less-sensational episodes that have created the human environment we live in today. One
of these stories is that land grant history is one the Hispanos and Pueblos share.
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My dissertation title, “Somos Indigena,” comes from a 1999 quote by Santa Fe
artist and activist Edwin Rivera, who responded to Santa Fe environmentalists who
protested Hispano wood gathering and its impact on the elusive Mexican spotted owl.
Rivera asserted Hispano indigenousness, boldly stating; “Tenemos el Sangre de Indio;
tenemos raices en la tierra: somos indigena” (“We have Indian blood. We have roots in
the land. We are indigenous.”). Atrisco land grant heir Richard Griego reiterated
Rivera’s claims nearly a decade later, imploring a crowd of land grant heirs to “forget
that stuff we learned about being Spanish when we were children. Our blood is mixed.
We are more Indian than Spanish. And we are an indigenous people.” Taken lightly,
these statements appear only envious, simplifying the complexity of the relationship
between Pueblos who hold their land grant lands and the federal government that for
decades did little to protect them. Just as the history of Pueblo-federal relationship is
more complex than public wisdom suggests, so are claims to Hispanic indigenousness.
These claims are not to Pueblo membership, but to both a pre-Columbian past and the
authenticity of their culturally based land rights.
Perhaps Hispano land grant activists simplify the implications of federal
guardianship of Pueblo lands. They likely ignore the fact that the Pueblo-state
relationship derives from complicated and contradictory government policies fixated on
the Pueblos’ unique agricultural character, which the state saw as essential to both
assimilation of natives and the preservation of Pueblo tribalism. Long held on the
periphery of federal policy, Hispanos expressed their frustrations and exercised their
power in state government. Hispanos motivation to reclaim their native ancestry varies.
While conducting research for this dissertation at the New Mexico State Records Center
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in Santa Fe, I witnessed at least a half dozen Hispanos completing genealogies that
attempted to stake a claim to tribal membership at Nambé or Pojoaque. One can only
assume that they are motivated by the perceived casino revenues and the hope that they
can qualify for payments to tribal members. Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Martinez v.
Santa Clara ruling (1969), tribes can define tribal membership however they choose, and
can ignore claims regardless of their authenticity.
The New Deal changed the relationship that Hispanos had with the federal
government, cultivating expectations that the federal government would continue
constructive land reform, respecting the usufruct rights of Hispanos to their former
common lands. Instead, it shaped the role that the federal government played in
continued community dispossession. Federal termination and relocation policies and
reduced usufruct rights in the 1950s created seedbeds for the radicalism of the 1960s and
1970s. Civil rights-era ethnic protest in northern New Mexico centered around land and
water rights. Taos Pueblo’s fight for the return of Blue Lake and the Alianza’s Tierra
Amarilla Courthouse raid were emblematic of this activism. But it was Pueblo elders and
a largely mature Alianza membership who led their respective movements. Their
activism was inspirational and influential among later generations whose connection to
traditional agricultural economies lessened over time.
The importance of Los Alamos National Labs to the Tewa Basin economy for
almost seventy-five years has altered the economy. As Pueblos and Hispanos are even
further removed from the struggles of their ancestors, how they will respond to future
contests remains uncertain. Tensions over land and water rights have transformed as
well. As economies transition again, this time away from Los Alamos National
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Laboratories, the entertainment and tourism industries, which have long eluded most of
the Tewa Basin, have changed the importance of water resources to its communities.
New Mexico State Engineer Steve Reynolds’s 1966 filing of the New Mexico v. Aamodt
lawsuit intended to adjudicate water rights along the Río Pojoaque stream system, which
includes the Río Nambé, RíoTesuque, Río Pojoaque and the Río Chupadero. The Abbott
case seeks the same along the Río Truchas and Río Santa Cruz watershed, forcing the
state of New Mexico to establish priority dates on all waterways in the Río Truchas-Río
Santa Cruz water system.
Just as the Middle Río Grande Conservancy District had in the 1930s, the Aamodt
and Abbott water rights adjudication cases brought Pueblos and Hispanos into court
against one another. If the US v. Joseph (1876) and both US v. Sandoval decisions (1897
and 1913) have taught us anything, it is that the law is prone to manipulation and fraught
with inconsistencies borne from the vested self-interest of lawyers and legal philosophies
informed by economics and ideas of human progress. If law renders confusion, we
should hold the law suspect and look toward other devices to understand the past and
plan for the future. Water now feeds growing bedroom communities for those avoiding
Los Alamos’s cold weather or Santa Fe’s high prices. Hope still remains. The Seed
Sovereignty Conference, held in New Mexico from 2007-2009, marked a significant
alliance between Hispanos and Pueblos against corporate agriculture.
There are a number of historiographic gaps that I attempted to close in this
dissertation. Some were temporal, like the gaps between the U.S. v. Joseph case (1876)
and the creation of Pueblo Lands Board, and space between the Court of Private Land
Claims and the end of the New Deal; others, almost philosophical, like the gap between
577

our understanding of Pueblo and Hispano land tenure. Filling the gap in scholarship
discussing land tenure in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was straight
forward, and I have left much to be done. Linking Pueblo and Hispano land tenure
beyond their shared experience is a philosophical exercise, one that I may have neglected
and perhaps could not address given my approach to this study. This untraditional
rereading of Pueblo and Hispano land tenure took rather traditional methodology that
limited inventive explanations. But it rooted the land tenure story in both the legal and
social experiences of both Pueblo Indians and Hispano mercedarios, and for that, I am
immensely satisfied.
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Appendix A: Pueblo Lands Act, 1924
Pueblo Lands Act
June 7, 1924
c. 331, 43 Stat. 636. (1924)
S. 2932
SEC. 1.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That in order to quiet title to various lots, parcels, and tracts of
land in the State of New Mexico for which claim shall be made by or on behalf of the
Pueblo Indians of said State as hereinafter provided, the United States of America, in its
sovereign capacity as guardian of said Pueblo Indians shall, by its Attorney General, file
in the District Court of the United States for the District of New Mexico, its bill or bills
of complaint with a prayer for discovery of the nature of any claim or claims of any kind
whatsoever adverse to the claim of said Pueblo Indians, as hereinafter determined.
SEC. 2.
That there shall be, and hereby is, established a board to be known as "Pueblo Lands
Board" to consist of the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney General, each of whom
may act through an assistant in all hearings, investigations, and deliberations in New
Mexico, and a third member to be appointed by the President of the United States. The
board shall be provided with suitable quarters in the city of Santa Fe, New Mexico, and
shall have power to require the presence of witnesses and the production of documents by
subpoena, to employ a clerk who shall be empowered to administer oaths and take
acknowlegdments, shall employ such clerical assistance, interpreters, and stenographers
with such compensation as the Attorney General shall deem adequate, and it shall be
provided with such necessary supplies and equipment as it may require on requisitions to
the Department of Justice. The compensation and allowance for travel and expenses of
the member appointed by the President shall be fixed by the Attorney General.
It shall be the duty of said board to investigate, determine, and report and set forth by
metes and bounds, illustrated where necessary by field notes and plats, the lands within
the exterior boundaries of any land granted or confirmed to the Pueblo Indians of New
Mexico by any authority of the United States of America, or any prior sovereignty, or
acquired by said Indians as a community by purchase or otherwise, title to which the said
board shall find not to have been extinguished in accordance with the provisions of this
Act, and the board shall not include in their report any claims of non-Indian claimants
who, in the opinion of said board after investigation, hold and occupy such claims of
which they have had adverse possession, in accordance with the provisions of section 4
of this Act: Provided, however, That the board shall be unanimous in all decisions
whereby it shall be determined that the Indian title has been extinguished.
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The board shall report upon each pueblo as a separate unit and upon the completion of
each report one copy shall be filed with the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico, one with the Attorney General of the United States, one with the Secretary
of the Interior, and one with the Board of Indian Commissioners.
SEC. 3.
That upon the filing of each report by the said board, the Attorney General shall forthwith
cause to be filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, as
provided in section 1 of this Act, a suit to quiet title to the lands described in said report
as Indian lands the Indian title to which is determined by said report not to have been
extinguished.
SEC. 4.
That all persons claiming title to, or ownership of any lands involved in any such suit, or
suits, may in addition to any other legal or equitable defenses which they may have or
have had under the laws of the Territory and State of New Mexico, plead limitation of
action, as follows, to wit: (a) That in themselves, their ancestors, grantors, privies, or
predecessors in interest or claim of interest, they have had open, notorious, actual,
exclusive, continuous, adverse possession of the premises claimed, under color of title
from the 6th day of January, 1902, to the date of the passage of this Act, and have paid
the taxes lawfully assessed and levied thereon to the extent required by the statutes of
limitation, or adverse possession of the Territory or of the State of New Mexico, since the
6th of January, 1902, to the date of the passage of this Act, except where the claimant
was exempted or entitled to be exempted from such tax payment. (b) That in themselves,
their ancestors, grantors, privies, or predecessors in interest or claim of interest, they have
had open, notorious, actual, exclusive, continuous, adverse possession of the premises
claimed with claim of ownership, but without color of title from the 16th day of March,
1889, to the date of the passage of this Act, and have paid the taxes lawfully assessed and
levied thereon to the extent required by the statutes of limitation or adverse possession of
the Territory or of the State of New Mexico, from the 16th day of March, 1899, to the
date of the passage of this Act, except where the claimant was exempted or entitled to be
exempted from such tax payment.
Nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to impair or destroy any existing right of
the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico to assert and maintain unaffected by the provisions of
this Act their title and right to any land by original proceedings, either in law or equity, in
any court of competent jurisdiction and any such right may be asserted at any time prior
to the filing of the field notes and plats as provided in section 13 hereof, and jurisdiction
with respect to any such original proceedings is hereby conferred upon the United States
District Court of the District of New Mexico with right of review as in other cases:
Provided, however, That any contract entered into with any attorney of attorneys by the
Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, to carry on such litigation shall be subject to and in
accordance with existing laws of the United States.
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SEC. 5.
The plea of such limitations, successfully maintained, shall entitle the claimants so
pleading to a decree in favor of them, their heirs, executors, successors, and assigns for
the premises so claimed by them, respectively, or so much thereof as may be established,
which shall have the effect of a deed of quitclaim as against the United States and said
Indians, and a decree in favor of claimants upon any other ground shall have a like effect.
The United States may plead in favor of the pueblo, or any individual Indian thereof, as
the case might be, the said limitations hereinbefore defined.
SEC. 6.
It shall be the further duty of the board to separately report in respect of each such
pueblo—
(a) The area and character of any tract or tracts of land within the exterior boundaries of
any land granted or confirmed to the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and the extent,
source, and character of any water right appurtenant thereto in possession of non-Indian
claimants at the time of filing such report, which are not claimed for said Indians by any
report of the board.
(b) Whether or not such tract or tracts of land or such water rights could be or could have
been at any time recovered for said Indians by the United States by seasonable
prosecution of any right of the United States or of said Indians. Seasonable prosecution is
defined to mean prosecution by the United States within the same period of time as that
within which suits to recover real property could have been brought under the limitation
statutes of the Territory and State of New Mexico.
(c) The fair market value of said water rights and of said tract or tracts of land (exclusive
of any improvements made therein or placed thereon by non-Indian claimants) whenever
the board shall determine that such tract or tracts of land or such water rights could be or
could have been at any time recovered for said Indians by the United States by
seasonable prosecution of any right of the United States or of said Indians, and the
amount of loss, if any, suffered by said Indians through failure of the United States
seasonably to prosecute any such right.
The United States shall be liable, and the board shall award compensation, to the pueblo
within the exterior boundaries of whose lands such tract or tracts of land shall be situated
or to which such water rights shall have been appurtenant to the extent of any loss
suffered by said Indians through failure of the United States seasonably to prosecute any
right of the United States or of said Indians, subject to review as herein provided. Such
report and award shall have the force and effect of a judicial finding and final judgment
upon the question and amount of compensation due to the Pueblo Indians from the United
States for such losses. Such report shall be filed simultaneously with and in like manner
as the reports hereinbefore provided to be made and filed in section 2 of this Act.
At any time within sixty days after the filing of said report with the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico as herein provided the United States or any pueblo
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or Indians concerned therein or affected thereby may, in respect of any report upon
liability or of any finding of amount or award of compensation set forth in such report,
petition said court for judicial review of said report, specifying the portions thereof in
which review is desired. Said court shall thereupon have jurisdiction to review, and shall
review, such report, finding, or award in like manner as in the case of proceedings in
equity. In any such proceeding the report of the board shall be prima facie evidence of the
facts, the values, and the liability therein set forth, subject, however, to be rebutted by
competent evidence. Any party in interest may offer evidence in support or in opposition
to the findings in said report in any respect. Said court shall after hearing render its
decision so soon as practicable, confirming, modifying, or rejecting said report or any
part thereof. At any time within thirty days after such decision is rendered said court
shall, upon petition of any party aggrieved, certify the portions of such report, review of
which has been sought, together with the record in connection therewith, to the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which shall have jurisdiction to
consider, review, and decide all questions arising upon such report and record in like
manner as in the case of appeals in equity, and its decision thereon shall be final.
Petition for review of any specific finding or award of compensation in any report shall
not affect the finality of any findings nor delay the payment of any award set forth in
such report, review of which shall not have been so sought, nor in any proceeding for
review in any court under the provisions of this section shall costs be awarded against
any party.
SEC. 7.
It shall be the further duty of the board to investigate, ascertain, and report to the
Secretary of the Interior who shall report to the Congress of the United States, together
with his recommendation, the fair market value of lands, improvements appurtenant
thereto, and water rights of non-Indian claimants who, in person or through their
predecessors in title prior to January 6, 1912, in good faith and for a valuable
consideration purchased and entered upon Indian lands under a claim of right based upon
a deed or document purporting to convey title to the land claimed or upon a grant, or
license from the governing body of a pueblo to said land, but fail to sustain such claim
under the provisions of this Act, together with a statement of the loss in money value
thereby suffered by such non-Indian claimants. Any lands lying within the exterior
boundaries of the pueblo of Nambe land grant, which were conveyed to any holder or
occupant thereof or his predecessor or predecessors in interest by the governing
authorities of said pueblo, in writing, prior to January 6, 1912, shall unless found by said
board to have been obtained through fraud or deception, be recognized as constituting
valid claims by said board and by said courts, and disposed of in such manner as lands
the Indian title to which has been determined to have been extinguished pursuant to the
provisions of this Act: Provided, That nothing in this section contained with reference to
the said Nambe Pueblo Indians shall be construed as depriving the said Indians of the
right to impeach any such deed or conveyance for fraud or to have mistakes therein
corrected through a suit in behalf of said pueblo or of an individual Indian under the
provisions of this Act.
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SEC. 8.
It shall be the further duty of the board to investigate, ascertain, and report to the
Secretary of the Interior the area and the value of the lands and improvements
appurtenant thereto of non-Indian claimants within or adjacent to Pueblo Indian
settlements or towns in New Mexico, title to which in such non-Indian claimants is valid
and indefeasible, said report to include a finding as to the benefit to the Indians in
anywise of the removal of such non-Indian claimants by purchase of their lands and
improvements and the transfer of the same to the Indians, and the Secretary of the Interior
shall report to Congress the facts with his recommendations in the premises.
SEC. 9.
That all lands, the title to which is determined in said suit or suits, shall, where necessary,
be surveyed and mapped under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, at the
expense of the United States, but such survey shall be subject to the approval of the judge
of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, and if approved by
said judge shall be filed in said court and become a part of the decree or decrees entered
in said district court.
SEC. 10.
That necessary costs in all original proceedings under this Act to be determined by the
court, shall be taxed against the United States and any party aggrieved by any final
judgment or decree shall have the right to a review thereof by appeal or writ of error or
other process, as in other cases, but upon such appeal being taken each party shall pay his
own costs.
SEC. 11.
That in the sense in which used in this Act the word "purchase" shall be taken to mean
the acquisition of community lands by the Indians other than by grant or donation from a
sovereign.
SEC. 12.
That any person claiming any interest in the premises involved but not impleaded in any
such action may be made a party defendant thereto or may intervene in such action,
setting up his claim in usual form.
SEC. 13.
That as to all lands within the exterior boundaries of any lands granted or confirmed to
the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, by any authority of the United States of America or
any prior sovereignty, or acquired by said Indians as a community by purchase or
otherwise and which have not been claimed for said Indians by court proceedings then
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pending or the findings and report of the board as herein provided, the Secretary of the
Interior at any time after two years after the filing of said reports of the board shall file
field notes and plat for each pueblo in the office of the surveyor general of New Mexico
at Santa Fe, New Mexico, showing the lands to which the Indian title has been
extinguished as in said report set out, but excluding therefrom lands claimed by or for the
Indians in court proceedings then pending, and copies of said plat and field notes certified
by the surveyor general of New Mexico as true and correct copies shall be accepted in
any court as competent and conclusive evidence of the extinguishment of all the right,
title, and interest of the Indians in and to the lands so described in said plat and field
notes and of any claim of the United States in or to the same. And the Secretary of the
Interior within thirty days after the Indians' right to bring independent suits under this Act
shall have expired, shall cause notice to be published in some newspaper or newspapers
of general circulation issued, if any there be, in the county wherein lie such lands claimed
by non-Indian claimants, respectively, or wherein some part of such lands are situated,
otherwise in some newspaper or newspapers of general circulation published nearest to
such lands, once a week for five consecutive weeks, setting forth as nearly as may be the
names of such non-Indian claimants of land holdings not claimed by or for the Indians as
herein provided, with a description of such several holdings, as shown by a survey of
Pueblo Indian lands heretofore made under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior
and commonly known as the "Joy Survey," or as may be otherwise shown or defined by
authority of the Secretary of the Interior, and requiring that any person or persons
claiming such described parcel or parcels of land or any part thereof, adversely to the
apparent claimant or claimants so named as aforesaid, or their heirs or assigns, shall, on
or before the thirtieth day after the last publication of such notice, file his or their adverse
claim in the United States Land Office in the land district wherein such parcel or parcels
of land are situate, in the nature of a contest, stating the character and basis of such
adverse claim, and notice of such contest shall be served upon the claimant of claimants
named in the said notice, in the same manner as in cases of contest of homestead entries.
If no such contest is instituted as aforesaid, the Secretary of the Interior shall issue to the
claimant or claimants, or their heirs or assigns, a patent or other certificate of title for the
parcel or parcels of land so described in said notice; but if a contest be filed it shall
proceed and be heard and decided as contests of homestead entries are heard and decided
under the rules and regulations of the General Land Office pertinent thereto. Upon such
contest either party may claim the benefit of the provisions of section 4 of this Act to the
same extent as if he were a party to suit to quiet title brought under the provisions of this
Act, and the successful party shall receive a patent or certificate of title for the land as to
which he is successful in such proceeding. Any patent or certificate of title issued under
the provisions of this Act shall have the effect only of a relinquishment by the United
States of America and the said Indians.
If after such notice more than one person or group of persons united in interest makes
claim in such land office adverse to the claimant or claimants named in the said notice, or
to any other person or group of persons who may have filed such contest, each contestant
shall be required to set forth the basis and nature of his respective claim, and thereupon
the said claims shall be heard and decided as upon an original contest or intervention.
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And in all cases any person or persons whose right to a given parcel or parcels of land has
become fixed either by the action of the said board or the said court or in such contest
may apply to the Commissioner of the General Land Office for a patent or certificate of
title and receive the same without cost or charge.
SEC. 14.
That if any non-Indian party to any such suit shall assert against the Indian title a claim
based upon a Spanish or Mexican grant, and if the court should finally find that such
claim by the non-Indian is superior to that of the Indian claim, no final decree or
judgment of ouster of the said Indians shall be entered or writ of possession or assistance
shall be allowed against said Indians, or any of them, or against the United States of
America acting in their behalf. In such case the court shall ascertain the area and value of
the land thus held by any non-Indian claimant under such superior title, excluding
therefrom the area and value of lots or parcels of land the title to which has been found to
be in other persons under the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That any
findings by the court under the provisions of this section may be reviewed on appeal or
writ of error at the instance of any party aggrieved thereby, in the same manner, to the
same extent, and with like effect as if such findings were a final judgment or decree.
When such finding adverse to the Indian claim has become final, the Secretary of the
Interior shall report to Congress the facts, including the area and value of the land so
adjudged against the Indian claim, with his recommendations in the premises.
SEC. 15.
That when any claimant, other than the United States for said Indians not covered by the
report provided for in section 7 of this Act, fails to sustain his claim to any parcel of land
within any Pueblo Indian grant, purchase, or donation under the provisions of this Act,
but has held and occupied any such parcel in good faith, claiming the same as his own,
and the same has been improved, the value of the improvements upon the said parcel of
land shall be found by the court and reported by the Secretary of the Interior to Congress,
with his recommendations in the premises.
SEC. 16.
That if any land adjudged by the court or said lands board against any claimant be situate
among lands adjudicated or otherwise determined in favor of non-Indian claimants and
apart from the main body of the Indian land, and the Secretary of the Interior deems it to
be for the best interest of the Indians that such parcels so adjudged against the nonIndian claimant be sold, he may, with the consent of the governing authorities of the
pueblo, order the sale thereof, under such regulations as he may make, to the highest
bidder for cash, and if the buyer thereof be other than the losing claimant, the purchase
price shall be used in paying to such losing claimant the adjudicated value of the
improvements aforesaid, if found under the provisions of section 15 hereof, and the
balance thereof, if any, shall be paid over to the proper officer, or officers, of the Indian
community, but if the buyer be the losing claimant, and the value of his improvements
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has been adjudicated as aforesaid, such buyer shall be entitled to have credit upon his bid
for the value of such improvements so adjudicated.
SEC. 17.
No right, title, or interest in or to the lands of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico to which
their title has not been extinguished as hereinbefore determined shall hereafter be
acquired or initiated by virtue of the laws of the State of New Mexico, or in any other
manner except as may hereafter be provided by Congress, and no sale, grant, lease of any
character, or other conveyance of lands, or any title or claim thereto, made by any pueblo
as a community, or any Pueblo Indian living in a community of Pueblo Indians, in the
State of New Mexico, shall be of any validity in law or in equity unless the same be first
approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
SEC. 18.
That the pleading, practice, procedure, and rules of evidence shall be the same in all
causes arising under this Act as in other civil causes in the Federal courts, except as
otherwise herein provided.
SEC. 19.
That all sums of money which may hereafter be appropriated by the Congress of the
United States for the purpose of paying in whole or in part any liability found or decreed
under this Act from the United States to any pueblo or to any of the Indians of any
pueblo, shall be paid over to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which Bureau, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, shall use such moneys at such times and in such
amounts as may seem wise and proper for the purpose of the purchase of lands and water
rights to replace those which have been lost to said pueblo or to said Indians, or for
purchase or construction of reservoirs, irrigation works, or the making of other permanent
improvements upon, or for the benefit of lands held by said pueblo or said Indians.
Approved, June 7, 1924.
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Appendix B: Pueblo Lands Compensation Act, 1933
Pueblo Lands Compensation Act
May 31, 1933
c. 45, 48 Stat. 108. (1933)
H.R. 4014
SEC. 1.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That in fulfillment of the Act of June 7, 1924 (43 Stat. 636), there
is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, the sums hereinafter set forth, in compensation to the several Indian
pueblos hereinafter named, in payment of the liability of the United States to the said
pueblos as declared by the Act of June 7, 1924, which appropriations shall be made in
equal annual installments as hereinafter specified, and shall be, deposited in the Treasury
of the United States and shall be expended by the Secretary of the Interior, subject to
approval of the governing authorities of each pueblo in question, at such times and in
such amounts as he may deem wise and proper; for the purchase of lands and water rights
to replace those which have been divested from said pueblo under the Act of June 7,
1924, or for the purchase or construction of reservoirs, irrigation works, or other
permanent improvements upon or for the benefit of the lands of said pueblos.
SEC. 2.
In addition to the awards made by the Pueblo Lands Board, the following sums, to be
used as directed in section 1 of this Act, and in conformity with the Act of June 7, 1924,
be, and hereby are, authorized to be appropriated:
Pueblo of Jemez, $1,885; pueblo of Nambe, $47,439.50; pueblo of Taos,
$84,707.09; pueblo of Santa Ana, $2,908.38; pueblo of Santo Domingo,
$4,256.56; pueblo of Sandia, $12,980.62; pueblo of San Felipe, $14,954.53;
pueblo of Isleta, $47,151.31;, pueblo of Picuris; $66,574.40; pueblo of San
Ildefonso, $37,058,28; pueblo of San Juan $153,863.04; pueblo of Santa Clara,
$181,114.19; pueblo of Cochiti $37,826.37; pueblo of Pojoaques, $68,562.61; in
all, $761,954.88: Provided, however, That the Secretary of the Interior shall report
back to Congress any errors or omissions in the foregoing authorization measured
by the present fair market value of the lands involved, as heretofore determined
by the appraisals of said tracts by the appraisers appointed by the Pueblo Lands
Board, with evidence supporting his report and recommendations.
SEC. 3.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Act of June 7, 1924, there is hereby authorized to be
appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, a sum to
compensate white settlers or non-Indian claimants who have been found by the Pueblo
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Lands Board, created under said Act of June 7, 1924, to have occupied and claimed land
in good faith but whose claim has not been sustained and whose occupation has been
terminated under said Act of June 7, 1924, for the fair market value of lands,
improvements appurtenant thereto, and water rights. The non-Indian claimants, or their
successors, as found and reported by said Pueblo Lands Board, to be compensated out of
said appropriations to be disbursed under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior in
the amounts due them as appraised by the appraisers appointed by said Pueblo Lands
Board, as follows:
Within the pueblo of Tesuque, $1,094.64; within the pueblo of Nambe, $19,393.59;
within the pueblo of Taos, $14,064.57; within the Tenorio Tract, Taos Pueblo,
$43,165.26; within the pueblo of Santa Ana (El Ranchito grant), $846.26; within the
pueblo of Santa Domingo, $66; within the pueblo of Sandia, $5,354.46; within the pueblo
of San Felipe, $16,424.68; within the pueblo of Isleta, $6,624.45; within the pueblo of
Picuris, $11,464.73; within the pueblo of San Ildefonso, $16,209.13; within the pueblo of
San Juan, $19,938,22; within the pueblo of Santa Clara, $35,350.88; within the pueblo of
Cochiti, $9,653.81; within the pueblo of Pojoaque, $1,767.26; with the pueblo of Laguna,
$30,668.87; in all, $232,086.80: Provided, however, That the Secretary of the Interior
shall report back to Congress any errors in the amount of award measured by the present
fair market value of the lands involved and any errors in the omissions of legitimate
claimants for award, with evidence supporting his report and recommendations.
SEC. 4.
That for the purpose of safeguarding the interests and welfare of the tribe of Indians
known as the Pueblo de Taos of New Mexico in the certain lands hereinafter described,
upon which lands said Indians depend for water supply, forage for their domestic
livestock, wood and timber for their personal use and as the scene of certain of their
religious ceremonials, the Secretary of Agriculture may and he hereby is authorized and
directed to designate and segregate said lands, which shall not thereafter be subject to
entry under the land laws of the United States, and to thereafter grant to said Pueblo de
Taos, upon application of, the governor and council thereof, a permit to occupy said lands
and use the resources thereof for the personal use and benefit of said tribe of Indians for a
period of fifty years, with provision for subsequent renewals if the use and occupancy by
said tribe of Indians shall continue, the provisions of the permit are met, and the
continued protection of the watershed is required by public interest. Such permit shall
specifically provide for and safeguard all rights and equities hitherto established and
enjoyed by said tribe of Indians under any contracts or agreements hitherto existing, shall
authorize the free use of wood, forage, and lands for the personal or tribal needs of said
Indians, shall define the conditions under which natural resources under the control of the
Department of Agriculture not needed by said Indians shall be made available for
commercial use by the Indians or others, and shall establish necessary and proper
safeguards for the efficient supervision and operation of the area for national forest
purposes and all other purposes herein stated, the area referred to being described as
follows:
588

Beginning at the northeast corner of the Pueblo de Taos grant, thence
northeasterly along the divide between Rio Pueblo de Taos and Rio Lucero and
along the divide between Rio Pueblo de Taos and Red River to a point a half mile
east of Rio Pueblo de Taos; thence southwesterly on a line half mile east of Rio
Pueblo de Taos and parallel thereto to the northwest corner of township 25 north,
range 15 east; thence south on the west boundary of township 25 north, range 15
east, to the divide between Rio Pueblo de Taos and Rio Fernandez de Taos;
thence westerly along the divide to the east boundary of the Pueblo de Taos grant;
thence north to the point of beginning; containing approximately thirty thousand
acres, more or less.
SEC. 5.
Except as otherwise provided herein the Secretary of the Interior shall disburse and
expend the amounts of money herein authorized to be appropriated, in accordance with
and under the terms and conditions of the Act approved June 7, 1924: Provided, however,
That the Secretary be authorized to cause necessary surveys and investigations to be
made promptly to ascertain the lands and water rights that can be purchased out of the
foregoing appropriations and earlier appropriations made for the same purpose, with full
authority to disburse said funds in the purchase of said lands and water rights without
being limited to the appraised values thereof as fixed by the appraisers appointed by the
Pueblo Lands Board appointed under said Act of June 7, 1924, and all prior Acts limiting
the Secretary of the Interior in the disbursement of said funds to the appraised value of
said lands as fixed by said appraisers of said Pueblo Lands Board be and the same are,
expressly repealed: Provided further, That the Secretary of the Interior be, and he is
hereby, authorized to disburse a portion of said funds for the purpose of securing options
upon said lands and water rights and necessary abstracts of title thereof for the necessary
period required to investigate titles and which may be required before disbursement can
be authorized: Provided further, That the Secretary of the Interior be, and he is hereby,
authorized; out of the appropriations of the foregoing amounts and out of the funds
heretofore appropriated for the same purpose, to purchase any available lands within the
several pueblos which in his discretion it is desirable to purchase, without waiting for the
issuance of final patents directed to be issued under the provisions of the Act of June 7,
1924, where the right of said pueblos to bring independent suits, under the provisions of
the Act of June 7, 1924, has expired: Provided further, That the Secretary of the Interior
shall not make any expenditures out of the pueblo funds resulting from the appropriations
set forth herein, or prior appropriations for the same purpose; without first obtaining the
approval of the governing authorities of the pueblo affected: And provided further, That
the governing authorities of any pueblo may initiate matters pertaining to the purchase of
lands in behalf of their respective pueblos, which matters, or contracts relative thereto,
will not be binding or concluded until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
SEC. 6.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prevent any pueblo from prosecuting
independent suits as authorized under section 4 of the Act of June 7, 1924. The Secretary
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of the Interior is authorized to enter into contract with the several Pueblo Indian tribes,
affected by the terms of this Act, in consideration of the authorization of appropriations
contained in section 2 hereof, providing for the dismissal of pending and the
abandonment of contemplated original proceedings, in law or equity, by, or in behalf of
said Pueblo Indian tribes, under the provisions of section 4 of the Act of June 7, 1924 (43
Stat. L. 636), and the pueblo concerned may elect to accept the appropriations herein
authorized, in the sums herein set forth, in full discharge of all claims to compensation
under the terms of said Act, notifying the Secretary of the Interior in writing of its
election so to do: Provided, That if said election by said pueblo be not made, said pueblo
shall have one year from the date of the approval of this Act within which to file any
independent suit authorized under section 4 of the Act of June 7, 1924, at the expiration
of which period the right to file such suit shall expire by limitation: And provided further,
That no ejectment suits shall be filed against non-Indians entitled to compensation under
this Act, in less than six months after the sums herein authorized are appropriated.
SEC. 7.
Section 16 of the Act approved June 7, 1924, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 16. That if the Secretary of the Interior deems it to be for the best interest
of the Indians that any land adjudged by the court or said Lands Board against any
claimant be sold, he may, with the consent of the governing authorities of the
pueblo, order the sale thereof, under such regulations as he may make, to the
highest bidder for cash; and if the buyer thereof be other than the losing claimant,
the purchase price shall be used in paying to such losing claimant the adjudicated
value of the improvements aforesaid, if found under the provisions of section 15
hereof, and the balance thereof, if any, shall be paid over to the proper officer, or
officers, of the Indian community, but if the buyer be the losing claimant, and the
value of his improvements has been adjudicated as aforesaid, such buyer shall be
entitled to have credit upon his bid for the value of such improvements so
adjudicated."
SEC. 8.
The attorney or attorneys for such Indian tribe or tribes shall be paid such fee as may be
agreed upon bye such attorney or attorneys and such Indian tribe or tribes, but in no case
shall the fee be more than 10 per centum of the sum herein authorized to be appropriated
for the benefit of such tribe or tribes, and such attorney's fees shall be disbursed by the,
Secretary of the Interior in accordance herewith out of any funds appropriated for said
Indian tribe or tribes under the provisions of the Act of June 7, 1924 (43 Stat. L. 636), or
this Act: Provided however, That 25 per centum of the amount agreed upon as attorneys'
fees shall be retained by the Secretary of the Interior to be disbursed by him under the
terms of the contract, subject, to approval of the Secretary of the Interior, between said
attorneys and said Indian tribes, providing for further services and expenses of said
attorneys in furtherance of the objects set forth in section 19 of the Act of June 7, 1924.
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SEC. 9.
Nothing herein contained shall in any manner be construed to deprive any of the Pueblo
Indians of a prior right to the use of water from streams running through or bordering on
their respective pueblos for domestic, stock-water, and irrigation purposes for the lands
remaining in Indian ownership, and such water rights shall not be subject to loss by
nonuse or abandonment thereof as long as title to said lands shall remain in the Indians.
SEC. 10.
The sums authorized to be appropriated under the terms and provisions of section 2 of
this Act shall be appropriated in three annual installments, beginning with the fiscal year
1937.
Approved, May 31, 1933.
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Appendix C: Table 1: Results of Pueblo Lands Board decisions in the
Tewa Basin
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Appendix D: Table 2: Actions of the First District Court on Pueblo Lands
Board decisions, Tewa Basin

593

Works Cited
PRIMARY SOURCES: Manuscript Collections
Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of New Mexico,
Albuquerque.
Sophie D. Aberle Papers. MSS 509.
Edward L. Bartlett Papers. MSS 153.
Holm O. Bursum Papers. MSS 92.
Thomas B. Catron Papers. MSS 29.
Dennis Chávez Papers. MSS 394.
Francis Cushman Wilson Papers on Pueblo Legal Issues. MSS 304.
Richard H. Hanna Papers. MSS 762.
Indian Affairs Collection. MSS 16.
Ward Alan Minge Papers. MSS 815.
Reies López Tijerina Papers. MSS 654.
United States Soil Conservation Service Region Eight Records. MSS 289.
John Collier Papers. Yale University, microform copy.
New Mexico State Records Center and Archives. Santa Fe.
Edward L. Bartlett. 1960-003.
Bergere Family Collection. 1975-024.
Eugene A Fiske Papers. 1960-017.
Suzanne de Borhegyi Forrest Research Papers. 1987-026.
Herbert J. Hagerman Papers. 1960-021.
James F. Hinkle Papers. 1959-099.
Andrew W. Hockenhull Papers. 1959-103.
594

A.A. Jones Papers. 1960-025.
Clark S. Knowlton Collection. 1980-027.
Land Grant Collection. 1959-133.
Napoleon B. Laughlin Papers. 1959-134.
Elisha V. and Boaz Long Papers. 1972-003.
Merritt C. Mechem Papers. 1959-098.
John E. Miles Papers. 1959-105.
L. Bradford Prince Papers. 1959-074.
Pueblo Indians Collection. 1959-176.
Pueblo Lands Board Records. 1974-013.
Erik Sverre Collection (formerly the Carmen Quintana Collection). 1981-011.
Renehan-Gilbert Papers. 1960-023.
Manuel A. Sánchez, Papers. 1971-013.
Southwest Association on Indian Affairs Collection. 1976-037.
Spanish Archives of New Mexico, I & II. 1959-200.
Clyde Tingley Papers. 1959-104.
Francis C. Wilson Papers. 1981-017.
Fray Angélico Chávez History Library. Museum of New Mexico. Santa Fe.
A.A. Jones Family Papers. AC 282.
Pueblo Indians Land Matters. AC 186-S.
WPA New Mexico Collection. AC 228.
Center for Southwest Studies, Fort Lewis College, Durango.
Myra Ellen Jenkins Papers. M127.
595

PRIMARY SOURCES: Published
Aberle, Sophie D. The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico: Their Land, Economy and Civil
Organization. Menasha, WI: American Anthropological Association, 1948.
Adams, Eleanor B. ed. Bishop Tamaron’s Visitation of New Mexico, 1760. Publications
in History, Vol. 15. Albuquerque: Historical Society of New Mexico, 1954.
American Indian Defense Association. The Pueblos: The Crowning Wrong and the
Rescue. San Francisco: American Indian Defense Association, 1931.
Armstrong, S.C. Report of a trip made in behalf of the Indian Rights Association, to some
Indian reservations of the Southwest. Philadelphia: Indian Rights Association, 1884.
Bandelier, Adolph F. and Edgar L. Hewett. Indian of the Río Grande Valley.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico and the School of American Research, 1937.
Calhoun, James S. The official correspondence of James S. Calhoun while Indian agent
at Santa Fe and superintendent of Indian affairs in New Mexico, collected mainly from
the files of the Indian Office and edited under its direction, edited by Annie Heloise Abel.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915.
Atwood, Stella. “The Case for the Indian.” The Survey, October 1922, 7-11, 57.
Carroll, H. Bailey and J. Villasana Haggard, eds. Three New Mexico chronicles: the
Exposicion of Pedro Bautista Pino, 1812; the Ojeada of Lic. Antonio Barreiro, 1832; and
the additions by Don Jose Agustin de Escudero, 1849. Albuquerque: Quivira Society,
1942.
Berle, Adolf Augustus. In the Matter of the New Mexico Pueblo Lands: White Claims
upon Lands Granted to the Pueblos. New York: American Indian Defense Association,
1923.
Berle, A.A., Howard S. Gans, Herbert K. Stockton. In the Matter of the New Mexico
Public Lands: White Claims Upon Lands Granted to the Pueblos. New York: American
Indian Defense Association, December 10, 1923.
Boas, Franz. The Mind of Primative Man. New York: Macmillan, 1911.
Brookings Institution, Institute for Government Research. The Problem of Indian
Administration (reprint of the 1928 Meriam Report). New York, Johnson Reprint Corp.,
1971.
Collier, John. “Plundering the Pueblo Indians.” Sunset Magazine, January 1923, 21-23,
56.
596

Collier, John. “The Red Atlantis,” The Survey, October 1922, 15-20, 63, 66.
Collier, John. From Every Zenith: A Memoir and Some Essays on Life and Thought.
Denver: Sage Books, 1963.
Cordova, Andrew R. “Effects of Government Land Purchases on the Tax Structure of
Three New Mexico Counties,” New Mexico Business Review, 8, January 1939, 3-10.
Davis, W.W.H. El Gringo, or New Mexico and her people. Santa Fe, 1938.
Donnelly, David H. and Paul Beckett. The Soil Conservation Problem in New Mexico.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1946.
Fay, George E. ed. Excerpts from the annual reports of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, re: Pueblo Indian Agency, New Mexico: 1868-1877. Greeley, CO: Museum of
Anthropology, University of Northern Colorado, 1982.
Haight, Lional D. “Discussion of ‘Rural Rehablitation’” New Mexico Business Review 5,
1936, 9-13.
Harper, Allan G. Andrew G. Cordova, and Kalvero Oberg, Man and Resources in the
Middle Río Grande Valley. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1943.
Haight, Lionel D. “Discussion of ‘Rural Rehabilitation’” New Mexico Business Review 5,
1936, 9-13.
Hay, Melba Porter. The Papers of Henry Clay, volume 10; Candidate, Compromiser,
Elder Statesman, January 1, 1844-June 29, 1852. Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press, 1991.
Hewett, Edgar L. Letters on the Pueblo Indian Situation. Santa Fe: School of American
Research, 1925.
Hewett, Edgar L. Present Condition of the Pueblo Indians. Archaeological Institute of
America, Papers of the School of American Research No. 10. Santa Fe: School of
American Research, 1925.
Hewett, Edgar L. and Bertha P. Dutton. The Pueblo Indian world: studies on the natural
history of the Río Grande Valley in relation to Pueblo Indian culture. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico and the School of American Research, 1945.
Hewett, Edgar L. Lummis the Inimitable, Santa Fe: School of American Research, 1944.
Hewett, Edgar L. Man and Culture. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1944.
597

Hewett, Edgar L., Junius Henderson, and Wilfred Robbins. The Physiography of the Río
Grande Valley, New Mexico, in relation to Pueblo culture. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1913.
Fredrick W. Hodge, ed. Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1907.
Julian, George W. “Land Stealing in New Mexico.” North American Review 145, July
1887, 17-31.
Kessell, John L. Rick Hendricks, and Meredith D. Dodge, eds. A Settling of Accounts:
The Journals of Don Diego De Vargas, 1700-1704, vol. 6. Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 2002.
Loomis, Charles P. “Wartime Migration from the Rural Spanish Speaking Villages of
New Mexico.” Rural Sociology 7, 1942, 384-395.
Lummis, Charles F. The Land of Poco Tiempo. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1906.
Madrid, Roque. The Navajos in 1705: Roque Madrid’s Campaign Journal, ed., annot.
and trans. by Rick Hendricks and John P. Wilson. Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1996.
Mosk, Sanford. “The Influences of Traditions on Agriculture in New Mexico” Journal of
Economic History. 2, supplement, November 1942, 34-51.
New Mexico Association on Indian Affairs and the Indian Welfare Committee, General
Federation of Women’s Clubs, Shall the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico be Destroyed? A
Critical Analysis of Senate Bill 3855. Santa Fe, NM: October 18, 1922.
New Mexico Bureau of Immigration, Ho! To the Land of Sunshine: A Guide to New
Mexico for the Settler and Immigrant, the Public Lands and the Laws Under Which They
can be Obtained, General Information for the Homeseeker. Santa Fe: Bureau of
immigration, 1907.
The Railway Age, Vol. 40, July 1-December 31. Chicago: Railway Age Company, 1905.
Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias, 5 vols. 1681; reprint, Mexico: M.A.
Porrúa, 1987.
Reid, J. T.. It Happened in Taos. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1946.
Renehan, Alois B. The Pueblo Indians and their land grants; the pioneers and their
families, their descendants and grantees occupying parts of the Pueblo Indian land
grants, in New Mexico. Albuquerque: T. Hughes, 1923.
598

Reynolds, Matthew G. Spanish and Mexican Land Laws: New Spain and Mexico. St.
Louis: Buxton and Skinner Stationery Co., 1895.
Ritch, Willian G. Illustrated New Mexico. Santa Fe: New Mexico Print and Publishing
Co. Bureau of Immigration, 1883.
Ritch, Willian G. Aztlan: The History, Resources, and Attractions of New Mexico.
Boston: D. Lothrop & Co., 1885.
Robbins, Wilfred William. John P. Harrington and Barbara Freire-Marreco, Ethnobotany
of the Tewa Indians. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916.
Las Siete Partidas, V. I-III. Samuel Parsons Scott, trans., Robert I. Burns, ed.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001.
Shevky, Eshrev. “Rural Rehabilitation in New Mexico.” New Mexico Business Review 5,
1936, 5-9.
Tyler, S. Lyman. The Indian Cause in the Spanish Laws of the Indies: English translation
of Book VI, 'Concerning the Indians,' from the Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reinos de las
Indias. Salt Lake City: University of Utah - American West Center, 1980.
Spanish Archives of New Mexico, comp. and ed. Ralph Emerson Twitchell. Cedar Rapids,
IA: Torch Press, 1914.
Twitchell, Ralph E. “Pueblo Indian Land Tenures in New Mexico and Arizona.” El
Palacio 12: 3, 4, 5, March 1, 1922, 32-33, 38-43, 58.
Villagrá, Gaspar Pérez de. Historia de la Nuevo México: A Critical and Annotated
Spanish / English Edition, translated and edited by Miguel Encinias, Alfred Rodríguez
and Joseph P. Sánchez. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992.
Weigle, Marta. Hispanic Villages of northern New Mexico: A Reprint of Volume II the
1935 Tewa Basin Study with Supplementary Materials. Santa Fe, NM: Lightning Tree,
1975.
Welsh, Herbert. Report of a visit to the Navajo, Pueblo, and Hualapais Indians of New
Mexico and Arizona. Philadelphia: Indian rights association, 1885.
Welsh, Herbert. Caring for the Pueblos. Philadelphia: Indian Rights Association, 1922.
Woehlke, Walter V. “The New Day in New Mexico: Race Prejudice and Boss Rule Are
Yielding to Progress in this Ancient Commonwealth.” Sunset Magazine, June 1921, 2124, 54-56.
599

NEWSPAPERS
Taos Valley News
Albuquerque Journal
Santa Fe New Mexican
Washington Post
New York Times
Los Angeles Times
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS: Collections
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (NARA)
Reports of the Pueblo Lands Board, compiled 1925 – 1931, Records of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75.
Records of Purchases of Lands with Trust and Unscheduled Funds by Various
Tribes, compiled 1930-1950, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Land
Division, Record Group 75.
Records Relating to the Farm Security Administration Land Purchase Program for
Submarginal Lands, compiled 1935-1939, Department of the Interior. Office of
Indian Affairs. Land Division, Record Group 75.
Records of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1934-1942, Department of
Agriculture, Record Group 83.
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA)
Farm Labor, New Mexico (7), 1946-1947. Records of the Extension Service,
1888-2000, Record Group 33.
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Rocky Mountain Region, Denver,
CO. (NARA-RM)
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Northern Pueblos Agency, General Correspondence,
compiled 1911 – 1935, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group
75.
Records Concerning the Southwest Superintendents' Council, compiled 1937 –
1949, United Pueblos Agency, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record
Group 75.
600

Correspondence, Reports, and Other Records Relating to the Pueblo Lands Board,
compiled 1918 – 1932, Records from the Department of the Interior. Bureau of
Indian Affairs. Northern Pueblos Agency, Record Group 75.
General Correspondence, compiled 1911 – 1935, Office of Indian Affairs.
Southern Pueblos Agency, Record Group 75.
Surveys of Indian Lands, compiled 1933-1946, Office of Indian Affairs. Division
of Extension and Industry, Record Group 75.
Project Subject Files, compiled 1937-1942, Office of Indian Affairs.
Interdepartmental Río Grande Board, Record Group 75.
Correspondence, Reports, and Other Records, compiled 1937-1942, Office of
Indian Affairs. Interdepartmental Río Grande Board, Record Group 75.
Records Concerning Claims Before the Pueblos Land Board, 1924 – 1941, Entry
13, Records of the Bureau of Land Management, 1685 – 2006, Record Group 49.
Records Concerning Claims Before the Pueblos Land Board, compiled 19241941, Bureau of Land Management, New Mexico State Office, Santa Fe Land
Office, Record Group 49.
Records of the Natural Resources Conservation Service, 1933-1971, Record
Group 114.
Records of the US Forest Service, 1898-1995, Record Group 95.
National Archives at San Francisco. San Bruno, CA.
Colonel LaFayette A. Dorrington, see box 1 of 6 (New Mexico - Crown Point,
Jicarilla, Mescalero, Pueblo, San Juan, Southern Ute, Zuni), Investigative Records
of Colonel L. A. Dorrington, 1913-1923. Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Record Group 75.
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS: Reports
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1850-1946.
Annual Report of the Commissioner, Bureau of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the
Interior, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947-1952.
U.S. Department of the Interior. Bureau of Indian Affairs. Indian Land Research Unit
601

U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service. Region Eight. Tewa Basin
Study. Albuquerque, 1935.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. Inventory of
Materials on the Río Grande Watershed: An Evaluation of Surveys and Reports. By
Hugh G. Calkins, Regional Bulletin No. 34, Conservation Economics Series No. 2.
Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1937.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. Proposals for
the Santa Cruz Area. By Hugh G. Calkins, Regional Bulletin No. 28, Conservation
Economics Series No. 1. Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1935.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight.
Reconnaissance Survey of Human Dependency on Resources in the Río Grande
Watershed. By Hugh G. Calkins, Regional Bulletin No. 33, Conservation Economics
Series No. 6. Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1936.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. Federal Relief
Expenditures for Labor in Three Sub-areas of the Upper Río Grande Watershed during
1935-1936. By Hugh G. Calkins, Regional Bulletin No. 41, Conservation Economics
Series No. 14. Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1937.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. Population of
the Upper Río Grande Watershed. By Hugh G. Calkins, Regional Bulletin No. 43,
Conservation Economics Series No. 16. Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1937.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. Village
Livelihood in the Upper Río Grande Area. By Hugh G. Calkins, Regional Bulletin No.
44, Conservation Economics Series No. 17. Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1937.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. The Santa
Cruz Irrigation District. By Hugh G. Calkins, Regional Bulletin No. 45, Conservation
Economics Series No. 18. Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1937.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. Handling of a
Cash Crop (Chili). By Hugh G. Calkins, Regional Bulletin No. 46, Conservation
Economics Series No. 19. Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1937.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. Village
Dependence on Migratory Labor in the Upper Río Grande Area. By Hugh G. Calkins,
Regional Bulletin No. 47, Conservation Economics Series No. 20. Albuquerque, New
Mexico, 1937.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. Rural
Rehabilitation in New Mexico. By Hugh G. Calkins, Regional Bulletin No. 50,
Conservation Economics Series No. 23. Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1935.
602

U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. Notes on
Community-Owned Land Grants in New Mexico. By George C. Taylor, Regional Bulletin
No. 48, Conservation Economics Series No. 22. Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1937.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. U.S. Department of the Interior. Interdepartmental Río
Grande Committee. Report and Recommendations. Washington D.C. 1937.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. “Water
Supply– Río Grande.” 1919.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. “Annual
Report for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1936.” 1936.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. “Annual
Report for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1937.” 1937.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. Río Grande
District “Annual Report for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1938.” 1938.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. “Report on the
Proposed Río Grande Project - Instructions for the Schedule used in the Human
Dependency Survey of the Río Grande Watershed.” 1934.
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation “The Embargo on the Upper Río
Grande.” Ottamar Hamele, 1924.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil Conservation Service, Region Eight. “A Report on
the Río Grande Watershed with Special Reference to Soil Conservation Problems.”
Albuquerque, 1936.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, Conservation
and Culture: The Soil Conservation Service, Social Science and conservation on Tribal
Lands in the Southwest. Rebekah C. Beatty Davis, Resource Economics and Social
Sciences Division, Historical Notes Number 6, Washington 1997.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, More Than a Scenic Landscape: Valles
Caldera National Preserve Land Use History, Kurt F. Anschuetz and Thomas Merlan,
Rocky Mountain Research Station, General Technical Report RMRS-GTR-196.
September 2007.
U.S. Congress, House. Committee in Indian Affairs. Hearings on H.R. 13452 and H.R.
13674, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., February 1-16, 1923.
U.S. Congress, House. Subcommittee of Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess., May 16, 1920.
603

U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs, Survey of
Conditions of the Indians in the United States: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Indian Affairs, 71st congress, 2nd session, pt. 20, Pueblo Lands Board, May
2, 8 and 9 1931; January 26-30, 1932.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, Survey of Conditions of the
Indians in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, 71st
Congress, 2nd Session, S. Res. 79, 308 (70th Cong.), and S. Res. 268 and 416 (71st Cong.),
Pueblo Lands Board, Part 20, May 2, 8-9, 1931.
U.S. Congress. House. Authorization of Appropriations to Pay in Part the Liability of the
United States to Certain Pueblos: Hearings Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, 72nd
Congress, 1st Session, on H. R. 9071, February 17, 1932.
U.S. Congress, Senate. Hearings on S. 3865 and S. 4223, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., January
15-18, 22, 23, 25, 1923.
U.S. Congress, House. Hearings on H.R. 9071, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., February 17, 1932.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: Definition and List of
Community Land Grants in New Mexico. GAO-01-951. Washington D.C.: GAO, 2001.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: Findings and Possible
Options Regarding Longstanding Community Land Grant Claims in New Mexico: Report
to Congressional Requesters. GAO-04-59. Washington D.C.: GAO, 2004.
Pueblo Lands Act, June 7, 1924, c. 331, 43 Stat. 636. 1924, S. 2932.
Pueblo Lands Compensation Act, May 31, 1933, c. 45, 48 Stat. 108. 1933, H.R. 4014.
SECONDARY SOURCES: Books
Adams, Eleanor B. and Fray Angelico Chávez, The Missions of New Mexico 1776.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1956.
Anderson, Gary Clayton. The Indian Southwest, 1580-1830: Ethnogenesis and
Reinvention. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.
Apodaca, Anacleto G. The Spanish-American Farmer of the Tewa Basin and the
Extension Service Press Bulletin 1059. State College, N.M.: Agricultural Experiment
Station, New Mexico College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, 1951.
Atencio, Ernest. Of Land and Culture: Environmental Justice and Public Lands
Ranching in Northern New Mexico. Santa Fe: Quivira Coalition, 2001.
604

Banker, Mark T. Presbyterians Missions and Cultural Interaction in the Far Southwest,
1850-1950. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993.
Barrett, Elinore M. Conquest and Catastrophe: Changing Rio Grande Pueblo Settlement
Patterns in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 2002.
Basso, Keith H. Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the Western
Apache. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996.
Baxter, John. Dividing New Mexico Waters, 1700-1912. Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1997.
Benavides, David. Lawyer-Induced Partitioning of New Mexican Land Grants: An
Ethical Travesty. Guadalupita, N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 1994.
Benavides, David. & Ryan Golten, Response to the 2004 GAO Report. Santa Fe: New
Mexico Attorney General’s Office, Gary King, Attorney General, Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo Division, 2008.
Blackhawk, Ned. Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the early American
West. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Blanton, Carlos Kevin. George I. Sánchez: The Long Fight for Mexican American
Integration. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.
Bolton, Herbert Eugene. The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old Florida and the
Southwest. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921.
Bradfute, Richard W. The Court of Private Land Claims: The Adjudication of Spanish
&Mexican Land Grant Titles, 1891-1904. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico,
1975.
Brayer, Herbert O. Pueblo Indian land grants of the "Río Abajo," New Mexico.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1939.
Brooks, James F. Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the
Southwest Borderlands. Chapel Hill, NC: Omohundro Institute of Early American
History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, & University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
Busto, Rudy V. King Tiger: The Religious Vision of Reies López Tijerina. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2005.
Burma, John and David E. Williams. An Economic, Social and Educational Survey of Río
Arriba and Taos Counties. El Rito, NM: Northern New Mexico College, 1961.
605

Burt, Larry W. Tribalism in Crisis: Federal Indian Policy, 1953-1961. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1982.
Caffey, David L. Chasing the Santa Fe Ring: Power and Privilege in Territorial New
Mexico. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014.
Cannon, Brian Q. Remaking the Agrarian Dream: New Deal Rural Resettlement in the
Mountain West. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1996.
Carlson, Alvar W. The Spanish-American homeland: four centuries in New Mexico's Río
Arriba. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.
Carter, William B. Indian Alliances and the Spanish in the Southwest, 750-1750.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009.
Chávez, Fray Angelico. Origins of New Mexico Families: A Genealogy of the Spanish
Colonial Period. Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1992.
Chavez, John R. The Lost Land: the Chicano image of the Southwest. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1984.
Church, Peggy Pond The House at Otowi Bridge: The Story of Edith Warner and Los
Alamos. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1960.
Clark, Ira G. Water in New Mexico: A History of Its Management and Use. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1987.
Cordell, Linda. Archaeology of the Southwest, San Diego: Academic Press, 1997.
Correia, David. Properties of Violence: Law and Land Grant Struggle in Northern New
Mexico. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2013.
Crane, Leo. Desert Drums: The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, 1540-1928. Glorieta,
NM: Río Grande Press, 1972.
Crutchfield, James A. Tragedy at Taos: The Revolt of 1847. Plano, Tex.: Republic of
Texas Press, 1995.
Cutter, Charles R. The Protector de Los Indios in Colonial New Mexico. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1986.
deBuys, William. Enchantment and Exploitation: The Life and Hard Times of a New
Mexico Mountain Range. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985.
deBuys, William and Alex Harris, River of Traps. Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1996.
606

Deacon, Desley. Elsie Clews Parsons: Inventing Modern Life. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1997.
Deutsch, Sarah. No Separate Refuge: Culture, Class, and Gender on an Anglo-Hispanic
Frontier in the American Southwest, 1880-1940. New York: Oxford University Press,
1987.
Dozier, Edward P. The Pueblo Indians of North America. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1970.
Dozier, Edward P. The Hopi-Tewa of Arizona. University of California Publications in
American Archaeology and Ethnology, No. 44. Berkeley: 1954.
DuMars, Charles T., Marilyn O'Leary, Albert E. Utton. Pueblo Indian Water Rights:
Struggle for a Precious Resource. Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1984.
Dunbar-Ortiz, Roxanne. Roots of Resistance: A History of Land Tenure in New Mexico.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007.
Dunham, Harold H. Spanish and Mexican Land Policies and Grants in the Taos Pueblo
Region, New Mexico. New York: Garland Pub. Inc., 1974.
Durán, Tobías. We Come as Friends: The Social and Historical Context of Nineteenth
Century New Mexico. Albuquerque: Southwest Hispanic Research Institute, University of
New Mexico, 1984.
Ebright, Malcolm. Land Grants and Lawsuits in Northern New Mexico. Guadalupita,
N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2008.
Ebright, Malcolm and Rick Hendricks. The Witches of Abiquiú: The Governor, the Priest,
the Genízaro Indians, and the Devil. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
2006.
Ebright, Malcolm, Rick Hendricks and Richard W. Hughes. Four Square Leagues:
Pueblo Indian Land in New Mexico. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
2014.
Ebright, Malcolm. Advocates for the Oppressed: Hispanos, Indians, Genizaros, and
Their Land in New Mexico. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014.
Ebright, Malcolm. Land Grant Community Associations in New Mexico. Guadalupita,
N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 1994.
Edmonson, Munro S. Los Manitos: A Study of Institutional Values. New Orleans. Middle
American Research Institiute, Tulane University, 1957.
607

Fincher, E. B.. Spanish-Americans as a Political Factor in New Mexico, 1912-1950. New
York: Arno Press, 1974.
Fixico, Donald L. Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986.
Flint, Richard. No Settlement No Conquest: A History of the Coronado Entrada.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008.
Foote, Cheryl J. Women of the New Mexico Frontier, 1846-1912. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2005.
Forrest, Suzanne. The Preservation of the Village: New Mexico’s Hispanics and the New
Deal. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998.
Frank, Ross. From Settler to Citizen: New Mexican Economic Development and the
Creation of Vecino Society, 1750-1820. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
Garcia, Ignacio M. Chicanismo: The forging of a militant ethos among Mexican
Americans. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997.
Gardner, Richard. Grito! Reies Tijerina and the New Mexico land grant war of 1967.
Indianapolis; Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.
Getz, Lynne Marie. Schools of their Own: The Education of Hispanos in New Mexico,
1850-1940. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997.
Gómez, Laura E. Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican American Race. New
York: New York University, 2007.
Gonzales, Phillip B., ed. Expressing New Mexico: Nuevomexicano Creativity, Ritual, and
Memory. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007.
González, Nancie L., The Spanish-Americans of New Mexico; a heritage of pride.
Albuquerque. University of New Mexico Press, 1969.
Gordon-McCutchan, R.C. The Taos Indians and the Battle for Blue Lake. Santa Fe: Red
Crane Books, 1995.
Griswold del Castillo, Richard. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: A Legacy of Conflict.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990.
Gutiérrez, David G. Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and
the Politics of Ethnicity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
608

Gutiérrez, Ramón A. When Jesus Came the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage,
Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1991.
Hall, G. Emlen. Four leagues of Pecos: A Legal History of the Pecos Grant, 1800-1933.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984.
Hämäläinen, Pekka. The Comanche Empire. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.
Hamm, Ron. The Bursums of New Mexico. Socorro, N.M.: Manzanares Street Publishing,
2012.
Hamilton, Holman. Prologue to Conflict: the Crisis and Compromise of 1850. Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1964.
Higham, John. Stranger in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925. New
York: Atheneum, 1975.
Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform. New York: Vintage, 1960.
Holm, Tom. The Great Confusion in Indian Affairs: Native Americans and Whites in the
Progressive Era. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005.
Hunt, Aurora. Kirby Benedict, Frontier Federal Judge: An Account of Legal and Judicial
Development in the Southwest, 1853-1874. Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1961.
Hyer, Sally. One House, One Voice, One Heart: Native American Education at the Santa
Fe Indian School. Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1990.
Iverson, Peter. “We Are Still Here:” American Indians in the Twentieth Century.
Wheeling, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1998).
Jacobs, Margaret D. Engendered Encounters: Feminism and Pueblo Cultures, 18791934. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999.
Jenkins, Myra Ellen. History of Laguna Pueblo land claims. New York: Garland
Publishing Inc., 1974.
Jones, Oakah L. Jr. Pueblo Warriors and Spanish Conquest. Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1966.
Jones, Oakah L. Jr. Los Paisanos: Spanish Settlers on the Northern Frontier of New
Spain. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979.
Lamadrid, Enrique R. Hermanitos Comanchitos: Indo-Hispano Rituals of Captivity and
Redemption. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003.
609

Lent, Stephen C. et. al., “Survey, Test Excavation Results and Data Recovery Plan for
Cultural Resources near San Juan Pueblo, Rio Arriba County, New Mexico” Archeology
Notes 17. Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico, Office of Archaeological Studies, 1991.
Keleher, William A. Maxwell Land Grant (facsimile of 1942 edition) Santa Fe: Sunstone
Press, 2008.
Kelly, Lawrence C. The Assault on Assimilation: John Collier and the Origins of Indian
Policy Reform. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983.
Keltz, Iris. Scrapbook of a Taos Hippie: Tribal Tales from the Heart of a Cultural
Revolution. El Paso: Cinco Puntos Press, 2000.
Kessell, John L. Kiva, Cross, and Crown: the Pecos Indians and New Mexico, 15401840. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987.
Kessell, John L. Spain in the Southwest: A Narrative History of Colonial New Mexico,
Arizona, Texas, and Californina. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002.
Kessell, John L. Pueblos, Spaniards, and the Kingdom of New Mexico. Norman:
University of Oklahoma, 2008.
Knaut, Andrew L. The Pueblo Revolt of 1680: Conquest and Resistance in SeventeenthCentury New Mexico. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995.
Kosek, Jake. Understories: The Political Life of Forests in Northern New Mexico.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
Krauze, Enrique. Mexico: Biography of Power: A History of Modern Mexico, 1810-1996,
trans. by Hank Heifetz. New York: Harper-Collins, 1997.
Kutsche, Paul and John R. Van Ness. Canones, values, crisis, and survival in a northern
New Mexico village. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981.
Kutsche, Paul. The Survival of Spanish American villages. Colorado Springs: Research
Committee, Colorado College, 1979.
Lamar, Howard R. The Far Southwest, 1846-1912: A Territorial History. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2000.
Lavender, David. Bent’s Fort. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972.
Lawrence, Adrea. Lessons from an Indian Day School: Negotiating Colonization in
Northern New Mexico, 1902-1907. Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 2011.
610

Lears, Jackson. Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920. New
York: Harper, 2010.
Lecompte, Janet. Rebellion in Río Arriba, 1837. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1985.
Leonard, Olen E. The Role of the Land Grant in the Social Organization and Social
Processes of a Spanish-American village in New Mexico. Albuquerque, C. Horn 1970.
Leuchtenburg, William E. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940. New
York: Harper Perennial, 2009.
Limerick, Patricia Nelson. The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American
West. New York: Norton, 1987.
Lowitt, Richard. The New Deal and the West. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1984.
Lowitt, Richard. Bronson Cutting: Progressive Politician. Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1992.
Lucero, Donald L. The Adobe Kingdom, New Mexico, 1598-1958. Santa Fe: Sunstone
Press, 2009.
Machen, Judith, Ellen McGehee and Dorothy Hoard. Homesteading on the Pajarito
Plateau, 1887-1942. Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2012.
Masco, Joseph. The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New
Mexico. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
McGerr, Michael. A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Era, 18701920. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
McWilliams, Carey. North from Mexico: The Spanish-Speaking People of the United
States. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1948.
Melzer, Richard. Coming of Age in the Great Depression: The Civilian Conservation
Corps Experience in New Mexico, 1933-1942. Santa Fe: Yucca Tree Press, 2000.
Montgomery, Charles. The Spanish Redemption: Heritage, Power and Loss on New
Mexico’s Upper Río Grande. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
Montoya, María E. Translating Property: The Maxwell Land Grant and the Conflict over
Land in the American West, 1840-1900. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

611

Morgan, Robert J. Governing Soil Conservation: Thirty Years of the New
Decentralization. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.
Myrick, David F. New Mexico's Railroads: An Historic Survey. Golden, CO: Colorado
Railroad Museum, 1970.
Nash, Gerald D. The Federal Landscape: An Economic History of the Twentieth-Century
West Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999.
New Mexico Legal Rights Demonstration Land Grant Project. The New Mexico Legal
Rights Demonstration Land Grant Project: An Analysis of the Land Title Problems in the
Santo Domingo de Cundiyo Grant. Albuquerque: Legal Aid Society of Albuquerque,
1976.
Nieto-Phillips, John M. The Language of Blood: The Making of the Spanish-American
Identity in New Mexico, 1880s-1930s. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
2004.
Norris, Jim. After the Year Eighty: The Demise of Franciscan Power in Spanish New
Mexico. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000.
Nostrand, Richard L. The Hispano Homeland. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1992.
Nostrand, Richard L. El Cerrito, New Mexico: eight generations in a Spanish village.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003.
Olson, James S. and Raymond Wilson. Native Americans in the Twentieth Century.
Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1984.
Ortiz, Alfonso. The Tewa World: Space, Time, Being, and Becoming in Pueblo Society.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
Owen, Gordon R. The Two Alberts: Fountain and Fall. Las Cruces, N.M.: Yucca Tree
Press, 1996.
Padilla, Genaro M. My History, Not Yours: The Formation of Mexican American
Autobiography. Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.
Parman, Donald L. Indians and the American West in the Twentieth Century.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.
Parman, Donald L. The Navajos and the New Deal. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1976.

612

Peña, Devon G., Mexican Americans and the Environment: Tierra y Vida. Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 2005.
Peters, James S. Headless in Taos: The Dark Fated Tale of Arthur Rochford Manby.
Santa Fe: Sunstone Press, 2012.
Philp, Kenneth R. John Collier’s Crusade for Indian Reform 1920-1954. Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1977.
Phillips, Fred M., G. Emlen Hall and Mary E. Black, Reining in the Rio Grande: People,
Land and Water. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2011.
Pojoaque Pueblo Poeh Center, Then and Now: A Historical Photo Sourcebook of
Pojoaque Pueblo. Santa Fe: Pojoaque Pueblo Poeh Center, 1991.
Poling-Kempes, Lesley. Valley of Shining Stone: The Story of Abiquiu. Tucson:
University of Arizone Press, 1997.
Prucha, Francis Paul. The Great Father: The United States Government and the
American Indians. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995.
Prucha, Francis Paul (ed.) Documents of United States Indian policy. Lincoln : University
of Nebraska Press, 2000.
Rebolledo, Tey Diana and María Teresa Márquez (eds). Women’s Tales from the New
Mexico WPA: La Diabla a Pie. Houston: Arte Público Press, 2000.
Reeve, Frank D. History of New Mexico, vol.1. New York: Lewis Historical Publishing
Co., 1961.
Reséndez, Andrés. Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico,
1800-1850. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Rivera, José. Acequia Culture: Water, Land, and Community in the Southwest.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998.
Rodríguez, Sylvia. Acequia: Water Sharing, Sanctity, and Place. Santa Fe: School of
American Research Press, 2006.
Roberts, Calvin A. and Susan A. Roberts, New Mexico. rev. ed. Albuquerque: University
of New Mexico Press, 2006.
Rosales, F. Arturo. Chicano! The History of the Mexican American Civil Rights
Movement. Houston: Arte Público Press, 1997.

613

Rothman, Hal K. Devil's Bargains: Tourism in the Twentieth-Century American West.
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
Rothman, Hal K. On Rims & Ridges: the Los Alamos area since 1880. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1992.
Rudnick, Lois Pallen. Utopian Vistas: The Mabel Dodge Luhan House and the American
Counterculture. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998.
Rusco, Elmer. A Fateful Time: The Background and Legislative History of the Indian
Reorganization Act. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2000.
Rusinow, Irving. A Camera Report on El Cerrito. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 1942.
Sálaz, Rubén New Mexico: A Mutli-History. Alameda, N.M.: Cosmic House Publishing,
2002.
Sánchez, George I. Forgotten People: A Study of New Mexicans. Albuquerque, NM:
Calvin Horn, 1967.
Sánchez, Joseph P., Robert L. Spude, and Art Gómez, New Mexico: A History. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2013.
Sando, Joe S., The Pueblo Indians. San Francisco: Indian Historian Press, 1976.
Sando, Joe S., Pueblo Nations: Eight Centuries of Pueblo Indian History. Santa Fe: Clear
Light Publishers, 1992.
Santa Cruz Parish, La Iglesia de Santa Cruz de La Cañada, 1733-1983. Santa Cruz, NM:
Santa Cruz Parish, 1983.
Scarborough, Mike. Trespassers on Our Own Land: Structured as an Oral History of the
Juan P. Valdez Family and of the Land Grants of Northern New Mexico. Indianapolis:
Dog Ear Publishing, 2011.
Scott, James C. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
Simmons, Marc The Little Lion of the Southwest: A Life of Manuel Antonio Chaves.
Chicago: Swallow Press, 1973.
Simmons, Marc. New Mexico: An Interpretive History. 1976; reprint Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1988.

614

Simmons, Marc. The Last Conquistador: Juan de Oñate and the Settling of the Far
Southwest. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.
Smith, Jason Scott. Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public
Works, 1933-1956. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Stegmaier, Mark Joseph. Texas, New Mexico, and the Compromise of 1850: Boundary
Dispute and Sectional Crisis. 1996; reprint, Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2012.
Stuart, David E. Pueblo Peoples on the Pajarito Plateau: Archeology and Efficiency.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010.
Swadesh, Frances Leon, Los Primeros Pobladores : Hispanic Americans of the Ute
Frontier. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974.
Taylor, Graham D. The New Deal and American Indian Tribalism: The Administration of
the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934-45. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980.
Torrez, Robert J. and Robert Trapp, eds., Río Arriba: A New Mexico County,
Albuquerque: Rio Grande Books, 2010.
Tucker, Edwin A. and George Firzpatrick, Men who Watched the Mountains: The Forest
Service in the Southwest. United States Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service,
Southwestern Region. Washington, 1972. online at
http://www.foresthistory.org/ASPNET/Publications/region/3/tuckerfitzpatrick/chap27.aspx
Twitchell, Ralph Emerson. The Leading Facts of New Mexican History, Vol. 2. 1912;
reprint, Santa Fe: Sunstone Press, 2007.
Van Dresser, Peter. Development on a Human Scale: Potentials for Ecologically Guided
Growth in Northern New Mexico. New York: Praeger, 1973.
Van Ness, John R. and Christine M., eds. Spanish & Mexican Land Grants in New
Mexico and Colorado. Manhattan, Kan.: Sunflower University Press, 1980.
Van Ness, John R. Hispanos in northern New Mexico: The Development of Corporate
Community and Multicommunity. New York: AMS Press, 1991.
Van Ness, John R. & Paul Kutsche. Cañones:, Values, Crisis, and Survival in a northern
New Mexico village. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981.
Vlasich, James A. Pueblo Indian Agriculture. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 2005.

615

Vigil, Julian Josue and Anselmo Arellano. Arthur L. Campa and the Coronado Cuarto
Centennial. Las Vegas, NM: Editorial Teleraña, 1980.
Vigil, Maurilio E. Los Patrones: Profiles of Hispanic Political Leaders in New Mexico
History. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980.
Walter, Paul A.F., Jr. Isolation and social change in three Spanish-speaking villages of
New Mexico. Charles E. Woodhouse, editor, New York: AMS Press, 2008.
Wasserman, Mark. Everyday Life and Politics in Nineteenth Century Mexico: Men,
Women, and War. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000.
Waters, Frank. The Woman at Otowi Crossing: A Novel. Denver: Alan Swallow, 1966.
Waters, Frank. To Possess the Land: A Biography of Arthur Rochford Manby. Chicago:
Swallow Press, 1973.
Weber, David J. Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
Weber, David J. Foreigners in their Native Land: Historical Roots of the Mexican
Americans. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003.
Weber, David J. The Mexican frontier, 1821-1846: the American Southwest under
Mexico. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982.
Weber, David J. Myth and the History of the Hispanic Southwest: Essays. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1988.
Weber, David J., ed. New Spain's Far Northern Frontier: Essays on Hispanos and
Indians in the American West, 1540-1821. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1979.
Weber, David J. The Spanish Frontier in North America. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1992.
Wenger, Tisa. We Have a Religion: The 1920s Pueblo Indian Dance Controversy and
American Religious Freedom. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
Westphall, Victor. Mercedes Reales: Hispanic Land Grants of the Upper Río Grande
Region. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983.
Westphall, Victor. The Public Domain in New Mexico, 1854-1891. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1965.

616

Westphall, Victor. Thomas Benton Catron and his Era. Tucson, University of Arizona
Press, 1973.
Whaley, Charlotte. Nina Otero-Warren of Santa Fe. Santa Fe: Sunstone Press, 2008.
White, Koch, Kelley, McCarthy and New Mexico State Planning Office. Land Title
Study. Santa Fe: New Mexico State Planning Office, 1971.
White, Richard. It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the
American West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Wiebe, Robert H. The Search for Order: 1877-1920. New York: Hill and Wang, 1966.
Wilson, Chris. The Myth of Santa Fe: Creating a Modern Regional Tradition.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997.
Worster, Donald J. Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American
West. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
SECONDARY SOURCES: Journal Articles, Chapters in Edited Books, and other
Articles
Annie Heloise Abel, “Indian Affairs in New Mexico under the Administration of William
Carr Lane. From the Journal of John Ward,” New Mexico Historical Review 16:2 (April
1941): 206-232; and 16:3 (July 1941): 338-358.
Anaya, Rudolfo A. “Aztlán: A homeland without boundaries.” In Aztlán: Essays on the
Chicano Homeland. edited by Rudolfo A. Anaya & Francisco Lomelí. 230-241.
Albuquerque: Academia/El Norte Publications, 1989.
Anschuetz, Kurt F. “Room to Grow with Rooms to Spare: Agriculture and Big-Site
Settlements in the Late Pre-Columbian Tewa Basin Pueblo Landscape.” Kiva 73:2 The
Rio Arriba (winter 2007): 173-196.
Apodaca, Anacleto G, “Corn and Custom: Introduction of Hybrid Corn to Spanish
American Farmers in New Mexico.” In Human Problems in Technological Change.
edited by Edward H. Spicer. 35-39. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952.
Archuleta, Elizabeth. “History Carved in Stone: Memorializing Po’Pay and Oñate, or
Recasting Racialized Regimes of Representation.” New Mexico Historical Review 82:3
(summer 2007): 317-342.
Arellano, Juan Estevan. “La Querencia: La Raza Bioregionalism” New Mexico Historical
Review 72:1 (January 1997): 31-37.

617

Arnon, Nancy S. and W. W. Hill. “Santa Clara Pueblo.” In Handbook of North American
Indians. edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 9: 296-307. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution,
1979.
Bebout, Lee. "Hero Making in El Movimiento: Reies Lopez Tijerina and the Chicano
Nationalist Imaginary." Aztlán 32:2 (2007): 93-121.
Benavides, David and Ryan Golten. “Righting the Record: A Response to the GAO’s
2004 Report Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: Findings and Possible Options Regarding
Longstanding Community Land Grant Claims in New Mexico.” Natural Resources
Journal 48:4 (fall 2008): 857-926.
Beninato, Stefanie. “Popé, Pose-yemu, and Naranjo: A New Look at Leadership in the
Pueblo Revolt of 1680.” New Mexico Historical Review 65:4 (October 1990): 417-435.
Blackhawk, Ned. Review of Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in
the Southwest Borderlands, by James F. Brooks, American Indian Culture and Research
Journal 28:1, 2004.
Blaut, J.M. and Antonio Ríos-Bustamante. “Commentary on Nostrand's "Hispanos" and
Their "Homeland."” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 74:1 (March
1984): 157-164.
Bodine, John J. “Acculturation Process and population Dynamics.” in New Perspectives
on the Pueblos, edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 257-286. Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1975.
Bodine, John J. "A Tri-Ethnic Trap: The Spanish Americans in Taos." in Proceedings of
the American Ethnological Society, edited by June Helm, 145-53. Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1968.
Briggs, Charles L. “Getting Both Sides of the Story: Oral History in Land Grant Research
and Litigation.” in Land, Water, and Culture: New perspectives on Hispanic Land
Grants, edited by Charles L. Briggs and John R. Van Ness, 217-268. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1987.
Brown, Donald N. “Picuris Pueblo.” in Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 9,
Southwest, edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 268-270. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution,
1979.
Arnon, Nancy S. and W. W. Hill. “Santa Clara Pueblo.” in Handbook of North American
Indians, Vol. 9, Southwest. edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 296-307. Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution, 1979.

618

Brown, Donald N. “Picuris Pueblo in 1890: A Reconstruction of Picuris Social Structure
and Subsistence Activities.” in Picuris Pueblo through Time: Eight Centuries of Change
in a Northern Rio Grande Pueblo. edited by Michael A. Adler and Herbert W. Dick, 1937. Dallas: William P. Clements Center for Southwest Studies, Southern Methodist
University, 2000.
Kevin Bruyneel, “Challenging American Boundaries: Indigenous People and the ‘Gift’ of
U.S. Citizenship.” Studies in American Political Development, 18:1 (2004): 30-43.
Carlson, Alvar W. “Spanish American Acquisition of Cropland within the Northern
Pueblo Grants, New Mexico” Ethnohistory 22, (Spring 1975): 95-110.
Chávez, Angélico. “Pohé-yemo’s Representative and the Pueblo Revolt of 1680.” in
What Caused the Pueblo Revolt of 1680? edited by David J. Weber, 81-114. New York:
Bedford/St. Martins, 1999.
Chávez, Chris. “A Brief History of Homesteading in the Santa Fe National Forest.” La
Herencia 58 (summer 2008): 17-19.
Clifford, Frank. “Albert Fall: New Mexico’s Dark Knight.” El Palacio 117 (Spring
2012): 52-59.
Correia, David. “‘Rousers of the Rabble’ in the New Mexico Land Grant War: La
Alianza Federal de Mercedes and the Violence of the State.” Antipode 40:4, 2008: 561583.
Correia, David. “The Sustained Yield Forest Management Act and the Roots of
Environmental Conflict in Northern New Mexico.” Geoforum 38, 2007: 1040-1051.
Correia, David. “Land Grant Speculation in New Mexico During the Territorial Period”
in David Benavides and Ryan Golten, Response to the 2004 GAO Report. Santa Fe: New
Mexico Attorney General’s Office, Gary King, Attorney General, Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo Division, 2008, appendices, 73-109.
Crown, Patricia L. “Evaluating Construction Sequence and Population of Pot Creek
Pueblo, Northern New Mexico.” American Antiquity 56:2 (April 1991): 291-214.
Damico, Denise Holladay. “Guadalupe Miranda.” newmexicohistory.org, website of New
Mexico Office of the State Historian, accessed 1 November 2014.
http://newmexicohistory.org/people/guadalupe-miranda.
deBuys, William. “Fractions of Justice: A Legal and Social History of the Las Trampas
Land Grant, New Mexico.” New Mexico Historical Review 56:1 (January 1981): 71-97.
Dickson, B. Alan. “The Professional Life of Francis C. Wilson of Santa Fe: A
Preliminary Sketch.” New Mexico Historical Review 51:1 (January 1976): 35-55.
619

Dinwoodie, David H. “Indians, Hispanos, and Land Reform: A New Deal Struggle in
New Mexico.” Western Historical Quarterly 17:3 (July 1986): 291-323.
Donnelly, Thomas C. “New Mexico: An Area of Conflicting Cultures.” in Rocky
Mountain Politics, edited by Thomas C. Donnelly, 236-258. Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1940.
Dozier, Edward P. “Río Grande Pueblos.” in Perspectives in American Indian Culture
Change, edited by Edward H. Spicer, 94-186. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1961.
Eastman, Clyde. “Community Land Grants: The Legacy.” Social Science Journal 28:1,
1991.
Eastman, Clyde, Garrey Carruthers, and James A. Liefer. “Contrasting Attitudes Toward
Land in New Mexico.” New Mexico Business (March 1971): 3-20.
Ebright, Malcolm. “New Mexican Land Grants: The Legal Background” in Land, Water,
and Culture: New perspectives on Hispanic Land Grants, edited by Charles L. Briggs
and John R. Van Ness, 15-66. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Advocates for the Oppressed: Indians, Genizaros and their Spanish
Advocates in New Mexico, 1700-1786.” New Mexico Historical Review 71:4 (October
1996): 305-339.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Breaking New Ground: A Reappraisal of Governors Vélez Cachupín
and Mendinueta and Their Land Grant Policies.” Colonial Latin American Historical
Review 5:2 (spring 1996): 195-223.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Sharing the Shortages: Water Litigation and Regulation in Hispanic
New Mexico, 1600-1850.” New Mexico Historical Review 76:1 (January 2001): 3-45.
Ebright, Malcom. "The San Joaquin Grant: Who Owned the Common Lands? A
Historical-Legal Puzzle." New Mexico Historical Review 57:1 (January 1982): 5-26.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Cañada de Santa Clara Grant.” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories vol. 3.
Guadalupita, N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2006.
Ebright, Malcolm. “The Cundiyó Grant,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories, vol. 4.
Guadalupita, N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2006.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Francisco Montes Vigil Grant,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories, vol. 5,
Guadalupita, N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2006.

620

Ebright, Malcolm. “Juan Bautista Valdez,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories vol. 7,
Guadalupita, N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2006.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Juan José Lovato Grant,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories, vol. 8
Guadalupita, N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2006.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Ojo Caliente Grant,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories vol. 10
Guadalupita, N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2006.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Piedra Lumbre Grant,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories, vol. 11,
Guadalupita, N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2006.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Polvadera Grant,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories vol. 12,
Guadalupita, N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2006.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Pueblo Quemado Grant,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories vol. 13,
Guadalupita, N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2006.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Las Trampas Grant,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories, vol. 16,
Guadalupita, N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2006.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Truchas Grant,” Land Grant / Pueblo Histories, vol. 17, Guadalupita,
N.M.: Center for Land Grant Studies, 2006.
Ebright, Malcolm and Rick Hendricks. “The Pueblo League and Pueblo Land in New
Mexico, 1692-1846,” in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Archives: A Project of the Ysleta del Sur
Pueblo (Tigua Tribe of Texas) Tribal Council, 90-155. vol. 4. El Paso: Sundance Press,
2000-2001.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Ojo Caliente,” in Rio Arriba: A New Mexico County. edited by
Robert J. Tórrez and Robert Trapp. 333-348. Los Ranchos, NM: Rio Grande Books,
2010.
Ebright, Malcolm. “Kirby Benedict,” newmexicohistory.org, website of New Mexico
Office of the State Historian, accessed 10 October 2013.
http://newmexicohistory.org/people/kirby-benedict.
Ebright, Malcolm. “The Coyote Creek State Park: History of Title and History of
Guadalupita and Mora Land Grants,” submitted to the Commission for Public Records,
Contract #09-36099-008720, 2009.
Ebright, Malcolm and Richard Salazar. Hispanic Homesteaders on the Pajarito Plateau:
An Unconstitutional Taking of Property at Los Alamos, 1942-1945, August 10, 2007,
accessed online at http://lanl-the-rest-of-the-story.blogspot.com/2007/08/hispanichomesteaders-on-pajarito.html, July 2010.
621

Sandra A. Edelman, “San Ildefonso Pueblo” in Handbook of North American Indians,
Vol. 9, Southwest. edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 308-316. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian
Institution, 1979.
Sandra A. Edelman and Alfonso Ortiz, “Tesuque Pueblo,” in Handbook of North
American Indians, Vol. 9, Southwest. edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 330-335. Washington,
D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1979.
Ellis, Richard. “Nambé Pueblo,” unpublished manuscript, 1970.
Ellis, Richard. “Santa Clara Pueblo,” unpublished manuscript, 1970.
Eppinga, Jane. “Henry O. Flipper in the Court of Private Land Claims: The Arizona
Career of West Point's First Black Graduate.” Journal of Arizona History 36 (spring
1995): 33-54.
Esquibel, José Antonio. "Tupatú and Vargas Accords, 1692: Orchestrating Peace in a
Time of Uncertainty, 1692-1696." El Palacio, 111:1 (spring 2006): 16-18.
Flint, Richard and Shirley Cushing Flint. “Gaspar Castaño de Sosa.”
newmexicohistory.org, website of New Mexico Office of the State Historian, accessed 21
March 2014. http://newmexicohistory.org/people/gaspar-castano-de-sosa.
Flint, Richard and Shirley Cushing Flint. “Francisco Vázquez de Coronado,”
newmexicohistory.org, website of New Mexico Office of the State Historian, accessed 20
April 2014. http://newmexicohistory.org/people/francisco-vazquez-de-coronado.
Ford, Richard I., Albert H. Schroeder, and Stewart L. Peckham. “Three Perspectives on
Pueblo Prehistory,” in New Perspectives on the Pueblos, edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 19-39.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1972.
Forrest, Suzanne. “The Vallecitos sustained Yield Unit: The (all too) Human Dimension
of Forest Management in Northern New Mexico, 1945-1968” in Forests under Fire: A
Century of Ecosystem Mismanagement in the Southwest. edited by Charles J Haggard and
Arthur R. Gómez, 67-92. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2001.
Francis, E.K. “Multiple Intergroup Relations in the Upper Río Grande Region.”
American Sociological Review 21:1 (February 1956): 84-87.
Frost, Richard. “Aspects of Southern Tewa Land and Water Rights in the American
Period.” unpublished manuscript, August 24, 1979.
García, F. Chris. “Manitos and Chicanos in Nuevo México Politics.” Aztlán 5:1-2 (spring
and fall 1974): 177-188.

622

Garner, Van Hastings. "Seventeenth Century New Mexico, the Pueblo Revolt, and Its
Interpreters." in What Caused the Pueblo Revolt of 1680? edited by David J. Weber, 5580. New York: Bedford St. Martin’s Press, 1999.
Golten, Ryan. “Lobato v. Taylor: How the Villages of the Río Culebra, the Colorado
Supreme Court, and the Restatement of Servitudes Bailed Out the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo,” Natural Resources Journal 45(Spring 2005): 457-494.
Gómez, Placido J. “The History and Adjudication of the Common Lands of Spanish and
Mexican Land Grants” Natural Resources Journal 25:4 (October 1985): 1039-1080.
Gonzales, Phillip B. “Struggle for Survival: The Hispanic Land Grants of New Mexico,
1848-2001”Agricultural History 77:2, Minority Land and Community Security (spring
2003): 293-324.
Gonzales, Phillip B. “El Jefe: Bronson Cutting and the Politics of Hispano Interests in
New Mexico, 1920–1935.” Aztlán, 25:2 (fall 2000): 67-108.
Gonzales, Phillip B. “The Political Construction of Latino Nomenclatures in Twentieth
Century New Mexico.” Journal of the Southwest, 35:3 (summer 1993): 158-185.
Gonzales, Phillip B. “Whither the Nuevomexicanos: The Career of a Southwestern
Intellectual Discourse, 1907-2004.” The Social Science Journal, 43:2 (2006): 273-286.
Gonzales, Phillip B. “The Categorical Meaning of Spanish American Identity Among
Blue Collar New Mexicans.” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 19 (May 1997):
123-136.
Gonzales, Phillip B. “The Hispano Homeland Debate: New Lessons” Perspectives in
Mexican American Studies: Mexican Americans in the 1990s: Politics, Policies and
Perceptions Vol. 6 (1997): 123-141.
González, Nancie L. "Spanish-American activism." in New Mexico, Past and Present: A
Historical Reader, edited by Richard N. Ellis, 240-250. Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1971.
González, Nancie L. "Alianza Federal de Mercedes." in The Mexican Americans: An
Awakening Minority, edited by Manuel P. Servin, 202-212. Beverly Hills, CA: Glenco
Press, 1970.
Graybill, Andrew. “Strong on the Merits and Powerfully Symbolic’: The Return of Blue
Lake to Taos Pueblo.” New Mexico Historical Review 76:2 (April 2001): 125-160.
Grubbs, Frank H. “Frank Bond: Gentleman Sheepherder of Northern New Mexico 18831915,”New Mexico Historical Review 35:3 (July 1960): 169-198; 36:2 (April 1961): 138623

158; 36:3 (July 1961): 230-243; 36:4 (October 1961): 274-345; 37:1 (January 1962): 4371.
Gutiérrez, Ramón A. "Franciscans and the Pueblo Revolt," in What Caused the Pueblo
Revolt of 1680? edited by David J. Weber, 41-53. New York: Bedford St. Martin’s Press,
1999.
Hall, G. Emlen. “The Pueblo Land Grant Labyrinth” in Land, Water, and Culture: New
perspectives on Hispanic Land Grants, edited by Charles L. Briggs and John R. Van
Ness, 67-140. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987.
Hall, G. Emlen & David J. Weber. “Mexican Liberals and Pueblo Indians, 1821-1829”
New Mexico Historical Review 59:1 (January 1984): 5-32.
Hall, G. Emlen. “Land Litigation and the Idea of New Mexico Progress” in Spanish and
Mexican Land Grants and the Law. edited by Malcolm Ebright, 48-58. Manhattan, KS:
Sunflower University Press, 1989.
Hall, G. Emlen. “Giant Before the Surveyor-General: The Land Career of Donaciano
Vigil.” In Spanish & Mexican Land Grants in New Mexico and Colorado, edited by John
R. Van Ness and Christine M. Van Ness, 64-73. Manhattan, Kan.: Sunflower University
Press, 1980.
Hall, G. Emlen. “Juan Estevan Pino, “Se los coma”: New Mexico Land Speculation in
the 1820s” New Mexico Historical Review 57:1 (January 1982): 27-42.
Hall, G. Emlen. “San Miguel del Bado and the Loss of the Common Lands of New
Mexico Community Land Grants,” New Mexico Historical Review 66:4 (October 1991):
413-432.
Hamon, Peter F. "The Landholding System of Santa Cruz," University of Oklahoma
Papers in Anthropology 11:1, 21-40.
Headley, J.C. “Soil conservation and cooperative extension” Extension 59:2 (1985), 290306.
Hendricks, Rick. "Juan de Onate, Diego de Vargas, and Hispanic Beginnings in New
Mexico," in New Mexican Lives, edited by Richard W. Etulain, 45-77. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2002.
Historic Santa Fe Foundation. “The Carlos Vierra House: 1002 Old Pecos Trail,”
Bulletin, January 1979.
Jacobs, Margaret D. “Clara True and Female Moral Authority” in The Human Tradition
in the American West edited by Benson Tong and Regan A. Lutz, 99-116. Wilmington,
Del.: SR Books, 2002.
624

Jenkins, Myra Ellen. “Taos Pueblo and it Neighbors, 1540-1847.” New Mexico Historical
Review 41:2 (April 1966): 85-114.
Jenkins, Myra Ellen. “Spanish Land Grants in the Tewa Area.” New Mexico Historical
Review 47:2 (April 1972): 117-134.
Jenkins, Myra Ellen and John Baxter. “The Pueblo of San Ildefonso and Its Land, 15981900.” unpublished manuscript, undated.
Jenkins, Myra Ellen. and John Baxter. “Pueblo of Pojoaque, 1598-1900.” unpublished
manuscript, undated.
Jenkins, Myra Ellen. “The Pueblo of Santa Clara and Its Land, 1598-1900.” unpublished
manuscript, undated.
Knaut, Andrew L. “Acculturation and Miscegenation: The Changing Face of the Spanish
Presence in New Mexico,” in What Caused the Pueblo Revolt of 1680?, edited by David
J. Weber, 115-127. New York: Bedford/St. Martins, 1999.
Kelly, Lawrence C. “History of the Pueblo Lands Board, 1924-1933.” Santa Fe: Office of
the State Engineer, 1980.
Kelly, Lawrence C. “Anthropology and Anthropologists in the Indian New Deal.”
Journal on the History of Behavioral Sciences 16:1 (January 1980): 6-24.
Kelly, Lawrence C. “John Collier and the Pueblo Lands Board Act.” New Mexico
Historical Review 58:1 (January 1983): 5-34.
Kelly, Lawrence C. “Anthropology in the Soil Conservation Service.” Agricultural
History 59:2 (April 1985): 136-147.
Kelly, Lawrence C. “History of the Pueblo Lands Board, 1922-1933, with Special
Emphasis on Water Rights in the Northern Pueblos” Special Report to the New Mexico
Office of the State Engineer, in the case New Mexico v. Aamodt. Santa Fe: 1984.
Kessell, John L. “The Ways and the Words of the Other: Diego de Vargas and Cultural
Brokers in Late-Seventeenth-Century New Mexico.” in Between Indian and White
Worlds: The Cultural Broker, edited by Margaret Connell Szasz, 25-43. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2001.
Kessell, John L. “A Long Time Coming: The Seventeenth-Century Pueblo-Spanish
War.” New Mexico Historical Review 86:2 (Spring 2011): 141-156.

625

Kirkendall, Richard. “The New Deal and American Politics.” in Fifty Years Later: The
New Deal Evaluated, edited Harvard Sitkoff, 11-36. Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1985.
Klein, Christine A. “Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.” New Mexico Law Review 26 (Spring 1996): 201-255.
Knowlton, Clark S. "Guerrillas of Río Arriba: the New Mexican land war." Nation Vol.
206, no. 25 (June, 17, 1968), 792-796.
Knowlton, Clark S. “Changing Spanish American Villages of Northern New Mexico.”
Sociology and Social Research 53 (1969): 472.
Knowlton, Clark S. "Tijerina, hero of the militants." Journal of Mexican American
Studies 1:2 (Winter 1971): 91-96.
Knowlton, Clark S. "New Mexican land war." Pain and Promise: The Chicano Today,
edited by Edward Simmen, 258-270. New York: New American Library, 1972.
Knowlton, Clark S. "Causes of land loss among the Spanish Americans in Northern New
Mexico." In The Chicanos: Life and struggles of the Mexican minority in the United
States, edited by, Gilberto Lopez y Rivas, 111-121. New York: Monthly Review Press,
1973.
Knowlton, Clark S. “The Study of Land Grants as an Academic Discipline” Social
Science Journal 13:3 (October 1976): 3-7.
Kosek, Jake. “Deep Roots and Long Shadows: The Cultural Politics of Memory and
Longing in Northern New Mexico” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22,
(2004): 329-354.
Kryder, Leslie R. “The Trans-Basin Acequias of the Mora Valley, New Mexico,” (n.p.
2010). Accessed online at http://taosacequias.org/Documents/TheTransBasinAcequiasOfTheMoraValleyNewMexico_2010.pdf
Lambert, Marjorie F. “Pojoaque Pueblo” in Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 9,
Southwest. edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 324-329. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution,
1979.
Leff, Mark H., "Revisioning U.S. Political History" American Historical Review 100:3
(June 1995): 829-853.
Levine, Frances “Dividing the Water: The Impact of Water Rights Adjudication on New
Mexican Communities.” Journal of the Southwest 32:4 (autumn 1990): 268-277.

626

Libecap, Gary D. and George Alter. “Agricultural Productivity, Partible Inheritance, and
the Demographic Response to Rural Poverty: An Examination of the Spanish
Southwest.” Explorations in Economic History 19:2 (April 1982): 184-200.
Loomis, Charles P. “Wartime Migration from the Rural Spanish Speaking Villages of
New Mexico.” Rural Sociology 7, 1942: 384-395.
Markowitz, Harvey. “The Reformer, the Monsignor, and the Pueblos of New Mexico:
Catholic Missionary Responses to New Directions in Early-Twentieth-Century Indian
Policy.” New Mexico Historical Review 88:4 (fall 2013): 413-436.
Massman, Ann M. “Adelina ‘Nina’ Otero-Warren: A Spanish-American Cultural
Broker,” Journal of the Southwest 42:4 (winter 2000), 877-896.
Mathews-Lamb, Sandra K. "'Designing and Mischievous Individuals': The Cruzate
Grants and the Office of the Surveyor General." New Mexico Historical Review 71:4
(October 1996): 341-359.
Montgomery, Charles. “The Trap of Race and Memory: The Language of Spanish
Civility on the Upper Río Grande.” American Quarterly 52:3 (September 2000): 478513.
Montgomery, Charles. “Becoming Spanish American”: Race and Rhetoric in New
Mexico Politics, 1880-1928. Journal of American Ethnic History 20:4 (summer 2001):
59-84.
Montiel, Miguel., Tomás Atencio, E.A. Mares. Resolana: Emerging Chicano Dialogues
On Community and Globalization. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2009.
Montoya, María E. “The Roots of Economic and Ethnic Divisions in Northern New
Mexico: The Case of the Civilian Conservation Corps.” Western Historical Quarterly
26:1 (Spring, 1995): 15-34.
Moorhead, Max L. "The American invasion of 1846 as told by New Mexicans." New
Mexico Historical Review 26:1 (January 1951): 68-82.
Nabokov, Peter. "Chicano power in the feudal west." in Introduction to Chicano Studies:
A Reader, edited by Livie Isauro Duran and H. Russell Bernard, 207-214. New York:
Macmillan, 1982.
Norcini, Marilyn. “The Political Process of Factionalism and Self-Governance at Santa
Clara Pueblo, New Mexico.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 149:4
(December 2005): 544-590.
Nostrand, Richard L. “The Hispano Homeland in 1900.” Annals of the Association of
American Geographers 70:3 (September 1980): 382-396.
627

Nostrand, Richard L. “Hispano Cultural Distinctiveness: A Reply.” Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 74:1 (March 1984): 164-169.
Ortiz, Alfonso. “San Juan Pueblo” in Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 9,
Southwest. edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 278-295. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution,
1979.
Ortiz, Alfonso. quoted in “In Memory of Alfonso Ortiz,” http://indigenouspeople.net/,
(accessed 5 January 2015).
Peña, Devon G. “Los Animalitos: Culture, Ecology, and the Politics of Place in the Upper
Río Grande,” in Chicano Culture, Ecology, Politics: Subversive Kin, edited by Devon G.
Peña, 25-57. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999.
Peña, Devon G. and Rubén O. Martínez. “The Capitalist Tool, the Lawless and the
Violent: A Critique of Recent Southwestern Environmental History,” in Chicano Culture,
Ecology, Politics: Subversive Kin, edited by Devon G. Peña, 141-176. Tucson: University
of Arizona Press, 1999.
Peterson, Helen L. “American Indian Political Participation.” American Academy of
Political and Social Science 311:1 (May 1957): 116-121.
Philp, Kenneth. “Albert B. Fall and the Protest from the Pueblos, 1921-1923.” Journal of
the Southwest 12:3 (Autumn 1970): 237-254.
Pickens, William H. “Bronson Cutting vs. Dennis Chávez: The Battle of the Patrones in
New Mexico, 1934.” New Mexico Historical Review 46:1 (January 1971): 5-36.
Pulido, Laura. “Ecological Legitimacy and Cultural Essentialism: Hispano Grazing in
Northern New Mexico,” in Chicano Culture, Ecology, Politics: Subversive Kin, edited by
Devon G. Peña, 121-140. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999.
Quintana, Frances Leon. “Land, Water, and Pueblo-Hispanic relations in Northern New
Mexico.” Journal of the Southwest 32:3 (Autumn 1990): 288-299.
Rodríguez, Sylvia. “Land, Water, and ethnicity in Taos” in Land, Water, and Culture:
New perspectives on Hispanic Land Grants, edited by Charles L. Briggs and John R. Van
Ness, 313-403. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987.
Rodríguez, Sylvia. "Art, Tourism, and Race Relations in Taos: Toward a Sociology of the
Art Colony." Journal of Anthropological Research 45:1 (spring 1989): 77-99.
Rodríguez, Sylvia. “Subaltern Historiography on the Río Grande: On Gutierrez’s “When
Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away.” American Ethnologist 21:4 (November
1994): 892-899.
628

Rodríguez, Sylvia. “The Taos Pueblo Matachines: Ritual Symbolism and Interethnic
Relations.” American Ethnologist 18:2 (May 1991): 234-256.
Rodríguez, Sylvia. “Ethnic Reconstruction in Contemporary Taos.” Journal of the
Southwest 32:4 (winter 1990): 541-555.
Rodríguez, Sylvia. “The Hispano Homeland Debate Revisited” Perspectives in Mexican
American Studies: Community, Identity, and Education Vol. 3 (1992): 95-114.
Rollings, Willard H. “Indian Land and Water: The Pueblos of New Mexico (1848-1924)”
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 6:4 (1982): 1-21.
Naranjo, Orlando. “Juan Luís García and the Navajos.” Herencia: The Quarterly Journal
of the Hispanic Genealogical Research Center of New Mexico 16:1 (January 2008).
Rosen, Deborah A. “Pueblo Indians and Citizenship in Territorial New Mexico” New
Mexico Historical Review 78:1 (Winter 2003): 1-28.
Rosenbaum, Robert J. and Robert W. Larson, “Mexicano Resistance to the Expropriation
of Grant Lands in New Mexico” In Land, Water, and Culture: New perspectives on
Hispanic Land Grants, edited by Charles L. Briggs and John R. Van Ness, 269-312.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987.
Salas, Elizabeth. “Ethnicity, Gender and Divorce: Issues of the 1922 Campaign by
Adelina Otero-Warren for the U.S. House of Representatives.” New Mexico Historical
Review 70:4 (October 1995): 367-382.
Sando, Joe S. “Popé, the Pueblo Revolt, and Native Americans in Early New Mexico.” In
New Mexican Lives: Profiles and Historical Stories, edited by Richard W. Etulain, 19-44.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002.
Schiller, Mark. “The Loss of Las Trampas Common Lands.” La Jicarita (AugustSeptember 2004) accessed online at http://www.lajicarita.org/04augsep.htm, May 2010.
Schiller, Mark. “The Truchas Grant: Nuestra Señora del Rosario, San Fernando y
Santiago Grant.” review by Malcolm Ebright, Center for Land Grant Studies,
http://www.southwestbooks.org/truchas.htm, accessed September 2011.
Schroeder, Albert H. “Río Grande Ethnohistory.” In New Perspectives on the Pueblos,
edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 41-70. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975.
Schroeder, Albert H. “Shifting for Survival in the Spanish Southwest.” In New Spain’s
Northern Frontier: Essays on Spain in the American West, 1540-1821, edited by David J.
Weber, 237-255. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979.
629

Schroeder, Albert H. “Pueblos Abandoned in Historic Times.” in Handbook of North
American Indians, Vol. 9, Southwest, edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 250. Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution, 1979.
Schwartz, E. A. “Red Atlantis Revisited: Community and Culture in the Writings of John
Collier.” American Indian Quarterly 18:4 (autumn 1994): 507-531.
Shadow, Robert D. & Maria Rodríguez-Shadow. “From Repartición To Partition: A
History of the Mora Land Grant, 1835-1916.” New Mexico Historical Review 70:3 (July
1995): 257-298.
Shadow, Robert D. & Maria Rodríguez-Shadow. “Rancheros, Land, and Ethnicity on the
Borderlands: Works on Social and Agrarian History in the Last Decade.” Latin American
Research Review 32:1 (1997): 171-198.
Simmons, Marc, Fray Angelico Chavez, D. W. Meinig, Thomas D. Hall, “Rejoinders
(Hispano Cultural Distinctiveness: A Reply).” Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 74:1 (March 1984): 169-171.
Smith, Jason Scott. "A Reintroduction to Political Economy: History, Institutions, and
Power." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 36:1 (Summer 2005): 63-71.
Smith, Jason Scott. “The New Deal Order.” Enterprise and Society 9:3 (September
2008): 532-534.
Speirs, Randall H. “Nambe Pueblo.” In Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 9,
Southwest. edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 317-323. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution,
1979.
Stanislawski, Michael B. "Hopi-Tewa." In Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 9,
Southwest. edited by Alfonso Ortiz, 587-602. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution,
1979.
Stratton, David H. "New Mexico Machiavellian? The Story of Albert B. Fall." Montana 7
(1957): 2–14.
Swentzell, Rina. “Conflicting Landscape Values: The Santa Clara Pueblo and Day
School.” In Understanding Ordinary Landscapes. Edited by Paul Groth and Todd W.
Bressi, 56-66. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
Sze, Corrine. “Harry H. Dorman House,” Bulletin of the Historic Santa Fe Foundation.
28:1 (November 2001): 1-21.
Thompson, Mark B. “William H. Pope,” newmexicohistory.org, website of New Mexico
Office of the State Historian,
http://www.newmexicohistory.org/filedetails.php?fileID=23332 (accessed 11 July 2013).
630

Trujillo, Michael L. “Oñate's Foot: Remembering and Dismembering in Northern New
Mexico” Aztlán 33:2 (Fall 2008): 91-119.
Trujillo, Patricia. “Rescuing Amado Chaves from the Footnotes of History,”
newmexicohistory.org, website of New Mexico Office of the State Historian,
http://newmexicohistory.org/people/rescuing-amado-chaves-from-the-footnotes-ofhistory (accessed 18 December 2014).
Tyler, Daniel. “Ejido lands in New Mexico.” In Spanish and Mexican Land Grants and
the Law, edited by Malcolm Ebright, 24-35. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press,
1989.
Valencia-Weber, Glora. “Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Twenty-five Years of
Disparate Cultural Visions: An Essay Introducing the Case for Re-argument Before the
American Indian Nations Supreme Court.” Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 14
(fall 2004): 49-66.
Van Ness, John R. “Hispanic Land Grants: Ecology and Subsistence in the Uplands of
Northern New Mexico and Southern Colorado” In Land, Water, and Culture: New
perspectives on Hispanic Land Grants, edited by Charles L. Briggs and John R. Van
Ness, 141-214. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987.
Vlasich, James A. “Transitions in Pueblo Agriculture, 1938-1948.” New Mexico
Historical Review 55:1 (January 1980): 25-46.
Walter, Paul A. F. “Octaviano Ambrosio Larrazolo.” New Mexico Historical Review 7:2
(April 1932): 97-103.
Warner, Louis H. “Conveyance of Property, the Spanish and Mexican Way.” New
Mexico Historical Review 6:4 (October 1931): 334-359.
Warner, Louis H. “Wills and Hijuelas.” New Mexico Historical Review 7:1 (January
1932): 75-89.
Wenger, Tisa. “Land, Culture, and Sovereignty in the Pueblo Dance Controversy.”
Journal of the Southwest 16:2 (Fall 2004): 381-412.
Westphall, Victor. “Fraud and Implications of Fraud in the Land Grants of New Mexico.”
New Mexico Historical Review 49:3 (July 1974): 189-218.
Peter M. Whiteley, "Reconnoitering ‘Pueblo’ Ethnicity: The 1852 Tesuque Delegation to
Washington." Journal of the Southwest 45:3 (autumn 2003): 437-518.

631

William Whitman, "The San Ildefonso of New Mexico." in Acculturation in Seven
American Indian Tribes, edited by Ralph Linton, 390-462. New York: D. Appleton
Century, 1940.
Wilmsen, Carl. "Maintaining the Environmental-Racial order in Northern New Mexico"
Environment and Planning D-Society & Space 25:2 (2007): 236-257.
Wroth, William H. “1841 Texas-Santa Fe Expedition,” newmexicohistory.org, website of
New Mexico Office of the State Historian, http://newmexicohistory.org/events/1841texan-santa-fe-expedition, accessed 11 October 2014.
Wroth, William H. “Charles Bent, Biographical Sketch,” newmexicohistory.org, website
of New Mexico Office of the State Historian, http://newmexicohistory.org/people/charlesbent-bio, accessed 15 October 2014.
SECONDARY SOURCES: Dissertations and Theses
Apodaca, Anacleto G. “The Hispano Farmers’ Conception of the Federal Agricultural
Services in the Tewa Basin of New Mexico.” Ph.D. dissertation. Cornell University,
1951.
Apodaca, Anacleto G. “Major Difficulties Encountered by County Extension Agents in
Reaching Spanish-Speaking People in New Mexico.” Master’s thesis. George
Washington University, 1949.
Avery, Doris S. “Into the Den of Evils: The Genízaros of Colonial New Mexico.”
Master’s thesis. University of Montana, 2008.
Briggs, Charles. “‘Our Strength is the Land’: The Structure of Hierarchy and Equality
and the Pragmatics of Discourse in Hispano (‘Spanish American’) ‘Talk about the Past.’”
Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago, 1981.
Bowden, J.J. “Private Land Claims in the Southwest.” Masters of Laws Thesis. Southern
Methodist University, 1969.
Bustamante, Adrian Herminio. “Los Hispanos: Ethnicity and Social Change in New
Mexico.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of New Mexico, 1982.
Córdova, Gilberto Benito. “Missionization and Hispanicization of Santo Thomas Apostol
de Abiquiú, 1750-1770.” Ph.D dissertation. University of New Mexico, 1979.
Díaz, Rosemary T. “El Senador, Dennis Chávez: New Mexico native son, American
senior statesman, 1888-1962.” Ph.D. dissertation. Arizona State University, 2006.
Durán, Tobías. “We come as Friends: Violent Social Conflict in New Mexico, 18101910.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of New Mexico, 1985.
632

Ellis, Richard Stewart. “Santa Cruz: Authority and Community Response in the History
of a New Mexico Town.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 1980.
Encinias, Marío Joaquin. “Irateo: World Destruction in the Life and Legacy of Reies
López Tijerina.” Master’s thesis. University of New Mexico, 2002.
Ferris, Kathlene F. “Sophie D. Aberle and the United Pueblos Agency, 1935-1944.”
Master’s thesis. University of New Mexico, 1997)
Gonzales, Angela. “American Indian Identity Matters: The Political Economy of Identity
and Ethnic Group Boundaries.” Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 2001.
Markwell, Samuel. “Unsettling Accounts: Life, Debt, and Development in the Middle
Rio Grande.” Master’s thesis. University of New Mexico, 2014.
Martínez, Matthew J. “Double Take: Tourism and Photography Endeavors among the
Northern Pueblos of the Rio Grande.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of Minnesota, 2008.
Moorman, Donald R. “A Political Biography of Holm O. Bursum, 1899-1924” Ph.D.
dissertation. University of New Mexico, 1962.
Orona, Kenneth M. “River of Culture, River of Power: Identity, Modernism, and Contest
in the Middle Rio Grande Valley, 1848-1947.” Ph.D. dissertation. Yale University, 1998.
Pickens, William Hickman. “The New Deal in New Mexico: Changes in State
Government and Politics, 1926-1938.” Master’s thesis, University of New Mexico, 1971.
Rael-Gálvez, Estevan. “Identifying Captivity and Capturing Identity: Narratives of
American Indian Slavery, Colorado and New Mexico, 1776-1934.” Ph.D. dissertation.
University of Michigan, 2002.
Reichard, David A. “‘Justice is God's law’: The Struggle to Control Social Conflict and
U.S. colonization of New Mexico, 1846-1912.” Ph.D. dissertation. Temple University,
1996.
Suina, Kimberly M. “Journeys to Other Places: Pueblo Tourism in New Mexico, 1880s1920s.” Master’s thesis, University of New Mexico, 2005.
Trujillo, Dennis Peter. “The Commodification of Hispano Culture in New Mexico:
Tourism, Mary Austin, and the Spanish Colonial Arts Society.” Ph.D. dissertation.
University of New Mexico, 2003.
Turo, Bryan W. “An Empire of Dust: Thomas B. Catron and the Age of Capital in the
Hispano Borderlands, 1868-1921.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of New Mexico, 2015.
633

Vigil, Christopher. “Representative Dennis Chávez and Water, 1922-1933.” Master’s
thesis. University of New Mexico, 2005.
Walden, Robin S. “The Pueblo Confederation’s Political Wing: The All Indian Pueblo
Council, 1920-1975.” Master’s thesis. University of New Mexico, 2011.
Witt, Shirley Hill. “Migration into San Juan Pueblo, 1726-1968.” Ph.D. dissertation,
University of New Mexico, 1969.
OTHER MEDIA
Cleofes Jaramillo, "Himno del Pueblo de las Montañas de la Sangre de Cristo," in Music
of New Mexico: Hispanic Traditions, © 1992 by Smithsonian Folkways Recordings,
SFW40409_121, compact disc.
Shadow of the Reconquest - Culture Shocks, blog, http://rockstoroads.blogspot.com/,
(accessed 21 July 2014).
Great New Mexico Pedigree Database, Hispanic Genealogical Research Center of New
Mexico, http://www.hgrc-nm.org
Website of New Mexico Office of the State Historian, newmexicohistory.org.
Canes of Power, Silver Bullet Productions, Santa Fe, NM, 2012.
“One Land, Many Hands: The Story of the Sangre de Cristo Land Grant,”
newmexicohistory.org, website of New Mexico Office of the State Historian,
http://www.newmexicohistory.org/landgrants/sangre_de_cristo/english/home.html
(accessed 12 December 2014).
Historic Albuquerque, Inc., “Albuquerque Indian School,”
http://www.historicabq.org/albuquerque-indian-school.html (accessed 2/21/2015).

634

